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List of abbreviations and organisations
CIRCA: See Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army.
Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army: Clown group originating in Britain
that has inspired many activist groups.
The Chaser team: Australian comedy team, responsible for the APEC stunt in
Sydney in 2007 among many other things.
FMK: Folkereisning Mot Krig, Norwegian pacifist peace organisation originating in
1937.
FMV: Försvarets materielverk (Swedish Defence Materiel Administration), operates
NEAT/Vidsel Test Range.
John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club: Australian group originating in 2004 to
challenge Australia’s conservative prime minister from 1996 to 2007, John Howard.
Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt: (The Campaign Against Conscription) Scandinavian
network originating in 1981, primarily concerned with the conditions of total
resisters.
KMV: See Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt.
Netwerk Vlaanderen: Belgian network concerned with responsible banking.
Organised the ACE bank stunt and the demining action against AXA bank.
NEAT: See Vidsel Test Range.
Ofog: Swedish anti-militarist network originating in 2002. The name roughly
translates into “mischief”.
Orange Alternative: Polish organisation active in the 1980’s, among many
happenings responsible for bringing elves to life on Children’s day in 1987.
Otpor: Serbian network originating in 1998, responsible for the Dinar za Smenu
action among many other stunts.
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S.I.N: Samvittighetsfanger I Norge (Prisoners of Conscience in Norway). Loose
network that cooperated with Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt.
Solvognen: Danish experimental theatre group which organised the Santa action
in Copenhagen 1974.
Studio Total: Swedish PR company which organised the dropping of teddy bears
over Belarus in 2012.
Vidsel Test Range: Europe’s largest overland military test site, located in the north
of Sweden. Administered by the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV).
Formerly known as NEAT, North European Aerospace Test range.
Voina: Russian art collective, responsible for painting a giant penis on Liteiny
Bridge in St. Petersburg in 2010.
Yes Men: US activist group specialising in “identity correction” and responsible for
impersonating representatives of Dow Chemicals and the World Trade
Organisation among many other stunts.

Note on translations
All translations of quotes, article titles, concepts etc. originally appearing in Danish,
Swedish and Norwegian are done by me.
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Abstract
Humour and seriousness are frequently posed as opposites both in academia and
everyday language. However, some nonviolent actions are both humorous and
serious and living proof that the dichotomy misses an important type of humour.
These humorous political stunts publicly challenge dominant discourses and
powerful institutions and people in five distinct ways. 1. Supportive stunts are
framed as ostensible attempts to help, celebrate and protect from harm. 2.
Corrective stunts present an alternative version of dominant discourses by
hijacking the identity or message of people, companies and institutions. 3. Naïve
stunts disguise their critique behind a pretended innocence, and 4. absurd stunts
defy all claims to truth and rationality. In 5. provocative stunts the pranksters
transcend power by appearing not to care about the consequences of infuriating
the powerful. The particular dynamics of these five strategies are explored through
15 short examples covering everything from struggles against neo-liberalism and
controversial bank investments to dictatorships. A theatre metaphor further
illustrates how humorous political stunts can be analysed.
The nuances about relations of power and humour uncovered by this typology
illustrate why it is inadequate to discuss whether humour should be considered
subversive or a vent for frustration as has been debated within humour studies for
decades. Instead the interesting question is what role humour can play in
facilitating resistance, since political humour is so diverse and takes place in such
different contexts that it is misleading to evaluate its impact as if it is all the same.
Two in-depth case studies are the basis for the further exploration of humour and
nonviolent action. Inspired by participatory action research methodology, the study
has utilised archival material, media reports, interviews, workshops, and participant
observation to document and analyse the use of humour by the groups Ofog and
KMV.
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Ofog is a Swedish anti-militarist network working on issues related to the arms
industry, military recruitment and military test sites. Ofog activists have found the
use of humour to be a positive way to reach out to media, passers-by and potential
new activists. Even more important is humorous political stunts’ contribution to the
discursive guerrilla war waged by activists. Power does not just manifest itself in
brutal repression and exploitation, but also in dominant discourses about what is
true, right and just. In this struggle, humorous incongruity can deconstruct patterns
of domination through the use of exposure, exaggeration, parody and irony among
many other techniques.
Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt, KMV, was a Scandinavian campaign against
conscription active in the 1980s. Here the focus is the work for improving the
conditions for Norwegian total resisters who refused both military and alternative
service. KMV pursued different strategies in its work, one of which was to create a
spectacle around court hearings and imprisonments, including several humorous
political stunts. Together with the legal work of filing charges against the state for
violation of their human rights, KMV’s spectacular actions were crucial in changing
the law on conscientious objection.
The phenomenon of humorous political stunts is discussed in relation to
Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action and its four dimensions. Just like other
nonviolent actions, some stunts are strong in one dimension while others mainly
work in another. Almost all the stunts temporarily contribute to breaking power and
many also include a dialogue facilitation element. The absurd and naïve stunts
have demonstrated a particular ability to be part of utopian enactment and
normative regulation, since Santas, clowns and similar figures speak to people’s
imagination and hopes for a more just and peaceful world.
Analysing humorous political stunts can give both academics and activists insights
into what type of stunt is most likely to emphasise a certain aspect of a humorous
nonviolent action in relation to various audiences. It will also bring a deeper
understanding of the nature and dynamics of power, resistance and humour.
18
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Introduction
What happens when nonviolent political activists use humour to challenge those
they consider more powerful than themselves? What does it mean to the activists,
and what types of responses do the use of humour generate from opponents,
media, police, bystanders and other activists?
These questions first started to interest me in 2003 when a Serbian activist told me
about his experience with using humour to oppose the rule of the Serbian dictator
Slobodan Milošević. According to the young man who had been active in a group
called Otpor, humour had been an effective way to make Otpor different from other
opposition groups and attract new young activists. Humour also lowered levels of
fear and created situations it was difficult for the regime to find an adequate
response to.
My primary focus is how subordinate and marginalised political groups use humour
to expose, ridicule and influence those they consider more powerful than
themselves, both in dictatorships and in democracies. It is explorative research that
raises more questions than it answers.
There is an inherent contradiction in trying to use the rational mode of
communication to analyse expressions made in the humorous mode. In the
discourse of science and research ambiguity is usually treated as an undesired
anomaly, but in the humorous political stunts which are my main unit of analysis,
the ambiguities are a necessity. In addition, humour is fragile and loses much of its
edge and special flavour as soon as one starts to analyse it and tear it apart.
Anyone who has ever tried to explain a joke will know what I mean.
When I have mentioned the theme of this thesis, I have been met with two types of
reactions. So called “ordinary people” and political activists have generally reacted
with enthusiasm and believed political humour to be a useful tool. I have enjoyed
the privilege that my research area turned out to be a good topic for dinner
conversations, including with people I met for the first time. Most of these “ordinary
22

people” share the view that is prevalent in many societies – that humour is
something positive and valuable in human interaction. They have no doubt that
humour can have an effect on politics and rarely question the more troublesome
sides of humour. However, in the literature on humour, it has for decades been a
persistent claim that humour cannot “really” have an impact on relations of power,
and that it is “just” a way of letting off steam. This discrepancy between an
everyday understanding and part of the scholarly work on humour indicates that
here is an interesting research question that deserves more attention. In addition,
such different views are not just interesting from a theoretical point of view, but can
have implications for the decisions activists struggling for a better world make
about which methods to use.
The data I have relied on indicate that the positions of unbridled optimism and
strong scepticism are both inadequate, and that the reality of real world activism is
complex. It is not straightforward to use humour in order to achieve political change
and it can be extremely difficult to convey the message that activists want to send
to the intended audiences. The sceptic’s idea that humour cannot really change
anything might look simple, but begs a whole set of questions about what “real
change” is, and how one is to know when it has happened. It assumes the
existence of a neutral position from which to judge an outcome. This idea about
“real change” usually also implies a comparison with other types of political dissent,
which the sceptic considers more genuine. What this ideal type of resistance ought
to look like is not clear to me, so I do not know if by “real resistance” they mean
conventional, rational protest or a violent struggle. The only thing that is obvious is
that dichotomous views on power and resistance cannot accommodate the
complexities needed to understand what happens when marginalised political
activists use humour within campaigns of nonviolent resistance.

Thesis outline and guiding questions
I have approached the theme of humour, political activism and relations of power
from various angles and with a range of different methods. I consider it quite naïve
23

to expect humour alone to be able to dismantle powerful institutions and
discourses, so the question is not whether humour can change relations of power.
Instead, the question that has guided my research has been:
What role can humour play in facilitating resistance to dominant discourses
and powerful institutions and people?
In order to approach this question, it was logical to start with investigating:
1. What does existing research on nonviolence, power, humour and political
protest say about the role of humour in resistance to dominant discourses
and powerful institutions and people?
This is the subject of chapter 1, which begins by outlining theories of nonviolence,
identifying the two different but overlapping traditions of principled and pragmatic
approaches to nonviolence. It continues with an introduction to societal theories on
humour, and in particular the humour that is used to express protest and dissent.
Central concepts such as power, resistance, nonviolence and humour are defined
here.
Chapter 2 explains how the examples and cases in Chapter 3-6 were selected and
how the research strategy was designed. The methods of semi-structured
interviewing, participant observation and document analysis that I have used are
also explained. The chapter places the thesis within an emancipatory approach to
research, taking its point of departure in standpoint theory and participatory action
research oriented strategies.
Chapter 3 introduces the phenomenon of humorous political stunts, a concept I
have developed to distinguish public humorous performances that challenge
relations of power from other types of political humour. Taking all the findings from
existing research on nonviolence, power, humour and political protest into
consideration requires one to abandon thinking that implies that humour is “one
thing” and instead take its complexities into account and ask:
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2. What different types of humorous political stunts exist?
In chapter 3, 15 examples of humorous political stunts serve to show the diversity
of the phenomenon and develop an original typology of five different types of stunts
called supportive, corrective, naïve, absurd and provocative. The defining
characteristic of this contribution is the way the stunt relates to the truths and
rationalities upheld by people in positions of power.
In order to explore the phenomenon of humorous political stunts in more detail, I
have been guided by another two questions:
3. What role can humorous political stunts play in facilitating outreach,
mobilisation, and a culture of resistance?

4. What does the use of humour mean to those who perform humorous
political stunts?
These questions are primarily addressed in the two case studies in chapter 4-6.
Chapter 4 is about clowning, one particular version of the absurd stunt that a
number of activists have used. The chapter is based on interviews with people
from the anti-militarist network Ofog in Sweden and the findings suggest that
clowning opens up space and communicates nonviolent values.
Chapter 5 is an in-depth case study of how Ofog uses and perceives outward
directed humour. It is based on 2½ years of research inspired by participatory
action research methodology that I did together with the network. Experiences from
a number of humorous political stunts confronting military recruitment, military test
sites and arms production are discussed in relation to the model presented in
Chapter 3. The chapter also discusses ethical aspects of using humour.
Chapter 6 is an historical case study of the Scandinavian Kampanjen Mot
Verneplikt (KMV), which means “Campaign Against Conscription”. Throughout the
25

1980s the group challenged militarism by refusing both military and substitute
service, when a growing number of young men chose to become so-called total
resisters. In Norway the consequence of total resistance was 16 months in prison.
One of the campaign’s strategies was to use spectacular and sometimes
humorous actions in order to challenge this law. The chapter traces how humorous
and non-humorous elements in the campaign complemented each other and finally
resulted in a law change in 1990. Since humour was only one factor among several
others, humour is not the only focus in this chapter. I also investigate in detail the
legal work KMV did and the particular circumstances surrounding the law change.
For the two case studies on Ofog and KMV I have chosen to make a thorough
documentation of the humour used by the two groups. Not all the details are
necessary in order to present my arguments about humorous political stunts but I
consider it important to contribute to documenting their experiences, since these
two groups have not had any part of their history written elsewhere.
Chapter 7 both addresses the overall question of what role humour can play in
facilitating resistance to dominant discourses and powerful institutions and people,
and one specific question related to this:
5. How do the different forms of humorous political stunts affect the logic of a
nonviolent action?
This question is approached by identifying how the five types of humorous political
stunts relate to the four dimensions of nonviolence called dialogue facilitation,
power breaking, utopian enactment and normative regulations. The existing data
show that the humorous political stunt has its strength in its possibility to break
monopolies of power, for instance when it contributes to what I call the discursive
guerrilla war about who is to define what is true, right and just. In certain cases
humorous political stunts can also contribute to dialogue and serve as an utopian
enactment and regulate norms.
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Dreaming about a better world
Some humorous political stunts appeal to reason and logic after having taken a
detour, but many appeal more to emotions and the multiple meanings and truths
that exist simultaneously in the world. Stephen Duncombe in his book Dream calls
for progressives to make more use of imagination and speak to people’s fantasies
when they do politics.1 Humorous political stunts are one answer to this.
Duncombe argues that Enlightenment was once a progressive dream, but in
democracies progressives now need bigger dreams that can speak to people’s
longing for drama and spectacle if they want to seriously challenge the dominant
world order. Appealing to reason, logic, restraint and moderation the way many
social movements working on issues like climate change and global justice do
today is doomed to fail. Duncombe writes that “truth and power belong to those
who tell the better story”.2 His book illustrates vividly how desires and dreams are
manufactured and constructed, not a self-evident constant that can be taken for
granted.
Duncombe does not consider himself a postmodern provocateur claiming there is
no truth. On the contrary he is very firmly grounded in the reality of an unjust world
order that causes early death and suffering for many. However, it does not matter
that this is the truth, and that that this truth is available for people to know, if they
don’t care or don’t want to believe it. The consequence is that if progressives want
to reach the hearts and minds of people, truth and reason are not enough: they
need to speak to the imagination as well. Duncombe suggests looking to places
like Las Vegas and popular video games and analysing what is so attractive about
them. What type of desires do they promise to fulfil, and what spectacles can
progressives offer instead that appeal to the same desires? Duncombe is very
critical of the dreams sold in Las Vegas and violent video games, but suggests that
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progressives have to let go of their fear of the spectacle and find ways to make
their own participatory spectacles that can make people dream. Duncombe almost
echoes peace researcher Elise Boulding in her book Cultures of Peace3 when he
suggests that “without dreams we will never be able to imagine the new world we
want to build.”4 With stories of the Reclaim the Street movement and Billionaires
for Bush, stunts and carnival within the same tradition as the humorous political
stunts presented here, he also points towards a possibility, a potential for these
types of stunts to become bigger. What they offer, like Las Vegas and video
games, is a possibility to participate, to be active, to be involved. And as
Duncombe finishes his introduction: “To embrace dreams as part of a winning
strategy for progressive politics may be just a dream itself, but really, at this point,
what do we have to lose?”5
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Chapter 1: Nonviolence, humour and relations of
power
Introduction
Two different academic traditions are brought together to provide the background
for this thesis. Within peace studies, nonviolence is a field which investigates
alternatives to violence in the struggle for social change. To illustrate the dynamics
of nonviolent struggle I present two very different approaches. Mohandas K.
Gandhi, leader of the Indian struggle against the British colonial power, personifies
the idea of nonviolence as a way of life, an idea nonviolent scholar Gene Sharp
argues against. His academic writing concentrates on explaining nonviolence as a
technique which is available as an effective tool for everyone and where moral
principles are irrelevant. The introduction to literature on nonviolence is concluded
with the theory of Stellan Vinthagen which combines ideas from Gandhi and Sharp
with modern sociology to provide new insights on nonviolent resistance.
The other academic tradition relevant to discussing humour as a method of
challenging power relations is humour studies. This is also a multidisciplinary field
that has caught the interest of psychologists, sociologists and a number of other
disciplines. I primarily focus on the social aspects of humour. After a brief
introduction to the various ways of understanding humour’s role in society and the
sociology of humour developed in the incongruity tradition, I suggest that part of
the traditional definition of humour is problematic when it comes to political
humour, since it treats the humorous and the serious as opposites.
The major part of the literature review in this chapter focuses on the research done
on humour, protest and social conflicts. It covers a wide range of approaches
including traditional folly and humour used against occupations and employers.
Along the way I evaluate and comment on a number of the works presented.
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Literature on nonviolence
Nonviolent resistance to injustice has been carried out for centuries without any
academic analysis. Literature on the subject is a combination of practitioners’ own
descriptions of what they have done and others’ descriptions and analysis.
Recently it has become part of the academic discipline of peace studies. Much
literature on the subject consists of case descriptions of particular struggles
combined with some theory or strategic discussion, like Nonviolent Social
Movements: a Geographical Perspective edited by Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz,
and Sarah Beth Asher,6 Unarmed against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe,
1939-1943 by Jacques Semelin,7A Force More Powerful by Peter Ackerman and
Jack Duvall,8 Strategic Nonviolent Conflict by Peter Ackerman and Christopher
Kruegler,9 Waging Nonviolent Struggle by Gene Sharp with Joshua Paulson,10 and
Sharon E. Nepstad’s Nonviolent revolutions.11 Sometimes other terms are used for
the same or very similar phenomena, such as “people power”, or “civil resistance”
in People Power edited by Howard Clark12 and Civil Resistance and Power Politics
edited by Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash.13 In his book Unarmed
Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies Kurt Schock

6

Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, Nonviolent Social Movements: A
Geographical Perspective (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999).
7
Jacques Semelin, Unarmed against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe, 1939-1943. (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1993).
8
Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
9
Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People
Power in the Twentieth Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).
10
Gene Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 20th Century Practice and 21th Century Potential
(Boston: Porter Sargent, 2005).
11
Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
12
Howard Clark, ed. People Power: Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity (London: Pluto
Press, 2009). See also April Carter, People Power and Political Change: Key Issues and Concepts
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012).
13
Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, eds., Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The
Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009).

30

combines nonviolent theory with social movement theory.14 In a recent study, Erica
Chenoweth and Maria Stephan have convincingly shown how nonviolent
campaigning is more effective than armed struggle in achieving its goals.15 They
have compared 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns between 1900 and 2006,
and found that nonviolent campaigns were “nearly twice as likely to achieve full or
partial success as their violent counterparts”.16 They have deliberately looked
specifically at three types of resistance where “common sense” says that violence
will be more effective than nonviolence – anti-regime, anti-occupation and
secession. Nevertheless, even in these hard cases, nonviolent campaigns are
more likely to achieve their goals. Chenoweth and Stephan’s main explanations for
the relative success of nonviolent resistance are that it generally is more
participatory than violent insurrections, and therefore better can build broad
movements where everyone can participate. Nonviolence also increases the
chance that security forces will defect.
The Indian independence movement and the US civil rights movement are two of
the most documented and analysed nonviolent struggles, but numerous other
examples of campaigns and actions all around the world exist. For a while, various
terms such as “civil defence”, “social defence” and “civilian based defence” were
used to describe defence against invasion and occupation where nonviolence
played a major role.

Defining violence and nonviolence
Many definitions of violence exist, I find the definition developed by peace
researcher Johan Galtung useful. He distinguishes between direct, structural and
cultural violence. Direct violence is the intentional harm or threat of harm of other
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human beings. This can be killings or other physical attacks. When I use the term
violence alone, this is the type of violence I refer to. Structural violence is when an
unjust system harms people, for instance if they die early because of lack of food,
clean water, and sanitation. Frequently I will refer to structural violence as
injustice.17 Cultural violence is the belief systems which make it possible to uphold
the unjust structures or legitimise direct and structural violence.18
When it comes to nonviolence I find Stellan Vinthagen’s definition useful. He
defines a nonviolent action as an attempt to overcome violence and repression
without using any violence yourself.19 This definition has two aspects, which he
calls against-violence and without-violence. To take action without using violence
(without-violence) does not by itself make it nonviolence. People can sit outside
their parliament and enjoy the sun. That is an everyday event that has nothing to
do with nonviolence even if it happens without violence. But if they sit there and
make it visible that this is a protest against the government’s use of violence, for
example the wars it is waging, then it is a nonviolent action. They do it without
using violence, in order to confront someone else’s violence (against-violence).
Nonviolent actions can take many different forms; some well-known examples are
strikes, boycotts and acts of civil disobedience. Nonviolent actions have been used
in struggles as diverse as anti-militarism, civil rights and environmental protection
as well as against dictatorships and foreign occupations. Although some authors
consider the two terms nonviolence and nonviolent action to imply a different
ideological or philosophical approach20, I use all the forms of the word nonviolence
interchangeably.
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Many misunderstandings of what nonviolent action is exist.21 For one thing, it is a
common mistake to associate nonviolence with passivity and avoidance of conflict.
But with Vinthagen’s definition, nonviolent action is about confronting various forms
of violence. Frequently nonviolent methods are used to escalate conflicts in order
to make violence and repression visible to others and force them to take a stand.
Martin Luther King Jr., the leader of the civil rights movement in the United States,
wrote in his famous ”Letter from a Birmingham jail” as a response to his critiques:
… You may well ask, “Why direct action? Why sit-ins, marches and
so forth? Isn’t negotiation a better path? You are quite right in
calling for negotiation. Indeed, this is the very purpose of direct
action. Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and
foster such a tension that a community which has constantly
refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to
dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored. My citing the
creation of tension as part of the work on the nonviolent-resister
may sound rather shocking. But I confess that I am not afraid of
the word “tension”. I have earnestly opposed violent tension, but
there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is
necessary for growth.22
For some people it sounds like a contradiction to work for a nonviolent world by
escalating conflict. But the confusion only happens when one confuses conflict with
violence.
Another common misunderstanding about nonviolent action is to think that no one
gets hurt or dies in a nonviolent struggle. However, nonviolence only means that at
least one side refrains from using violence, and it is not a requirement that other
sides do the same. Many people have been killed and hurt during nonviolent
struggles for social change.
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Gandhi: Nonviolence as a way of life
Nonviolence can be divided into two main categories – those who treat it as a
technique in a struggle for change, sometimes referred to as pragmatic
nonviolence, and those who consider it a lifestyle involving one’s whole life, called
principled nonviolence.23 However, this should be understood as a spectrum with
two opposite poles rather than distinct categories. The divide is artificial and many
writers and practitioners do not fit neatly into one end of the spectrum.
Nevertheless it is a useful analytical distinction for presenting the whole spectrum
of thinking on nonviolence based on the Weberian ideal types. In the next section,
the theories of scholar Gene Sharp will introduce the idea of nonviolence as a
technique. Regarding nonviolence as a way of life, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi
will show the way. More than anyone else, he made the concept of nonviolent
struggle for change available to the world when he led the struggle for an
independent India against the British colonial power, and he personifies the idea of
nonviolence as a way of life.
Gandhi, often referred to as Mahatma Gandhi, (an honorary title he himself did not
approve of) wrote extensively about nonviolence in the form of letters and
articles.24 He did not himself write a coherent theoretical framework of nonviolent
action, but wrote throughout his life about what he called his “experiments with
truth.”25 By studying how he practiced his method and the texts he wrote, many
scholars have systematised his ideas. The most systematic attempt of developing
a coherent norm system was done in Norwegian by Johan Galtung and Arne
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Næss.26 The amount of literature on Gandhi is enormous, and still growing.27 In
this short introduction I will rely on the way Vinthagen has described Gandhi’s
practical philosophy.28 This is a thorough work based on his study of Gandhi’s own
writings and more than enough to cover the core ideas necessary here.

Illustration 1. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Drawing by Siri Mette
Henriksen
Gandhi was a very religious person, and in order to understand his whole
philosophy, one also has to consider his spiritual sides and the meaning he
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attached to them. However, it is possible to understand his practical use of
nonviolence and the logic in the method without dwelling on his religious writing.
Since I am concerned with the role of humour within the practical application of
nonviolent action, I will only describe the minimum which is required to understand
nonviolence as a way of life.
The central concept in Gandhi’s writing is satyagraha which is often taken to mean
nonviolent struggle. However, his ideas about nonviolent struggle reach much
further than what many other writers mean when they use this term, which is the
reason I will use satyagraha when referring specifically to Gandhi’s philosophy.
Satyagraha comes from Sanskrit and loosely translates as soul force or truth force.
For Gandhi, satyagraha consist of three parts: 1. Truth (satya), 2.nonviolence
(ahimsa) and 3. self-suffering (tapasaya). All three are closely related and
combined they are the basis of satyagraha. Truth is closely connected to God, and
only God knows the whole and full Truth (with capital T). All people should strive to
know Truth, but will only ever find what they believe to be truth (with lower case t).
However, it is their obligation to fight for this truth, but remaining humble towards
the possibility that they are wrong. Acknowledging the possibility that people can
be mistaken leads Gandhi to nonviolence, ahimsa. If one person in her fight for her
truth kills someone else, she has denied that person the possibility to be right and
the possibility that she herself is wrong. If it later turns out that she is wrong and
the dead person was right, it is not possible to apologise and revive the person.
This possibility remains open if she struggles for her truth with nonviolent means.
Should that happen, she and the people she struggles against have together
gotten one step closer to Truth.29 It is not necessary to be religious in order to
acknowledge that no one knows the whole and full truth.
The means to reach towards Truth is to strive for ahimsa, which means
nonviolence or love. According to Vinthagen, ahimsa is a collective non-egoistic
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self-realisation (not to be confused with western ideas about individual selfrealisation). The collective aspect is that one person’s suffering is connected to
other people, and the collective self-realisation is concerned with diminishing the
amount of suffering and violence in the world. For Gandhi, it is not possible to
reach the truth as long as other people suffer. Therefore, ahimsa is about much
more than avoiding the use of violence oneself: it also includes opposing the
violence of others. This part of Gandhian thought is central in Vinthagen’s definition
of nonviolence. The total absence of violence is an unachievable goal, but what is
realistic is an eternal striving towards reducing violence. In the struggle against
violence, suffering is inevitable, which leads to the third aspect of satyagraha, selfsuffering, tapasya. The idea of self-suffering is foreign to many, but has nothing to
do with masochism. I will return to this when I show how Vinthagen uses the
concept.
Gandhi did not distinguish between the means and the ends of a goal; each
depends on the other. He is supposed to have said that “If you take care of the
means, the ends will take care of themselves”, but there is no source for this quote.
Nevertheless, it summarises his ideas about nonviolence nicely. If people use
nonviolence (ahimsa) to reach their goals, the result will be marked by that
approach.
Another aspect of Gandhi’s thought which I will return to later is the idea of
“constructive work”. Parallel with the struggle against violence and injustice, those
struggling for nonviolent social change should also work to build the world they
want to see. Gandhi’s campaigns during the Indian independence struggle were
almost always for something, and not just against it. This is an aspect of
nonviolence which is lacking in the technical approach to nonviolent action which
Sharp represents.

Sharp: A pioneer for a pragmatic approach to nonviolent action
In the 1950’s US scholar Gene Sharp set out to prove that nonviolence was not
just an option for committed pacifists who based their choice on strong moral
37

principles, like Gandhi had done, but an effective strategy which everyone could
use in their struggles for freedom and justice. Although he of course based his
work on what others had done previously, he was the first to develop systematic,
academic thinking about nonviolence. His book The Politics of Nonviolent Action30
is a groundbreaking analysis of nonviolence. Although forceful critiques of his ideas
have been published, it is unquestionable that his contribution to the study of
nonviolence has been unique and far reaching.
Sharp’s analysis starts with the concept of power. He insists that power does not
come in a certain amount where more power to one person automatically means
less power to someone else. To agree with his approach to nonviolence, one has
to accept that governments, police and courts are only powerful as long as people
obey and let them get their way. This is called a consent theory of power. Since
power is a relationship, people always have the possibility to withdraw their
consent to being governed by someone else. The basic idea is that when people
stop obeying laws and orders, those usually considered “powerful” become
“powerless”.
Many factors influence elites and authorities’ ability to remain in control – e.g.
material and human resources, personal authority and charisma as well as the
sanctions they can impose. But in order to stay in power, they always depend on
obedience. Even if they can invoke prison or death penalty on those who are
disobedient, every person in a position of authority is always depending on a
certain number of obedient citizens to carry out the sanctions, such as police
officers, soldiers, prison guards and executioners, to mention just a few. The day
these functionaries decide to withdraw their obedience, the elites fall to the ground.
However, since the daily news provides abundant evidence of brutal repression,
violence and injustice, a central question is: Why do people obey? Of course fear
of sanctions plays a role, Sharp says, but that is not the whole answer. Habit, self-
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interest or the idea that obedience is a moral obligation also kick in. In addition,
potentially disobedient persons might lack the self-confidence and belief in their
own ability to achieve change. However, obedience is not eternal and inevitable,
even in dictatorships where it has persisted for decades. The giving and receiving
of orders always occur in an interaction between two or more persons.31 In Sharp’s
opinion, each individual always has a choice to disobey,32 a point of his theory
which has received some criticism. In Vinthagen’s theory, this aspect of
disobedience has been modified to some degree.
In his introduction to nonviolence as a technique, Sharp writes: “In political terms
nonviolent action is based on a very simple postulate: people do not always do
what they are told to do, and sometimes they do things which have been forbidden
to them.”33 Thus, nonviolent action can both occur when people avoid doing what
they usually do or have been requested to do, or they can do something they
normally do not do, or which is specifically forbidden.34 If people’s ordinary
behaviour is important in order authorities to uphold their position, “acts of
omission” can have a huge effect – for example if the police refuse to arrest
protesters, or soldiers desert or mutiny. Less dramatic “acts of omission” are tax
refusal or strikes. Actions which people are not expected to do or are directly
forbidden can be organising a boycott or a demonstration, or it can be illegal
actions involving civil disobedience, a theme I will return to in chapter 5 about
Ofog.
Sharp described 198 different methods of nonviolent action giving numerous
historical examples of their use. However, this number is rather artificial since only
creativity limits the possibilities. His three broader categories are a more
operational concept for analysis:

31

Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. p. 16
Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. p. 26
33
Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. p. 63
34
Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. p. 68
32

39

1. Methods of protest and persuasion
2. Methods of noncooperation
3. Methods of nonviolent intervention
Well known methods of protest and persuasion include demonstrations, petitions
and letter writing campaigns. Two traditional methods of noncooperation are the
strike and the boycott. Examples of methods of nonviolent intervention are the sitins which the civil rights movement did in segregated restaurants in the southern
states in the US in the 1960’s or the establishment of a parallel education system
which the Kosovo Albanians did in the 1990’s.
According to Sharp, people striving for nonviolent social change can achieve their
goals in four different ways:
1. Conversion: The opponent ends up viewing the issue completely differently,
and is convinced that the nonviolent activists are right.
2. Accommodation: The opponent accommodates the demands of the
nonviolent activists, for example because she sees that she cannot win, but
without changing her point of view fundamentally.
3. Nonviolent coercion: Things change without the consent of the opponent.
He loses control of the situation when he no longer has access to the
resources he once had, for example when police and army refuse to shoot
nonviolent activists.
4. Disintegration: In rare cases the opponent simply disintegrates and falls
apart after prolonged nonviolent coercion, and there is no longer anyone to
negotiate with.35
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For some nonviolent activists it is a goal to convert the opponent and make her
agree that the nonviolent activists are right. This is a quite high demand and it is
seldom that a complete conversion happens. Sharp thinks that it is mainly religious
nonviolent activists who work with this goal in mind. Many of Gandhi’s actions had
the goal to change the hearts of the British, and he thought that the self-suffering
played an important part in this. However, social distance between the nonviolent
activists and those they want to convert can make it difficult to touch someone’s
heart and convert her. No matter how much they are willing to suffer it does not
matter if those who witness the suffering do not consider them human. In the case
of India, Thomas Weber has shown how the self-suffering of the Indian
independence activists did not work directly on the police ordered out to beat them
up, but indirectly on so-called third parties. His case study of the salt raids at
Dharasana in 1930 shows that the refusal to fight back did not touch the police or
the British authorities at all. Those who were converted by the suffering were the
general public in the US who read the journalist Webb Miller’s moving report of the
events. When it came to the police responsible for the beating, Miller observed how
the refusal to offer any resistance when attacked made the aggressors even more
furious.36
I consider it important to think of the opponent not as a single individual, but an
organisation or other unit whose members share a common goal. Apart from this
particular goal their interests usually differ a lot. A state, a company or an
organisation is seldom an integrated whole, and although leaders may try to speak
with one voice when communicating with others, individuals within the unit can vary
a lot in their approaches to a nonviolent movement (and vice versa of course).
Even when leaders are not converted, other supporters of the opponent, such as
police or military personnel, may be. Anyone aiming to convert someone must
avoid humiliating their opponent, and the activists will have to signal that a
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conversion will not harm the converted. In order to touch the heart of the opponent
in this way, it does not matter how many activists participate. It is their dedication
which counts.
When an opponent accommodates to the demands of the nonviolent activists, but
without actually changing his mind, Sharp thinks the opponent considers the
nonviolent activists an irritation rather than a threat. He might also consider the
costs of continued struggle more damaging than giving in to some of the activists’
demands. If there is a chance of withdrawing with honour intact he will do that.
The third way the activists can achieve their goals are through nonviolent coercion.
The opponent has not changed her mind in any way, and she is prepared to keep
on fighting as previously. She will not negotiate or withdraw. But still she cannot
win, because the nonviolent activists have cut off her access to central resources
for the struggle. Maybe some of her former allies have been converted, or they see
which way the wind blows and prefer to change side while there is still time.
Nonviolent coercion is well-known from strikes or threats to strike. When it comes
to nonviolent coercion, numbers count. If a large number of people are disobedient,
it is harder for the opponent to continue as before. However, even more important
than the number is the position of the disobedient. Key disobedient people make a
bigger difference than the general public. Those who are armed on behalf of the
state, such as police and military, are important, but the system also depends on
courts, key industry and infrastructure.
A central concept in Sharp’s theory is political jiu-jitsu, which he uses to describe
what happens when an opponent’s supporters abandon him because he is
perceived to overreact to the nonviolent confrontation. The term is derived from the
Asian sport jiu-jitsu, where the fighters try to use the opponents’ own weight and
force in order to win. When a nonviolent movement is met with violent repression,
the same effect can happen. When the opponent is seen to misuse his force,
previous supporters might leave him and he loses his position in the end. It can be
difficult to convince supporters and bystanders that violent repression is necessary
42

against someone who remains nonviolent. Sharp describes the phenomenon this
way:
Cruelties and brutalities committed against the clearly nonviolent
are likely to disturb many people and to fill some with outrage.
Even milder violent repression appears less justified against
nonviolent people than when employed against violent resisters.
This reaction to repression is especially likely when the opponent’s
policies themselves are hard to justify. Thus, wider public opinion
may turn against the opponent, members of his own group may
dissent, and more or less passive members of the general
grievance group may shift to firm opposition.37
The dynamic of political jiu-jitsu shows why it is important for those who choose
nonviolence to remain nonviolent, including when faced with repression. Even a
tiny bit of violence is likely to change the dynamic. The opponent can be expected
to focus on the violence, no matter how little and how justified it may appear in
some eyes, and this violence is likely to be the excuse for using all the force at his
disposal. If those who want change use violence, they will shift the game to an
arena where the opponents have the upper hand thanks to his access to the use of
force.
Brian Martin has further developed the concept of political jiu-jitsu in his work on
the dynamics of backfire.38 Martin reveals how violent repression sometimes
backfires, not only in cases of nonviolent resistance. Many factors influence this
dynamic, it is not enough for an injustice to happen. People also need to know
about it, and the perpetrators of injustices that have a potential to backfire do
everything possible to avoid such reactions. Martin describes five techniques
perpetrators use to minimize outrage, such as cover up their actions and discredit
the victims.
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Sharp’s theory has received much critique, especially the way he insists that power
is based on consent. Kate McGuinness presented a theoretical feminist critique of
this consent theory, claiming that Sharp did not have much to offer feminists
resisting patriarchy.39 Martin shows how the core of Sharp’s theory is very actor
oriented, thus making the forces that prevent people from taking nonviolent action
secondary. Another aspect which is not covered by Sharp’s theory is the
complexity of many cases of domination, for instance when someone is both
subordinate but nevertheless occasionally benefit from the system. Martin sums up
his critique:
The point is that Sharp’s picture focuses first and foremost on the
ruler-subject dichotomy and on consent and its withdrawal,
whereas a detailed analysis of the structures of power can only
enter as an afterthought or as a general context for the consent
picture.40

Vinthagen: Four dimensions of nonviolence
Stellan Vinthagen’s conceptual exploration of nonviolent action, developed in his
thesis Ickevåldsaktion: En social praktik av motstånd och konstruktion (Nonviolent
action – A Social Practice of Resistance and Construction) combines Gandhi’s and
Sharp’s insights on nonviolence with modern sociological theories developed by
Jürgen Habermas, Erving Goffman, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault.41 With
this combination, he takes nonviolent theory a major step further in understanding
it to be a “multi-dimensional rationality”. Nonviolence is a combination of resistance
and construction, expressed through four aspects which he calls dialogue
facilitation, power breaking, utopian enactment, and normative regulation. Together
they explain the unique rationality of nonviolent action as a tool for change, using
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insights from contemporary sociology to explain the rationality of nonviolence in a
way which takes critique of Gandhi and Sharp seriously.

Dialogue facilitation
The choice of nonviolent action, as opposed to a violent alternative, means that
nonviolent activists can be seen to engage in a kind of dialogue. In Gandhian
terms, dialogue means that they are prepared to work towards a common Truth
with their opponent. Vinthagen uses Habermas’ thoughts on the ideal speech
situation to develop this further. He shows how Habermas’ concept of the ideal
speech situation has many things in common with Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha.
In the ideal speech situation, the participants in the communication mean what they
say and they treat each other’s statements with mutual trust. The communication is
undisturbed by power relations, and there is time enough to hear all people’s
opinions and explore what they mean. All people with a stake in the issue under
consideration participate on equal terms and all have access to relevant
information. Finally, everyone is ready to change their point of view based on
convincing arguments by someone else. In practice, such an ideal speech situation
will never occur, but is the utopia one should strive towards. In this situation,
rational arguments are allowed to rule and the best argument wins, not the person
who is most resourceful or best at manipulating. The ability to change one’s
opinion when confronted with good arguments is also a central aspect of Gandhi’s
philosophy, something he did himself on several occasions. In Gandhi’s opinion it
is a “blessing” to have an opponent, because the conversation with her helps
everyone involved to reach a little closer towards Truth. In nonviolent actions, one
acknowledges the possibility that one’s opponent might be right, at the same time
as one holds on to one’s own truth until better arguments have been put forward.

Power breaking
The second aspect of Vinthagen’s theory is the way nonviolence is used to break
existing relations of power. Although dialogue should be free from power according
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to the utopia of the ideal speech situation, this is not the reality on the ground.
Everyone working to change status quo is met with power in many different forms
and thwarted by vested interests. The way Vinthagen describes power breaking is
also a critique of Sharp’s idea of power. Although they both agree that power
happens in the interaction between people and is not something that exists in itself
outside of the relationship, Vinthagen thinks that Sharp’s view of power is too
simplistic. Although individuals have a possibility to change their behaviour, this is
not something they just do. Deciding to resist is not just an individual choice open
to anyone who are oppressed. Using the theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre
Bourdieu, Vinthagen shows that power and resistance are complex processes and
not just a question of making the right choice. The research of both Foucault and
Bourdieu shows that no one is outside of power and free to decide to resist.
Through their upbringing, people become subordinated to power, and the power is
so much part of them that they do not think about it – people just continue to act as
they have always done. Obedience and submission are so infiltrated in everyone’s
life that they become part of their bodies, what Bourdieu calls habitus. For
Vinthagen, power is something which people give away, often unconsciously and
out of habit and conventional thinking. They are obedient because they have
always been that, and “one has to follow the rules.” Power should not be confused
with money, property, high status or other things people associate with power.
These manifestations can be tools for exercising power, but they are not power in
themselves.42
In some of their writings, Foucault and Bourdieu almost make it sound as if
resistance is not possible because power is everywhere. Vinthagen does not follow
them in this. He thinks that people are at least to some degree free individuals who
can make decisions about what is best for them.43 But people, including nonviolent
organisers, have to acknowledge and understand the systems of submission in
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order to be able to empower and liberate themselves. They need to fight actively
and systematically against their internalised submission.
Even if nonviolent actions are a way of facilitating a dialogue with the opponent, the
dialogue is influenced by the existing power relations. Although nonviolent actions
should encourage dialogue and be open towards the opponent’s good arguments,
(in the cases where this is a person or an organisation) at the same time they
should actively resist existing relations of power. This is of course a challenge,
since those who benefit from the status quo seldom have reason to engage in
dialogue until they are forced to do so. They frequently resist this dialogue on equal
terms with all possible means, including devaluing the activists as persons and
their motives, reframing what the action is about and using all official and unofficial
sanctions at their disposal.

Utopian enactment
The third aspect of Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action deals with how
nonviolent actions can be a way of acting as if the societies the activists work
towards already exist. This he calls utopian enactment. The activist should both
believe and behave as if even the most brutal opponent at some point will be
willing to change. The nonviolent action should make visible that the utopian
situation is possible in principle, at least for a short moment while the action is
being carried out.
Good nonviolent actions help people deal with hatred and enemy perceptions and
undermine the idea that violence is normal. At the same time as the activists fight
injustice, they should – to the degree it is possible – build the society they long for,
just as in Gandhi’s constructive work.
The problem with Habermas’ ideal speech situation is not just existing power
relations, but also emotions which will affect communication. Negative emotions of
hatred, grief and sadness can lead to perceptions that some people are worth less
than others, deserve to die or be harmed and longing for revenge for real or
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perceived past injustice. Facts like these influence communication from both the
nonviolent activist and her opponent. Gandhi speaks about how activists should
“touch the opponent’s heart” to reach him or her, and that rational argumentation is
not enough. He saw the self-suffering, tapasya, as one way of doing this. The
ability to suffer can show the opponent the humanity of the nonviolent activist. The
idea of suffering is closely connected to Indian philosophy of religion, but in
Vinthagen’s interpretation of the concept, self-suffering is different. He sees it as a
risk of death or harm which the nonviolent activists accept as part of the struggle.
Willingness to run risks is common among soldiers fighting in wars, and is nothing
unique for nonviolent activists. It is not a wish to suffer or die, but means that one is
prepared for it, or even counts on it, in the struggle for one’s cause.

Illustration 2. Lunch counter sit-in in Richmond February 22, 1960 at the
Thalhimer’s Department Store. African American students sit orderly and
ask to be served at a white only counter. Photo reprinted under GNU
Free documentation license.
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Vinthagen uses a drama model developed by Erving Goffman to show how
nonviolent actions undermine the perception that violence is normal and for a short
while dramatise what the society that the activists strive for could look like. An
example from the civil rights movement in the US which Vinthagen himself uses
can illustrate what he means: In May 1959, when segregation was still enforced in
the southern states, a group of 10 African Americans went to Biloxi Beach in
Mississipi to swim and have fun with family and friends. But this was a “white only”
beach, and while the African Americans sang and walked with their picnics and
swimming towels they were arrested. This way, they dramatised the injustice being
done to them, and what justice would look like. The civil rights movement was good
at enacting injustices like this, where African Americans peacefully and with great
dignity asked to be served in lunch restaurants for white people, or as Rosa Parks,
refused to move from the seat where whites had priority on the bus. These activists
were of course aware that they ran a risk of being beaten up by white people in
favour of segregation or arrested by the police. But at the same time they made a
live drama which showed what a more just society would look like, where going to
the beach, buying lunch or taking the bus is nothing else than ordinary everyday
life and not a confrontation.

Normative regulation
The fourth and last aspect of Vinthagen’s theory is that in nonviolent actions, the
activists work towards making nonviolence the norm, something he calls normative
regulation. In most societies people learn that violence is normal, at least in some
situations. This “knowledge” about violence is internalised the same way as power,
resulting in the perception that violence is normal even if they disapprove of it.
Nonviolent activists try in different ways to ”unlearn” this perception and make
nonviolence the new norm. For Gandhi, the constructive programme was an
important part of this education to make nonviolence central in all aspects of life. In
western nonviolent movements, it is mainly through nonviolence training before big
nonviolent actions that different organisations have tried to teach participants new
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ways of reacting. Only a small minority have taken up the idea of living in
communities that emphasise nonviolence as a way of life.
Many nonviolent training methods were developed or refined during the civil rights
struggle in the US. They aim to prepare the participants for what will happen during
the action and make new and more desirable reactions a natural first choice. When
the African Americans went into a restaurant for whites, it was important that all
participants stayed calm and dignified if they were physically or verbally attacked. It
should not be possible in any way to frame them as aggressive. Many people learn
while growing up that it is acceptable to shout or hit back at an attacker, but the
civil rights activists (as well as many other activists) had to unlearn this behaviour.
Role plays are one method in this preparation, where the aim is to make dignified
responses to attack and abuse a part of the body’s natural reaction. The question
is of course to what degree previous lessons can be unlearned and new behaviour
internalised. Can this be done during a weekend course before a major nonviolent
action? The nonviolent discipline in many actions with thousands of participants
shows that this can be done when it comes to the action itself, but is the change so
thorough that the new behaviour becomes part of a new way of life? Gandhi would
probably have been sceptical of the idea that a weekend course can change well
established ways of reacting much. He saw life in the communities, ashrams, as a
daily training where nonviolent activists should live their life as a service to society
and the constructive programme. For an individual to experience profound change
it is often necessary to create new social relations and to be in an environment
where the majority really does experience nonviolence as the norm.

Attitudes to humour in research on nonviolence
Both of the two traditions of nonviolence introduced above have shown very little
interest in humour. In her PhD thesis Janjira Sombutpoonsiri gives an execellent
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overview of the different attitudes towards humour.44 Those who are closest to
perceiving nonviolence as a principled way of life usually dismiss humour as a
legitimate method in a conflict because it can humiliate and ridicule and in the long
run be counterproductive to peaceful conflict resolution.45 However, Gandhi said
that “if I had no sense of humour, I should long ago have commited suicide”46, so
this broad generalisation should be taken with a grain of salt.
Among the pragmatic approaches where nonviolence is seen as an effective
method in a political struggle rather than a moral obligation, the attitude to humour
is a little more positive. In his 198 methods of nonviolent resistance, Sharp also
includes one which is called “Humorous skits and pranks,” (number 35) where he
uses examples from Eastern Europe, but he does not elaborate any further on the
issue.47 Sombutpoonsiri traces a similar lack of interest for humour and even
scepticism towards its effectiveness among other scholars from the proponents of
pragmatic nonviolence. Humour does not seem to be found worthy of serious
attention.48
With this introduction to the core ideas about nonviolence and their attitude to
humour, it is time to turn to theories of humour and in particular the relevant
research on protest and social change.

Humour research
Humour research is a multi-disciplinary field, and many different authors have
written about the subject over the centuries. Psychology is the area which has
produced the largest amount of academic research, but humour has also been
studied from the perspective of rhetoricians, linguists, sociologists, theorists of
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literature, philosophers, communication theorists, and anthropologists. In his book
Blind Men and Elephants49, Arthur Asa Berger illustrates how each of these
disciplines has contributed to explaining humour, but like in the poem to which his
book title refers, each of them only sees part of the subject in question, and
therefore they are not able to explain the whole of it.
There is no theory of humour with which everyone agrees. A common way of
categorising theories is into three schools50 each with its own underlying
assumptions of what humour is and how it should be explained.
1. Relief theory focuses on how humour can reduce tensions, and how it is
used to express forbidden ideas and deal with taboo topics. Sigmund Freud
is the person most closely associated with this approach to humour.
2. Superiority theory claims that humour is a way of showing who is superior,
and even when we laugh at ourselves, we laugh at a part of us which is
inferior. 16th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes put forward this theory. In
modern times, Charles R. Gruner is the only humour theorist who claims
that all humour is based on aggression, and a dichotomy of winning-losing.
3. Incongruity theory is concerned with the cognitive perception of what is
funny, and is the most widespread way of explaining humour today. This
theory says that in order for us to perceive something as funny, there has to
be an incongruity or ambiguity which forces us to think in more than one
dimension at the same time.
Although some theorists see their own theory as a way of explaining all humour,
each of these three perspectives contributes something meaningful to the
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understanding of humour, but no single one provides the full explanation. Humour
is not one thing, but a label which has relations to both cognitive processes,
emotions within the individual, interpersonal relations in small groups as well as
broader social relations in our societies. As sociologist Jerry Palmer has
suggested, it seems unrealistic to demand that one theory should explain all this.51
Incongruity theory explains the cognitive process that needs to be present in order
to generate humour. Relief theory is one way of explaining why an individual
chooses to use humour in a certain situation, or laugh at a particular joke.
Superiority theory can explain some forms of aggressive humour.
Since this thesis is about the use of humour as a method of social activism, the
humour I present here is constructed to be part of a social conflict. It is kicking
upwards to criticise particular people in power or systems of power – for example
dictators, elected politicians considered to take themselves too seriously, dominant
“isms” of any kind, or a company profiting from environmental exploitation or
human suffering. Therefore it should be no surprise that it includes many examples
of humour which some people would call aggressive – that is, humour which
criticises, humiliates, ridicules or in some way aims at “speaking truth to power”.
Nevertheless I want to emphasise that I do not consider this a contribution to
Gruner’s theory about humour’s universal aggressiveness.52
It is not the purpose here to discuss all the literature on humour, and I will only look
in depth at the theories and literature which are relevant for the theme of humorous
political activism which aims to challenge power relationships. This means that I
will focus on sociological theories of humour and what has been written about
political humour or humour related to social conflict.
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Defining humour
Humour is special way of communicating. In itself, it is neither good nor bad. It can
be used to hurt other people, and it can be used to make them happy, just like
other methods or mediums for communication. In his article “Humor as a DoubleEdged Sword: Four Functions of Humor in Communication”, John C. Meyer calls
this ability to both unite and divide “the paradox of humour”.53 Michael Billig has
identified three other paradoxes of humour. It is both universal and particular,
meaning that all cultures have a sense of something that is funny, but not everyone
finds the same things funny. 54 In addition, the impulse to laugh appears to be
biological.55 Another paradox that Billig has identified is similar to Meyer’s paradox:
Humour is both inclusive and exclusive. Finally, there is the third paradox regarding
humour’s ability to be mysterious and resist rational analysis at the same time as it
is possible to understand and analyse it.56
My focus is on political humour which aims to criticise power. Most of the examples
I provide are from grassroots organisations who “kick upwards” and criticise abuse,
self-righteousness and dominant truths and world views. That humour can be used
in this way does not exclude the fact that it is frequently used to ridicule minorities
and humiliate those at the bottom of society as well.57
Psychologist Rod Martin, in his introductory book on humour and psychology, uses
this definition with four components:
1. Humour has a social aspect, which is associated with play. When using
humour, people operate in a different mode than when they talk seriously.
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2. Secondly, there is a cognitive-perceptual component of humour. This is the
mental process which needs to happen in order for people to perceive
something as funny.
3. Humour also has an emotional aspect. People do not just react to
something funny intellectually, it also creates a good feeling. English does
not really have a word to describe this feeling, but Martin calls it mirth.
4. Finally, the emotion of mirth is frequently expressed through laughter.
Laughter is a signal that this is play and not serious.58
This is a useful operational definition, but the way the humorous is contrasted with
seriousness makes this an inadequate way of defining some political humour which
has a serious intent. Although political humour operates within a play frame and
generates laughter and amusement this should not be confused with not being
serious.
One interview with an Ofog activist in particular caused me to question Martin’s
(and most other humour researcher’s) choice of words. Lisa and I had just talked
about a humorous nonviolent action that activists in Ofog had carried out, and Lisa
had expressed concern about the problems with combining the ironic with the
serious when it became obvious how problematic the term serious is in this
context:
Majken: But [how do you mean], when you talk about serious and
non-serious, because I think that something like Reality AB [the
action] is very serious…?
Lisa: yes, yes, serious was maybe the wrong choice [of word],
ehh, serious as in non-ironic, that is what I mean
Majken: yes, yes, grave and… (hesitant)
Lisa: yeeees (hesitant)
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Majken: The other is also grave, no, it is very difficult with the
words (both laugh)
Lisa: Yes, grave and serious
Majken: Yes, I think I understand what you mean
When I first listened to this interview I felt very embarrassed that I did not manage
to express myself more clearly, but then realised that humour research had not
provided me with a language to have this kind of conversation. The core of the
problem was that both everyday language and humour research use a terminology
that is not adequate for talking about humour that has a very serious intent.
I am not the first to notice this contradiction, since it is implicitly addressed in a
book title like Taking humour seriously, 59 and briefly mentioned as a side comment
by scholars writing about political humour.60 Linda Hutcheon in her book about
irony writes that “even humorous ironies can be deadly serious.61 However, the
implication for humour studies as such has not been discussed. I suggest that if the
term “seriously” is replaced by “rational argument”, Martin’s definition is still valid.

Sociological theory on humour
The sociologists of humour have hardly paid any attention to political humour and
its relations with power. The focus has been on developing broader sociologies of
humour and humour’s place in everyday life and interaction. Marvin Koller
described the different social functions of humour, including social correction and
provoking thought.62 Michael Mulkay made an important contribution to the study of
humour when he suggested that the humorous mode or discourse operates in a
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way which is very different from the serious mode or discourse we engage in most
of the time.63
In the serious mode, we do our best to avoid misunderstandings, incongruity and
double meanings. We assume that there exists a “real” world, and that other
people potentially can see the world more or less the same way as us. When we
discover that someone perceives that reality in a way which is different to our own
understanding, we look for explanations for the discrepancies.
In contrast, says Mulkay, we have the humorous mode, which requires us to think
in a different way. It is based on incongruity and duality, and we can only grasp
humour when we switch to the humorous mode of understanding the world, where
inconsistency and ambiguity are part of the rules. As I mentioned when discussing
definitions of humour, I agree with this differentiation between a humorous and a
non-humorous mode of communication. However, I think it is inappropriate to call
the other mode serious, since this indicates that humour cannot be serious. Instead
I will refer to the non-humorous mode as rational. I do not disagree with the basic
idea that Mulkay presents, since it is the incongruities in the humorous mode which
appear to be essential to him, I just point out that the word “serious” is misleading.
Within the same tradition of incongruity, Peter Berger has written about how
humour requires us to think in more than one dimension at the same time 64, and
Jerry Palmer has brought our attention to the fact that humour has to be
negotiated, to be permitted, in order to be able to happen. Every theory of humour
also needs to take into consideration that humorous intent is not enough for
humour to succeed. Humour is fragile and can easily fail. This does not mean that
the butt of the joke or prank has to agree that something is funny, but either the
situation demands or the audience agrees that this was humorous.65 He points to
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the fact that there is a huge difference between laboratory experiments with
psychology students and a stand-up comedy show in real life. Every comedian
knows that a show has to be “built up”, and the joke which is a success towards the
end can’t be told until the audience is warmed up.66
In his writing about humorous incongruity, Palmer works with a concept he calls the
logic of the absurd, which consists of two parts. In order for an incongruity to be
funny, it has to appear suddenly in order to surprise us. At the same time the
cognitive process of perceiving something as both implausible and slightly
plausible at the same time has to happen.67 Palmer thinks that a combination of an
incongruity as well as an adequate level of arousal is required to produce humour.
If the arousal is too high, we will experience a feeling of threat and anxiety rather
than mirth.68 Elliott Oring has used the term appropriate incongruity to express
similar thoughts.69 The development of incongruity theory within psychology is long
and complicated, but the details are not relevant here.70
When we go to a comedy show, the situation immediately makes us understand
that something is intended to be funny, but in everyday interaction, it is a constant
negotiation about what constitutes humour and what does not.71 There is no
automatic relationship between intention and what others perceive. Shared humour
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depends on shared context and knowledge of the cues that make a situation
humorous as well as emotional resonance.72 However, something can be
negotiated as humour, even if the butt of it disagrees and sees this as nonhumorous, an important point which I will return to later. When something which is
intended as humour is perceived differently, Palmer thinks there can be many
different explanations. He points to reasons such as the skills of the performer or
the use of mediums we now consider old-fashioned, like silent movies. In addition,
intended humour can be considered offensive either because of the structure of the
humour, the relationships between the parties involved or the nature of the
occasion.73
Murray S. Davis also places himself firmly in the incongruity tradition,74 and argues
that nothing is incongruous in itself, only in relation to something else, when there
is something which does not fit in.75 Along the same lines as Oring and Palmer,
Davis argues that the incongruity has to be moderate in order to be considered
funny.76 Davis’ contribution to the sociology of humour is a thorough description of
all the different ways humour can be generated when one unit of a social system is
replaced with something incongruent. This way, humour draws our attention to the
essential parts of social systems and what it means to be human.77
Summing up the sociologies of humour, it is obvious that the incongruity tradition
has been a common point of reference for sociologists. Political humour has not
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played a major role in any of these works which aim to categorise and explain how
humour works in society. An exception to this, which is the focus of the next
section, is the category of political jokes.
A sociological article that deserves mentioning in this section as well is “Romance,
Irony, and Solidarity” by Ronald Jacobs and Philip Smith. They have looked at the
relationship between irony and civil society, and are mainly concerned about
improving theory of civil society. They are critical of existing theory of civil society
because culture, emotions and identity have been neglected in this metanarrative
and a consequence is
a latently mechanistic conception of human action; a failure to
consider identity as multiple, contradictory, hybrid, or public; and
an inability to explain how democratic institutions and procedures
sometimes promote social outcomes that are neither just nor
moral.78
In order to have discourses within civil society that promote “healthy’ political
cultures”79, Jacobs and Smith argue that the genres of romance and irony should
be brought into public life and not delegated to the sphere of the private. Combined
these two genres provide a discourse that makes room for the four attributes they
consider essential for a descriptive/normative theory of civil society – intersubjectivity, solidarity, reflexivity, and tolerance. Romance and irony each have
virtues and vices which supplement each other. Among the positive sides of irony,
Jacobs and Smith point towards irony’s potential to disrupt power and encourage
reflexive processes in civil society.80 However, they also warn against irony’s risk of
being trapped in fatalism and becoming disengaged from civil society if it just
creates ironic distance without providing alternatives.81
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A similar argumentation is used by Robert Hariman in his article “Political Parody
and Public Culture”82 where he argues that parody is essential for a democratic
public culture. According to him “genres such as parody play a particularly crucial
role in keeping democratic speech a multiplicity of discourses.”83 The reason is that
as soon as something has been “doubled” through parody, it can no longer pretend
to be an uncontested truth.84
Several contributions to humour studies have focused on the different functions of
humour in relation to social interaction.85 However, their categorisations are not
adequate to (or meant to) understand political humour which challenges power
relations.

Humour, politics, protest and social conflict
The amount of academic literature about political humour is enormous. Frequently
it is approached as a certain type of genre (like satire, parodies or cartoons)
presented in a certain medium (such as TV or the Internet).86 Others have
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analysed political humour from a historical perspective,87 politicians’ use of
humour,88 or tried to create artificial experiments about the use of humour in equal
and unequal power relations.89
Humour as an expression of social protest has a long history, but it is debated as
to whether it works as a safety valve, allowing a dissatisfied population to let off
steam now and then, or if it actually contribute to resistance. In this section, I begin
with presenting research on political jokes and traditional folly as an expression of
protest, and continue with various case studies on humour as a form of protest
against occupations and dictatorships. Both gender studies and organisational
theory have also provided insights into humour’s influence on power relations. The
small body of literature which focuses specifically on humour as nonviolent
resistance is presented before I round off with humour’s relationship with other
types of creative activism such as culture jamming, pranks and tactical carnival.

Political jokes
Jokes have been a relatively popular source for studying humour, both in
psychology and when it comes to social aspects of humour. Because they come as
a ready “package”, jokes are short and do not require much explanation compared
to everyday conversational humour. Jokes also differ from the comedy we watch
on TV. Although professional comedians often use jokes, it is an even more
packaged product. The public humorous stunts and performances which I will
present are also very different from jokes.
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One of those who has written most extensively on jokes from a sociological point of
view and their relation to society is Christie Davis. Among other things he has
studied jokes about stupidity and political jokes in the former Soviet Union.
In his book Jokes and their Relation to Society Davies explores how jokes about
stupidity and the canny have developed from being about other localities (the next
village, a certain region) to being about other ethnicities.90 He illustrates how the
butts of the jokes are not the very foreign, but those that are slightly different, like a
distorted image of yourself in a strange mirror. Jokes about a certain group do not
indicate that this group is a victim of hate, and they are not a sign of social conflict.
As an example, he mentions that jokes about Poles and Irish people’s stupidity in
the US do not mean that they are the ones who are most marginalised. He quotes
two English boys who are interviewed about jokes about the Irish, who says “We
have nothing against the Irish; my father and his father are Irish. They are just
supposed to be stupid.”91 Davies argues that the reason people enjoy stupidity
jokes is their own fear of the modern world, which is so complicated that people
usually cannot explain how the machines they use every day work. This
uneasiness leads people to joke about those whom they imagine cannot
understand even the simplest things.92
In the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under Soviet dominance before the
fall of the Berlin wall and the nonviolent revolutions in many of these countries,
jokes about stupidity were not directed towards minorities, but towards the most
powerful people in society, the party members, planners, bureaucrats and police.
This way, jokes about stupidity became political jokes, in societies where the rulers
did not just want to rule, but expected people to celebrate them and attempted to
control all aspects of social and private life. However, Davies thinks that it is still
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the same mechanisms that guide these jokes. Behind the iron curtain they just took
a slightly different turn.93
Davies is very hesitant in calling these jokes a protest. He understands them to be
a sign of dissatisfaction and they showed that the communist systems were
unstable, but they were not a sign of active resistance. He disagrees with those
who have proposed that the more repressive a regime is, the more political humour
directed against it one will find. There were more jokes about the communist
regimes after 1956 when control and repression were relaxed a bit compared to
the previous decades. But neither does Davies support those who have put
forward the opposite idea, that political jokes prevent resistance because they
become a vent for frustration. He simply says that political jokes are a sign of the
system’s instability, but that they do not help or prevent active resistance.94
Gregor Benton, is his chapter “The Origins of the Political Joke”95 about political
jokes in the Soviet Union under dictatorship, insists that the political joke is not a
form of resistance, and that a smart repressive regime permits jokes about it as “a
clever insurance against more serious challenges to the system.”96 Without
providing any documentation for his claim, he finishes his chapter with a very
strong statement that claims that political jokes cannot change anything:
But the political joke will change nothing. It is the relentless
enemy of greed, injustice, cruelty and oppression – but it could
never do without them. It is not a form of active resistance. It
reflects no political programme. It will mobilise no one. Like the
Jewish joke in its time, it is important for keeping society sane and
stable. It cushions the blows of cruel governments and creates
sweet illusions of revenge. It has the virtue of momentarily freeing
the lives of millions from the tensions and frustrations to which
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even the best organised political opposition can promise only longterm solutions, but its impact is a fleeting as the laughter it
produces.97
Alexander Rose is another academic writer who looks at political jokes. In “When
Politics is a Laughing Matter”98 he explores the differences between jokes in
democracies and jokes under authoritarian rule. He finds that in a democracy the
focus is on individual politicians and their personal shortcomings, but not their
politics. In authoritarian regimes, there is more focus on exposing the difference
between the visions and realities of the politics.
Egon Larsen’s book Wit as a Weapon: The Political Joke in History99 is a collection
of political humour which includes many examples of jokes as well as descriptions
of some satirical journals and cabarets from around the world. The title suggests
that the author thinks humour has an ability to influence people, but the book does
not include any analysis of this or explain what sort of harm can be done with this
“weapon”.
“Wit and Politics: An essay on Laughter and Power”100 by Hans Speier as well as
Don L. F. Nilsen’s “The Social Functions of Political Humor “101 should also be
mentioned in this section about jokes, since their data consist almost exclusively of
jokes, supplemented by some witty remarks. Nilsen is categorising the political
jokes according to the social function they serve when told by politicians or political
commentators. The categories include disarming critics, making a point, or
exposing chauvinism, ineptitude, oppression, pretentiousness and relieving
tension. Speier also divides his material into categories such as “The diversionary
and soothing jokes”, “The healing joke”, “The cynical political joke” and so on.
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Speier reflects on the role of humour in relation to politics and power, and sees it
as just another way of struggling for power, along with flattery, bribery and
violence. He points out how certain jokes and techniques appear to be timeless
and can travel huge distances. Speier thinks that there are more jokes from
“above” at the expense of the downtrodden than from below that kick upwards, but
does not document this claim.102 This idea of humour’s potential for reinforcing
social hierarchies appears now and then103 with a reference to two studies in two
psychiatric wards where the high ranked staff initiated joking more often than lower
ranked staff during staff meetings.104 However, the data for these studies are from
formal meetings, not recordings of what happens when the high ranked staff are
not present. Coser even specifically mentions that the findings might have been
different in more informal settings. In a similar way, Speier has no access to
humour which is kicking upwards in the data he uses, since humour from “below” is
not documented in the same way as speeches and biographies of statesmen. The
discussion about numbers is quite irrelevant since it is unlikely to reach any
conclusion, but I will provide many examples of political humour from below,
although none will be in the form of jokes.

Traditional folly
One of the most cited works on carnival and traditional folly is Mikhail Bakhtin’s
Rabelais and His World,105 which he wrote in the late 1930s during Stalin’s rule.
The book is a thesis about the French Renaissance writer Rabelais, whom Bakthin
believes it is only possible to understand when the context of medieval carnival is
taken into consideration. To Bakhtin, carnival is a liberation from the prevailing
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truths and order,106 and the grotesque in art and literature (such as in Rabelais) is
only possible to understand in the spirit of carnival. The book has been interpreted
as a critique of the repression in the Soviet Union and was not published until
1965. Although still widely cited and acclaimed, Bakhtin’s claims about carnival
have also been strongly contested.107
Another author who writes about traditional folly but from a very different
perspective is Anton Zijderveld who focuses on medieval and early modern Europe
in his book Reality in a Looking-Glass.108 Zijderveld thinks that traditional folly was
diverse. Some of it was conservative in preserving traditions and enforcing social
norms, but other aspects were critical of all norms and rules. More than anything
else, traditional folly was ambiguous.109
The fools were outcasts and pariahs of society, but popular because of the
entertainment they provided. Folly was often the expression of a pagan past,
covered by a thin layer of Christianity. It could be a disguise for critique but most
entertainers were ready to ridicule everything and everyone and did not have a
political agenda. Church leadership and double standards were good material for
entertainment, and much unrest was released through folly. Nevertheless,
Zijderveld thinks that most of the fools were “opportunistic critiques” without
ideology.110 One of the most well-known examples of medieval folly was the
“festival of fools,” organised by the lower clergy in different versions all over
Europe. Central elements were cross dressing, eating forbidden food, riding on a
donkey with head towards tail, electing a choir boy for bishop, playing dice in front
of the altar and in various ways reversing and turning conventions upside down.
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The tradition was condemned by the higher clergy, who interpreted it as a cover for
pagan fertility traditions, but nevertheless continued for several hundred years. In
the end it disappeared because of modernisation, not condemnation. According to
Zidjerveld, folly was never intended as an ideological critique of power, but in its
practice ended up as an important critique of the status quo. He thinks that the idea
of folly as a safety valve needed for release once a year in order to keep unrest at
bay at other times had nothing to do with reality. It was an argument invented by
the lower clergy in order to be able to continue the traditions that they enjoyed.111
Another medieval tradition which Zijderveld takes a closer look at is the court jester
of the 16th and 17th centuries. At this time the court jester was firmly established as
an institution and started to depart from its roots among the medieval fools.
Zidjerveld calls the court jesters “parasites of power”, and sees them as an
integrated part of the absolutist monarch institution. The idea of the court jester
“speaking truth to power” might be more of a myth than reality, since the court
jester was considered a kind of pet along with the royal dogs. The court jester
would do everything to please his master and knew his tastes, which meant that he
attacked other people in powerful positions, such as intellectuals or religious
people, with spiteful words, or played tricks on those out of favour with the king.
However, his own master would never be the butt of the joke.
The writings of Bakhtin and Zidjerveld illustrate that, just as with the political jokes
of today, the historical role of humour in protest and social conflict is by no means
straightforward. The same can be said of the humour during occupations and
dictatorships which is the subject in the next section, where there exists
considerable disagreement about its achievements.
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Humour in occupations and dictatorships
Academic literature on humour as a method for protest in modern times is relatively
limited, and even the literature which has been published in academic journals
sometimes is more anecdotal than contributing to development of theoretical
understanding. Humour from different occupations and dictatorships has been
studied in various academic fields.
Already in 1942, Antonin J. Obrdlik wrote “’Gallows humor’ – A Sociological
Phenomenon” which was published in the American Journal of Sociology.112 The
article is interesting because it is an early contribution to the topic that this thesis is
concerned with. Obrdlik gives a first-hand account of the Czech humour during the
Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia. He uses the term gallows humour to describe all
the humour used by people in a difficult situation, no matter what they joke about.
The claims in the article are not very well documented, and it does not include a
single reference. However, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the
anecdotes and jokes Obrdlik recounts. Obrdlik makes two major claims about the
social functions of humour:
1. That it helps increase morale among a repressed people. He also thinks that the
amount and strength of humour is a sign of how morale is doing. If there is no
humour directed against the occupier, he thinks it means that people have given
up.
2. The second claim is that humour disintegrates the forces that it is directed
against. There is no documentation of this claim, although Obrdlik attempts to
justify it. His most convincing argument is that the Nazi’s anger towards the
humour is a proof that it hurts. Obrdlik argues that an enemy that felt in control
would not take humour seriously. That humour directed against the occupation
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forces was severely punished, and that graffiti removed immediately, meant that
the Nazis felt insecure.
Much later, humour from two other countries occupied by Nazi Germany from
1940-45, Denmark and Norway, has been described in academic literature.
Nathaniel Hong in his article “Mow’em all down grandma: The ‘weapon’ of humor in
two Danish World War II scrapbooks”113 uses humour from two Danish scrapbooks
from the occupation to discuss to what degree humour is a political weapon. He
claims that most people who write about political humour overestimate its potential
as a form of resistance without actually having any data behind their claims. Hong
thinks that by using the scrapbooks as sources the way he does, he comes much
closer to the everyday life of ordinary people and their use of humour than many
other researchers. First and foremost, the scrapbooks show the complexity of the
issue.
One of the collectors of humour who Hong looks at is called Jensen. He primarily
seemed to use his book to get through these difficult years more easily and Hong
thinks that the humour in his books became a substitute for real resistance. The
other collector is called Holmboe, and he collected many examples of jokes in
circulation and wrote down humorous anecdotes. Holmboe himself said that what
he tried to do was document the mood of the Danish population during these
years. His primary concern was the free flow of information, free speech and the
way censorship prevented that. His family participated in many different forms of
resistance activities, and according to Hong, the humour which Holmboe collected
shows how humour can be part of a critical reflection. However, humour was only a
minor part of Holmboe’s huge material, which mainly consisted of newspaper
articles.
Hong thinks the power of humour is overestimated, but his main focus is jokes,
which do not engage with the enemy/opponent as long as they are whispered in
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private. Only a few of Hong’s examples are public and therefore part of an
interaction with the German occupier. Because of this focus on jokes, the article’s
conclusions have little relevance for this thesis. But although Hong uses written
primary sources, we still know little about to what degree the private jokes
contributed to creating a culture of resistance and a hidden transcript, a subject I
will return to shortly. Although the humour turned out to be a safety valve for
scrapbook writer Jensen, Hong presents no data to show that everyone else
reacted the same way.
In her writings about the use of humour as resistance to the Nazi occupation in
Norway 1940-45, Kathleen Stokker114 notes that quisling humour (directed towards
Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the Norwegian Nazi party) protected people’s selfrespect and gave the population some sort of control in an uncontrollable
situation.115 The jokes also served to break down isolation and create a solidarity
and group identity within the population. Because so many people shared the
jokes, their very existence contradicted the Nazi propaganda that people who did
not join them would stand alone.116 Stokker writes: “The jokes also provided an
image of nation-wide solidarity that vitally assisted the resistance effort.”117 Stokker
compares the Norwegian occupation humour with jokes from Eastern Europe
during dictatorship, and finds that in Norwegian humour “everyone” fights back,
and support for the resistance movement is found in the most unusual places,
whereas in Eastern Europe, the jokes show that you should trust no one.118
In the post-war period, the jokes have helped create the myth that “everybody”
participated in the resistance, and that nobody supported the occupation, which is
contradicted by the fact that 60.000 Norwegians joined the Nazi party. Similarly,
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Patrick Merziger, writing about humour in Nazi Germany itself, has identified a
post-war perception of whispered jokes that has served to overstate the distance
between the German people and the Nazi party. 119
Humour from a different occupation has also been collected and presented in an
academic article. In “Humor of the Palestinian Intifada”, Sharif Kanaana presents
resistance humour from the occupied Palestinian territories from the first
Intifada.120 She and her assistants have collected around 200 different jokes and
anecdotes about the Intifada from all parts of Palestine. The majority are about
Palestinians triumphing over Israelis. The Israelis in the jokes are almost
exclusively the Israeli Army, not Jews, and not even settlers. In a minority of the
jokes collected, the butt are Palestinians who are not doing enough for the Intifada,
and in a few cases, collected late in the Intifada, the target is the leadership of the
Intifada.
In the stories about Palestinians triumphing over the Israeli soldiers, it is very often
women and children from non-urban settings who are smarter than the soldiers
and intuitively understand what the Intifada is about. The jokes are not violent
towards the Israeli soldiers, even when the soldiers are captured. The strength of
the Palestinians lies in their humiliation of the soldiers. The author also contrasts
the intifada jokes to her perception of pre-intifada humour, where Palestinians
made fun of themselves and seemed to lack self-respect.
Apart from dividing the humour into categories depending on their theme, the
article does not contribute to any theoretical developments. However, it is an
interesting finding that the humour during the Intifada was mainly nonviolent, and
seeking out alternative ways of humiliating the enemy, rather than promoting
violence.
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A recent article about humour utilised against a dictatorship is Helmy and Frerichs’
“Stripping the Boss: The Powerful Role of Humor in the Egyptian Revolution
2011”.121 They argue from a social psychological perspective that humour can be a
“resource in power battles”122, and conclude that humour was a stress buffer during
the Egyptian revolution in February 2011. They even go as far as saying that
without the extensive use of open ridicule of President Mubarak and other forms of
public humour, it would not have been possible for the activists to sustain their
occupation of Tahrir Square for the 18 days that was necessary for the revolution
to bring down Mubarak.123 Although I find it a very far reaching conclusion to
consider humour such a decisive factor, their study is certainly convincing that
humour was important. An anecdotal account of the same case is Iman Mersal’s
article about the spirit of solidarity created by humour on Tahrir Square.124
In his article “Political Humor in a Dictatorial State: The Case of Spain”125, Oriol PiSunyer does not tell how the data for the article were collected, and there is no
systematic analysis of different categories regarding content. The article reads as
Pi-Sunyer’s own personal observations about the functions of humour. He sees it
as a form of oral guerrilla warfare that everyone could, and almost everybody did,
participate in. He also mentions how jokes, like other forms of oral communication,
travel far and fast in times of uncertainty. Pi-Sunyer thinks that humour functioned
as a way of alleviating anxiety.
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Humour, power and gender
There is not much academic work which focuses particularly on power and
humour. However, some aspects have been raised from a gender perspective.
Joanne R. Gilbert’s book Performing Marginality: Humor, Gender and Cultural
Critique126 is an interesting starting point. In this book Gilbert focuses on how
American women stand-up comedians perform their marginality as women. She
points to the fact that they actually manage to get paid for subverting power
relations by performing the age old role of the fool. Their entertainment is a
disguised resistance that holds up a mirror so that society can see itself
reflected.127 She sees marginality as the perfect position for expressing critique,
because it is a place between the inside and outside. As an example of this
marginal position being used as disguised resistance, Gilbert shows how women
who use self-deprecatory humour (e.g their body size or sexuality) and put
themselves down in their show appear so non-threatening that they disarm their
audience. But because they perform this in a comic context, they also subvert the
status quo by raising subtle questions and critique.128 This is an interesting thought
to explore in relation to other marginalised groups, such as those who are “just”
politically marginalised. Gilbert is also critical of critiques which claim that women
who use self-deprecatory humour are not feminist, and that what they do is harmful
to feminism. Gilbert thinks that they have missed a crucial point – that this is
humour, not to be taken too seriously.
Gilbert draws on superiority and relief theories of humour to make her points, and
thinks that political humour can be both conservative and contribute to maintaining
the status quo as well as be liberating and subversive. This way, humour is both
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violating and affirming cultural norms and values.129 Her finding is that women
stand-up comedians (and other minority stand-up comedians) must appear as nonthreatening fools in order to get access to the stage, and suggests that there is a
difference between making the master laugh and undermining his power position.
She considers the fool to have a double role – as a satirist to encourage critical
self-reflection, and at the same time entertain to relieve tension.
Gilbert distinguishes between the victim and the butt of a joke.130 They can be the
same, but not necessarily. Although a victim might be a woman, the butt might be a
man, or society. Another thing she points out is how the “just joking” can be a
defence that disguises attacks, something I will return to later.131
Although Gilbert acknowledges humour’s ability to express subtle critique in a nonthreatening way, and mentions that humour can be a “rehearsal for the revolution”,
she does not believe in any “comic activism.” The very existence of female standup comedians is a subversive act, and is contributing to demolition of the
hegemonic wall, but in itself it will not change real power relations. Even subversive
humour will never be taken seriously. For this reason she thinks that “true
believers” in any cause will never be good comedians.132 I think the following
pages will prove her wrong. Although these political activists are not professional
comedians, their humour is still good enough to make many people laugh.
Someone who has more faith in the potential to affect power relations through
humour is Anna Johansson. In a chapter in a Swedish book about resistance
studies, she writes about humour among Nicaraguan women living in a workers’
area of the city Leon.133 She investigates how humour has a potential to both
strengthen established power relations and resist them. The kind of humour the
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women in Nicaragua produce is very often about men, and it is done behind their
backs. Johansson uses James Scott’s concept of hidden transcripts to analyse the
situations. She shows how it is possible to see the joking about men’s sexual
relations with other women as revenge. Johansson does not think that humorous
resistance is a question of either-or. The humour she observed in Leon certainly
reinforced existing stereotypes of how men are and what masculine behaviour is.
But at the same time their humour is part of an everyday resistance against male
domination. The women overcome their fear through humour, which makes men’s
power and domination seem less dangerous. However short and fragile the
moment is, everyday resistance humour is a play with existing power structures,
and a break in the routine of men’s domination.
In an article called “Laughing when it hurts: Humor and violence in the lives of
Costa Rican Prostitutes”134, Pamela J. Downe looks at how sex workers in Costa
Rica use humour. Just like Johansson, her main focus is the women’s everyday
lives, and the group solidarity they build among themselves. The prostitutes use
humour behind the scene to laugh at violent costumers and ridicule them when
they are not present. In the very beginning of the text Downe also provides an
example of how the prostitutes used humour during a demonstration to protest new
laws that required them to carry a medical health card. The women thought that the
government was neglecting the abuse and violence directed against the sex
workers, and focusing too much on them as a problem, in spite of prostitution being
legal in Costa Rica. During the demonstration, one politician came out to talk to the
women, and in a prepared action, one woman used a balloon looking like a penis
to mock the politician.
A different performance described in the text was conducted by another woman,
who during the national AIDS day started a street performance telling jokes about
prostitutes being a problem in Costa Rica. Dressed for work and in a self-
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deprecating tone, she focused on how prostitutes spread disease. When she had
the attention of the mainly female audience she changed the style and instead
attacked the prejudice of the women, accusing them of ignoring the fact that it was
men like their own husbands who are her customers. The audience stopped
laughing, but she still had their attention. Although she was not a professional
stand-up comedian like the women in Gilbert’s book, her self-deprecation became
a way of raising serious critique.
A perspective which is not very different from Gilbert’s is Case and Lippard’s
article, “Humorous Assaults on Patriarchal Ideology”.135 This is a description of a
research project about women/feminist humour, and categorises American jokes of
this kind. More than 60 percent of the collected jokes are about male stereotypes,
where men are useless, stupid, hypersexual or disgusting. Very few of the jokes
are about “feminist subtleties”, that is questioning gender hierarchy or about equal
rights. The authors conclude with noticing that almost all of the humour they have
recorded upholds stereotypes about men and women being very different from
each other, and this way contribute to sustaining divisions. However, they also see
the very existence of this kind of humour as a proof that men’s supremacy and
patriarchy is being challenged.
The research on humour done within gender studies shows that there are different
opinions regarding humour’s ability to affect gender relations. Disagreement is also
apparent within organisational theory concerned with humour and employeremployee relations which is the next theme.

Organisational theory and humour
Within organisational studies, there has also been some research on humour.
Taylor and Bain in their article “Subterranean Worksick Blues: Humour as
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Subversion in Two Call Centres”136 from 2003 includes a good overview of this
literature. Their own research, using ethnographic data collection methods, shows
how humour can be part of resistance in two call centres. In one call centre,
humour was used to undermine management, for example by circulating emails
which clearly suggested that management did not do its work properly. Another
habit which challenged management ideals was to mock customers behind their
backs but within earshot of the other workers.
Taylor and Bain’s other case study is even more interesting from my perspective.
In a call centre where management actively worked against unions, a group of
workers consciously used humour as a tactic to undermine management and
create support for a union. Taylor and Bain document how it was difficult for
management to find appropriate responses, especially towards one openly
homosexual man. He made use of prejudice and ambivalence towards gay men to
get away with things for which others would have been punished. The humour was
sometimes very hostile, but was used against people in superior positions. The
authors demonstrate that humour can contribute to collective resistance even in a
working environment as controlled as a call centre. An example of a collective
humorous action was directed against new regulations demanding that the workers
wear a shirt and tie. Since this is a call centre, the workers found it unnecessary.
On the first day with the new regulations, a large number of workers did come to
work in shirt and tie. But they had collectively organised to look as unprofessional
as possible, by selecting patterns and colours not considered to go well together.
In their article “Having Fun? Humour as resistance in Brazil”137, Rodrigues &
Collinson argue that in the work place, workers’ humour is not just a way to let off
steam, something they find to be a persistent idea in organisational theory.
Through a case study from Brazil, they show that humour is complex and can force
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management to change practices. In a big company, the union newspaper used
humour (primarily cartoons), to expose bad management practices. This kind of
humour was not encouraged by the leadership. By drawing on familiar images from
mainstream Brazilian culture, such as comparisons with animals, the anonymous
cartoons made such an impression that the company management was forced to
improve working conditions and to change a practice regarding selection of
employees.138
Another article which primarily draws on organisational theory is “Jokes in a
Garment Workshop in Hanoi: How does Humour Foster the Perception of
Community in Social Movements?”139 by Nghiem Lien Huong. In spite of its title,
the article has no references to social movement literature. The author analyses
two jokes from a garment factory in Hanoi and the most important point is that the
jokes help to foster a sense of community among workers on the shop floor and
reflect a collective reality. Huong thinks that the jokes help to relieve tensions in a
tough working environment. In the two jokes which are mentioned, the workers
joke about themselves (in one of them about their perceived stupidity), while at the
same time the jokes illustrate how terrible the working environment is, and how
workers are pressured to lie to working condition inspectors. The author also
claims that these kind of jokes lie somewhere between obedience and resistance,
that they are neither one nor the other. However, that the jokes are told among the
workers and not a way of confronting the employer makes it difficult to see how
they can be more than part of Scott’s hidden transcript of not-yet declared
resistance.140
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Humour as nonviolent resistance
The basic question that this thesis asks is what happens when political activists
use humour in an encounter with persons and institutions they consider more
powerful than themselves. Among scholars of humour, the opinions about this
issue diverge considerably, and scepticism towards the rebellious potential of
humour is not unusual. Billig, for example, wants to show how humour also serves
to enforce social order through ridicule and mockery, a subject he thinks has been
neglected in humour research.141 Some of the researchers who focus on political
jokes or medieval folly also have a tendency to become sceptical.142 However, as
shown above, studies with organisational theory as their point of departure found
that there can be much humour in the workplace at the expense of those on top of
the hierarchies, including in places with very hard working conditions and
systematic suppression of unions.143
In her book Irony’s edge, Linda Hutcheon calls irony transideological, meaning that
in itself irony is not radical or conservative. It is not a mode of oppression or a
mode of resistance; it is just a particular way of communicating. Irony can be
labelled in all sorts of ways depending on how it has been applied, and who you
ask to have an opinion about it.144 Although not all humour is ironic, I think that this
particular observation is valid for all kinds of humour.
The dismissal of humour’s rebellious potential is still going on. Tsakona and Popa
in their introduction to Studies in Political Humour from 2012 continue the
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argumentation of people like Benton, Davies and Hong, although in a slightly
moderated phrasing. They claim to identify this myth:
Political humour is considered to be subversive and leading to
political change: by offering a different perspective on political
issues, it not only leads the audience to question the effectiveness
of political decisions and practices, but also serves as a means of
resistance to, or even rebellion against, political oppression and
social injustice.145
In their introduction they say that all of this is just a popular myth and claim that
even when humour conveys criticism, it “recycles and reinforces dominant values
and views on politics”146 This might be a fair conclusion based on the data they
have looked at, but it should not be generalised to all political humour. It is
especially problematic when they are basing it on a literature review that neglects
findings that point in a different direction. So while Hong’s findings (which are
based on just two personal diaries) are referred to at length, they do not include
Barker, Branagan, Downe, Huong, Rodrigues & Collinson, Taylor & Bain, Stokker
and Sørensen in their review.147
What is particularly problematic about these humour scholars’ way of discussing
what happens in political humour is the dichotomous understandings of power,
resistance and change underlying their line of argumentation. They do not appear
to take into consideration that power, change and resistance is not a question of
either-or.
James Scott’s concept of hidden transcripts and everyday resistance is one of the
most nuanced yet also very concrete ways of explaining the complexity. Scott
developed the idea of the hidden transcripts as a way to describe the behaviours of
people in extreme subordinate positions, such as slaves and serfs, behind the
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backs of their masters. In the public transcript which they display to their masters,
they might appear humble, subdued and passive, but when they are out of sight,
they might work slower, steal and ridicule the master. In Scott’s opinion they are
wise to do this behind the scenes. These sorts of resistance activities might never
become an open confrontation, but according to Scott it is unlikely that a public
declaration of resistance is going to happen without being preceded by a welldeveloped hidden transcript.148
Asef Bayat is another author who has nuanced perceptions of what resistance can
look like and how organised it has to be in order to have an effect. Although Bayat
criticises Scott for his emphasis on intention, they do have much in common. Bayat
has coined the expression quiet encroachment of the ordinary to describe the way
for example street vendors and slum dwellers in the cities of the global south carve
out niches of public space for themselves in order to improve their lives. They
spread out their businesses on the pavements, sell merchandise comprising major
brands, build their homes without permission and illegally tap into the power grid.
People do this as part of their everyday lives, individually and fragmented and
without guidance from ideology or leaders. Because they are so many, the
practices change societies. This quiet encroachment of the ordinary Bayat calls
social nonmovements. What they do is not an obvious political protest, since they
are not protesting on the streets demanding to get a better life, but day by day
creating it. Like Scott, Bayat gives much agency to ordinary people who
“understand the constraints yet recognize and discover opportunities and take
advantage of the spaces that are available to enhance their life-chances.”149 Only
when their gains are under attack do these social nonmovements act collectively,
for instance in defending their homes and business opportunities. The social
nonmovements might one day become social movements, but that is not what is
most interesting about them. Bayat’s major contribution is to document how their
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impact can be measured by the way they transform societies through the quiet
encroachment.150 Bayat’s findings are not of direct relevance to the study of
humorous political stunts which are not part of ordinary, daily activities, but his
studies broadens the horizon when it comes to understanding the complexities of
resistance. Just as the slaves and serfs that Scott writes about, the resistance of
the urban poor is more successful the more discreet and unnoticed it manages to
be. A major implication of Scott’s and Bayat’s work is that hidden resistance might
have an influence even if it does not lead to immediate results or is organised.
People like of Benton and Tsakona & Popa imply that only a more organised
resistance is real resistance. However, much resistance is covert, opportunity
based, and goes on behind the scenes. It is in its nature not to be discovered. It
can happen totally without humour – but humour is also likely to be part of the
folklore that keeps the cultures of resistance alive.
In my own previous work I combined Scott’s concept of hidden transcripts with
theory of nonviolence to develop a framework for understanding humour as
nonviolent resistance to oppression.151 I documented how those who think like
Benton have too simple a view of power and resistance when they claim jokes are
a vent which cannot contribute to resistance. I suggested that humour as a form of
nonviolent resistance to oppression has three different functions:
1. As a way of reaching out to people who are not already part of a nonviolent
resistance movement, it can facilitate outreach and mobilisation.
2. Within an already established resistance movement, humour can facilitate a
culture of resistance by building solidarity and strengthening the individual’s
capacity for participating in resistance. Colin Barker in his book chapter “The
Making of Solidarity at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk” about the emergence of the
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independent trade union Solidarity in Poland in 1980 explains how political jokes
were an expression of distrust in the ruling system that contributed to people
distancing themselves emotionally from the regime.152 His findings support my own
stance, and provide a challenge to authors such as Davies and Benton who
dismiss the potential contribution of whispered jokes to resistance. Political jokes
themselves do not automatically lead to resistance, but they can potentially be
crucial in shaping independent thinking that assists moves towards open
resistance.
3. Humour can affect the relationship between the nonviolent resistance movement
and the oppressor. This last function has the most powerful potential, because it
can affect the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed.
This framework was originally developed to understand humour which was part of
a resistance to oppression, and its main source of empirical data was humorous
actions carried out by a Serbian group called Otpor between 1998-2000. These
actions were successful as part of a strategy to resist the dictatorship in Serbia
during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. However, I now find that the dichotomy of
oppressor-oppressed is too narrow and simplistic to adequately address relations
of power. I provide a less dichotomous definition below.
The only other major work which explicitly analyses the use of humour within
nonviolence theory is Janjira Sombutpoonsiri’s PhD thesis “The Use of Humour as
a Vehicle for Nonviolent Struggle: Serbia's 1996-7 Protests and the OTPOR
(Resistance) Movement”.153 It is a thorough documentation of the use of humour in
Serbian nonviolent resistance to the rule of Milošević in the late 1990’s and 2000
based on interviews with the organisers of the nonviolent actions and analysis of
media reports. It investigates how humour was used or not used in different cities
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and towns depending on Otpor’s cooperation or lack of cooperation with the
opposition parties, NGO’s and access to independent media. Sombutpoonsiri
places the use of humour in its cultural context, characterised by Serbian black
humour, absurd theatre and the political situation for the opposition in the 1990’s.
Sombutpoonsiri is well aware that her findings based on a single case study cannot
be generalised to all use of humour in nonviolent struggles without testing them on
other cases. With this in mind, she offers the following theoretical contribution:
… humour works as a vehicle of nonviolent struggle in three ways.
First, it subverts the propaganda of ruling elites, enabling
protesters to turn that propaganda against its creators. Second,
humour channels the antagonistic atmosphere of street protests
into cheerfulness, helping to avoid clashes between protesters and
the security forces. Third, humour offers a metaphor of
emancipation from an oppressive polity, encouraging the
oppressed to make this metaphor become reality.154
Sombutpoonsiri uses the concepts of excorporation and the carnivalesque to
analyse humour’s unique contribution to nonviolent resistance. The concept of
excorporation was introduced by John Fiske, and by applying that to the use of
humour in nonviolence, Sombutpoonsiri takes critiques of Sharp’s theory of
consent into consideration. Excorporation means that resistance to a system does
not require a total withdrawal from that system, something which critiques of Sharp
said was not possible. Sombutpoonsiri writes:
’Excorporation’ suggest a method of subverting hegemonic power
without suspending the entire system of domination. The concept
is based on the understanding that domination and resistance can
take place in the same space.155
Sombutpoonsiri documents many examples of Serbian use of excorporation
through satire and parody against Milošević’s regime, both in the 1996-97 protests
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and in Otpor’s street skits. It twisted the regime’s propaganda thus invalidating its
truth claims without making the critique explicit.156
During carnivals, Sombutpoonsiri thinks that multiple voices can exist at the same
time thus fostering an atmosphere of dialogue despite the existence of prejudices
and antagonism. She explains “The carnivalesque world offers a scenario where
alternative realities to the seemingly fixed present one may just be possible”.157
Again this is thoroughly documented with many examples of how the carnivalesque
speaks to the imagination of other possible realities and channels anger into
positive emotions.158 A joyful atmosphere transforms hostility between protesters
and authorities and helps maintain nonviolent discipline. It also becomes a way for
protesters to overcome the dilemma between their anger and frustration over the
situation, and the seemingly impossible demand from advocates of principled
nonviolence to “love the enemy”. Sombutpoonsiri expresses it this way:
In a nonviolent conflict, carnivalesque humour constitutes an
alternative means of expressing emotion that overcomes the
dilemma of choosing between getting angry at those responsible
for the oppression being resisted, or loving them in spite of it.159
In spite of the limited interest in humour from scholars of nonviolence, some other
studies that are relevant exist. They use social movement theory as their point of
departure rather than theory of nonviolence. In 2007, an interesting collection of
articles were published in the book Humour and Social Protest edited by Marjolein
‘t Hart and Dennis Bos,160 containing both historical and contemporary examples of
humorous protest. Some of them I have already mentioned in the relevant sections
about jokes, occupations and organisational theory. The introduction to the book
includes an overview of the study of humour and protest and suggests the social
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movement theory concerned with identity and emotions as an interesting tool for
analysing humour and protest. Thomas Olesen in his article “The Funny Side of
Globalization: Humour and Humanity in Zapatista Framing”,161 shows how the
Zapatistas’ humour was one strategy for framing their struggle in a way which
could be understood globally. They used a universal humour referring to humanity
and human beings’ shortcomings in order to have resonance with their audience,
thus using the symbolic and emotional aspects of humour to bridge differences
between them and their audience.
Lisiunia A. Romanienko’s contribution “Antagonism, Absurdity, and the AvantGarde: Dismantling Soviet Oppression through the Use of Theatrical Devices by
Poland's Solidarity Movement”,162 is also using a frame of social movement theory
to highlight how the Polish group Orange Alternative through their absurd
happenings in the late 1980’s found a way of protesting which was difficult for the
Polish authorities to respond to. In his book A Carnival of Revolution - Central
Europe 1989, Padraic Kenney shows how groups like the Orange Alternative, the
Society for a Merrier Present in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Children
contributed to a carnivalesque atmosphere in Central Europe and a transformation
of “how to do protest” in the late 1980’s. The change was essential for preparing
the ground for the revolutions of 1989 and is neglected in most accounts of the
events.163
The Orange Alternative is a group whose stunts will be analysed in Chapter 3.
Another scholar which has used the Orange Alternative as a case study is M. Lane
Bruner in his article “Carnivalesque Protest and the Humorless State”.164 Bruner
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thinks that conditions need to be favourable in order for carnivalesque protest to
succeed, but when they are, this form of protest can be the most effective way to
challenge corruption. Also he notices that humour, in contrast to serious protest,
can be difficult to respond to, since arresting elves and turtles means bad publicity
for the state. In his discussion about carnival he points out (like Zijderveld) that
although authorities might intend carnivals to be an outlet for frustration and a way
of retaining social control, they have no guarantee that they do not end up as a
challenge to power. The same conclusion is reached by Anna Lundberg in her
contribution to Humour and Social Protest. In “Queering Laughter in the Stockholm
Pride Parade”165 she also finds that carnival has a political potential because of its
rejection of what is considered normal.
Simon Teune is also interested in how the use of humour affects the relationship
between a social movement and the authorities it reacts against. In “Humour as a
Guerrilla Tactic: The West German Student Movement’s Mockery of the
Establishment “he investigates how the student movement in the conservative and
authoritarian Republic of Germany was influenced by the concept of Spassguerrilla
(fun-guerrilla) towards the end of the 1960’s.166 He uses examples of actions
carried out by Kommune 1, the most widely known group that to a large degree set
the tone in the early stages of the student movement. Their ironic actions provoked
strong reactions from the state and from the populist media, and in this way
radicalised members of the student movement and drew new members to it.
Kommune 1 used their court cases to continue ridiculing authority, and in this way
showed how difficult it is to respond to humorous attacks. However, their tactics
were not embraced by everyone in the student movement. The biggest student
organisation preferred a strategy of rational argumentation, and did not perceive
the ambiguity and irony that Spassguerrilla represented as a fruitful path to pursue.
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An early attempt to point out that humour is an under researched area of social
movement studies was done by Harry Hiller in his article “Humor and Hostility: A
Neglected Aspect of Social Movement Analysis”.167 He set up a model for how to
explain humour and used the case study of the Western Canadian separatist
movement to illustrate how most of the humour used by social movements ought to
be considered resistance-oriented and can be a way of expressing hostility in a
social conflict. At the time of his case study in the early 1980’s, many people in
Western Canada felt that they were being neglected by the Canadian central
authorities in spite of their contributions to the national economy. Hiller looks at
humorous novelty items such as bumper stickers, t-shirts and caps from a social
movement working for independence for Western Canada. A message like
“Republic of Western Canada” on a cap is ambiguous because people cannot be
sure if the person who wears it is serious or making fun of this idea. This ambiguity
means that the carrier of this message is not held responsible the same way she
would normally be, and that people can adjust to the idea of an independent
Western Canada slowly. Even if some will wear it because they are committed to
the idea, others will buy it because they like to play with an idea they are not yet
fully committed to.
Marty Branagan in his article “The last laugh: humour in community activism”168
writes from his own experience as a participant in social justice and eco-pax
movements in Australia. He describes many positive functions of using humour as
a supplement to serious communication, especially relating to internal dynamics in
the movements. He observes that humour makes popular education more
interesting and contributes to a more inclusive movement. It can also make
activism more sustainable by preventing burnout, contribute to transforming anger
into more positive emotions and help maintain nonviolent discipline in spite of
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provocations. In relation to people who are not involved in a movement
themselves, he notes how the use of inclusive humour improved relations with
police during events he observed.

Culture jamming, pranks and tactical carnival
Research traditions (and practices of activism) that frequently include humour but
are not limited to humour are culture jamming, pranks and tactical carnival. These
genres share a playful attitude towards expression of dissent and use various
creative or artistic ways of communicating. A couple of activist accounts and
documentations are Joel Schechter’s Satiric Impersonations169 and a collection of
stories and interviews about “creative disruption of everyday life” called The
Interventionists.170 Many examples of these practices are also included in the
handbook Beautiful Trouble: A Toolbox for Revolution.171
The boundaries between various forms of art, interventions, and pranks are
porous. In her book Satire and Dissent: Interventions in Contemporary Political
Debate, Amber Day writes about the differences and similarities between some of
them.172 She primarily uses US examples, and focuses on parody news shows
(like the The Daily Show), satiric documentaries (like Michael Moore’s movies) and
ironic activism (similar to what I call humorous political stunts).
An important inspiration for many of these activist-artists was the Situationist
International, which originated in France from 1957 and worked against the way
that society had become a spectacle, a phrase introduced by Guy Debord.173 As
part of the spectacle, citizens were expected to consume ready-made cultural
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products instead of inventing their own. The situationists found that people were no
longer important as workers and producers; their major role was as consumers.174
Responding to this development, the situationists aimed to deconstruct the readymade, and had several strategies for this. The most well-known is
détournement.175 Harold defines this as “a detouring of pre-existing Spectacular
[sic] messages and images in an effort to subvert and reclaim them.”176 That
means an altering of original concepts into something different that can express a
deeper message.
The French situationists and Debord’s détournement were important inspirations
for what later became known as culture jamming and the idea of the detour is
present in many humorous political stunts. The American Yippies have been a
similar inspiration coming from a different direction. The group was not formally
founded until December 31st, 1967, but already earlier in 1967, two of the would be
yippies, Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman, had been the front figures of
performances that would fit into my definition of humorous political stunts.
On August 24, 1967, Abbie Hoffman and a group of people entered the New York
Stock Exchange, and from the gallery threw dollar bills down on the floor. What
actually happened and how the stockbrokers reacted has been the subject of much
mythmaking – and Hoffman has deliberately been vague about it. However, the
lack of exact documentation has most likely caused many to imagine greedy
stockbrokers crawling around on the floor to grab the money. No media were
inside, and there are no photos of the event. One person claimed that they threw
1000 dollars, others that it was just 30-40 one dollar bills. Hoffman himself wrote
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that the stock dealers “let out a mighty cheer,”177 while the New York Times
reported mixed reactions of smiles and shouts.178 After being escorted out, the
activists also burned dollar bills outside of the stock exchange. Although this was
certainly not the first time performers tried to blur the line between audiences and
performers, according to Duree, the demonstration created “a form of protest that
happened in the midst of the spectators, whether the spectators wanted to be
involved or not”.179
Later culture jammers have mainly focused on resisting corporate control of public
space, for example through billboard liberation. The involved groups and networks
have been numerous and frequently anonymous. An early Australian example was
Billboard Utilising Graffitists Against Unhealthy Promotions, or for short B.U.G.A
U.P, which in the 1980’s especially targeted cigarette commercials and was
influential in changing the laws regulating cigarette advertising in Australia.180
A few years later, Naomi Klein’s book No logo181 and Kalle Lasn’s Culture Jam182
quickly became classics for activists from the global justice movement. Today
companies rely on branding to sell their products – Coca Cola is not just a soft
drink, and Nike not just a shoe, but brands that aim to sell an image of a cool
lifestyle filled with beauty, youth and happiness. Companies spend millions of
dollars on developing their brands, but the brands also become vulnerable to
attack by so-called subvertising.183 Well done subvertising does not just express a
general critique of consumerism, but use parody to attack the vulnerable aspects of
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a particular product. Subvertising uses the brand’s own imagery to talk back to it,
and reveal consequences of consuming the product or the production methods
which the producers would prefer to keep away from the public mind. This can be
to connect cigarettes with cancer or Nike with sweatshop production where
workers in the global south work long hours in horrible working conditions and are
paid wages they cannot live on. Harold quotes Robert Phiddian to suggest that the
parodies do not destroy a brand, but instead deconstruct it by making potential
consumers associate the brand with something other than what was intended.184
Harold herself suggests the term rhetorical jiu-jitsu to catch how the force of the
brand is turned against itself like in the martial art.185 Harold does not refer to
Sharp, but this is an echo of his concept political jiu-jitsu from theory of nonviolent
action. When the company Calvin Klein was advertising the perfume Obsession
using a very thin young female model, the magazine Adbusters’ parody ad used
the brand’s own style to attack it. In Adbusters’ version, the skinny model is not just
young and pretty, but vomiting over the toilet bowl, indicating that in order to look
like the skinny models, women develop eating disorders.186 To do this kind of
subvertising in a way that makes sense to the audiences, requires familiarity with
the brand and its ads, otherwise they just become meaningless.
Harold also points to the limitation of this type of activism – it does not provide
alternatives, since there is no suggestions of how to replace the desires the brands
tempt with. There is also a risk of co-optation, of the anti-logo becoming the new
cool logo for those who are the avant-garde trendsetters. Already the situationists
were aware of this risk. They wrote that the spectacle was so sophisticated that it
would be possible for the companies to take over the critique and make it their
own, re-package it in a slightly different version and sell it back as the latest
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trend.187 Today the rebels, culture jamming and anti-logo culture itself become cool
and you can buy merchandise with jams. This all leads Harold to ask: “I can only
wonder: Is the rhetoric and imagery of rebellion bankrupt?”188

Illustration 3. Parody of Obsession ad that uses skinny model. ©
Adbusters, reprinted with permission.
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Harold refers to Derrida when she says that the parodies are not really
deconstructions, because a real deconstruction requires a double reading, not just
the sabotaging of the establishment.189 In search of deconstructions that do not
provide the recipe of what is “correct thought” and where the
performer/artist/activist does not talk down to the audience, Harold turns to pranks,
hoaxes, and comedy. She writes: “Whereas the parodist attempts to change things
in the name of a presupposed value, the comedian diagnoses her situation and
tries something to see how people respond.”190
An example of a prank in Harold’s understanding is the Barbie Liberation
Organization which since 1989 has liberated the Barbie doll and the G.I Joe action
figure from gender stereotypes. A group of people bought a number of talking dolls,
and switched the voice boxes from these two figures around. Afterwards they put
the boxes back on the shelves without the staff noticing, an activity called
shopdropping. When the children opened their Christmas presents, Barbie said
“Dead men tell no lies” instead of giggling “let’s plan our dream wedding.” G.I Joe
said things like “I love shopping.” The reaction from Mattel that produces Barbie
was to downplay it all and say they had had no complaints from customers.191
In this example of shopdropping, like many types of pranking, the pranksters are
not explicit with why they do this. The whole idea is to stimulate independent
thinking without telling people what to think. The deception is all part of the drama,
and serves an important purpose – when people realise they have been exposed
to a prank, and maybe temporarily fooled by it, their daily routines are broken.192
In his book Electoral Guerrilla Theatre: Radical Ridicule and Social Movements L.
M. Bogad identified what he calls electoral guerrilla theatre, as a recently added
tactic in the repertoire of contention. Electoral guerrilla theatre is used by activists
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within liberal democracies to ridicule these highly ritualised arenas, either by
attacking the whole electoral system or sabotaging a particular candidate’s
possibility for being taken seriously. Bogad uses three case studies from the
Netherlands, Australia and USA to show how this has been an innovative way for
social movements to confront a right wing candidate in Australia (Pauline
Pantsdown ridiculed Pauline Hanson), criticism of heteronormativity in the US
(drag queen Miss Joan Jettblakk) and confronting the establishment in the
Netherlands (the Kabouters).193
Bogad has also analysed various performance elements in traditional
demonstrations, calling them tactical carnival. It is both a way to confront some of
the dogmas within the traditional left and can contribute to opening up public space
as well as “create a joyous counterculture that can sustain long-term participation
in a movement”.194 The goals of tactical carnival are to occupy space, present a
friendly face to outsiders, provide an alternative to the existing world order, help
overcome fear and create a culture of active defiance.195 In Queer Political
Performance and Protest, Benjamin Shepard is not concerned with a particular
tactic, but shows how performance, show and the carnivalesque have a long
tradition within queer protest in the US. The group ACT UP, focused on HIV and
AIDS, was crucial in setting the example for how protest could be performed in a
more carnivalesque atmosphere.196 The carnivalesque is one way of doing
aesthetic politics as Kenneth Tucker calls it. In his book Workers of the World,
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Enjoy! he ties the increase in aesthetics to the crisis in modernity where truth and
knowledge are no longer given.197
Theoretically, Bogad makes a distinction between the Bakhtian carnival that turns
the world upside down, and the tactical carnival that suggests that other worlds are
possible. The tactical carnival of today is not the same as the carnival carried out in
medieval times or as described by Bakhtin. Instead it is a reclaiming of the idea of
carnival for the purpose of the activists.198
From a similar activist-academic performance studies tradition, Kristina Schriver
and Donna Marie Nudd write about their experiences with the Mickee Faust Club in
Florida in the US.199 One of the two examples they give is a prank where some of
the performers made an intervention in a controversial parade. They suggest a
distinction between celebratory and interventionist types of protest performances
but unfortunately they do not eleborate on this distinction.
In their article “Performing vs. the Insurmountable”, Benjamin Shepard, L. M.
Bogad and Stephen Duncombe enter the debate about power and effective
activism from the perspective of playful activism. This type of activism has been
accused of the same shortcomings as humour – not being effective and taking
away energy from forms of activism which really matter. The three authors, who all
have participated in playful organising for social change, use their own experiences
to show how playful activism can increase outreach to media, recruit new members
by inviting them in to play, contribute to creating communities of resistance and
play with relations of power. They write that:
At its most basic level, play as political performance is about
freedom – of the mind and the body – from any number of
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repressive forces, from the state to the super ego, the cop in the
head.”200
In an article Shepard wrote on his own, he emphasised joyfulness as an important
aspect of community organising.201
Shepard, Bogad and Duncombe write that “play and political performance creates
spaces where activists feel compelled to challenge seemingly insurmountable
targets”.202 One of the criticisms they counter is that only the middle class can
afford to play.203 Instead of seeing the playful as something alien to the struggle
itself, they show how it is an integrated part of people’s lives and struggles and
playful elements in protest can make people remain committed over a long period
of time. And even if much creativity is directed towards the already converted, it
helps make these networks denser.204
In their text Shepard, Bogad and Duncombe reflect together with Jennifer Miller,
founder of New York based Circus Amok, about the importance of doing
something, even if it is not the most “effective” way of behaving:
“This insurmountable thing is where cynicism comes from,” Circus
Amok founder Jennifer Miller concedes. “It’s insurmountable,
we’ve got to become capitalists.” Yet, the flip side of such thinking
remains. The logic of play is that it defies conventional logic. It
invites people to stay engaged within subjects that are far more
serious than can be dealt with in an earnest fashion. Some issues
are far too important to be dealt with a straight face. Rather,
jokes, ridicule, and play may be the most post potent tools
activists have, especially in the face of overwhelming obstacles.
Such a spirit of defiance is sometimes all one can do; sometimes it
is just enough. “That opens up space for activism,” Miller reflects.
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It makes the predictable not so predictable for just a minute. “It
makes working in the face of the insurmountable a reasonable
choice [. . .] It’s not the most efficient thing to do, but its the only
thing we can do [. . .] there is so much joy in being able to shout
in our anger together.205
Finally, with a reference to Schechner, Shepard, Bogad and Duncombe write that
“Much of the politics of play involves shifting debate about who plays, on what
terms, by whose rules, and on whose playing field”.206
This section with the overall heading “humour, politics, protest and social conflict”
has included seven subheadings aimed at summing up and discussing the
possibilities and limitations of a number of different academic traditions relevant to
the subject of humorous political stunts. It has included perspectives from studies
of political jokes, traditional folly, humour in occupations, gender studies,
organisational theory, nonviolent resistance and finally culture jamming, pranks
and tactical carnival. After this long introduction, I will conclude the chapter by
defining the central concepts of the thesis and discussing the ethical aspects of
humour.

Power, resistance, activism and discourse
Power is one of the most contested terms in social science. My approach to the
issue is inspired by a number of authors, including the scholars of nonviolence that
I referred to above. Steven Lukes’ classic essay Power: A Radical View and the
three views on power he presents are a good starting point for a multifaceted
understanding of power.207 Chapter 4 in April Carter’s book People Power and
Political Change208 gives a good overview of the limitations with the consent
perspective dominant in theory of nonviolence. Foucault’s thinking on power has
inspired Vinthagen, but otherwise his perspectives are rather absent in theory of
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nonviolent action. Foucault worked from the assumption that power only exists in
people’s relations to other people, which means that power is multi-dimensional.209
Although Foucault wrote very little about how power can be resisted, he did point
out that resistance was a place to start investigating how power works. 210 An
interesting application of Foucault’s perspective in relation to nonviolence can also
be found in Bleiker’s concept of transversal dissent.211
Power is not something people have or do not have, and therefore resistance
cannot be a question of either or. Nevertheless, some people appear more
powerful than others. A person or a group of people might perceive themselves to
be in power, and others might view them as extremely powerful. If this dominant
group control resources, and can induce other people to do things that are in the
interest of these apparently powerful, then this becomes a self-reinforcing cycle.
Those already in power get the opportunity to set the agenda, and become the
representatives of dominant discourses. This does not imply that the resisters are
powerless, that alternative discourses are non-existent or that the power relations
cannot change. Nevertheless the activists themselves experience their position as
marginal, subordinate and asymmetric. The apparently powerful can experience
moments of slipping control, but under most circumstance this is only temporarily.
Dominant discourses are those well-established “truths” and taken for granted
knowledges which rule a certain domain without being appreciably affected or
displaced by challenges. I will not discuss in detail how the dominant discourses
manifest themselves and to what degree they dominate. Sufficient for the purpose
here is to recognise that some people consider them dominant enough, and are
disturbed enough by this dominance, to set out to challenge them.
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Although dominant and apparently powerful, even in the most brutal dictatorship or
situations of oppression the dictator cannot have total control. Dissenters always
manage to carve out small niches outside of the apparently almighty’s control.
These pockets of resistance are important for expanding resistance. As an overall
name, I refer to these dissenters as “activists”. Most of the activists that appear in
the examples here are from groups concerned with social justice, peace, anticonsumerism and the environment since they appear to be the ones using
humorous political stunts in their activism. However, activists can just as well be
marginalised right wing extremists and conservatives and I do not exclude the
possibility that they can use humorous political stunts as well.
In most arenas the activists are subordinate towards representatives of the state
and big companies who control resources like money, land, legal violence, welleducated employees, and have the law on their side. In spite of these enormous
obstacles, activists are not just fighting against people and groups who are more
powerful than them, but also the discourses of what is true, right and just that the
apparently powerful uphold. In order for the writing not to become monotone, I will
refer to these interchangeably as “dominant discourse”, “truth” and “rationality” and
to the people who represent these views as “representatives of the dominant
discourses” and “the powerful”. Sometimes I will modify with “apparently powerful”
and similar expressions.
In order to take these nuanced understandings of relations of power into
consideration when studying political humour, it is necessary not just to judge the
immediate outcome of telling a joke, painting a humorous graffiti or doing a
humorous action in public by its ability to change policies or actual circumstances.
One also has to ask if humour contributes to reaching out to various audiences,
mobilising new activists and creating a culture of resistance that makes activism
sustainable. And in what ways can humour be part of challenging established
relations of power and undermine dominant discourses?
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Humour and ethics
In the context of political humour it is also relevant to raise the question of ethics. In
2005, two scholars independent of each other published books about ethical
considerations regarding laughter and ridicule. Michael Billig’s Laughter and
Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Laughter is written from the perspective of
critical sociology, and sets out to question common sense beliefs that humour is
necessarily positive and good.212 The Pleasure of Fools: Essays in the Ethics of
Laughter by Jure Gantar213 takes a very different approach. His point of departure
is philosophy about ethics. For Gantar there is no question that some laughter is
unethical, but he wants to investigate if this is a characteristic of all laughter, or if it
is possible to have constructive and inclusive laughter.214 The sources for Gantar’s
investigations are various forms of classic literature – from Greek comedies to
Oscar Wilde.
Gantar finds no shortage of people who throughout history have considered
laughter unethical, and he writes that “Of all these different kinds of laughter the
one that is most frequently associated with the unethical is satirical laughter”.215
Since much political humour involves satire, Gantar’s findings are of interest. The
reason satire is considered unethical is because its target is very often a real
person, and satire is based on contempt for this person. No matter how much they
deserve it, there is always someone who gets hurt by satire. As an example,
Gantar notes how Adolf Hitler was upset by Charlie Chaplin’s movie The Dictator.
However, Gantar emphasises that it is also possible to argue that satirical laughter
is most ethical. Satire is social correction, and it corrects what is morally wrong.216

212

Billig, Laughter and Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Laughter.
Jure Gantar, The Pleasure of Fools: Essays in the Ethics of Laughter (London: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2005).
214
Gantar, The Pleasure of Fools: pp. 10, 14-16.
215
Gantar, The Pleasure of Fools: p. 32.
216
Gantar, The Pleasure of Fools: p. 48.
213

102

Gantar also recognises humour’s subversive potential, and thinks that it can be
ethical to laugh at the oppressor.217 He then proceeds to see if there will be any
laughter at all in Utopia, when all social inequality has been abolished. He finds
that the prospect for laughter is bleak in the perfect world that various authors have
dreamed about.
Gantar’s conclusion is both interesting and surprising. After he has carefully
demonstrated how all types of laughter can potentially be unethical, he declares
that he has found himself at “an epistemological dead end”.218 The problem is that
ethical criticism of laughter either ends up censoring laughter, or keeps looking for
an innocent laughter that does not exist. He concludes that the subject of ethics “is
incapable of dealing with laughter.”219 The reason is that ethical criticism does not
have the capacity to distinguish between a joke and an insult; it will all look the
same. So Gantar ends up concluding that “When we laugh, we should not care
about offending. And when we investigate laughter critically, we should forget
about ethics”.220
Billig’s approach to laughter and ridicule differs greatly from Gantar’s, since his
starting point is not ethics, but critical sociology. His aim is to question the taken for
granted assumption that humour is something good and positive which is dominant
in today’s western societies. He reminds his readers that much humour also serves
to enforce social order through ridicule and mockery, and that this aspect is a
neglected area in studies of humour.221 Billig is aware that humour can both disrupt
and impose social order. However, in the tradition of critical sociology his focus is
the social control he thinks others have neglected and what appear to be contrary
to dominant common sense beliefs. Nevertheless, this one-sidedness becomes
problematic because Billig almost ends up with the opposite one-sidedness. He
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makes generalisations from everyday ridicule which cannot be justified to apply to
humorous political stunts as well.
Billig shows that the concept of a good sense of humour as a positive character
trait historically is a rather new phenomenon, which was first used in the 1840s, but
did not become common until the 1870’s. In his critical investigation, Billig also
points out that contrary to common sense impressions, the medical evidence on
the benefits of humour is “weak and inconclusive”.222 He claims that the idea that
humour helps us heal and prevents diseases, as stressed by many self-help
books, is not based on solid evidence. Psychology’s focus on the individual’s
capacity to handle stress and negative events by laughing and looking at what is
positive is also problematic. Such a perspective of learning to live with whatever
the problem is and get the best out of the circumstance is an implicit
discouragement of struggles for social change.223 The origin of many people’s
problems is not a lack of capacity to cope, but their social position in an unfair and
unequal world where wealth is the privilege of the few.
Previously I mentioned Palmer’s point that humorous intent does not automatically
mean that the audience agrees that something is humorous. Differing perceptions
of the same situation are also a theme for Billig who points out that ”one person’s
harmless bit of teasing will be another’s cruelty”.224 This is most obvious when it
comes to ridicule and mockery. In everyday interactions, few people are willing to
admit that they ridicule and mock others. What the target considers inappropriate,
the person who is responsible for it instead refers to as “friendly teasing”. When
someone is accused of mocking or ridicule during the interactions of daily life,
many respond that no harm was meant or that they were “just joking”.225 Billig has
named this response the tease spray, which the person offending can spray
around her to cover up the bad smell of ridicule. Billig’s arguments about how
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children learn this behaviour by being mocked and ridiculed by their own parents
through their upbringing are convincing226, and there is little doubt that the same
“tease spray” is used by political activists. On the other hand, people exposed to
ridicule do not have to laugh, but can turn to what Billig calls unlaughter.
Unlaughter is not the same at not laughing because one does not understand; it is
a way of showing disapproval when others laugh.227 Unlaughter easily becomes
the target of ridicule, as will be apparent in chapter 3 about humorous political
stunts.
Billig belongs to the group of humour researchers that think that instead of
producing “real” rebellion, humour becomes a safety valve.228 The problems with
this position were addressed in detail above and Billig does not add anything new
to the debate. He suggests that there are some life circumstances people ought to
rebel against. Nevertheless, his focus on how ridicule maintains social order in
daily life has led him to sound as if ridicule is always something morally
problematic. He acknowledges that ridiculing a child as a form of discipline might
be considered a milder form of punishment than violence, but this is not discussed
in relation to humour’s rebellious potential.229 If the example of the ridiculed child is
transferred to societal level, the equivalent would be that a mocking would be
better than a violent crackdown on protesters. Although he provides an example of
a child ridiculing its parent this is not transferred to an ethical discussion about
what it means when a subordinate political group ridicules those in power.

Conclusion
Both nonviolence and humour have been researched academically as
multidisciplinary fields. Humour as a form of protest has caught the attention of
many authors, studying themes as diverse as political jokes, traditional folly, culture
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jamming and humour during occupations. They come from various backgrounds,
including everything from sociology, folklore research and gender studies, to
organisational theory and community studies. Many scholars have contributed with
insights through case studies focusing on particular circumstances or specific
forms of humour, but few have been interested in humour as an aspect of
nonviolent resistance.
Theories of Sharp and Gandhi were used to introduce the variety in approaches to
nonviolent action. These theories range from viewing nonviolence as a pragmatic
choice, which increases the odds for success, to the only morally acceptable way
to strive for social change, involving the activist’s whole life. The four rationalities of
dialogue facilitation, power breaking, utopian enactment and normative regulation
suggested by Vinthagen provide a framework for understanding nonviolent action
which takes its complexities into consideration. In chapter 7 I will investigate how
the different rationalities might be affected by diverse forms of humour.
Within humour studies what is called the incongruity tradition is most dominant,
and this aspect is also included in the definition of humour used here. However, the
opposite of humour is routinely called “serious” both in academia and everyday
language – a use of terminology which creates an artificial and misleading
dichotomy between the “serious” and the humorous. I consider it more useful to
refer to the opposite of humour as “rational” or “non-humorous”, a distinction that
takes into account that some humour is indeed deadly serious.
There are two important works on the ethics of humour. Billig thinks that ridicule
plays an underestimated role in social control, but has not investigated political
humour aimed at kicking upwards. Gantar concluded that it is impossible to judge
humour through the lens of ethics.
Often the data for analysing humorous protest has been whispered jokes, which by
their very nature do not engage with the opponents. The emphasis of this source of
data is probably one reason why there have been so few investigations into the
interactions between humorous nonviolent resisters and their opponents.
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For decades it has been debated whether humour contributes to resistance or if it
is “just” a vent for frustration that either has no impact or is counterproductive
because it takes time and energy away from activities that would make a real
difference. For me it is impossible to frame this as a question of either-or. Some
political humour probably has very little influence on relations of power, but to claim
humour will never contribute to resisting dictatorship, abuse and injustice is a very
strong statement. Those who are proponents of these ideas seem to have a
rudimentary understanding of power and resistance. The insights that authors such
as Foucault, Scott and Bayat have provided about the complexity of power and the
subtle and discreet ways that resistance is practiced behind the scenes are absent
from these scholars’ writings. In addition it is not clear what they actually think
constitutes “real” change and resistance.
Dominant discourses and powerful institutions are unlikely to be dismantled
overnight, but through the centuries, social movements have succeeded in
changing societies dramatically. The question is not if humour can create this
change by itself, which is of course very unlikely, but rather the question guiding
my research: What role can humour play in facilitating resistance to dominant
discourses and powerful institutions and people?
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Chapter 2: A methodology for emancipation and
social change
Introduction
The literature review revealed that relatively little is known about my research
questions regarding subordinate and marginalised political groups’ use of humour
in public to expose, ridicule and influence those they consider more powerful than
themselves. This chapter outlines how I have gathered information and discusses
the possibilities and limitations to the knowledge that can be generated based on
this data. My case study data collection strategy is described, followed by the
methods used for later chapters. Afterwards I discuss the assumptions behind the
decisions I made along the way.

Data collection – a case study strategy
In the previous research on the role of humour in nonviolent resistance done by
myself and others, the Serbian group Otpor had been used as a single case study
to discuss the relations between humour and nonviolence.230 This time I wanted to
broaden the data in order to discuss the questions on a more general basis and not
be limited by the circumstances around this or another particular case. I decided to
look at many instances of the use of humour and in addition explore how humour
was used in relation to other non-humorous methods of challenging relations of
power. Conducting several case studies appeared to be a way to approach the
subject.
In “The Case Study and the Study of Social Movements” Snow and Trom describe
what they call the “the core defining characteristics of the case study” as:
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(a) investigation and analysis of an instance or variant of some
bounded social phenomenon that (b) seek to generate a richly
detailed and “thick” elaboration of the phenomenon studied
through (c) the use and triangulation of multiple methods or
procedures that include but are not limited to qualitative
techniques231
The “bounded social phenomenon” that I study is political activists’ use of
humorous political stunts. Chapters 5 and 6, the case studies of Ofog and KMV,
illustrate how two different but comparable “instances and variants” of this
phenomenon have utilised humour in their struggles against militarism.232
Snow and Trom write that using case studies is a research strategy rather than a
particular method:
a case study is not a method per se as are ethnography, survey
research, laboratory experimentation, and historical/comparative
research. Rather, we argue that the case study is more
appropriately conceptualized as a research strategy that is
associated with a number of data-gathering methods or
procedures.233
This means that researchers who use case studies as a data collection strategy
still have to specify what methods they have used in order to collect the data for
the case study. For both my case studies I have used a triangulation of methods
which is described in detail below.
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In order to get even more information about the social phenomenon of humorous
political stunts, I also collected the examples that are part of chapter 3. They are
not detailed and “thick” enough to deserve the label case studies, but illustrate a
part of the diversity of the phenomenon of humorous political stunts, thus
broadening the study and making it possible to generalise more than what would
have been possible with just the two case studies.
I have not used any quantitative methods, for the simple reason that they would not
be appropriate in order to gather useful information about this subject. Although
qualitative and quantitative methods do have a different epistemological history, I
agree with Howard S. Becker that the difference is not as big as some people
make it. “Practitioners of qualitative and quantitative methods may seem to have
different philosophies of science, but they really just work in different situations and
ask different questions.”234 At the moment, so little is known about humour and
political activism that little valuable information can be gathered through a method
like a large survey.

Selection of cases
Why these particular cases? With so little information about humorous political
stunts available, I aimed to look for case studies that are rich in information and
where it was possible to establish that humour had been or is playing a role for the
political activists. This means that I have used what Patton calls “Extreme or
deviant case sampling”, a special type of purposeful sampling.235 These cases are
not to be considered typical of the way that grassroots political activists use
humour. The two groups in the case studies use or have used humour to a much
larger degree than the average political activist group. At the same time, I was
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interested in the interplay between humorous and non-humorous activities, which
ruled out groups that have humour as their primary strategy, such as the Yes Men
and Billionaires for Bush.
Many factors play a role in a sampling strategy. As a PhD student, I was
constrained by a time limit and limited economic resources. I also felt it was
important that I use my skills with Scandinavian languages to prioritise
Scandinavian experiences in order for these to be included as research available in
English.
It was not a sampling criterion that the political activists were concerned about the
same or similar themes, but as it turned out, both Ofog and KMV are/were radical
anti-militarists organised like networks that work as marginalised groups within a
democratic setting. Even among radical activists they are quite marginal. These
similarities have led me to offer some conclusions that would not have been
possible with less comparable cases. Nevertheless, there are also major
differences. An obvious one is the separation in time, so while Ofog is still an active
network, KMV dissolved many years ago. The most decisive difference for my
analysis is that KMV worked on a campaign with one particular aim in mind, while
Ofog’s focus is much broader.
The purpose of the 15 examples in Chapter 3 is to illustrate the diversity of the
phenomenon of humorous political stunts with examples that cover different
political issues, varying political circumstances and differing across time,
geography, culture and language. Other differences have more to do with the way
the stunt was carried out – the humorous techniques, mediums used and degree of
professionalism. This number of examples is not required to establish that the
phenomenon I have labelled humorous political stunts exist, but they are useful to
illustrate how much such stunts can vary.
In the selection process for the examples in Chapter 3, I started out with cases that
are described in the literature on nonviolent activism or well known via the mass
media. After I started researching, many activists, researchers, friends and family
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pointed me towards examples I had not heard about before. When deciding on
which cases to include and which to leave out, my criteria for inclusion were that
they:


Illustrate the diversity of the phenomena when it comes to the type of stunt
or humorous technique



Contribute diversity in terms of geography, time, language or culture



Are not well described in academic literature already

However, although this was the ideal, in reality there is an apparent excess of
European and Scandinavian examples. Those not European are all from the
English speaking part of the world. Another limitation is that the majority of the
examples come from groups concerned with social justice, peace, human rights
and the environment. These selection biases might be because it is mainly this
type of groups that uses humorous political stunts, but especially when it comes to
language it is also a reflection of my language skills and the spheres of interest for
people who have suggested cases to me.
Some well documented cases, such as Yes Men, are also included because they
are useful illustrative cases for certain types of stunts, or when the reactions to
them can contribute to a better analysis. Almost all new examples I have come
across fit within the model since they use one of the five types of stunts. It is a
limitation of the study that it does not include more examples from the “global
south” something which would in all likelihood have shown an even greater
diversity. However, other scholars and activists can in the future investigate to what
degree this typology of humorous political stunts is valid outside of the “western
world”.

Data collection process for the case study with Ofog
Chapters 4 and 5 present the results from the case study I did together with the
Swedish anti-militarist network Ofog.
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Sandra L. Kirby, Lorraine Greaves, and Colleen Reid in their book Experience
Research Social Change: Methods Beyond the Mainstream identify three different
techniques for gathering information in qualitative research: 1. Listening (such as
interviews) 2. Observing and 3. Examination of records and historical traces.236 In
this case study, I used all these three techniques in order to gather data. However,
the overall approach was participatory action research and the intention to produce
knowledge that can contribute to social change. I consider participatory action
research a strategy more than a method in itself, the same way that Snow and
Trom speak about the case study as a strategy rather than a method per se. This
way of understanding participatory action research is also in line with McTaggart
who writes that
Action research is not a ‘method’ or a ‘procedure’ for research but
a series of commitments to observe and problematize through
practice a series of principles for conducting social enquiry…237
In the sections below I describe this overall approach of participatory action
research and the methods of participant observation, semi-structured interviews,
workshop facilitation as well as data collection from written documents. I also
describe what expectations the Ofog activists had of the research project and me
and how the research developed.

Participatory action research
The term participatory action research can be used in different ways, but starts
from the assumption that research should contribute to creating change for the
better. Participatory action research is a collaborative process that people do
together and on equal terms in spite of differences in formal qualifications and
training. It is used in many different fields such as education, social work and
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development work. Usually one avoids loaded terms that indicate that a neutral
researcher do research on someone else. In the end of this chapter I have included
a discussion on the theoretical aspects of research and power and the
epistemological assumptions behind the whole thesis. In this section I discuss the
way participatory action research inspired the case study with Ofog in practice.
Bridget Somekh’s eight principles of action research sum up nicely what
participatory action research is about:
1. Action research integrates research and action
2. Action research is conducted by a collaborative partnership of
participants and researchers
3. Action research involves the development of knowledge and
understanding of a unique kind
4. Action research starts from a vision of social transformation and
aspirations for greater social justice for all
5. Action research involves a high level of reflexivity
6. Action research involves exploratory engagement with a wide range
of existing knowledge
7. Action research engenders powerful learning for participants
8. Action research locates the inquiry in an understanding of broader
historical, political and ideological contexts.238
These eight principles guided the research process with Ofog, but translating the
ideals into a concrete project within a specific context that set certain limitations
was a challenge.
In the “ideal” action research situation, the person who initiates the research is
herself part of an already established group, for example a group of colleagues or
volunteers. If this ideal is followed, there is no boss who can dominate or direct the
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process or an outside expert who knows how research is supposed to be done. In
reality, this spontaneous formation rarely happens, and the action research
process is initiated by outsiders.239 Another ideal is that the research is carried out
collaboratively by the whole group, on a subject that they together have decided is
worth researching. However, much research is done under the label participatory
action research where one of more of these premises is set aside. This was also
the case with my work together with Ofog, where none of these three ideals were
in place. Although I was a long term “insider” to the peace movement, I did not
know anybody in Ofog well and thus approached the group as an “outsider”. In
addition, I already had a particular topic that I considered worth researching – the
use of humour as a way to challenge people in power. Since the premises for the
case study divert so much from the ideals, I consider the case study to be inspired
by participatory action research rather than an example of participatory action
research, although in the beginning I did talk with Ofog about it as if it was a
participatory action research project. However, the principles of combining action
and research, contributing to greater social justice for all through a highly reflexive
learning process on equal terms were indeed guiding the process. Therefore the
project were in many ways more “faithful” to other important principles of
participatory action research than many projects that do not hesitate to use this
label. I will return to some of these critiques of specific action research projects
shortly.
Because the participatory element is so important to participatory action research I
will describe the research process at some length. This is both a story about how I
have become a part of Ofog, and how we together approached the subject of
humour.
I had been aware of the existence of Ofog for a couple of years before I started this
research project through my own involvement in War Resisters’ International
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(WRI), a network of pacifist and anti-militarist organisations from around the world.
I had been active in WRI for more than a decade, and Ofog was in the process of
becoming an associate organisation.
When I started to look for case studies for this project which would be rich in
information and the groups open to working together with me, Ofog came naturally
to mind since my impression was that it was a network which was expanding and
favouring creative radical anti-militarist work. I had met a couple of people who
were active in Ofog, and contacted one of them about my research project and
asked him if he thought Ofog would be interested in working with me and how I
should proceed to find out. He suggested presenting the project on an open email
list, which I did. Already in this first document I stressed that I was interested in
doing participatory action research with Ofog, and not research on them. When I
did not get any response I asked the same person again if he had suggestions for
people I could contact directly. He gave me a name, and shortly afterwards I was
invited to a meeting in Gothenburg. After the meeting, I summarized our agreement
this way:
Ofog expectations:
1. In the day to day work of the organization, Ofog activists
generally don’t spend enough time on reflecting on their
work. Actions are often prepared at short notice and under
time pressure. They would like support from Majken in
facilitating a process for reflections around how Ofog has
used humor in the past and can use it in the future. Ofog
also welcomes the idea of trying to evaluate the use of
humor in order to try out improved methods in the next
round.
2. Ofog likes the idea of Majken presenting an overview of how
different humorous methods have been used by different
groups across time and space.
3. Ofog expects that the documentation of their experiences
that Majken will do through her thesis will be reflected back
in a form that is accessible for nonviolent activists both in
Sweden and in other places.
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The mutual agreement is now:
Majken certainly aims to fulfil the expectations mentioned above.
Ofog and Majken will investigate the potential of humour together.
Majken will facilitate the process, and the experiences will be
documented in Majken’s PhD thesis at Wollongong University,
Australia. In the thesis, Ofog will be identified as an organization,
but all individuals will be anonymous unless they have agreed
otherwise.
The first step will be a workshop to take place in mid May 2011.
Majken will facilitate the content of the day, Ofog Gothenburg will
arrange a place to meet and invite participants from other parts of
Sweden. The day will focus on 1. Lessons learned from past
experiences of humour from Ofog, 2. introduce examples of
humour as they have been used in other places and contexts, and
3. try to develop ideas that can be used during the action camp in
Luleå in July.
The research method that Majken uses is called participatory
action research. This means that Majken is a participating
observer in the process. In addition to this, she will also interview
people. Before the workshop in May, Majken would like to make
some interviews with people.240
I immediately felt very welcome in Ofog, already after this first meeting. When we
talked about the possibility of going through Ofog’s archive, one person said to me
that “we never let journalists into this office. When we meet with them, we meet
somewhere else. But you are one of us.”241 I am not sure where this trust in me
came from, but have assumed that it was based on my background in the peace
movement. However, to my knowledge I was never checked to make sure that I
was not an infiltrator.
Although this project differs from the ideal participatory action research project
because I was not a part of Ofog beforehand and already had decided on the topic
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of our research, I think the process has worked well and benefited both me and
Ofog. Although I was going to earn a degree with the material, the project has not
been haunted by many of the power problems that other projects labelled action
research struggle with. Graham Webb, for instance, is critical of how so-called
action research is used in the area of staff development, where the staff developer
functions as a catalyst or consultant. To Webb, this means that the staff developer
automatically has the upper hand. To him, the idea of equality is a myth which
might be declared in various “ground rules”, but disguises that the established
power relations remain intact.242
A related critique is articulated by Richard Weiskopf and Stephan Laske 243 who
analysed the power dynamics of a project they were involved in. They think that
action research that does not take unequal power relations into consideration
easily contributes to a reproduction of power. In the project they worked on, a
major employer had to close down, but reopened as a cooperative run by the
former workers. Weiskopf and Laske’s project was about how the new cooperative
could survive in the tough business environment and they were given the role as
consultants and outsiders rather than insiders. Their interest in the project differed
heavily from that of the former workers and it turned out to be difficult to create an
environment free from power and domination. According to them, the label action
research became a camouflage for new power relationships.244 Weiskopf and
Laske found that thanks to their academic schooling they and the former
management were the ones who got to name the problems instead of those who
worked on the ground. Although there was a mutual dependence between the
researchers and the workers who needed each other to “succeed” with the project,
it was still an unequal relationship with no common interest regarding what
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constituted success. As an example they mention that written reports are not a
neutral medium of communication, but favour those who are most familiar with
producing and reading text.245
Although there is much to say about power within a network like Ofog, it was not
the challenges mentioned by Webb, Weiskopf and Laske that were most
problematic in this research project. Although some might say that affiliation with a
university and status as a researcher will automatically give one more power, I
definitely did not feel that I had a more powerful position. On the contrary, I was
totally dependent on Ofog for getting data, the network was not depending on me
in any way, and I had not yet proven that I had the “qualifications” that give status
within Ofog.
My status as a PhD student was probably a plus and gave me undeserved respect
among a few people in the beginning, but within Ofog academic schooling is not as
prestigious as in many other settings. My impression was that most Ofog activists
were indifferent towards research and did not expect social science to contribute to
developing more effective nonviolent activism. My history with WRI probably gave
me more credibility than doing a research project. About six months into the
research process, I made a list of five things that appeared give status within Ofog:


Time spent on Ofog work per week and over the years



Self confidence



Having done civil disobedience



Having been to prison for a civil disobedience action



Having been convicted to pay huge amounts in criminal damage for a civil
disobedience action246

Since I had not spent any time working for Ofog, never been to prison, no criminal
damage and only did my first civil disobedience action after I became involved with
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Ofog, this only left me with a bit of self-confidence and general social skills to rely
on. I reflected:
My lack of history with Ofog and civil disobedience make sure that
I’m not something special. To me it is quite obvious that I need
Ofog in order to get data much more than the rest of the group
needs me (…) I have no way of imposing anything on Ofog. People
do as they please anyway.
The last sentence reflected my feeling that even if I had tried to pressure for more
use of humour in order to get more data to work with, it would have been unlikely to
work in this network of independent local groups and affinity groups.
There is one particular area where the research I did is unquestionably an
unavoidable exercise of power, and that is the interpretation of the material.
Although all readers of Ofog’s mailing list were given the opportunity to comment
on drafts of this thesis, only one person did. However, these comments were not
about the conclusions regarding Ofog’s use of humour. This lack of interest in
commenting is a power issue that is seldom addressed. The emphasis on long
written texts within academia is potentially a much bigger barrier than the status
that comes with academic degrees.
Relationships in research projects like this develop over time. After the initial
workshop focusing on humour, I participated in a couple of meetings and
interviewed some of the most active participants in the Gothenburg group. The
next big event I took part in was a summer peace camp in July 2011 in Luleå in the
north of Sweden. During this camp I noticed that I switched from talking about Ofog
as “them” to “us”, clearly identifying as a participant myself.
My interaction with other people in Ofog has taken various forms during the
research project. Below I distinguish between four different types of methods I
used for data collection together with Ofog.
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Participant observation
Participant observation has a long tradition and is a well-established method within
anthropology and ethnography. In the introduction to Contemporary Field
Research: Perspectives and Formulations,247 Robert M. Emerson traces its history
back to the 19th century and British and American interest in the “natives” and
“savages”. The principles of participant observation have developed much since
then and previous ideas of naturalistic observing and recording abandoned. They
have been replaced with reflexivity and acknowledgement that an “observer” will
influence the situation in the field. Another obvious point which is now widely
recognised is that two people are unlikely to make exactly the same observations.
Because researchers know little about humour and political activism, participant
observation within an action research framework seemed like a good way of
supplementing other methods of data gathering. Participant observation is usually
used to observe various forms of everyday life, and is also suggested as a method
to gain insights into a subject that little is known about.248 Introductions to the
method emphasise that the researcher should aim at being a natural part of the
everyday that disturbs as little as possible, striving towards becoming an insider of
whatever group is of interest.249 However, in a setting like Ofog it is impossible to
be an “insider” without “disturbing” both the group itself and the society that Ofog
aims to change. To sit passively in a meeting, taking notes and not participate in
the discussion would be more disturbing to the social interaction and everyday life
of Ofog than to contribute with personal opinions.
Between May 2011 and October 2013 I participated in a number of the meetings in
the local group in Gothenburg and in most of the bigger activities at the national
level such as camps, the celebration of Ofog’s 10 year anniversary and yearly
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national meetings that decided on organisational matters and made some plans for
the future. I also participated in some humorous actions, but not all. In this way, I
was very much a participant observer of the everyday life of Ofog. However,
because I was not interested in studying Ofog as a group, but in working together
to study the phenomena of humour, this is not a traditional ethnographic study.
Much could be written about the interactions and dynamics within Ofog, but that
would be a different study. After each meeting or action I wrote field notes, but the
only topics I systematically wrote about were ideas about humorous actions that
had been suggested and attitudes towards the use of humour.
As a result of this participation through two and a half years, I have indeed become
an “insider” in the sense that I consider myself a fully accepted participant in Ofog
in my own right, and not just as a researcher. At the end of the research project, I
am also very likely to continue my involvement in the group. However, I write the
term “insider” in quotation marks because I agree with Kirby, Greaves and Reid
that it is more helpful to speak about reflexivity than a rigid insider-outsider
dichotomy.250 By reading and discussing methodology with other people in
university environments I have developed my ability to have a reflexive attitude
towards both my own and others’ taken-for-granted assumptions. By sometimes
taking a step back from my “insider” role, I can “travel” back and forth between the
different positions. This is not a skill that one acquires for good, but an attitude that
requires continued attention. As someone who is now an active participant in Ofog,
I aim to present the point of view of other “insiders” as accurately as I can.
Although I do not claim to speak for everyone in Ofog on all subjects, it is possible
to present the point of view of other people relatively accurately without having
lived exactly the same experience.
The advantage of being part of Ofog myself is that I see from the “inside” how
people talk about humour and how humour is treated as a subject when I or
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someone else have come up with humorous ideas. Nevertheless, being so close
also has some disadvantages. Especially as time passed, my impression is that
many people came to view me more and more like any other Ofog activist, and
less and less as a facilitator of a research process we were doing together. This is
of course a very good sign of trust and acceptance, but it also meant that I lost the
possibility of being seen to be an “outsider”.
Participant observation regarding peace, war and conflict is not unusual.251 Patrick
Coy’s study of Peace Brigades International, an organisation that offers
accompaniment to peace, union and human rights activist in high risk
environments, discusses a number of ethical dilemmas.252 Although his work is a
traditional ethnographic study in a situation of armed conflict that does not involve
participatory action research, some of the dilemmas he faced have similarities with
mine. For instance, Coy had to juggle with the issue of having more than one
“agenda”. He appears to have been a committed participant in Peace Brigades
International during his time in Sri Lanka and writes that he was more involved in
the work of the organisation than what is usually the norm in ethnographic
studies.253 From his writing it seems obvious that he valued the interests of those
he was there to protect as well as his fellow activists high. Nevertheless, like me,
he also had his research agenda, and for Coy that influenced the risks he was
willing to take.
Barrie Thorne in her research on the draft resistance movement in the US in the
1960’s encountered some of the same challenges when she decided to avoid
participating in activities that meant a risk of spending time in jail.254 In my research
project with Ofog, the dilemma has not been what kind of risks I was willing to take,
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but how much I should encourage the use of humour. I truly believed (and still do)
that carefully planned humorous political stunts would be a very effective method
for us to use. At the same time, I continually had to consider if I argued in favour of
humour because I thought it to be a wise strategy, or because it would generate
interesting data for me to analyse. In the chapters on Ofog I have aimed to
describe my own involvement in the discussions, development and performance of
the humorous political stunts as accurately as possible.
Coy also discusses the dilemma of informed consent in fluid arrangements where
participants come and go and consent has to be renegotiated continually.255 In my
case, Ofog’s network structure and lack of a formal hierarchy on some occasions
made informed consent problematic. Because of its decentralised structure, very
few decisions in Ofog are made at the national level. As described above, it was
the Gothenburg group that agreed to do the participatory action research project
together with me. When meeting new people at the national level or when new
people joined the Gothenburg group, I have done my best to tell them that I was
doing this project. Nevertheless, it is very likely that there are some people who
have never heard about it (for example if they only participated in part of a
meeting) or maybe forgotten that I told them. When it came to particular humorous
actions and I was part of an affinity group, I was careful to obtain oral consent from
everyone else in the group to use material from our joint action in my thesis. I
described what I was writing about, the basic principles of participatory action
research and promised that I would not disclose their names or any other
information that could identify them in anything I wrote.
A final theme that Coy raises which is also relevant for me is the integration of the
activist and academic self. For Coy, his research project together with Peace
Brigades International made it possible for him to combine his long-time interest in
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peace and justice with his academic career.256 In an article specifically about
activist academics, Divinski et al. define these as “academics who attempt to
integrate their academic and activist identities”.257 The authors outline some of the
problems of conflicting roles and expectations. The main obstacle to integration of
activist and academic selves is that academic’s work for social change is seldom
rewarded academically and that academic institutions generally uphold the status
quo rather than work for change. Obstacles also occur when activist organisations
do not see the relevance of academic research to their work. For example,
expectations may differ considerably when it comes to timing and complexity.
Academic research takes time and emphasises complexity, while activists
frequently are concerned with the need for immediate action and conclusions that
can be boiled down to a bumper sticker slogan.258 Although it has sometimes been
a challenge to integrate my activist and academic self, my experience of working
together with Ofog on the use of humour is that it has made it possible to combine
my passion for radical anti-militarist peace work with my academic interest.

Semi-structured interviews
The second method for data gathering I have used within the overall strategy of
participatory action research in the case study on Ofog has been to make formal
semi-structured interviews with ten people about the use of humour.
Semi-structured interviewing is another well-established method used to get a
number of different types of information.259 With interviews it becomes especially
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obvious that data are not something which is just “out there” waiting to be
collected. It is created through the interviewer’s and the interviewee’s interaction.260
All interviews were done on a one-on-one basis, except one where two persons
were good friends, had participated in many of the same events and preferred to
do the interview together. Most of the interviews took place in quiet environments
either at Ofog’s office or in the activists’ own home or a friend’s home. Two of the
interviews were focused on a certain action I wanted to know more about. The
remaining eight were longer interviews about many aspects of humour. I had
prepared a set of questions to be asked and tried to make the conversation as
natural as possible. I aimed to focus on events that the interviewees had
participated in, but some also spoke more generally. Very often people on their
own initiative brought up themes that I had planned to ask later, and I did not have
the opportunity to phrase the question exactly as I had planned. I just made sure
that we had covered all the themes that interested me. The great benefit of the
semi-structured interview is the possibility for people to describe things in their own
words, and for the opportunity to ask them to elaborate on interesting or
unexpected things.
The eight longer interviews were audio recorded and some parts transcribed. The
purpose of the interviews was twofold. They provided facts about events that I had
not observed myself and they gave an impression of what the humour means to
those who tell about it. When it comes to research about perceptions of humour, I
have aimed to be as accurate as possible. Becker writes that all researchers
attribute points of view to those they do research together with. The question is not
if they should or not, but how well they do it – how accurate they are. Nobody can
be perfect, but a good researcher does better than zero when describing what
other people think.261
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Some informants are quoted at length in order to give the reader as vivid an
impression of the situation described as possible, especially when it comes to
particular humorous political stunts. This also gives the reader the opportunity to
agree or disagree with my interpretation and analysis. In other places I chose to
paraphrase what someone said in order to provide a better flow in the text.
Everyone I interviewed signed a written consent form before the interview. After
deciding what to include I send a draft of the text about Ofog to everyone I had
interviewed so they could see any direct quotes or a paraphrasing of something
they had said within the context of what others said and my analysis. Everyone
was invited to check the quotes and paraphrasing and given two months to reply. I
explained that if I did not hear back from them, I assumed that it meant that they
were satisfied with the way I had used the interviews. Almost everyone responded
saying that it looked fine. To me this indicates that the interview data in this chapter
are reliable and have a high credibility. After this initial round I edited the text
considerably, and I also decided that it would increase readability without
disturbing the meaning to edit the transcribed quotes to some degree. Since the
purpose of the quotes is not a word by word analysis, it was more important that
they are easy to read also for readers who are not used to reading oral accounts.
Thus natural parts of oral language, such as ehh, uhh, etc. have been removed. I
also cut out repetition and instead of putting implied meanings in square brackets,
as is common, they are included in the text in most places. Everyone I interviewed
were given the opportunity to comment on the final version of the text as well.
In the case study on Ofog, all the informants have pseudonyms. In the other case
study, some of the informants insisted that I use their real names and I have
respected this wish. The reason I have not done the same regarding the interviews
with Ofog activists is first and foremost that no one has asked me to. As well, many
of the Ofog activists I spoke to have not been exposed much in media and even if
they had insisted that I use their names, it would have taken much convincing for
me to agree. Even if someone had insisted it would have been problematic to
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present some with pseudonyms and others with their real names, making it too
easy for the rest of Ofog to identify everyone I had interviewed.

The development of the research process
The third type of method that I used for triangulating information was facilitating
workshops about humour with Ofog. Workshops are not a standard data gathering
method for researchers, but a common way of sharing knowledge among activists.
Workshops can be done internally within a group where people already know each
other, or can be a way to bring together activists who are not familiar with each
other to share knowledge about a particular topic. The facilitator does not
necessarily have special knowledge about the subject but is there to guide the
process. However, often someone who has a special interest in a topic offers or is
asked to facilitate a workshop about it.262 To use workshops as a method seemed
to be very much in line with the letter and spirit of participatory action research and
a familiar way of working together and organising collective learning in Ofog.
The workshops that I facilitated were a type of participant observation where I took
a leading role and the purpose specifically was for us together to learn more about
humour. In practice a workshop shares many similarities with a focus group
interview where a researcher usually interview 6-10 people about a particular topic
in order to gather information efficiently both from the individuals and from the
discussions that arise among the participants. Sometimes the people in the focus
group know each other, but frequently they have not met before.263 The major
difference between a workshop and a focus group interview is that in a workshop
the purpose is to share knowledge that everyone will benefit from. A focus group is
conducted in order for outside researchers to gather data and if anyone happens to
learn something from the experience that is just a side effect.

262

For more information and to get an impression of the ideas and spirit of workshops and
facilitation see for instance Robert Chambers, Participatory Workshops: A Sourcebook of 21 Sets of
Ideas and Activities (London: Earthscan, 2002).
263
Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods: pp. 385-90.

128

Early in the research process with Ofog I facilitated three workshops in
Gothenburg, Luleå and Malmö between May and September 2011. At the time I
described how I would implement the approach of participatory action research to
my colleagues at the university like this:
In the context of my thesis this means that I sit down with
activists and ask: What questions are you working on? What is
important to you? If you should try to do something humorous,
what could it be? Do you want to try out your ideas? Afterwards I
will continue: How do you think it went? Is there anything you
would do differently if you should try this again?264
The first four questions were addressed in the workshops in Gothenburg and
Malmö as well as in the interviews. These two workshops lasted about six hours
each and were structured as a sharing about past experiences of humour and a
one hour talk by me presenting a number of humorous political stunts carried out
by others to inspire. The longest part of the workshop was spent working on the
question “If you should try to do something humorous, what could it be?” Many
ideas and suggestions came up, but most of them were never carried out. The last
two questions had the character of an evaluation and I aimed to address them in
the affinity groups I participated in that actually carried out humorous political
stunts. The workshop held in Luleå was considerably shorter than the others and
the purpose was to inspire the activists participating in the camp rather than a
genuine sharing.
In order to get an impression of what perceptions people in Ofog had about
humour and political activism, I started both interviews and workshops by asking
what people thought could be achieved by using humour, before saying much
about my own ideas. However, the very action of asking the network to be part of
the research project and inviting participants to a workshop on humour provides
the idea that this is a topic worthy of their time and thoughts. I have no illusion that
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I have not been an “influence” from the very first email, and I assume that I have
caused more talk and thoughts about humour than would otherwise have
happened. Lena, who I interviewed after the first workshop in Gothenburg,
mentioned this spontaneously during our conversation. Spending a whole day on
humour had made her realise how much humour Ofog used, and it had been very
revealing for her to think about Ofog’s activities along those lines.
Informed consent for the workshops was sought in a tacit way. In all written
invitations to workshops there was a reference to the fact that the workshop was
part of an ongoing participatory action research project and the insights from the
workshop would be used in my thesis.
The four questions to the participants in the workshops were phrased like this:
1.

What is the best example of a humorous nonviolent action that you

know of?
2.

What do you think can be achieved by using humour as a method in

nonviolent actions?
3.

How can humour influence relations with the military, media, arms

producers and police in nonviolent actions?
4.

Can there be any problems with using humour as a method in

nonviolent actions?
The answers to question 1 became background information for me. During the
analysis the answers to numbers 2 and 3 were divided into the four categories:
a)

facilitating outreach and mobilisation

b)

facilitating a culture of resistance

c)

challenging power relations

d)

others

These categories are almost equivalent to subheadings in Chapters 4 and 5 and
together with information from the interviews some of the answers are included
here as part of the analysis of the effect and meaning of humour.
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Participant observation, interviews and the workshops were all part of the
triangulation. I also used the interviews in the spirit of participatory action research
to ask people what expectations they had of the project and of me as a researcher.
Some focused on what had been mentioned already during the initial meeting –
that they would like more focused discussions about strategy, and how humour
could be part of that. Another recurring topic was to be inspired and learn about
how humour had been used by other groups in other contexts. In addition, there
were also suggestions for particular ideas to look more into. Two of them can also
give an impression on how the research process worked. Clowning was a theme
that came up in almost all interviews and many expressed interest in developing
this further. When I specifically asked if they thought it would be interesting to look
at clowning in connection with counter recruitment (discouraging people from
enlisting in the military), I received several positive responses, and it is something
we worked on during the workshop in Malmö. Therefore it is also an idea I spent
time investigating and contributed to organising.
It is a natural part of the process of discussing ideas that some of them have not
been carried out and maybe never will. Several people expressed interest in
looking into another topic, how humour could be used in the legal system, for
instance during court cases. So far Ofog had always been very serious during the
court procedures and tried to appear as otherwise “ordinary” citizens who were
only breaking a particular law. However, in a research process like this such a
suggestion requires not just that it is an interesting idea, but that someone who has
a court case coming up would like to carry it out, and that did not happen.
Asking people how they would like to work with humour is an unusual starting point
in an activist context, and this is also the source of the biggest tension in the
project. My primary interest was to explore humour, and it did not matter much to
me if it was done in relation to military exercises, arms production or military
recruitment. For everyone else in Ofog, this was a strange order of things, since
they wanted to start either with a particular theme that they were most concerned
about, like recruitment, or think strategically about areas where they thought Ofog
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could have most influence. When I asked Lisa if she was interested in participating
in humorous actions directed outwards, she is the one who expressed this most
directly when she said:
I really don’t know at all, I don’t know what I want to do with Ofog
in the future. That depends on what most people seem interested
in doing and if I feel inspired by that in particular. I really can’t
say that I want to do something funny, because it is not that I
want to be funny (…)I want to do what I think is best, (…)
otherwise it is a bit like a weird end to start in.
When I started the project I had expected that it would result in more use of
outward directed humour than what it did. Of course it is not possible to say what
kinds of humorous political stunts, if any, would have been carried out without the
research project. But in my naïve perception about what role I could play, I had
hoped that my enthusiasm for humour would be more contagious. As it turned out,
Ofog had a peak event in July 2011 quite early in the process. After that some of
the most driving people reduced their commitment to Ofog.
My original idea was to do follow-up workshops, but it never became possible to do
them the way I planned. In Malmö, the small group was hibernating when it was
time to do a follow-up workshop a year later. In Gothenburg the group was still
active, but with considerably less activity than the year before. For this reason I
decided to suggest a one hour feedback of the preliminary results rather than push
for a longer event where very few people were likely to show up. This short session
took place in September 2012. None of the participants were interested in focusing
particularly on humour in the near future, but together we identified a need for a
workshop about strategy. Although some humorous ideas came up here, most
people considered it more important to work on long term organisational issues
where humour would not be appropriate. I think this was a wise strategy although it
meant that I obtained less data than I originally expected.
My attempt to honour the wish that material from the research project became
available to activists in a non-academic form has also taken different formats. The
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first was a booklet called “Humour and political activism – inspiring examples from
around the world”. It includes examples which are described in chapter 3. The first
version of this was printed in July 2011 and sold for a very reasonable price to
cover printing costs during the camp “War starts here.” The second type was the
one hour feedback mentioned above where I presented my findings relating to
Ofog and the typology presented in Chapter 3.

Other methods
The three methods of participant observation, interviews and workshops generated
a rather large amount of data about the use and perception of humour in Ofog. In
addition I collected written documents like press releases and photos produced by
Ofog as well as media coverage of Ofog actions provided by newspapers, radio or
websites. This material supplements the data from the three other methods.
Chapter 4 focuses on Ofog’s experiences with the rebel clown army. In order to
make comparisons with the original British Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown
Army (CIRCA) and other ways of using clowning in political activism I also
analysed 10 videos from YouTube featuring rebel clowns. The main purpose was
to document how seldom rebel clowns use incompetence in their performances,
something which is a staple ingredient in traditional clowning. The videos were all
downloaded from youtube.com on October 22 2013. It is a random selection of the
videos that appeared when searching for “clandestine insurgent rebel clown army”
and where it was obvious from the picture and/or the description that they were
about rebel clowning. I picked out videos from different clown actions in different
cities, taking place between 2005 and 2013.
As part of the joint effort with Ofog to understand humour better, I also did another
type of interview/observation that is neither participant observation nor semistructured interview. In August 2012 while other Ofog activists did a gym session
against the military training area in the north of Sweden called NEAT, I dressed as
neutrally as possible and talked to people who stopped to watch the performance. I
was able to talk to 15 people during the 45 minutes the action lasted and get their
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impression about what they were watching. The purpose was to find out to what
degree the action was successful in getting the anti-militarist message across.

Data collection process for the case study on KMV
The case studies on Ofog and KMV have some similarities, but also obvious
differences. With KMV the events now belong to history with all the advantages
and disadvantages that poses for a researcher. Looking from a distance, some
things become clearer. With KMV, it is easier to see the role of humour within an
overall approach – when it comes to Ofog, the events are too close both
emotionally and time-wise to get the same clarity. Most of the key people in KMV
are still alive, but 30 years is a long time for busy people who since then have
moved on with their lives. People who only encountered KMV in the outskirts of
their life are likely to remember this time as even more distant.
KMV’s history and role in the Scandinavian peace movements is hardly
documented at all, except that one of the participants has written a little about it.265
For the triangulation of this case I have used four types of sources: Newspaper
reports from the period, KMV’s own documents, interviews with four key informants
– three activists and one representative from the government – as well as the
official documents about the law change that eventually took place.

Newspaper reports of KMV’s activities
Analysing written documents is a standard method for data gathering, especially
used by historians who trawl the archives for information. However, searching the
official archives is not likely to produce much evidence of KMV’s existence. Official
documents from the ministry of justice would be about individual men who refused
conscription, not about the organisation. Although the media are not known to be
the best source for facts, in this case they provide the most reliable data available
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about when things happened and approximately how many participated. The
newspaper coverage also gives an impression of how some of the activities of
KMV were perceived by the surrounding society. I have used the articles to better
understand KMV’s use of humour rather than a content analysis of the media
coverage. My main interest has not been what the media write about KMV and
why, but to get closer to KMV, the thinking within the group and what responses
the authorities provided through the media.
The limitation of this data source is that the newspapers’ objective is to sell as
many papers as possible, inclining them to focus on the issues they think their
readers will be interested in. The decisions about what to print reflect the fact that
news production is geared towards writing about conflict rather than reconciliation
and the spectacular and unexpected rather than the everyday and ordinary. Thus
they covered spectacular actions carried out by KMV, but not the more hidden or
less conflict oriented aspects. The newspapers, for instance, do not write about
internal organising or lobbying activities. The materials I have obtained from
newspapers also reflect that some individuals within KMV had a greater wish to
and were more skilled at generating attention toward their individual conscientious
objector cases than others.
The news reports are from both local, regional and national Norwegian
newspapers. In addition I have included one TV report which two people I
interviewed considered very important. Most of the articles I have obtained from
KMV participants’ personal archives; the TV broadcast I bought from the
Norwegian national TV archive. Although I knew KMV activists themselves had
collected most of the published material, I was interested in finding out if the
coverage was as extensive as some of the people I interviewed thought. For this
reason I also did a wide search for KMV in seven selected mainstream regional
and national newspapers for the period 1980-1989 (Aftenposten, Adresseavisen,
Hamar Arbeiderblad, Klassekampen, Morgenbladet, Nationen, Nordlys and
Stavanger Aftenblad). These newspapers can be searched electronically at the
National Library in Oslo. For these wide searches I used the search words
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“Kampanjen mot verneplikt” (campaign against conscription), “siviltjeneste i
fengsel” (substitute service in prison) and “nektet siviltjeneste” (refused substitute
service). In the same newspapers I also searched specifically for two particular
actions, narrowing the search period to June 24-27 1983 and September 20-21
1983, but with the broad search words “fengsel” (prison) and “aktor” (prosecutor). I
also searched manually through the microfilms of six other national and regional
newspapers (Arbeiderbladet, Dagbladet, VG, Finmarksposten, Fædrelandsvennen,
and Bergens Tidende) for the same narrow time periods. Neither the manual nor
the electronic searches are perfect, which I discovered by doing both for the two
newspapers Nordlys and Stavanger Aftenblad. In the first, I found an article in the
manual search that did not appear in the electronic search. In the second, I found a
piece in the electronic search that I had missed with the manual. Nevertheless,
although there is a possibility that I have missed some small mentions here and
there, I feel confident that I have had access to the large majority of the relevant
news coverage.

KMV documents
The most central source for this case study is the documents produced by KMV
itself. The newsletter Rundbrev266 which was distributed to all subscribers with
irregular intervals from 1 to 6 times per year, turned out to provide valuable
information. I am especially grateful to Ulf Norenius and Jørgen Johansen for
giving me a complete collection of the KMV newsletter from 1982-1990 as well as
many other documents. The information in Rundbrev includes minutes from the
grand meetings which were KMV’s “decision making body”, invitations to various
meetings and reports and documentation of the network’s activities. Some items
were produced by KMV, but frequently the newsletter contained photocopies of the
newspaper coverage. Where it has been possible to identify which newspaper it is,
these articles are referenced as a regular newspaper article. On the few occasions
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where KMV photocopied them without writing which newspaper or which date I
have not prioritised tracking down this information, but instead referred to the
relevant newsletter. Where this is the case it is clearly indicated in the footnotes.
KMV also produced some posters, flyers and a booklet. This type of data are
characterised by being made for an immediate purpose. It gives a very good
impression of what was considered important information to the participants of
KMV at the moment, a snapshot of the group’s daily life. Unfortunately these items
were usually not dated. This means that they give an impression of KMV in the
1980’s, but it would be very difficult to use them to trace developments in the
arguments KMV used over time.
Both KMV’s own documents and the newspaper coverage are mainly descriptions
of events and include almost no analysis. The details of the debates about what
KMV activists thought would be most effective are lost. The only thing left as
“evidence” is what was actually done – presumably what KMV considered most
effective given the human and economic resources available.
The most analytical document is the booklet Verneplikt: Statlig Tvangsarbeid
(Conscription: State forced labour) published for the launch of KMV in 1981, which
explains conscientious objection as a strategy against militarism.267 KMV’s own
documents include almost no self-evaluation and analysis of what is effective. Only
several years later did one of the participants, Jørgen Johansen, analyse his
experiences in two different pieces of writing. 268

Interviews
The third type of data gathering technique for the KMV case study is interviews
with three of the most central activists from the early 1980’s and one person who
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represented the Norwegian state and the department of justice in questions
regarding conscientious objection.
Like in the case of Ofog, these four interviews were done in a semi-structured way.
The interviews with the three KMV activists provided information about some of the
aspects of KMV activities not captured by the news coverage and internal
documents. For many of the individuals concerned these activities were central in
forming them as politically conscious members of society. They can provide
detailed memories of events and their thinking about them. Nevertheless, the time
gap of almost 30 years means that much has been forgotten and many events
“rewritten” in the participants’ minds. They have been told as a good story many
times, but 30 years later the order of things, the time that lapsed between certain
events, the number of participants and so on are no longer reliable.
My awareness of the case of KMV and the humorous political stunts they
performed stems from my close relationship with one of the most active
participants in the group. Jørgen Johansen has been my partner since 1999, and I
have heard him tell some of the stories in this chapter on numerous private and
public occasions. There is therefore a risk that my account and analysis of the
events are biased towards his version. However, both his and the other oral
accounts have been cross checked against the written documentation. Generally I
have considered Rundbrev and newspaper coverage of facts such as dates, times
and numbers more reliable than the interviews.
My relationships with Johansen made it easy to contact other key people in KMV,
and they readily agreed to be interviewed and help with access to their personal
archives. Other researchers might have experienced intense questioning about
their motives for doing this research and be met with a more reserved attitude. On
the other hand, there is a possibility that our relationship can have caused some to
withhold information about the personal dynamics within KMV. However, since it is
the outward directed activities that are the focus here rather than the internal
organising, this has had little if any impact on the analysis and conclusions.
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Johansen was one of the driving forces within KMV, and some of the activities
where he was a key figure take up much space in this chapter. I have carefully
considered whether he is getting undue attention and come to the conclusion that I
have not given him and his case more space than what is required to give a fair
account and analysis of KMV. The only exception is the description of his first court
hearing. The reason that it is his case and not someone else’s is simply that
Johansen’s personal archive includes extensive media coverage from the local
newspaper that would have been time consuming or maybe even impossible to
obtain through a library search on another case.
By only interviewing three of the most central participants in KMV, there is a risk
that the material is biased towards those who took on leadership roles in this
otherwise non-hierarchical network. It does not include the perspectives of those
who only participated for shorter periods of time or observed from the periphery.
This is a conscious decision reflecting my wish to talk to people who might
remember discussions about the choice of strategy and the role of humour rather
than get an overall impression of how KMV worked – that is an issue for future
research. For this chapter, I discussed with the informants how to treat their
identity. I considered it unlikely that people who had been active in KMV and knew
Johansen would not be able to guess who I had talked to. Promising total
confidentiality was not realistic. All three informants also said that they would like
me to use their real names. I ended up deciding this would be the most ethical
thing to do. These people are grownups who spent many years of their adult life
organising KMV activities. They have appeared with names and photos in
countless media interviews, and are very proud of what they did.
The first interview with Ulf Norenius was done in 2012 before I had finished writing
up the events described in the written documentation. I was surprised that he did
not remember more details and discussions, and therefore decided to postpone the
rest of the interviews while I did some more writing. Before I interviewed Johansen
and Øyvind Solberg, I asked them to read a draft of chapter 6 so we could begin
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the interviews with their comments and reflections on that. Interviewing the two
good old friends together also seemed to prod their memories.
Solberg suggested several people who represented the Norwegian state that I
could talk to, and one of them was willing to be interviewed. This person is
introduced with the pseudonym Jens Jensen. Because of the time that had passed
there were many details that he did not remember. However, when he looked at
the timing of various events he did not doubt that it was the total resisters
themselves that played the decisive role in bringing about the law change that they
were working for. This interview is an important confirmation of what appear as a
logical conclusion from the official documents about the law change.

Official documents
KMV’s major success was a change in the law that sent the total resisters to prison
for 16 months but did not call it a punishment. In the archive of the Norwegian
parliament, Stortinget, I tracked down all the relevant documents about the
preparations for the law change, including white papers, official reports,
suggestions for decisions from the justice committee and the transcription of the
debate in parliament.

Epistemological assumptions
After this detailed tour through all the data collection methods and selection criteria
for case studies and examples, I finish this chapter on methodology with some
more general reflections on the epistemological assumptions underlying the thesis
and a discussion about research and power.
Generally speaking, normative approaches to research are more the rule than the
exception – most research in medicine and social work is either explicitly or
implicitly conducted with the purpose of improving people’s lives.269 As a peace
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and nonviolence researcher, I use what Abigail Fuller calls an “emancipatory
methodology”.270 In addition to contributing to an increased scholarly
understanding of nonviolence and humour, I also hope my findings will be
meaningful to nonviolent activists who are interested in developing their strategies
and experiments with humour as a way to challenge power.
There are many labels in use for methods claiming to work in the tradition of
emancipation: Action research, participatory action research, feminist action
research, institutional ethnography, anti-oppressive research, participatory
research, collaborative research to name some of the most popular. Action
research is probably the most well-known of these, and has also inspired my
approach. The term was first used by sociologist Kurt Lewin in 1946 in an article
about the problems that minorities in the US faced.271 Many authors have traced
the historical developments of the different types of emancipatory research
strategies and identified the finer points of their differences and similarities.272
Emancipatory research approaches has been used most frequently in the areas of
education, social work and development where researchers have worked together
with marginalised and subordinate groups in order to improve their situation.
Examples of introductions to these approaches include Participatory Action
Research by Alice McIntyre273, Action Research by Ernest T. Stringer274, Action
Research: A Methodology for Change and Development by Bridget Somekh,275
Revolutions in Development Inquiry by Robert Chambers,276 and New Directions in
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Action Research edited by Ortrun Zuber-Skerritt.277 The research on nonviolence,
social movements and humour introduced in chapter 1 rarely makes use of these
normative research methodologies. Even within a well-established field such as
social movement research where one might expect to find emancipatory research,
this is not the case. For instance, none of the approaches named above is
mentioned in Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg’s book Methods of
Social Movement Research, which solely focuses on methodology for social
movement research. The book otherwise offers introductions to everything from
surveys to semi-structured interviews and historical research.278 Jason MacLeod’s
recent PhD thesis is an exception. MacLeod carried out an extensive participatory
action research project together with the resistance movement in West Papua to
explore the potential of nonviolence.279
Dorothy Smith and the feminist standpoint theory she developed has been another
inspiration for my investigations. In this tradition one acknowledges that there is no
neutral point from which to start researching and that people’s position in the social
world determines how that world looks and what constitutes the right kind of
knowledge. For Smith, this meant doing sociology from the perspective of women’s
everyday and experiences. The result was sociology very different from what was
the norm of her time where the so-called neutral and objective sociology in reality
almost exclusively reflected the standpoint of white affluent men with a Eurocentric
perspective. In the volume Sociology for Changing the World280 Caelie Frampton
and her co-editors celebrate the legacy of Dorothy Smith’s work related to
institutional ethnography. This in turn led George Smith to his work on the ruling
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regimes and ruling relations.281 Although the research I present here is not a piece
of institutional ethnography, institutional ethnographers’ attempt to bridge the gap
between academia and activism and produce knowledge which is useful for
activists has been a great inspiration and in that sense I attempt to follow their
lead.
Another inspiration has been Leslie Brown and Susan Strega’s book Research as
Resistance: Critical, Indigenous and Anti-Oppressive Approaches.282 They use the
term anti-oppressive research, but are engaged in a similar journey towards a
methodology that emphasises social justice in a world of unequal power relations.
They want to engage in the discussion about what constitutes knowledge and
write:
Framing the discussion about what constitutes knowledge within
the discourse of positivism obscures important questions about
how the development of knowledge is socially constructed and
controlled, how knowledge is used, and whose interests
knowledge serves.283
Brown and Strega are concerned with what they call “research from, by and with
the Margins” and continue:
Marginalization refers to the context in which those who routinely
experience inequality, injustice, and exploitation live their lives.
Being marginalized refers not just to experiences of injustice or
discrimination or lack of access to resources. In the research
context, it acknowledges that knowledge production has long been
organized, as have assessments of the ways producing knowledge
can be “legitimate”, so that only certain information, generated by
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certain people in certain ways, is accepted or can qualify as
“truth”.284
What Brown and Strega say here is that traditional types of research contribute to
upholding the status quo, even when researchers have no intention of this, as long
as it keeps limiting what are “real” truth, knowledge and science. For them, it
means that any researcher who wants to claim that he or she is doing antioppressive research also has to look towards unconventional research
methodologies: “We take the position that research cannot challenge relations of
dominance and subordination unless it also challenges the hegemony of current
research paradigms.”285
Although I agree with Brown and Strega that traditional ways of researching have a
strong tendency to limit what can be considered “real” knowledge and that the
voices of the marginalised are seldom heard, I think their picture is very black and
white with little space for nuances. Blaming certain methods for the ways they have
been applied is like blaming the gun for a murder. For instance, statistical analysis
– a conventional research method – can contribute to liberation. An example of this
is the study by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan about nonviolent resistance
that was introduced in Chapter 1.286 They used statistical analysis to document
how nonviolence is more effective than violence, a finding which has a strong
potential for contributing to emancipation when this knowledge spread among
activists.
Kirby et al. define research as a “systematic inquiry into a phenomenon of
interest”.287 They identify three research paradigms:
1. The instrumental paradigm, the traditional positivist paradigm which is often
based on quantitative methods. Here the emphasis is on controlling the
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environment in a way which means that other researchers can reproduce the
research and get the same results.
2. The interactive paradigm, which includes constructionist and ethnographic
approaches. Here the focus is on lived experience and the construction of
meaning. The theoretical base is in phenomenology, symbolic interactionism and
grounded theory. For the researcher importance is on credibility.
3. The critical paradigm focuses on reflexive knowledge and is founded on
materialist, structural, feminist, and queer theory. Here the focus is on power
relations as well as what is right and just.288
My approach to this study has been inspired by the critical paradigm. I wanted to
explore how activists use humour to challenge established relations of power. But I
was also interested in activists’ own reflections about humour, and the meaning
they attribute to it. This part of the research belongs in the interactive paradigm and
is mainly included in the case study with Ofog.
In the concluding chapter of Research as Resistance: Critical, Indigenous and AntiOppressive Approaches Karen Potts and Leslie Brown provide three statements
that convey what it means to be an anti-oppressive researcher:


Anti-oppressive research is social justice and resistance in process and in
outcome



Anti-oppressive research recognizes that all knowledge is socially
constructed and political



The anti-oppressive research process is all about power and relationships289

These statements are very radical and have far reaching consequences for how
research should be done. However, as the introductions to the methods above
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indicated, it is not so much the choice of a particular method that makes the
difference, but the way it is applied in practice, the assumptions about knowledge
that is behind it, who is going to benefit from the research and what the goal of the
research is. Also crucial is the choice of what topic to study, something seldom
discussed in the focus on methods.
In her call for peace researchers to conduct emancipatory research, Fuller refers to
Dorothy Smith and feminist standpoint theory as the epistemological background
for suggesting that in order to work for social change, one needs to work together
with the oppressed in order to get results which are more scientifically valid.290
Researchers do not start their projects from a neutral point. Their own position in
the world determines what they consider worth researching, and how the research
is carried out. Both the choice of subject and the interpretation of the results are
influenced by who the researcher is and knows. Interpretation is not just something
one does when the data have been collected, but part of the research process from
start to finish. What researchers consider important to ask guides what kind of
information they are able to gather. All researchers construct meaning, and what
kind of meaning they are able to see and make sense of depends on the point from
where they look. Methods are not just a toolbox to pick and choose from, they all
come with assumptions about the world and what can be known about it.291
Researchers have a standpoint in relation to their research whether they declare it
or not, and even if they are not aware of it.292 When choosing the subject for my
thesis, I made a conscious decision to investigate a subject that I thought would be
of interest to nonviolent activists striving for social change, and enable activists to
make informed decisions about the possibilities and limitations of using humour as
a strategy in the struggle. I strongly believe more knowledge in this area can
contribute positively to activists’ goals and make activism more fun, effective,
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sustainable and welcoming to newcomers. My background for this choice was that
I had been an activist and organiser, contributing to peace and anti-militarist work
for almost two decades before I embarked on this research journey. There are
some disadvantages with choosing a subject I feel so passionately about. It has
been a constant challenge to distinguish between what I and other activists would
like to be the result of humorous political stunts and perceive have happened, and
what conclusions it is reasonable to draw based on the information available.
However, this is a problem many researchers face when studying groups they
personally support. The proximity to my area of study has made me acutely aware
of the limitations with the data, an awareness that might not have been so obvious
for researchers who believe they have a greater distance to the subject of their
inquiry.
Much of the literature on emancipatory methodologies mentioned above speaks
about conducting research which is meaningful to subordinate groups or the
margins as Brown and Strega call it. Talking about “margins” can give a wrong
impression, since in some cases the “margins” are actually the numerical majority,
for instance in some of the nonviolent revolutions mentioned previously.
In these texts, subordination is either explicitly or implicitly understood to be poor or
disadvantaged communities, or victims of discrimination and harassment. Although
some of these subordinate groups take up nonviolent struggle and might be
inspired to use humour effectively, many nonviolent activists whose stunts are
included here are not subordinate in this sense. On the contrary, they are
frequently well educated, white, have middle class incomes and no problem
speaking up for themselves. Nevertheless, activist groups working on peace,
justice and environmental issues are indeed subordinate and highly marginalised in
relation to the governments, multinational corporations, and authorities with state
backing that they are challenging.
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Research and power
That power is a complex phenomenon became clear already in Chapter 1 when I
discussed power, resistance and the possibilities for change through humour. The
Foucaudian perspective on power as relational and multidimensional that I
advocated clashes somewhat with part of the action research tradition. Action
research has its roots in the Enlightenment and ideas of progress, reason and
improvement that Foucault was critical of and only saw as contributing to ever
more sophisticated ways of exercising control. However, some researchers have
drawn from both approaches. Somekh’s inspiration by Foucault is reflected in the
eight principles of action research quoted above. She emphasises that power is not
something negative, but constructed in social interaction. It is not something one
person does to another, but part of social formations.293 In “Exposing Discourses
through Action Research”, Leonie E. Jennings and Anne P. Graham try to reconcile
the modern tradition of action research with based in rationality and progress with
the postmodern “moment” and Foucault’s poststructuralism. They remind action
researchers that postmodern ideas are not a rejection of struggles against
oppression and suggest discourse analysis to be a useful way for action
researchers to deconstruct established dominant discourses. There might be more
than one “truth” and interpretation, depending on which perspective one look from.
They also draw attention to some of the commonalities between action research
and postmodern approaches, such as concerns with power and knowledge.294
Many action research projects work from the assumption that the conditions for the
marginalised can be improved. This is also the normative approach taken in this
research project. However, in some of the literature on participatory action
research and related approaches, there seems to be an assumption that policy
makers will change policies towards social justice once they know better and if they
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are included in the process.295 This implicit or explicit assumption appears rather
naïve, but can probably be explained by action research’s roots in the
Enlightenment. Policymakers might sometimes change laws and regulations when
better informed, but there is nothing automatic in this process. In a chapter about
young people’s transition from care, Deb Rutman et al. write:
… the common objectives in doing participatory action research
are for shared ownership, learning and action. This often pits
researchers and clients/subjects against authority and resources;
indeed, the solutions to issues that emerge do not have to be
acceptable to those who hold power and control over resources.296
Some issues are more contested than others, and it would probably be difficult for
Rutman et al. to find policymakers who do not use rhetoric about providing the best
transition from care as possible. The disagreements would arise about the best
way to do it and how this service should be prioritised when compared with other
tasks competing for the same resources. In the Scandinavian countries where my
case studies were carried out, it would be difficult to find a politician who would say
that acting against poverty and discrimination is undesirable. Research on poverty
and discrimination might be areas where these politicians would change policies if
they are better informed and included in the process of finding solutions together
with disadvantaged groups. However, when it comes to areas such as arms export,
military exercises and conscription, the political rhetoric is very different. Here one
should be careful not to underestimate the vested interests in upholding the status
quo and the active and deliberate marginalisation of those who want to change it.
As Fuller writes, “historically those with power have not been known to relinquish
it.”297
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Robin McTaggart writes that people underestimate how much oppressive
structures are upheld deliberately by those who actively strive to avoid change and
how much time must be spent on just avoiding regression. In his response to some
of the criticisms of action research he also points out that there are frequently
unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved in a short time. 298 The radical
peace and anti-militarist groups whose humour is the core of this thesis are very
aware that they are considered peripheral by those in power. The voices of these
volunteer networks are easily drowned when they stand up to companies, states
and institutions that have enormous economic and human resources at their
disposal. Any conclusions about the effects of humour also have to reflect this
inequality. It is quite unrealistic to expect a handful of anti-militarist activists armed
with a humorous political stunt to overturn such a dominant discourse as militarism
overnight. Finally McTaggart stresses that emancipation is not some ideal stage.
For him the central question is not “are we emancipated yet?” but “are things better
than they were?”299 For some contexts, one could also ask, “did we prevent it from
getting worse?”
Another way the term “power” is relevant when discussing methodology has to do
with the way research is carried out. The research approaches emphasising
emancipation and change that I have referred to above are becoming increasingly
popular, but sometimes they are now used in ways which dilute concepts of
change and participation of meaning and very far from their roots of liberation.300
For instance, Ortrun Zuber-Skerritt writes about how action research can make
organisations more effective.301 It is a major problem with her approach that she
talks about more effective organisations without discussing what these
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organisations are doing. Where is the emancipation in becoming more effective if
this effectiveness is used to become even better at being violent and destructive?
Developing more effective gas chambers together with Adolf Hitler during World
War II using an action research model would probably have been quite possible.
But it would never become emancipatory as long as it is based on the Nazi
ideology and the result is more effective killing of Jews, homosexuals, gypsies and
others considered unworthy of life. This is an extreme example, but many
institutions, also in democracies, have at least some goals that might have violent
and destructive consequences. Weapons manufactured in Sweden are used in
wars around the world, although the companies’ stated intention is to make a profit
and not that people die. When the Norwegian court system functioned smoothly
regarding the total resisters, it contributed to upholding a law that sent young men
to prison for 16 months because of their beliefs.
A final power issue to make note of is that unequal relations of power do not just go
away because one is aware of their existence. It is not enough to have good
intentions about including the marginalised and subordinate in a research process
in order to make it happen in reality.

Conclusion
Using a case study strategy as my main approach, I have used many conventional
methods for data gathering, such as participant observation, semi-structured
interviews and document analysis of newsletters and media reports. In addition I
have relied on some more unconventional methods as part of the participatory
action research project I did with Ofog, for example facilitating workshops about
humour and nonviolence.
Another researcher would have approached this subject in a different way, but by
being open about my own standpoint and role in the research process others have
the possibility to follow the development of the project and judge the way data have
been gathered and analysed. My long-term commitment to the peace movement
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has provided openings for me that would not have been there for others, but it also
has some limitations.
Humorous political stunts take place within a context, and my perspective has
primarily been from those who initiate these stunts. The research hardly includes
any firsthand accounts about how they were perceived from the “other side”. When
analysing the responses and reactions, I have relied on what can be observed and
what is stated in public, and this is probably the biggest limitation with this project.
Hopefully future research can get closer to those who are the targets of the
humorous political stunts.
This research process has been guided by an epistemological assumption about
social science’s obligation to contribute to creating a society based on respect for
diversity and social justice for all. A positivist research paradigm seldom contribute
to this emancipation, but instead is a part of upholding the status quo by
accrediting more value to a certain kind of knowledge gathered by certain kinds of
people. Although not all research that claims to be participatory and liberating is
this in reality, awareness of the power relations in a research project should
increase the chance that these relations do not determine what will count as
valuable knowledge. By focusing on humour’s role in nonviolent action my hope is
to develop knowledge which is meaningful and useful for nonviolent activists in
their struggles for more peaceful and just societies.
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Chapter 3: Humorous political stunts
Introduction
Humorous political stunts are confrontational performances/actions carried out
openly which attempt to undermine dominant discourses. An original model
consisting of five different types of stunts provides the structure for this chapter.
Before the model is presented I described how I developed the concept of the
humorous political stunt and discuss how to define it.
The five types in distinct ways challenge the prevailing order and transcend
established power relations. I have named them supportive, corrective, naive,
absurd and provocative. Each category is presented with two to four examples
from different political contexts that can illustrate some of the diversity within each
type of stunt. Supportive stunts are framed as ostensible attempts to help and
protect from harm. Corrective stunts present an alternative version of the power
holders’ truth, and the naive stunt challenges from behind a pretended innocence.
The absurd stunt defies all rationality and in the provocative stunt the pranksters
transcend power by appearing not to care about the consequences of infuriating
the powerful. In all instances, humour is the tool of serious dissent and protest
attempting to humiliate and undermine the powerful. The model is based on the
way the stunt relates to the perception of what is true, rational and logical that the
representatives of the dominant discourses aim to uphold.
In the analysis of 15 examples I start with identifying the humorous techniques they
use to generate an amusing incongruity. Then a metaphor of theatre is applied to
these “plays of politics”. The theatre metaphor has four different dimensions that
analyse the cases from the perspectives of who the actors are, what stage they
play on, how the audience is included and interpret the performance and the timing
of the whole affair.
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After the analysis of all the individual examples, the similarities and differences
between the different types of stunts are discussed in relation to a table that
summarises the core characteristics of the different types of stunts. Humorous
political stunts are very diverse when it comes to the mediums they use, the
settings they take place in, and the degree of professionalism in the performance.
Identifying this complexity helps illustrate how power and resistance cannot be
considered a simple question of either-or, but is a multi-dimensional struggle.
In the end of the chapter the humorous political stunts are discussed in relation to
public jokes, theatre and graffiti.

Defining humorous political stunts
This is what I mean by humorous political stunts:
A humorous political stunt is a performance/action carried out in public
which attempts to undermine a dominant discourse. It is either so
confrontational that it cannot be ignored or involves a deception that blurs
the line between performers and audiences. It includes or comments on a
political incongruity in a way that is perceived as amusing by at least some
people who did not initiate it.
The discourses which are challenged can be major and all-pervading discourses
like militarism, consumerism or neo-liberalism, or it can be more limited discourses
controlled by a powerful political party. This challenge can be directly aimed at a
person or institution considered an opponent, or it can be communicated to other
audiences using a variety of media. That the humorous political stunt takes place in
public means that this is more than a humorous critical comment or joke whispered
in secret. One can observe someone doing something without hiding it, although
they might try to hide their identity. The stunts are political in the broad sense that
they comment on a political theme of how society should be organised. Humorous
political stunts also have to be humorous. Since what people consider funny varies
greatly, not everyone will necessarily find the stunts below amusing.
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Among nonviolent activists and scholars the type of activity which I refer to as
stunts are known as actions, but within cultural and performance studies terms
such as performance, happening, hoax or prank are more common. I decided on
the term stunt because it is not so clearly associated with one particular activist or
academic tradition. I have not used Day’s notion ironic activism because not all of
the humorous political stunts rely on the technique of irony. Later I compare
humorous political stunts with conventional/ordinary protest. With these terms I
refer to the stereotypical ideal type of non-humorous, rational routine
demonstrations, speeches, posters, blockades and leafleting. Of course nonhumorous protest can be creative, disruptive and everything but ordinary and
conventional, but nevertheless a rather big proportion of political activism usually
consists of these stereotypical activities.
The focus here is on stunts performed by grassroots political activists, but in order
to illustrate the potential two stunts performed by professional comedians are
included as well. These stunts could have been performed by grassroots activists
since they do not in themselves require access to a professional stage, although in
these cases it certainly helped spreading the ideas. Humorous political stunts
seem primarily to be a tactic chosen by those who communicate critiques or
alternatives to the prevailing order from a subordinate or marginal position, aiming
to disrupt or transform the status quo. I have not identified any stunts in favour of
the status quo, but this possibility is not excluded by the definition.
The logic of humorous political stunts differs from what goes on in theatre
performances, graffiti, stand-up comedies and cartoons that can also be examples
of political humour. The stunts include a confrontation or blurring between
audiences and performers which is usually absent in political humour that uses
these traditional mediums. Stand-up comedies are based on jokes which can be
repeated from one stage to the next. The stand-up comedy can be provocative, but
the audiences remain audiences and the comedian the comedian. As long as the
comedy happens on stage there is usually not enough confrontation to create a
humorous political stunt. The act of making graffiti or a political cartoon can be
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confrontational, but the images that result are clearly distinct from their viewers. In
most theatre performances there is a distinction between the actors and the
audiences. An exception from this is the “invisible theatre”, which does blur the
lines when people are not aware that they have been exposed to a piece of
theatre.302 Invisible theatre is usually not amusing, although it does provide
interesting avenues for humorous political stunts.
A stunt is not a joke, a text or an image which can be transferred from one stage or
show to the next and have the same effect. The performance of a humorous
political stunt is in itself the critique, and although it can be turned into a narrative
that can be retold, the critique and confrontation occur in the original encounter, not
in the retelling. Thus, if something is a stunt or not depends very much on the
situation it takes place within. Some comedians (like Michael Moore, Mark Thomas
and The Chasers) perform stunts which are filmed and included in their TV shows
in order to reach a larger audience.303 Repetitions can also have effect on power
relations, but it is not the encounter which is repeated, only the story about it.
Humorous political stunts have much in common with phenomena such as culture
jamming, satiric theatre and news show parodies, and some examples of
oppositional counter culture like graffiti painting or protest music. When I started
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researching humorous political stunts I did not have a name for this phenomenon.
The definition and explanation developed over time. I knew that there was a type of
actions and performances taking place which to me was different from other forms
of political humour. I had an idea about what my ideal types were – the actions
carried out by Otpor which I had studied before, the Yes Men identity corrections
and CIRCA’s clowning that will appear below, and the KMV actions I will return to
in Chapter 6. When I came across examples of political humour they sometimes
fitted my ideal type, but frequently they did not. Cartoons, theatre, TV and movies
were seldom relevant, although there were a few exceptions.
The definition was developed by going back and forth between the theoretical
definition and the examples, trying to narrow down what they had in common and
what separated them from related phenomena that others had described in the
literature under labels such as culture jamming and tactical carnival. In a
conceptual exploration like this, I have intentionally been clear about what is the
core of the phenomenon, but vague about the borders. The purpose of this is to
remain open about what can possibly be counted as a humorous political stunt in
order not to exclude what might shed light on the subject. I have also taken the
point of departure in the practice of what activists actually do, rather than a
theoretical desk definition. Further research might make it clearer where the
humorous political stunt ends.

Analysing humorous political stunts as “play of politics”
This chapter presents and analyses 15 examples of humorous political stunts
according to my model of five different types of stunts. The distinction between the
different types developed during the process of defining what a humorous political
stunt is. Through this process I approached the examples from different
perspectives. An important one was to look at the 45 different techniques of
humour which Arthur Asa Berger had identified in his book An Anatomy of
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Humor.304 Berger divides the 45 techniques in four categories, depending on
whether they have to do with language, logic, identity or action.
In an attempt to understand the examples better, I started out identifying what
techniques they use in order to generate their humour. Berger’s framework is
widely known within humour studies and professes to be a tool to understand all
types of humour. Although Berger’s techniques were useful to describe what is
funny in most of the examples, I also have some cases which did not fit very well.
However, Berger did not have political humour in mind when he described the 45
techniques, so that should be no surprise that this technical framework is not
enough when one wants to investigate what happens in power relationships where
humour is involved. I do not intend to engage in a discussion about whether
Berger’s techniques are appropriate for describing all kinds of humour or if this is a
good description of them, but those that I have drawn on are useful for analysing
these examples. In addition to the techniques described by Berger, I suggest a few
additional techniques necessary to explain what makes some of the examples
funny.
When the technical approach to humour did not bring new insights about the power
relationship, I started to look at the ways the activists use humour to undermine
and transcend dominant discourses. Above I described how I went back and forth
between the theoretical definition and the examples I had as my ideal types until I
could narrow down what I was interested in. In parallel I also noticed that even
within the phenomenon of the humorous political stunt that I wanted to study, there
was a huge variation in how they were performed and carried out. I found that the
pretence that the stunt is not a form of protest was a central element in almost all
of them, and arrived at five different ways that this pretence is presented, each
challenging the relations of power in different ways.
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The five types in my model are not based on the humorous techniques they use,
but on the different ways they attempt to undermine the discourse of their
opponent, and transcend the established relations of power. They are not meant to
replace the techniques identified by Berger, since they meet a different need. As
with all categorisations, some cases are more clear-cut than others. Nevertheless
these five types transcend power relations in distinct ways, independent of the
techniques used to generate the humour. For example, exaggeration and irony are
central in much political humour and can be found in several of the categories.
The 15 examples included here are not intended to be representative of all
humorous stunts, but to illustrate their diversity.305 Many groups are well known for
performances that fit into my definition of humorous political stunts, but not
included here. Among those are US Reverend Billy and his “church of life after
shopping”,306 and the Guerrilla Girls that drew attention to the lack of women in the
US art world from 1985 and onwards.307 Billionaires for Bush, who change their
name depending on the situation and for instance became Billionaires for Bailouts
during the 2008 Wall Street meltdown, are a well-documented case.308 A historic
example is the dropping of dollar bills at the New York Stock Exchange mentioned
in chapter 1. Other individuals, networks and organisations are radical
cheerleaders309, Raging Grannies310, Laboratory of Insurrectionary Imagination311
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and The Space Hijackers.312 The recent Spanish M15 movement has used much
humour in its protests about the financial crisis313, and in Russia and Belarus, when
people were banned from demonstrating in 2012, the idea spread about toys
holding a protest.314
Several authors have suggested that pranking, culture jamming and creative
activism are becoming more frequent, constitute a new type of activism and are
spreading all around the world.315 I am not convinced these types of activities are
all that new – some of my examples go back 40 years – and it is difficult to judge to
what extend it is global since primarily European and US examples have been
studied. However, academic interest in the phenomena certainly seems to have
increased, at least as measured in the number of publications.
Supportive stunts are framed as ostensible attempts to help and protect from harm
by exaggerating and over-emphasising the discourse and claims to truth upheld by
those in power. Corrective stunts also use exaggeration to present an alternative
version of the power holders’ truth, but they hijack the identity or message of those
in power and declare their protest from this disguise. In the naïve stunts, the
challengers put forward their critique from behind a pretended innocence that
seems unaware that a dominant discourse exists. It provides the possibility to act
as if the pranksters do not understand that what they do can be interpreted as
protest. Absurd stunts attempt to defy all rationality and ignore all dominant
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discourses. Finally, in the provocative stunts the pranksters transcend power by
appearing not to care about the consequences of infuriating the powerful.
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Table 1. A schematic overview of five different types of stunts. Short
version that shows how those who carry out the stunts position
themselves in relation to the dominant discourses.
Type

Description

Position in relation
to dominant
discourse

Dominant
humorous
techniques

Supportive

Activists appear
supportive and pretend
to support, celebrate,
help, or protect from
harm, but the stunt is a
way of invalidating the
target

Exaggerate the
dominant discourse,
play along with it,
overemphasise it

Irony,
parody,
unmasking

Corrective

Activists appear rational
but hijack the identity
or message of their
target in order to reveal
a correction

Exaggerate the
dominant discourse,
play along with it,
overemphasise it

Unmasking

Naive

Activists appear naive
and innocent and
pretend not to
understand that their
action can be
interpreted as a protest

Appear not to
understand
dominant discourse

Pretended
coincidence

Absurd

Activists appear as
innocent clowns that
point towards
absurdities

Ignore dominant
discourse altogether

Absurdity,
slapstick

Provocative

Activists openly act as
provocateurs in order
to expose
vulnerabilities

Don't care about
dominant discourse

Ridicule,
insult
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Table 1 presents a summary of my model. After looking at the 15 examples I will
return to an expanded version of this summary table.
For each example I have aimed to do a number of different things. First of all the
humour is explained within its context in order to enable readers to grasp what is
going on. Without knowing what the situation is about, most of the examples here
become meaningless. Where it has been possible to identify the goals of the
activists and reactions from the audiences these are included in order to analyse
the dynamic of the interaction. In addition to identifying the techniques used to
generate amusement 316, I also explain what makes a certain stunt supportive,
corrective, naïve, absurd or provocative. Finally the examples are analysed using a
metaphor of theatre in order to better understand what happens when a humorous
political stunt is staged.
In his ground-breaking study about how individuals keep up a certain front, Erving
Goffman showed how metaphors of play, drama and theatre can be used to show
how individuals stage their own appearance in front of others.317 Studies of social
movements have also used theatre metaphors to describe and analyse the
interactions between movements and their audiences318, and it is not unusual to
refer to politics as a game where politicians play politics on the public stage.319
Since humorous political stunts are performed in public they literally make political
issues into a piece of theatre, when their attacks on dominant discourses disrupt,
subvert, oppose and transform what I call the play of politics.320
Dominant discourses operate almost unchallenged on the political scene. The
representatives of these power formations decide who play the lead roles and the
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minor roles, and what props should be on the stage. Under all political
circumstances there are also some people who will insist on playing roles such as
opposition, protesters and critical journalists. In democracies, these roles have
been written into the play, although representatives of dominant discourses do their
best to control or sideline them. Journalists are handled through carefully scripted
press conferences and well prepared answers in interviews, and protesters are
tolerated or even welcomed as a sign of true democracy. Mass demonstrations
and marches get police escorts and the organisers cooperate with the
representatives of the dominant discourses for the protest to be carried out in an
orderly manner without risks for the participants. These types of protests are all
part of the ordinary play of politics, and although the participants might be satisfied
by this staged opportunity to express their opinion, it can also be understood as
what Marcuse called repressive tolerance.321
Although the activists are those who disrupt the usual play, they are not the only
ones “playing”. The metaphor also takes into account that those who are already
on the stage representing a dominant discourse perform and enact a drama when
they are conducting “business as usual”.
Sometimes, someone shows up and interrupts the ordinary drama, insisting on
playing a part not included in the script at all. What is at stake during the
interruption is the ability to determine what is right and wrong, true and false
regarding the issue. The surprise does not have to be humorous, but one type of
unexpected disruption is the humorous political stunt. When the usual rules of the
game are broken the ordinary play being performed changes, since the challengers
on stage have to be dealt with somehow. How the play unfolds in these cases
depend on many factors, some controlled by the newcomers, some outside of their
control. Four major aspects for the theatre can be identified – 1. the stage, 2. the
actors, 3. the audiences and 4. the timing. These four aspects are ideal type
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analytical categories developed to assist the analysis, but since they are all part of
the play of politics they are closely linked to each other and the choices activists
make in relation to one will influence what is possible in the others.
1. What type of stage is it that the pranksters attempt to enter or create? Is it a
physical location, or is it a virtual stage like a TV show or a webpage? What
significance does this stage have? Is it a major, established stage with high
symbolic value such as a national parliament or a world famous building already
closely observed by media, politicians and political commentators? Is it a little
scene outside of the spotlight? Or do the challengers try to establish their own
stage and capture attention from there, regardless of which venues others consider
important?
Space and location have a high significance for many forms of resistance. Certain
places are associated with those in power, while other locations are traditional sites
of protest. As will be apparent in some of the examples, there is a high symbolic
value when certain places are “invaded” by pranksters. In Scott’s concept of the
hidden transcript it is significant that resistance is invisible and happens under the
radar of those in power. In the humorous political stunt, it is a characteristic that it
takes place openly and can be observed by various audiences, frequently
attempting to temporarily control a space usually controlled by others. 322
2. Who are the actors performing in the play of politics about to be disrupted?
Lead actors considered very important, such as presidents, royalties and other
celebrities, or minor characters who might be important on their own little stage?
Sometimes it can be difficult to separate the factors of stage and actors, since lead
actors have a tendency to create a major stage wherever they go because of their
fame. The new actors in the show who initiate the stunt I have termed the
challengers, and their identity matters as well. Are they already famous or wellknown from other plays, such as professional comedians? How many are they,
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how unexpected is their appearance, how convincing are they in their new roles,
and what is it that they do, once they have gained access to the stage? How much
have they prepared their script, and how good are they at improvising?
An important element is how well the challengers play their roles in the new drama.
Do they manage to take it all the way when they have chosen a certain path? It is
not uncommon that activists who are used to playing the ordinary role of protester
find it hard to leave this role behind. If they bring symbols of protest along in the
stunt, there is a risk of the stunt losing focus: it is neither a pure traditional protest,
nor a pure humorous stunt.
In Chapter 1 the complexities of understanding relations of power were discussed.
Applying this metaphor of theatre by looking at both the apparently powerful and
the challengers as people performing roles highlights how much impressions of
who is powerful are in the eye of the beholder. It becomes more obvious that in
order for a discourse to remain dominant, the actors who uphold it also have to
convincingly perform as if they believe the discourse to be right and true.
3. The audiences include many different people who can be friendly, hostile or
indifferent from the outset. In his article about parody’s role in sustaining a
democratic public culture, Hariman speaks about the audience as “unruly, mixed,
possibly drunk or stoned, maybe crazy, and at times also stupid, deluded, out of
work, or otherwise deviant from the norms of serious, respectable, daytime
routine.”323 Seldom do activists take such diversity into consideration. Audiences
include both people who already know about the issue and those who are new to it.
Kathleen Blee and Amy McDowell have written about how social movement groups
construct their audiences and how that construction can develop over time. Blee
and McDowell emphasise the performance studies perspective that focuses on the
interaction taking place in the encounter: “… audiences typically do not exist a
priori, as natural or given categories of social life; rather, audiences are discursive

323

Hariman, "Political Parody and Public Culture," p. 255.

166

constructions, created by social actors through social interaction.”324 Even more
importantly, social movements have perceptions about who their audiences are
and how they want them to think and react. One of the findings of Blee and
McDowell is that social movements seldom have a neutral perception of their
audiences. If they are not constructed as people who can fulfil a need for the
group, such as providing more activists or serving as allies, then they are seen as
“needy” of knowledge and information.325
In some instances where a stunt is about to take place, the audience is not aware
that a piece of theatre is going on at all. In other cases, the audience has already
directed its attention towards a stage or an actor, expecting something to happen.
Stages with a significant symbolic value are frequently under constant surveillance,
and major actors have a tendency to draw a big audience wherever they go. An
interesting question is also how the challengers treat the audience – as an
audience, or as part of the play? Challengers frequently design their stunts to
appeal to the type of audience with access to media, in order to be able to reach
larger audiences, but some challengers are more concerned with reaching out to
the general public and communicating directly with them.
Perhaps the most important aspect regarding the audience is how they interpret
the performance according to their own previous knowledge, cultural references,
experiences and expectations. What do audience members think is happening and
what does it mean to them? In order for a humorous political stunt to succeed, the
challengers almost always depend on challenging audience expectations. The
interruption of the ordinary drama includes a surprise which turns the world upside
down.
4. Finally, the timing of the whole affair matters: Is the stage already occupied
when the new actors enter, or do they sneak in while the spotlight is off? How long
do they stay, and how frequently do they appear? The answers to these questions
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determine how the dynamic of the power relations between the challengers and the
old actors will develop. The timing can also be analysed in a broader perspective –
are the humorous political stunts part of a social movement expressing similar
kinds of critique, or is it a one-time event?
The theatre metaphor does not in any way indicate that the play of politics is not
serious. All the actors, both those who represent a dominant discourse and the
challengers, consider this game highly serious. As discussed previously, that some
activists decide to use humour in no way implies that they are not serious about the
issue. However, using the theatre metaphor allows us to take a step back in order
to better see what happens in the unscripted meeting when the “non-protesting
protesters” enter the stage.

Supportive Humorous Stunts
Supportive humorous stunts are framed as attempts to help, support, protect from
harm, and celebrate. Those who carry out supportive stunts appear supportive and
rational, but what happens is that the target is invalidated. On the political scene,
those assumed to be in power and control are joined up front by the pranksters.
Apparently the pranksters do not dismiss the truth and rationality the
representatives of the dominant discourses present, instead it is exaggerated and
overemphasised. Usually irony plays an important role in supportive humorous
stunts, since they are not supportive at all, but instead attempt to disconfirm their
targets. The targets will know that they are being watched, and the audiences are
presented with an image of the power holders’ vulnerable sides. Here the
protesters do not appear irrational in their relation to what they actually oppose,
they are constructive, helpful and supportive. By acting in this way they attempt to
undermine their opponents’ claims to truth and transcend the unequal relations of
power. Compared to conventional political protest, at first glance supportive stunts
look like real support, but a closer look reveals an underlying message that
exposes and disconfirms. Below are three examples of supportive stunts from
Australia, Britain and Belgium challenging the dominant discourses of a
168

conservative prime minster, the Indonesian government’s denial of human rights
abuses and a bank’s investment in land mines and cluster munitions.

John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club
Australia’s conservative prime minister from 1996 to 2007 had an extraordinary fan
club consisting of four young women plus their driver and camera women. In
character as Bea Wight, Bea Wright, Bea Rich and Bea Strait they mocked him
and his politics during the last part of his time as prime minister. In an interview, the
women explained how the names “reflect the key pillars of Howardism – being
white, right, rich and straight.”326 The women were provoked by Howard’s
conservative politics and what they saw as his attempt to bring Australia back to
the 1950s. They set out to confront his politics in an unusual manner, starting with
the 2004 election. Dressed up in silly hats, pearls, long white gloves, lots of
makeup and frocks, representing the stereotypical Australian housewife of the
1950s, they tried to confront him with these ironic personas. In 2004 they did not
get closer than 50 metres, but in the following years the characters were
developed. Prior to the 2007 election campaign, they did their first public
performance on a tram. Here they launched the “White blindfold campaign” and
explained to the passengers “Now, this is the official John Howard view of history.
What happens with the white blindfold is that you put it on and you can’t see a
thing. It completely whites out everything. All you can see is white.”327 Then they
had a “patriotic” Australian history quiz, satirising Howard’s perception of what
Australia’s history was like. Responses from the passengers were positive, and
even Howard supporters thought it was funny.328
Getting a chance to get close to Howard during the election campaign was difficult,
since his schedule was kept secret, but in 2007 they finally found themselves at the
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right hotel. While the journalists were waiting for Howard, the women got a chance
to introduce themselves as the John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club. They had
a number of gags, e.g. playing on the electoral Viagra they had prepared for Mr.
Howard and the race card that he could play during the election (which Howard
had done in previous elections) and uranium export to Iran and North Korea. Later
that day, they finally met him in the botanical gardens in Melbourne. Bea Wight
asked Howard if he would like some yellowcake, referring to a form of uranium
concentrate powder, and Howard’s recent signing of an agreement with Russia
about export of Australian uranium. Bea Wight explains what happened: “He
looked at us and smiled as though all his dreams had come at once. He smiled. He
was happy, just for one split second, and then he realised – ‘Electoral Viagra’ –
that we were evil.”329
The fan club continued to follow Howard, including by going to a horse race he
attended. Here they found their way into the exclusion zone with their pink fluffy
hats and white gloves in order to encourage Howard to play the race card. When
security guards wanted to escort them out, they explained that “Johnny” had asked
them to be there, and that they were his fan club.
Next time they tried to get to Howard, their costumes helped them though several
security points, since they looked cute and harmless. That gave the four ladies
time with Howard’s people and an opportunity to offer them xenophobia pills, with
words like "Are you afraid of muslims dear, please take this pill it will help you.”
They had white pills for fear of muslims, pink for gay people, purple for feminists
and red ones for communists and unionists – all minority groups the fan club
thought were attacked by Howard’s politics.330
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The fan club managed to get away with many stunts without being arrested or
fined, and made it to the national TV news.331 They think themselves that because
they presented themselves as absolute Howard lovers and behaved so nonthreateningly, they were perceived more as performers than as activists. It also
helped that they were four small white women.332 And they were convincing. A
news reporter starts her account of the offering of yellowcake “Even if their
message is not quite your cup of tea, it’s hard not to admire the commitment of the
four mothers of the John Howard Ladies Auxiliary Fan Club.”333

Mark Thomas’ PR training for dictatorships
Mark Thomas is a British professional comedian who has done numerous
humorous political stunts. His work combines serious investigative journalism with
deeply felt opinions about what is right and wrong. He has disclosed his
investigative findings in his immensely popular performances as a stand-up
comedian and in TV shows. In his book As used on the famous Nelson Mandela334
Thomas describes his “underground adventures in the arms and torture trade.”
One of the adventures led Thomas and his colleague Chris Martin to the Defendory
Arms Fair in Athens in 1998. Here their self-invented PR company McKintosh
Morley offered advice to the arms dealers and potential buyers on how to deal with
accusations of human rights violations. The organiser of the arms fair thought it
was very interesting to have a PR company for the first time and told them that “PR
is absolutely vital.”335
With two large posters proclaiming “Are you ready when Amnesty International
comes knocking on your door?” And “Who’s Winning the War on Words?” outside
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their stall, Thomas and his helpers tried to attract attention from customers from
countries with a record of human rights violations. They presented their services
with words like:
We offer media training and advice on how to minimise the
negative impact of the human rights industry. We teach crisis
management, damage limitation, pre-crisis preparation, and we
focus on training the trainers so that when we leave our work
continues. We can’t solve your problems with Amnesty but we can
teach you how you can solve them.336
Arms fair participants who showed interest got a realistic free media training, where
Martin interviewed them in front of a camera, while Thomas gave them advice on
how to improve their public appearance. Their basic advice was that when accused
of human rights violations, it is better to admit a little of the truth – the part that is
least damaging – than to deny everything. One of the visitors to the free media
training in the stall was a high ranking officer from Kenya who in front of the
camera told Martin and Thomas that beating your wife is a way of showing love
and affection, and that the women really want it. This episode made its way into
Thomas’ show. However, their biggest exposure came when Major General
Widjojo from Indonesia visited the stall.
Indonesia has a long record of severe human rights violations. From 1965 to 1998
the country was ruled by a military dictatorship, headed by President General
Suharto. Amnesty International had many reports on human rights violations in
Indonesia, but no official had ever admitted to them in public. During the media
training, Thomas and Martin gained Major General Widjojo’s trust and on video he
appears to be an open-minded officer who is willing to learn something new.
Apparently he really believed that they had skills to offer that would help him cover
up human rights abuses.
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During the interview Thomas had different relaxation exercises for the officer. This
included making big waves with his arms, which meant that he made a fool of
himself in front of the camera. He was also given different toys as a positive
reinforcement when Thomas judged that he did something well. All the time,
Thomas was playing his part as the self-help coach and his colleague that of a
reporter asking critical questions. In the end of the training, Major General Widjojo
admitted in front of the camera that occasionally the Indonesian army practiced
torture, and that it was “in order to protect the security of the society”. When asked
why they did this, he said that the Indonesian government occasionally needed to
torture some people in order give other people freedom of expression, freedom to
move and the right to education.337
After the interview, Major General Widjojo was pleased with the experience, and
inquired if it would be possible for McKintosh Morley to come to Jakarta to teach a
six week military media course. This did not go ahead, but Major General Widjojo’s
positive experience became the entry ticket for McKintosh Morley to meet Defence
Attaché Colonel Halim Nawhe at the Indonesian Embassy in London. Major
General Widjojo was a friend of his, and Colonel Halim Nawhe was easily talked
into trying the free media training himself, this time in a studio in London.
The advice to Colonel Halim Nawhe was the same as to Major General Widjojo –
admit to some of the minor things you are accused of, and continue to lie about
what is most grave to you. With Colonel Halim Nawhe in the studio, Thomas and
Martin gave him a list of some of the recent troubling accusations. He was then
asked to decide what was most sensitive and should be lied about, and pick a few
that he considered the least damaging. One of the issues that Thomas and Martin
presented him with was the use of British produced military equipment in East
Timor during Indonesian occupation. For years, this had been a controversial case
in Britain, and the British government had been assured that British produced arms
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had not been part of the occupation. However, this was one of the things on the list
that the Colonel said he could admit to, and he confessed that tanks made in
Britain had been used in East Timor. As Thomas wrote “The colonel’s selection of
‘sensitive’ issues is based on what would be most embarrassing to the Indonesian
government. They are not, however, the issues most sensitive to the British
government.”338
In spite of these confessions, nothing changed regarding the export of British
produced arms to Indonesia. Both Colonel Halim Nawhe and Major General
Widjojo denied the confessions.339 A British newspaper reported that:
Diplomatic sources in Jakarta said that the programme was a "set-up". "The
officers were entrapped and were co-operating with the PR company in the
spirit of a game, almost," said an Indonesian spokesman. "This does not
prove anything."340
Mark Thomas is an unusual comedian, who is not even sure if he would rather be
called an activist or an investigative journalist. One reviewer of his work calls him
an investigative comic.341 Where many comedians pride themselves of being ready
to ridicule everything and everyone, Thomas has strong opinions about how to
choose the subject of his humour. To him, everything is political. As he says, “it’s a
political decision to believe that people just want a good night out without having to
think.” 342 He does not believe in objectivity, on the contrary. Looking at the state of
the world, his duty as a comedian is to present a critical corrective of the ruling
elite. In addition, people should have a good laugh and be encouraged to work for
change themselves.343
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Searching for landmines at the Belgian bank AXA
In Belgium a network working against landmines and cluster munitions sent a
landmine clearance team to the headquarter of AXA, a bank which had increased
its investment in mines while other banks where reducing their investment in this
industry. In the press release they wrote:
Today, 18th October, activists from the campaign “My Money.
Clear Conscience?” symbolically demined the headquarters of AXA
in Brussels. A landmine clearance team went in search of
landmines, cluster munitions and other controversial weapons.
This action is needed more than ever, as research from Netwerk
Vlaanderen reveals that AXA invests heavily in two new US
landmine producers.344
The demining team of approximately 10 people used orange and white tape to
close of the area and displayed signs saying “danger, mines” and “demining in
progress”. In a three minute video about the action which enabled the continuation
of the performance across time and space, the employees in AXA show emotions
like bewilderment, surprise, amusement and worry.345 It seems apparent that they
do not know what to do with the deminers. Landmines and cluster monitions is a
serious issue, and there should be no doubt that the organisation is serious in its
critique of AXA’s continued investment in this type of weapons. At the time of the
action the Ottawa Treaty, an international ban on anti-personnel landmines, had
been in place for 8 years. Netwerk Vlaanderen had been campaigning for more
ethical investments for three years, and while most banks had decreased their
investment in weapons, AXA had not been willing to cooperate with the group.346
To make this more public, the group decided to do the demining action.
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Although this was only pretence and the employees seemed more bewildered than
scared and we as viewers knew that the landmine clearance team would not find
any landmines or cluster munitions at the AXA headquarters in Brussels, it is
obvious that they approached the conflict with a logic which differed from
conventional protest.

Confronting power through support
In order to better understand the incongruity that generates amusement in the
examples above, Berger’s list of 45 humorous techniques is useful. Both Netwerk
Vlaanderen and the fan club used the technique of irony.347 They say that they are
there to search for landmines and profess to love Howard and his politics although
the real purpose is to highlight AXA’s investments and critique Howard’s social
politics. A standard definition of irony is to say one thing but mean something else
or in another way make a gap between what is said and what is meant.
Encyclopædia Britannica distinguishes between verbal irony and dramatic irony. In
verbal irony, “the real meaning is concealed or contradicted by the literal meanings
of the words.” Verbal irony arises from a sophisticated or resigned awareness of
contrast between what is and what ought to be. In dramatic irony, “there is an
incongruity between what is expected and what occurs.”348 However, Linda
Hutcheon suggests understanding irony in relational terms. She is critical both of
those who focus on the ironic intent and the skills of the one who aims to be ironic
as well at those who understand irony to require a certain competence from the
interpreter. Instead she says that irony “happens” when the ironist and the
interpreter share enough knowledge about the subject being ironised about, that
they belong to the same “discursive communities”. For irony to happen,
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competence is not the key word, but everyone involved shares at least some
assumptions about the world and about communication.349
All humour risks being misinterpreted and there is always a chance that the
audiences will not “get it”. This risk appears to be especially present when it comes
to the technique of irony where the fact that the literal meaning can be the
complete opposite of the intended meaning poses an extra risk.350 Most other
techniques will just generate confusion or bewilderment if the signals to indicate
humorous intent are not communicated obviously enough to the audience.
Impersonation is another technique used in several of the supportive stunts.
Impersonation can be “theft” of a person’s identity or of a profession (occupational
identity). The three examples illustrate how diverse the “theft” can be. Mark
Thomas impersonated a PR consultant, the deminers impersonated the role of a
mine clearance team, and the fan club appear as caricatures of a white middleclass Australian woman from the 1950s.
In addition allusion is used to hint at AXA’s investment in landmines. Allusions are
hinting at something, referring to something which is not present. Much everyday
humour consists of allusions, where just the mentioning of the name of a person
who has done something stupid is enough to cause laughter. The fan club used the
technique of exaggeration, which is to make things smaller, bigger, higher, worse,
better etc. than what the audience expects them to be or what is generally
considered “normal”.
Unmasking and Revelation of Character is also a technique used by both Thomas
and Netwerk Vlaanderen to reveal the true colours of the AXA and the Indonesian
military. Berger describes it this way: “The emphasis in unmasking is on the
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process and effects of discovery (…) what is revealed or discovered often leads to
embarrassment and humiliation.”351
Thomas is a popular comedian, and his shows draw large audiences. This episode
was not just causing little smiles; his professional skills when it comes to timing and
building up expectations meant that the episode was hilarious. The techniques are
the mistakes that the officer makes. The audience is aware that this is a trap, and
enjoy that a highly disliked figure makes the mistake of thinking this was real.
Mistakes can be humorous when someone shows poor judgement, does
something considered stupid or makes an error. Berger thinks that we laugh at
others’ mistakes because we feel superior to them.
Identifying these techniques might help understand what is funny to the audiences
in these cases, but it does not tell anything about the relationship between the
different actors and or their power relationship.
Conventional protest can easily be identified as such by the use of leaflets,
posters, critical speeches, blockades etc. Ordinary protesters use rational
argumentation in their efforts to convince others to join them. In contrast the
activists performing these supportive stunts offered help, support and concern for
other’s safety. The landmine clearance team, dressed in orange wests, protective
helmets and equipped with instruments for mine detection looked out for the safety
of the employees of AXA, while John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club was there
to support their hero through difficult times. Mark Thomas did not appear to criticise
human rights abuses, but to support those who carry them out. This way, they all
engaged with their opponent by applying a different type of logic to what the
conflict was about, although in very different ways.
Applying the theatre metaphor it is obvious that the fan club tried to enter the stage
where “Australian politics” was being played, casting one of the main actors – the
prime minister. He did what he could to ignore his fan club, but could not avoid
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them getting attention nevertheless. Because they used irony and said they were
his biggest supporters, it was difficult to force them into the ordinary protester role
and the political play was disrupted in a way that transformed the meaning of
support and opposition. What happened with the landmine action had both
similarities and differences. The activists did not play the usual protester role here
either, but entered a scene where they were not expected at all. Their apparent
help made it easier for them to remain on the scene in order to stage their own play
about landmines than would have been possible had they acted as conventional
protesters. Mark Thomas’ strategy was different yet. He entered an established
scene (the arms fair) under disguise, and managed to set up a “sub-stage” where
he was in control of the rules. He lured important participants from the main stage
onto his sub-stage. One must assume that McKintosh Morley’s presence on the
main stage made the Indonesian Major General less cautious than he would
otherwise have been. The real intentions of Thomas was not revealed until he was
on stage as himself months later, so there was no direct confrontation where
anyone had to decide how to respond to the stunt – no one was aware that they
have been subjected to a stunt until it was too late.
The audiences for these stunts varied a lot. In all three cases there were
immediate audiences, for example passing by and bank employees. However, all
these humorous political stunts were filmed, making it possible for many more to
watch the confrontations. When it comes to the factor of timing, it was important for
the fan club to time its activities around the schedule of the prime minister. The PR
training depended on being present at the arms fair, while Netwerk Vlaanderen had
the possibility to show up at AXA bank any day they liked, since the investment in
landmines was ongoing.

Corrective Humorous Stunts
Corrective humorous stunts aim to transcend the inequality in power by presenting
an alternative version of “the truth”. They hijack the identity or the message of their
target in order to reveal a correction. This type of stunt unmasks the dominant
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discourse by disclosing a more nuanced version of persons, institutions or
messages. Just like in the supportive stunt, this happens when the discourse and
rationality of the target are exaggerated and overemphasised. Returning to the
metaphor of theatre, the pranksters do not enter the scene right in the face of the
powerful as in the supportive stunt, but sneak in behind their back while the main
actors look the other way or are busy somewhere else. Then they reveal what they
consider a more correct version of who the target really is. They choose a scene
usually controlled by the powerful. This way, the pranksters communicate to the
power holders that they are being watched, but the correction is usually more
directed towards the audience to whom the true colours of the target is revealed.
Corrective humorous stunts frequently share their goal with conventional protests –
they want to inform the public about an alternative version of the truth.
Corrective stunts subvert a dominant message by using a distorted version of the
message that those in power use. The dynamics are illustrated below with
examples from two groups: The Yes Men hijacked the identity of the World Trade
Organisation and a multinational corporation and Netwerk Vlaanderen created a
bank that invested in arms, oil and child labour.

The Yes Men: Hijacking WTO and Dow
The Yes Men is a small US based activist group which has challenged the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) and multinational corporations with different stunts in
order to expose the shortcomings of their neoliberal ideology. The predecessor to
what is now the WTO was called GATT, and in first years after the change, it was
not uncommon for people to talk about GATT meaning the WTO. The Yes Men
established a web site on www.GATT.org, which was a parody of the WTO.
Through this site, they have been contacted by conference organisers who thought
they had come to the official WTO site and wanted to invite a speaker. The Yes
Men have posed as WTO representatives on several occasions, and have been
able to say the most outrageous things apparently without anybody taking notice.
At a conference in Salzburg in Austria they suggested the idea of making
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democracy more profitable – that a voter should be able to sell his/her vote on an
auction to the highest bidder. At another occasion they announced “might equaled
right… that there ought to be a market in human rights abuses.”352
The Yes Men were surprised by the lack of response, so when they got a new
invitation to the WTO they decided to do something more spectacular. The
Tempere University of Technology in Finland was hosting a textile industry
conference in August 2000, and Andy Bichlbaum went together with his colleague
Mike Bonnano. Bichlbaum was posing as Hank Hardy Unruh, and this time they
wanted to visualize the ridiculousness in what he said from the podium. In his
speech, Bichlbaum told the participants that slavery was inefficient in producing the
economic results that their owners wanted, and that exploitation of third world
labour was much more efficient. New technology would make it possible for
management to control their workers by keeping them under constant surveillance,
transferring the idea of the prison panopticon to the new technology. He then
presented the Management Leisure Suit as the WTO solution to management
difficulties. He tore off his ordinary clothes, and underneath the audience could see
his golden leisure suit. He continued to introduce the audience to the core features
of the suit, and when he unzipped the front of it, a three foot long golden phallus
was inflated in front of him. The audience clapped. Hank Hardy Unruh then told his
audience about the Employee Visualisation Appendage which with an electronic
device could communicate with chips implanted in the worker’s bodies.353
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Illustration 4. Andy Bichlbaum from the Yes Men posing as Hank Hardy
Unruh, representing the WTO at Tempere University of Technology in
Finland, August 2000. The photo is in the creative commons.
In this stunt, the Yes Men used a traditional conference lecture as their medium,
and the potential audience was expanded when film was used to spread the story
of the stunt. Their agenda was to attack the WTO and its promotion of neo-liberal
economics. At this occasion it was the abuse of cheap labour in the sweat shops of
the textile industry which was under attack. The Yes Men did not seem to design
their action to make the conference audience laugh, but just to make them react
and be outraged at what they head. But that failed, as it had done before when the
Yes Men criticised free trade and the idea that it should be possible to make a
profit from anything. Only the people who were present know what they actually
thought about the situation. From the data available there is no way of telling if they
were upset by the speech but too shy to stand up and say that this was ridiculous.
They might have understood this was a stunt, been amused but chose not to say
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anything. All we know is that the audiences who watch the movie are amused, but
they have also been given many clues that this was a stunt about to happen.
The WTO could either choose to ignore a stunt like this, or make a public
announcement that this is not their opinion. From the WTO point of view, it was
probably wise to ignore it.
In 2002, the Yes Men thought it was time to end their careers as WTO
representatives, and decided to do it properly by shutting down the organisation.
After the event in Finland, the WTO had put a warning on their website about
www.gatt.org, and the Yes Men did not expect to get any more invitations.
Nevertheless, an accountants’ association in Australia invited the WTO to Sydney
to talk about “Agribusiness Globalisation”.354 When the Yes Men arrived as WTO
representatives they explained that there had been a change in plans that
prevented them from talking about the topic of agribusiness. Instead Bichlbaum,
this time going by the name Kinnithrung Sprat, explained that the WTO had
initiated an internal evaluation of its work, and that the conclusion was that the
organisation would close down shortly. The speech went through much
documentation of the shortcomings of the WTO and the neo-liberal doctrine of “free
market” and how it had been unjust and prevented poor countries from prospering.
Sprat announced that the WTO would be re-launched under the name Trade
Regulation Organisation, but that much was still uncertain about this new
organisation. However, it would certainly have its basis in the UN Charter of
Human Rights, in order to secure that the needs of all human beings counted more
than profit and free trade.355
Also after this stunt, the Yes Men were surprised by the reactions. The audience
was actually happy to hear this announcement, thought it was a good idea and
came up with many suggestions for how to make the new Trade Regulation
Organisation good. The stunt was convincing enough to make a Canadian MP ask
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in parliament what the consequences of the closure of the WTO would be for the
Canadian people. The official WTO had to reply to at least one journalist that this
was a hoax.356
Another Yes Men stunt had its background in serious accident which took place in
the city Bhopal in India on December 3rd, 1984. Poisonous gas leaked out from a
pesticide plant that was owned by the company Union Carbide. 5000 people died
immediately after the accident, while 15,000 more died over the next 20 years as a
result of the gas. Another 120,000 are estimated to need lifelong medical care. The
victims of the disaster have fought for compensation and a clean-up of the site ever
since. Union Carbide left India shortly after, and in 2001 the company was sold to
another company, Dow Chemical.
20 years later, on December 3rd 2004, the BBC asked the company for a comment
about the case. On live TV from Paris, the Dow Chemical representative Jude
Finisterra appeared. To everyone’s surprise he said that Dow Chemical was finally
ready to take full responsibility for cleaning up and paying compensation to all the
victims. At the same time he apologised that it had taken so long for the company
to take this step. On film it looks as if the BBC reporter was quite surprised by the
announcement, and in the next hours the value of Dow on the stock exchange fell
with two billion American dollars.357 Jude Finisterra turned out to be Bichlbaum
from Yes Men, and again appeared live on BBC, this time posing as himself. He
explained the rationale behind the action – that the Yes Men were helping Dow
improve. The Yes Men received some criticism for bringing the victims false hope,
but argued that it was Dow that denied the victims what they deserved. Just as in
the case with the WTO, it was the Yes Men’s alternative webpage for Dow and a
mistake by the BBC that made the stunt possible at all.358
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Illustration 5. Andy Bichlbaum from the Yes Men posing as Jude
Finisterra on the BBC in 2004. As a spokesperson for Dow Chemicals,
Finisterra announced that the company would finally take full
responsibility for the Bhopal catastrophe. The photo is in the creative
commons.
The message of the Yes Men is difficult to argue about: That Dow should take full
responsibility for compensating victims and cleaning up. Their medium of choice for
communicating this message is not unusual – activists around the world dream
about access to the BBC to communicate their message.

ACE bank for ethical investments
In the category of supportive stunts, Netwerk Vlaanderen’s demining of AXA was
one example. The same organisation was behind a more elaborate deception.
Focusing on the same issues as when searching for landmines – banks’
responsibilities for what they invest in – they decided to set up a new bank, ACE
bank. The bank opened an office in central Brussels and advertised that it was
investigating if there was a market for its special way of doing banking. The bank
wanted to specialise in investments in dubious areas such as arms and oil
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production as well as child labour. It claimed to be ethical and transparent because
in contrast to other banks it did not try to hide what it invested in. On the contrary,
they exclusively invested in these areas in order to provide the best possible
interest rate to their customers. In a video about ACE bank the viewer sees
potential bank customers being introduced to the idea. Some are very sceptical;
others appear seriously interested, some thought it was a parody. The new bank
made headlines in the TV news and in newspapers – but after a week of
speculation it was closed down by the Belgian bank authorities. Apparently furious
about the decision, ACE bank called for a press conference. Here they named all
the major banks and their investment in similar products and demanded that if ACE
bank had to close because of its investment practices, then all the other banks had
to be closed as well. Finally they revealed that it was Vlaanderen Netwerk which
was responsible.359

Confronting power by correcting it
Returning to Berger’s techniques, impersonation was used in most of the examples
of the corrective stunt, just as it was a popular technique in the supportive stunt.
Yes Men impersonated WTO and Dow representatives, and Netwerk Vlaanderen’s
activists took on the role of bankers when they created ACE bank.
Exaggeration is another technique that appeared again, this time in the Yes Men’s
performance at the textile conference in Finland where they exaggerated the neoliberal policies of the WTO in order to provoke a reaction from the conference
participants. When Berger describes this technique, he mentions that exaggeration
has to be combined with one or more other techniques in order to be funny. Here
they combine it with absurdity. The giant golden penis was so absurd that it seems
unbelievable that the conference audience did not understand that this was a joke.
This way, the technique to make the spectators of the movie laugh is the ignorance
of the conference audience. According to Berger, ignorance works as a technique
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because we like to feel superior to those we consider stupid.360 The absurdity in
the speech is created by the extreme exaggeration of the possibility and wish for
control. No matter what one thinks about the WTO, their statements have not yet
been as outrageous as what the Yes Men made them say.
ACE bank is a parody of the real banks. In Berger´s understanding of the term,
parody is a “verbal mimicry” of a particular person, where his or her style is
imitated. ACE bank is not an example of this kind of parody, but a parody of an
institution.
Unmasking is another technique used in examples of both supportive and
corrective stunts. The Yes Men showed that it would in fact have been possible for
Dow to offer compensation to the victims in Bhopal, and in a similar type of
unmasking, Netwerk Vlaanderen exposed the double standards of the ordinary
banks. Some audiences might also have enjoyed the mistakes of the potential
customers which were fooled by the false bank.
The Yes Men themselves write about what they do as “identity correction”
(although someone suggested the term to them after they had already done some
of their stunts). Amber Day talks about “identity nabbing”.361 Dow and the WTO
uphold an image of themselves that the Yes Men do not think covers the whole
truth. The WTO neglects to talk about some of the devastating consequences of its
neo-liberal policies, and Dow pretended that it could not do anything about Bhopal.
The Yes Men set out to correct this self-presentation by revealing the true colours
or providing alternative causes of actions.
At one point, it was suggested to me to call this category honest – however, that
implies that those who are being corrected are lying. Although they might
frequently do this, corrective stunts can also be used in cases where someone
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make statements they themselves believe in. Therefore it is more appropriate to
talk about different understandings of the truth rather than the truth.
On the surface, the corrective stunt seems to be acting within the frame of logic
and rationality, and again the metaphor of theatre can be useful for illustrating what
is going on. The stages that the pranksters entered vary a lot: The play that the
Yes Men attempted to disrupt was an ordinary conference about textiles. ACE
bank set up an alternative stage and lured their audience in there, just like Mark
Thomas did in his supportive stunt. Who the correcting activists considered the
audiences and what they wanted to communicate differed, but they all had in
common that they wanted to provide an alternative. The Yes Men wanted to
present a more correct picture of what the WTO is, and what ideology the
organisation represents. The activists behind ACE bank wanted to bring the issue
of banking investment practices in dubious areas to the attention of the general
public. On these various stages, no one appeared to be playing a protester role,
neither did they want to “help” in the way the participants in the supportive stunt
did.
What they did was different again, and the timing of the stunts was important. They
had to appear at exactly the right moment and control the stage for a while in order
to communicate an alternative point of view to the audience. Netwerk Vlaanderen
brought in a new actor – a new bank – in order to expose the old banks already on
the scene. The Yes Men did not change the play by bringing in new actors; they
just let one of the ordinary actors exaggerate his part. In the direct interaction with
the conference audience, this failed when nobody seemed to notice anything
wrong. They were not even treated like ordinary protesters and ordered out of the
conference room. The WTO was not put in a position where they were forced to
react. From this perspective, the prank was a complete failure. Nevertheless, the
Yes Men reached a much larger audience through their film: viewers were given
the clues that this was a joke.
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When it comes to the audience element of the play metaphor, it is difficult to know
if members of the general public changed their perception of the neo-liberal
discourse targeted by the Yes Men because of these stunts. Neither will we ever
know if ACE bank influenced investment habits in Belgium. Even if it is possible to
trace a change in behaviour people can always claim that this is a coincidence or
that other factors caused the change. However, although it might be due to a
selection bias it is striking that the examples of corrective stunts I have come
across have been very effective in getting media attention.362 It would be worth
investigating further if there is something about this type of stunt that is especially
appealing to media.

Naïve Humorous Stunts
Naive humorous stunts deal with the power holders’ truth and rationality in a way
which differs from the supportive and corrective stunt. By appearing naïve and
innocent, protesters pretend not to understand that what they do can be interpreted
as a protest and this way point to the unequal relations of power by only hinting at
them. Where the supportive and corrective stunts exaggerate and overemphasise
the rationality of the power holders in order to get their message across, those who
carry out naïve stunts pretend that they are not aware that they have challenged
any power. In terms of the theatre metaphor, they enter a scene but pretend that
they are not aware that there was a play going on. If anything looks like a protest,
that must be a coincidence. The story of the good solider Svejk who challenged the
authority of the army without ever framing his actions as protest is a classic literary
example of a naïve prankster.363
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The purpose of the naïve stunt is not to present a more correct version or
unmasking, but under the disguise of naiveté to simply utter a dissenting message.
Below four short examples illustrate the diversity of the naïve stunt. The first is an
advertisement for sausages during the Nazi occupation of Denmark, followed by a
Serbian blood donation action. The third example involved a number of Poles who
took their TVs for a walk. I conclude with another Danish example where Santa
came to town just before Christmas in 1974.

Innocent advertising during the Nazi occupation of Denmark
During WWII, both Denmark and Norway were occupied by the Nazis from 19401945. In these countries, jokes ridiculing the occupation forces were widespread
and to some degree contributed to creating a culture of resistance. Examples of
humour which was public and therefore part of an interaction with the German
occupier are less common. In his article about Danish occupation humour, which
mainly focuses on whispered jokes, Hong provides an unusual example from a
butchers van in the town Esbjerg. On the back of double doors the butcher had
written:
“Salted down sausages. N.S Jensen, Butcher. Delivery Anywhere.
England Road 22, Esbjerg.” But when the right door was opened,
the words on the left door then read “Down with N.S [National
Socialism], Long Live England.364
This anti-Nazi message, which is also a support of England, took place under very
serious conditions. Repression from the Nazis was harsh and the butcher was
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taking a great risk. The medium used in this case was a traditional advertising on
the door, which should not pose any threat to the Nazis. Only upon closer
inspection does the message turn out to be far from innocent.365

Donating blood to avoid bloodshed in Serbia
In November 1996 there were elections in Serbia, and at the local level the
coalition Zadjeno opposing Slobodan Milošević won in more than a hundred
municipalities, including Belgrade and other important cities. When the regime
refused to accept the result, this sparked more than three months of mass
demonstrations. The students played a major role in bringing a carnivalesque
atmosphere to the protest. One event, called blood transfusion, was an example of
a naïve stunt. It was based on a statement by Mirjana Markovic, the leader of the
Yoguslav Left Party and the wife of Slobodan Milošević. She had threatened to use
violence against the protesters when she said that “a lot of blood had been shed
for the introduction of communism into Yoguslavia and that it [the Communist
Party] would never go without blood”.366 Some students initiated a campaign to
collect blood and then said “here is our blood, now you can go”.367

Poland – taking the TV for a walk
The independent trade union Solidarity in Poland called for a boycott of the official
TV news in 1982. Since the creation of Solidarity in August 1980, the union had
been a huge challenge to the communist government. On December 13, 1981, the
enforcement of martial law put a temporary stop to the democratization movement
when tanks rolled through the streets of Poland. However, this was not the end of
resistance. From underground, Solidarity called for a boycott of the news on TV,

365

An example of a similar tactic used by a sports magazine in Burma is included in Sørensen,
"Humorous Political Stunts: Speaking “Truth” to Power?."
366
Sombutpoonsiri, "The Use of Humour as a Vehicle for Nonviolent Struggle," p. 129.
367
Sombutpoonsiri, "The Use of Humour as a Vehicle for Nonviolent Struggle," p. 129.

191

which was filled with lies from the regime. But how would anybody get an idea
about how many people participated in the boycott?
In the town of Swidnik in the east of Poland, the inhabitants started the habit of
going for a walk, just as the half-hour news report began at 7.30 pm. The streets
would be full of people chatting with each other. Before they went out, some people
would place their TV in the window, pointing to the street with a blank screen.
Others took their unconnected TV with them in a stroller for children or something
else with wheels. The habit soon spread to other places, and apparently the
authorities were furious, but felt there was little they could do. After all, the chance
of being ridiculed increase even more if you decide to arrest people for taking their
TV for a walk.
The authorities’ “solution” was to move the start of the curfew forward from 10 pm
to 7pm. The answer from the people of Swidnik was to take their walk during the
5pm news instead.368
This humorous twist to a boycott depends on many people participating in order to
have an effect, which it apparently did have in Poland in 1982 – if not, why should
the regime had bothered to change the timing of the curfew?
The message from the people is straightforward – we don’t believe in your news,
therefore we don’t want to watch it and by taking our walk where everybody can
see us, we show you (and each other) how many we are.

Santas hand out gifts from the shop shelves
In the week leading up to Christmas 1974 100 Santas visited Denmark’s capital
Copenhagen. This week long action/performance was created by the theatre group
Solvognen that wanted to bring public attention to the rising unemployment and
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commercialisation of Christmas.369 The action had many different parts, ranging
from friendly Santas singing to the elderly and giving away hot chocolate to a
symbolic attack on the court of industrial relations which were renamed a class
court.
The culmination came late afternoon on December 22, when the army of Santas
visited the shopping centre Magasin. The place was filled with people buying last
minute presents, and here Santa set out to do what Santas are supposed to do,
hand out presents. The Santas had brought some books with them, but also picked
books from the shop shelves and handed them to the customers with a “merry
Christmas” and words like “no, today it does not cost anything, today it is free.”370 A
film about the event shows how some customers smile and laugh, some ignore the
Santas, and over the loudspeaker system the management of Magasin declares:
Announcement to all our customers. Please be aware that the
persons in Father Christmas costumes that hand out goods from
the shelves, do not belong to the staff of Magasin. We kindly
request our customers to return items they have already received
at the checkout counters. The police have been called.” 371
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Illustration 6. The Santas marching through central Copenhagen with
their Christmas goose, December 1974. ©: Nils Vest 1974, reprinted
with permission.
The police arrived and children cried when the Santas were arrested and rather
roughly led out with their arms behind their backs. Outside the shopping centre, the
passers-by which had stopped to watch were on the side of Santa. They sang
Christmas carols and tried to prevent the police from taking the Santas to the
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waiting police vans.372 A group of Santas who had not been arrested proceeded to
another shopping centre called Illum, where they repeated the performance before
they were arrested as well.
The shopping centre did not want to press charges against the Santas for theft, but
the prosecutor raised a case for disturbing public order against 45 Santas. In the
first trial they were acquitted, but when the prosecutor appealed the case they were
later convicted and received small fines.373
During the week of the action, Solvognen succeed in gaining extensive media
coverage that to a large degree was fair and unbiased.374 Later there was much
debate and even more coverage after Solvognen received a grant from a stately
art fund. More than 30 years later the stunt became part of the Danish cultural
canon. The performance is considered one of 108 cultural expressions that is part
of the Danish cultural heritage.375

Confronting power with naiveté
It is more difficult to explain what causes amusement in the naïve stunts using
Berger’s techniques than with the supportive and corrective stunts. Although
pretence plays a role in most humorous stunts, it is crucial for understanding the
apparently naive, and none of the 45 techniques captures pretence. In order to
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stay within Berger’s technical perspective, one would have to add categories that
included the pretended coincidence and pretended innocence present in these
cases. Berger does describe techniques for coincidences, innocence,
misunderstandings and ignorance, but the way he uses the terms varies
considerably from what is happening in the examples above. For instance, Berger
explains a kind of coincidence which is based on embarrassment, and in his
description of ignorance people laugh at those who are ignorant.376 That situation
changes when someone is pretending to be innocent or ignorant – instead of
laughing at them, we laugh with them. In the donation of blood episode in Serbia,
Markovic intended to mean “blood by using violence”, an implicit understanding
which the students pretended not to understand. Berger has a technique for
ignorance where people laugh because they feel superior to others who are
stupid.377 But here we laugh at Mira Markovic, not the activists who pretend to
misunderstand her statement. Therefore it is inappropriate to talk about mistakes
and misunderstandings as the techniques used, since the Nazis, Polish, Danish
and Serbian authorities were not fooled and fully understood that this was only
pretended innocence.
Berger mentions pretence when he writes about taking on a different identity, like
impersonation, but that differs from the mechanism of defining the whole situation
as something else. In the Polish example, the timing of the TV walk with the
beginning of the TV news was crucial, although it of course was a “coincidence”
and not intended as a protest – should anybody from the authorities ask. The
Danish butcher wrote an innocent message which by “mistake” happened to be
anti-Nazi.
Although Berger’s techniques are inadequate for fully explaining these examples,
some of his techniques are present. The result of the Danish butcher’s “mistake” is
an insult to the Nazis, something which can be funny to an audience when they
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dislike a person or a group, but generally it has to be combined with some other
technique in order to be amusing. The TV walk is both an example of the absurd
and eccentric. I will return to the technique of absurdity when describing the absurd
stunt, but eccentricity is a technique that builds on people’s eccentric behaviour or
appearance. It would have been eccentric to walk around with your TV in a stroller
had the circumstances been different. Had it happened out of a context like this,
we would not have made much sense of it. It is a technique which in many ways is
similar to the absurd, but Berger operates with a distinction between strangeness
connected to identity (eccentric) and our sense of logic (absurdity).
There is also a literalness of the boycott of the TV news. To Berger, literalness is
when the same word or statement gets a different meaning when you look at the
actual words. However, it is possible to understand the technique of literalness
much more broadly than Berger, and not just connected to language.
These types of stunts are naive – not because the activists would be called naïve
by their opponents, on the contrary, but because they frame what they do so on the
surface they are not doing anything wrong at all. They pretend to avoid the logic of
power and protest altogether. This can be by doing something which is actually
quite normal, like advertising sausages, donating blood and Santa handing out
presents. In other cases the behaviour cannot be called normal, such as taking the
TV for a walk, but it can still be framed as completely harmless.
Solvognen’s army of Santas played on Danish mythology where Santa is naive,
friendly, helpful and more than anything else associated with giving away gifts to
children. The humour in the stunt arises when Santa performs his role in a way
which clashes with other societal norms, such as not stealing. When the police was
called out to perform their law enforcement role and did that dutifully, it became
funny because Santas in handcuffs being taken away by police is completely
incongruous with the image of the naïve gift-giving Santa.
Most of the examples of naïve stunts that I have come across took place in
situations of relatively severe oppression. For those living with oppression, framing
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oneself as naïve might be the only possibility for protest they consider available at
all. The Santas in Denmark are an exception and together the four examples show
how diverse the naïve stunts can be.
Returning to the theatre metaphor, it is not the major stages that these activists aim
for, but whatever scene that seems to be within reach. The Danish butcher used
his own van, the Polish TV walkers their own streets and their own TVs. The
Serbian students provided their own blood, but were depending on media coverage
in order to spread the message of what they had done. The same was the case
with the Santas. The cases from dictatorships attempted to disrupt the pieces of
theatre called “everything is normal” which these dictatorial regimes aimed to
uphold, and any disruption, however minor, fulfilled this purpose. They did not
attempt to hijack the character of someone else as in the corrective stunts, and
there were no major actors like prime ministers and presidents nearby. There is
little data to tell how the audiences reacted and interpreted the stunts taking place
in severely oppressive circumstances. In the Santa example Solvognen received
extensive media coverage, and the media reported that many of the customers
who witnessed the event were supportive, although many was confused about
what was going on and some accused the Santas of stealing.
In some of the examples, timing was important – had the Poles walked out with
their TV half an hour later it would not have made any sense, and the Santas
depended on it being Christmas time. The Serbian students could have donated
their blood at any time after Markovic’s statement, but the closer in time the more
sense it would make. For the butcher timing was less crucial – the ad would work
during the whole occupation.
The naive stunt has a different way of refusing the rationality of those in power than
the corrective and supportive stunts; those who carry it out simply appear not to be
aware of how the play of politics works. However, since there is logic to what they
do, which presents an alternative message; they do leave themselves vulnerable to
persecution, and the authorities can respond accordingly. There is no
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documentation of what happened to the Danish butcher. For the Polish regime,
there was no obvious way of reacting when the TV walkers entered and started
their absurd play. The communist regime had seen plenty of protest in 1980-81
and knew how to react to strikes and other outspoken protests, but since this was
different, it did not seem wise to remove them with force. But the theatre of
normalcy was disrupted enough to cause a change in the curfew time.

Absurd Humorous Stunts
In absurd humorous stunts, the activists frame themselves as innocent clowns who
point towards society’s absurdities. Their relation to the rationality of the dominant
discourse is to defy it altogether. The absurd stunt shares some similarities with the
naïve stunt regarding the apparent naiveté of the activists, but whereas the
participants in the naïve stunt appear not to understand, the absurd pranksters
refuse to acknowledge any kind of rationality. Returning to the theatre metaphor,
those who carry out absurd stunts can capture any stage, anywhere. They might
invade a major scene right in the power holder’s face, or they might sneak in
behind someone’s back on a smaller and less guarded scene. Their message is
that the whole world is absurd, including the apparently powerful. All claims to
power and truth are challenged with silliness, slapstick or total craziness. Everyone
is assumed to be participants in the play and no one is being chased away, but the
previously prevailing rules and roles are altered. The absurd pranksters are
unlikely to suggest that this has anything to do with protest; it is only the context
and the audiences’ interpretations which can reveal any critical intent. The Orange
Alternative’s happenings in Poland during the late 1980’s and the British
Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army serve as examples of this type of stunt.

Poland’s Orange Alternative
During martial law in the early 1980’s in Poland, at around the same time as the
inhabitants in Swidnik took their TVs for a walk, graffiti in favour of the now illegal
trade union Solidarity was quickly painted over by the authorities. This left “blobs”
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on the walls, so that everyone knew that they covered graffiti. Activists who
identified with a new group called Orange Alternative started to work on the blobs
by giving them arms and legs so that they became little elves. According to
Kenney, who has written about the Orange Alternative and its place in the fall of
the communist regimes in central Europe, elves made passers-by “consider the
point of the struggle over wall space, and wonder why little elves were threatening
to the communists”.378
Several years later, the elves came to life at an Orange Alternative happening on
Children’s day, June 1st 1987, one of the happenings which became what Kenney
calls a “catalyst” for the Orange Alternative. An invitation to the happening was
distributed at schools and universities around the city Wroclaw, and almost 1000
young people showed up. Here they got a red cap, and then they became elves.
Since it was Children’s day, they handed out candy to people, danced and sang
children’s songs. The leader of the Orange Alternative called himself Major
Fyderych, but he could not be present himself this day, since he was arrested just
before the happening began. Nevertheless the happening went ahead and the
guitar player Jakubczak, another central person in the Orange Alternative, played
and sang with the crowd. When the police started to take the elves to the police
cars they followed without protesting, kissing the police and throwing candy out
through the windows. Then the crowd started to shout “elves are real”, and
accounts of this surreal celebration of Children’s day went around Poland in the
underground press, providing new images of what protest could look like.379
Orange Alternative was a small group that mainly worked in the city Wroclaw, but
later spread to other cities in Poland. They initiated happenings which brought
colour and carnival to the greyness which characterised both the communist
regime and the opposition in Solidarity. Instead of staging a protest march or a fast
as other protesters did, they arranged events which involved the audience. In
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addition to candy, on other occasions they also handed out toilet paper or sanitary
pads (scarce under communism). The concept of socialist surrealism mocking the
socialist realities guided the happenings, but the Orange Alternative was a coorganiser of events, not the organiser, since the police and passers-by also had a
say in what was to happen.380 The happenings were never an open expression of
dissent, but any independent organising, no matter the reason, was a threat to the
communist desire for total control.
In 1987 and 1988, there was a happening on average once or twice a month,381
and another major event took place on February 16, 1988. This was carnival time,
and Orange Alternative invited everyone to the surreal version of carnival in
socialist Poland – the “ProletaRIO Carnival”. This time the only dress code was
carnival costume, and the crowd of 3-5000 people included a skeleton, Ku Klux
Klan men, smurfs, and Red Riding Hood together with a wolf. Official radio first
reported the invitation, thinking it was an idea invented by the authorities. Finally
bluehelmet police joined the crowd, but they were not there to party, but to take the
carnival to the police station. In the official press the events was framed as student
foolishness that had to be stopped in order not to create traffic chaos in the
afternoon peak period.382
In contrast to Solidarity, Orange Alternative was unpredictable and the regime
never knew what would come next. The little elves did not resist arrest, but they
kissed the police and gave them flowers. This way, they became difficult for the
regime to suppress, since arresting someone for playing an elf seems ridiculous,
even for the communists. In the beginning, Orange Alternative was not just critical
of the communist regime, but also of Solidarity and the church because of its belief
that the Bible provided the answers. It was the regime itself which pushed the
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Alternative more and more in the direction of protest.383 The happenings became a
training ground for protest and socialised people to the idea of speaking out. They
encouraged people to come out on the streets where they noticed that a few hours
of detention was not that dangerous after all.384 This way, by lowering levels of
fear, Orange Alternative prepared people for toppling the regime a few years later.

CIRCA – Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army
Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA) is a UK based network of
clowns that uses nonviolent action against symbols of capitalism and militarism,
e.g at military recruitment offices and G8 meetings.385 They explain why they are
clowns:
We are clowns because what else can one be in such a stupid
world. Because inside everyone is a lawless clown trying to
escape. Because nothing undermines authority like holding it up to
ridicule (…) We are circa because we are approximate and
ambivalent, neither here nor there, but in the most powerful of all
places, the place in-between order and chaos.386
Clowning is visual, so to experience CIRCA, one needs to see it rather than read a
description. At the very least, it is worth quoting one clown’s own description of
what happened at a military recruitment office in Leeds in the UK. Kolonel Klepto
from the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army explains:
…15 clownbatants from the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown
Army (CIRCA), dressed head to toe in combat gear delicately
trimmed with pink and green fuzzy-fur and sporting sparkling steel
colanders helmets, had marched into the [recruitment] centre and
asked the recruiting officers if they could join up. In high pitched
clown voices we told them about our previous experience in the
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clown army, displaying skills such as silly salutes, showing
subversive slapstick drills, exhibiting the art of telling jokes that
disarm and explaining that where their bombs fail we might be
able to succeed with laughter (…)But they hadn't taken our desire
to join their army seriously, and a very large and extremely unamused commando from the Royal Marines tried to throw us out
of the centre with the help of a growing number of police officers.
But it's hard to move a rebel clown, they don't resist in a
conventional sense, but tend to slip out of the clutches of
authority like wobbly jelly and distract them from their duties with
loud gaffaws and stinging mockery. The more our pleas to join the
army fell on deaf ears - "Please teach us how to liberate people!"
"Where are the application forms? " "Why can't we have really
really big guns like yours?" - the more chaotic the scene in the
recruitment office became. Very long sausage ballons started
screaming across the space sounding like ammunition about to
explode, sherbert filled toy aeroplanes did manic loop the loops
over the RAF desks, one clown crawled around the floor polishing
soldiers boots with his feather duster while another read out loud
the latest communique from CIRCA…387

Confronting power with absurdity
In CIRCA’s action in the recruitment office, the 15 clowns participating used a
number of different techniques. The whole situation with its chaos and unexpected
behaviour can be called an example of slapstick, which might best be described as
the refusal to let someone be comfortable in their role as adults. Berger explains:
Slapstick is physical humour, often involving degradation by action
(…) It is an “attack” on our claims to adulthood, importance, and
status of any kind. As such, it feeds on an inner sense of
egalitarianism we have (…) a kind of “democratic” degradation
that is tied to a sense we have that we are all humans…388
When CIRCA turned the situation in the recruitment office into chaos, they refused
to let the military and police carry out their adult roles with dignity. CIRCA also uses
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irony, a technique already encountered in other examples. The clowns asked to
learn how to become soldiers, but they did not really want to be recruited. Another
technique they used is ridicule of military behaviour and statements, for example
when they said “please teach us how to liberate people.” Ridicule happens when
we expose people in a way that put them in a bad light. No one likes to be
ridiculed, so humour which humiliates people risks causing strong reactions.
Berger calls ridicule a ”direct verbal attack against a person, thing or idea”389 and
mentions different forms of ridicule, such as mocking, taunting and deriding.
Ridicule and its consequences will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Berger also includes the technique of absurdity in his list, something also found in
these two examples of absurd stunts. Absurdity is a common technique for creating
humour, and occurs when something or someone seems completely out of place.
We find things absurd when we think it is obvious that they do not belong together
in any way. Berger explains how the absurd causes us to be puzzled and
sometimes amused when our sense of order and logic is challenged. He also
thinks that the absurd is used to communicate human beings’ “possibilities in an
irrational universe.”390 Watching CIRCA, there is absurdity in the contrast between
the clown figures and the military recruitment office, especially between the military
uniforms and the little silly clowning attributes that go with them, pink and green
fuzzy fur. Also the idea that their experiences from the clown army should make
them fit for military service is absurd. The whole episode is one big incongruity
between military behaviour and expectations, and clowning behaviour and
expectations.
The incongruity which Orange Alternative exposed was between the everyday life
under communist rule and the propaganda of the regime. The technique they
primarily relied on was absurdity, evoking images from people’s childhood which
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were transformed into the socialist surrealism of the Alternative. Sometimes they
also made parodies of communist slogans and ideology.
The role of the clown is familiar to a western audience: just the sight of red noses
and other clowning paraphernalia increase expectations of being amused. Many
people automatically shift to the play frame and expect certain behaviour.
The absurd stunt is not a direct confrontation, but an attempt to be an eye-opener.
It is the type of stunt which is furthest away from protest, since it might just as well
expose hierarchies, rigidity and domination within a protest movement. To the
degree it is possible to talk about design at all with this type of stunt, it is designed
to make people question everything they hear and see. The absurd stunt does not
provide any answers, but questions dogmas.
The absurd stunts refuses rationality altogether, and in this tradition the activists
respond to all reactions from those in power with further absurdity, as both CIRCA
and the Orange Alternative did. When trying to give rational responses, the
opponent finds herself confronted with even more silliness and absurdity, with the
world turned upside down. The only thing predictable is that the performers will
continue to be unpredictable. All attempts to deal with this as conventional political
opposition will only contribute new components to their absurd plays. However,
since the absurd is bound to remain within the absurd, it cannot suggest
alternatives and improvements without leaving its position. If the participants in an
absurd stunt suddenly should decide to suggest solutions to a problem in a rational
way, they leave themselves vulnerable to critique that they are (mis)using the
absurdity for their own purposes, and not ready to criticise all and everyone.
CIRCA in the recruitment office appeared where there were already other actors
performing their own play. Unlike prime ministers and gatherings with many
politicians, recruiting officers are not even used to the usual role of protesters
appearing in their daily show. The recruiters felt forced to shut down the
recruitment office and get someone to carry the clowns away. The daily show had
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been successfully interrupted from CIRCA’s point of view, but police and military
insisted on treating them as ordinary protesters and removing them from the
scene. This episode did not generate big headlines, presumably because the
police and military description of them as ordinary protesters was accepted. The
description and video of the episode is available to everyone who is interested, but
CIRCA did not force themselves upon a scene with world leaders, and as soon as
the clowns were removed they could be ignored. However, clowns appearing at
every recruitment office every day for an extended period of time would probably
be a different story.
Through their happenings, Orange Alternative took their play right into the
everyday life of the Polish people. Just like CIRCA, Orange Alternative depended
very little on what others did. Any reaction, also being ignored, contributed one way
or the other. In these two examples, everyone who came along – police, passersby, recruiting officers - was treated as partners in the show. Accounts of these two
examples include some descriptions on reactions from part of the audience, the
authorities. Both the Orange Alternative and CIRCA expected to be removed from
the scene by the police. However, these arrests just added to the absurdity that the
activists apparently attempted to point towards. After all, clowns and elves should
hardly pose any threat to a communist regime and the military. These absurd
stunts did not depend on any particular timing – the recruitment office could have
been visited any day to the same effect, and the Orange Alternative could always
find an excuse for a happening, although its particular design could be fitted to the
circumstances.

Provocative Humorous Stunts
Provocative humorous stunts are the type of stunt closest to conventional protest
since they generate their humour simply by daring to directly confront those in
power, usually without the pretence that is so central to the other stunts. The
pranksters do not deny the unequal relations of power as in absurd stunts or
present any alternatives like the supportive or corrective stunts; they simply appear
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not to care. In this way they amuse and impress parts of their audiences with their
boldness and devil-may-care attitudes. The “almighties” become ridiculous when
they turn out not to have total control anyway. The activists openly act as
provocateurs in order to expose vulnerabilities and hurt big egos. They capture any
scene, openly or secretly, and aim to control it long enough to humiliate the target.
They speak a message of lack of fear both to the target and to other audiences.
Three examples from Serbia, Russia and Belarus illustrate what humorous
provocations can look like when the secret police forces are insulted and teddy
bears fall from the sky.

Otpor: Dinar za Smenu
Earlier Serbian students’ action to donate blood was mentioned as an example of a
naive stunt. A few years later, the youth and student-led movement Otpor, which
played a decisive role in bringing Slobodan Milošević from power, carried on the
tradition of humorous political stunts. One of Otpor’s popular actions was mocking
an initiative taken by Milošević’s government. To support agriculture, Milošević
placed boxes in shops and public places asking people to donate one dinar (the
Serbian currency) for sowing and planting crops. As a response, Otpor arranged its
own collection called Dinar za Smenu. Smenu is a Serbian word with many
meanings: Change, resignation, dismissal, pension and purge. This action was
repeated several times in different places in Serbia, and consisted of a big barrel
with a photo of Milošević, a stick and instructions for passers-by to use the stick to
hit the barrel after donating one dinar. On at least one occasion, the sign
suggested that if people did not have any money because of Milošević’s politics,
they should bang the barrel twice. Another day it suggested to hit harder. Usually
there were no activists present, something which decreased the risks. When the
police removed the barrel, Otpor said in a press release that the police had
arrested the barrel. They also claimed that the action was a huge success,
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because they had collected enough money for Milošević’s retirement, and that the
police were going to hand over the money to Milošević.391
President Milošević himself, as the prime symbol of bad government in Serbia, was
the target in this example. Although the action did not make much sense on its own
other than expressing hostile feelings towards Milošević, it was part of a larger
campaign to de-legitimize the regime in Serbia, expose its double standards and
show how its politics was damaging to ordinary Serbian citizens. The regime had
the choice between removing the barrel, and thereby exposing their intolerance to
critique, or let it stay and continue a public display of disapproval.

Voina: Insulting bridge painting
In Russia, an art collective called Voina has made itself loved and infamous
because of its creative stunts that expose Russian authorities. In June 2010, they
painted a giant penis on Liteiny Bridge in St. Petersburg in just 23 seconds. Liteiny
Bridge is a bascule bridge, and the action was done just before it was opened to let
a ship pass. When that happened, the penis was standing erect for several hours
just in front of the unpopular secret police (FSB) headquarters in St. Petersburg.
Members of Voina are facing prison sentences for this and similar actions.392
The circumstances in authoritarian Russia make this different from performing the
same stunt in a more democratic country.
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Illustration 7. Voina’s penis painting on Liteiny Bridge in St. Petersburg,
June 2010. Courtesy of http://plucer.livejournal.com.

Teddy bears over Belarus
In July 2012, a small airplane took off from Lithuania and flew over Belarus. On
board were two Swedish PR management consultants turned human rights
activists. The plane was loaded with 879 teddy bears each in a parachute and
carrying the message “We support the Belarusian struggle for free speech” in
English and Belarusian. The stunt was a response to naive stunts performed inside
Belarus earlier in the year. Local activists from the campaign “Tell the Truth” had
arranged stuffed animals at Minsk’s Independence Square with little signs telling
President Lukashenka to "free the people!", asking "Where is freedom of the
209

press?" and saying "Toys against lawlessness" and "Cops tore my eye out."393 One
person, who says he was just watching the toys, was later sentenced to 10 days in
prison for holding an unsanctioned toy protest.394

Illustration 8. Toy protest in Belarus. Courtesy photo.
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Illustration 9. Teddy bears in parachutes landing in Belarus in support
for human rights July 2012. Photo reprinted with permission from Studio
Total.

One of the Swedes who dropped teddy bears over Belarus in support of the stuffed
animals said to a Norwegian TV station, “Our campaign was to support the teddy
bears [in Belarus], from teddy bears all over the world”.395 To Euronews, he said “A
dictator can be feared and he can be hated, but when people start to laugh at him,
his days are numbered. So, that was the objective.” 396 He and his colleagues run
Studio Total, a Swedish PR and marketing company. On its webpage, the
company says that they did this pro bono in support of the Belarusian opposition,
and tells how the PR consultants became interested in the fate of the Belarusian
opposition by a coincidence. When it turned out that no pilot was willing to risk

395

Birger Henriksen, "Svensker Teddy-Bombet Hviterussland " [Swede teddy-bombed Belarus]
www.TV2.no, August 2 2012.
396
Euronews, "Swedish Activists Behind Belarus Teddy Bear Stunt," euronews.com, August 2
2012.

211

dropping the teddy bears, they decided to learn how to fly and bought a little
airplane.397
Belarusian authorities first denied that the stunt had taken place, but soon said that
it was a provocation. The stunt had direct consequences for high ranking officials
and journalists in Belarus. The heads of border control and the air force were
sacked,398 and two people detained accused of assisting the Swedes and
publishing photos of the teddy bears on the internet.399 The affair also turned into a
diplomatic crisis between Belarus, Sweden and other members of the European
Union. Although the stunt was not mentioned specifically, shortly afterwards the
Swedish ambassador to Belarus was expelled from Belarus and accused of having
too close relations with the opposition. As a response, the new Belarusian
ambassador to Sweden was no longer welcome.400
For this stunt, there is a little information available about Belarusian citizens’
support for the event. The group Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and
Political Studies made a survey shortly afterwards about Belarusian attitudes to
Russia and the European Union which included the question: “In July a group of
Swedish citizens made an unauthorized flight to Belarus and dropped teddy bears
over Ivenets and Minsk with slogans that called for freedom of speech in Belarus.
How do you evaluate this action?”401 1502 people were asked, and about one third
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replied that they did not know about the action, and 13.8% that it was a provocation
by Western intelligence. 23%, almost one in four, considered it “a courageous
protest against the violation of human rights”. However, the largest group, 31.7%
responded that “it was a silly action”. This category is rather ambiguous and
reflects the general problem with both academic and everyday understandings of
humour mentioned previously. The categories in the survey are not mutually
exclusive since it is quite possible to think it was a silly action and in addition
consider it either a courageous protest or a provocation by Western intelligence. In
spite of this methodological problem with the possible answers, the 23% that
express a supportive attitude by accepting the word “courageous” can be
understood as a relatively high level of support for the action.402
Variants of answer403
It was a silly action.
It was a courageous protest against the violation
of human rights.
It was a provocation by Western intelligence.
I don’t know what you are talking about.
Difficult to answer.

%
31.7
23.0
13.8
31.2
0.3

Confronting power with provocation
Applying Berger’s techniques to these three provocative stunts, new techniques
appear. In Otpor’s Dinar za Smenu action five different techniques are present
simultaneously. The action was both a parody and a ridicule of the government’s
campaign, as well as an insult. In addition, it used a wordplay on the word smenu
with its multiple meanings. Puns/wordplay happens when one word can have more
than one meaning. Such words differ from language to language, but in Serbian
smenu is such a word. When the barrel was removed, the word play continued
when Otpor activists said that Milošević had accepted the money and was now
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going to retire, playing on the pension meaning of smenu. The word play also
contains an allusion to Milošević’s retirement.
A technique used by Voina was the grotesque, in the form of an over dimensioned
phallus. Placed on the rising bridge, it became a severe insult to the FSB. Berger
explains that the grotesque can be both comic and scary, and that the framing of
the grotesque determine our response. As with the other giant penis that the Yes
Men used at the conference about the textile industry, this is a loaded sexual
symbol. Under these circumstances it can hardly be interpreted as anything else
than a provocation. Of course the Russian authorities had the option to ignore it,
but taking their usual reactions to protest into consideration, it is doubtful that the
option was considered.
Like the absurd stunt, the provocative stunt also refuses rationality. As described in
the examples above, the provocative stunts display a devil-may-care attitude which
causes amusement when the almighty, such as the Russian secret police,
Belarusian or Serbian regimes, are shown to be unable to prevent such attacks
right under their noses. Even those supposed to exert total control can be brought
down from their pedestals.
Although the corrective, innocent, constructive and absurd stunts are
confrontational as well, the provocative stunts appear to depend especially on
whether the audiences recognise the irreverent attitude of the activists. Therefore it
is no surprise that the technique of insulting is present in two of the provocative
examples.
From sympathetic bystanders, provocative activists get a “wow, how courageous”.
However, many other nonviolent actions can generate that feeling without being
humorous at all. For instance, the Freedom Flotillas that in 2010 and 2011
attempted to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza were also considered bold actions.
In 2010, nine activists were killed during this attempt to bring humanitarian aid to
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Gaza. The convoy was attacked by Israeli soldiers while it was still in International
waters.404 The Ploughshares is another example of a nonviolent movement that
has not involved any humour and might be considered courageous by some. Using
hammers as a symbolic reference to the Bible verse of turning swords into
ploughshares, they enter arms factories and military areas in Europe and the US in
order to start the disarmament process themselves. Afterwards they await the
police. Especially in the US, these actions have resulted in long prison terms,
causing numerous people within the peace movement to understand these acts as
bold and courageous.405 They are also provocative, but not humorous at all, so
there is more to the provocative humorous stunt than boldness and courage.
What makes the provocative stunts different are the initiators’ attitude towards
those they attack, and their expectations of reactions. The Freedom Flotilla
movement and the ploughshare activists care a great deal about the reactions of
states and companies and thereby indirectly recognise their power and the
rationality they represent. Although their actions use much symbolism, they are not
just a performance and their approach to their opponents is rational. In contrast,
the participants in a provocative stunt do not appear to be concerned about the
power of the institutions they attack at all and deny them their claims to rationality.
The provocative stunts do not seem to have any other purpose than to provoke
and communicate to a large audience: “We do not care very much about potential
consequences.” The actions by Voina, Studio Total and Otpor tease and humiliate
the target with the message “You are not that powerful after all, because we can do
this right under your nose, and we refuse to be scared of you.” And to the wider
audience it adds “Why are you so scared?” “See, they just pretend to be powerful!
Why do you believe that?” With this refusal to be intimidated they contribute to
transcending the rationality of the so-called powerful. When someone finally says
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that the emperor has no clothes, people’s fear may start to decrease. In addition
some of these stunts include other humorous techniques, such as the parodies and
wordplays in Otpor’s Dinar za Smenu action, and the absurdity and naïveté in the
Belarusian case.
The case with dropping teddy bears over Belarus is a little different from the other
two examples. It is certainly provocative, but because the Swedes behind it are not
a local activist group that has to continue working inside Belarus, the edge of “we
don’t care” is not so sharp as in the other provocative stunts. Although there was a
risk involved, as soon as their plane left Belarus they were safe, meaning that the
typical statement of “what are you afraid of?” to the audience was lost. People who
live in Belarus would have reason to be afraid if they had done this. Just publishing
the photos on the internet got one blogger in trouble.406 The way the humour is
generated in this example is also different from the other provocative stunts where
what causes amusement is ridicule and insults. Although the authorities are
insulted, the stunt would not have been humorous if the Swedes had just violated
the airspace to show that they could. It is the teddy bears – a symbol of naïveté –
that causes amusement when they parachute to Belarus in an absurd show of
solidarity from the teddy bears around the world.
The provocative stunt does not attempt to appear as a serious threat to those in
power – from a rational point of view what authoritarian state leader would be
scared because someone drops teddy bears, paints a giant penis or shows
contempt by hitting a photo of them? After all, they have armed police and military
troops ready to back them up. Nevertheless, that authorities bother to react can be
interpreted as a sign that these types of humorous stunts are indeed considered
threatening. One can understand them as kind of guerrilla attack, but not a violent
physical attack. Instead they are attacking the dominant discourse as part of the
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discursive guerrilla war.407 With this concept I mean to say that if one believes
Foucault to be right when he claimed that the most important way of dominating a
society is through discourse, then it also follows that an important way to resist is
by combatting dominant discourses. All humorous political stunts can be
understood from this perspective, but the attack is perhaps the most obvious in the
provocative stunts.
The provocative stunt is the least friendly and dialogue oriented type of stunt. The
laughter it generates is not based on wittiness and inclusiveness, but on
establishing a clear we and they divide, where “the other” can be mocked and
ridiculed. Although it happens without violence and against violence, there is no
aspect of the type of nonviolence that aims to include the opponents and win them
over.

Stunts overlapping different categories
This typology of five different kinds of humorous political stunts divides the
examples according to the way the pranksters relate to the power holders’
rationality and claims to truth. In some cases, it is possible to identify traces from
more than one type of stunt in work at the same time. Where this is the case, I
have included them in the type of stunt which is most prominent. For instance, I
have placed the Polish TV walkers in the naive category, because naiveté is the
most crucial aspect in their way of relating to the authorities. However, it does have
some absurd elements as well with the TV’s in the strollers in the street. In the Yes
Men’s hijacking of the WTO the corrective aspects of the stunt were most
dominant. However, the Management Leisure Suit that they introduced was also a
way to “help” managers keep better track of their workers, and the outfit was rather
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absurd, showing traces of the supportive and absurd stunt as well. The dropping of
teddy bears over Belarus in support for the opposition was mainly a provocative
stunt, but did also include absurd and naïve elements – the teddy bears are naïve,
and the idea of them protesting and showing solidarity is rather absurd.
One stunt in particular that I have come across is difficult to place in only one
category. A performance by the comedians from The Chaser team during an APEC
meeting in Australia in 2007 draws on aspects from both the corrective and
supportive stunt.
In 2007, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) held a summit in
Australia. Representatives from the 21 member states gathered for a week in
Sydney for Leaders week. Many heads of state participated, and security in
downtown city was supposed to be tight. Official figures show a cost of 170 million
Australian dollars for security arrangements.408 The popular comedy team The
Chaser and their TV show The Chaser’s War on Everything decided to do a stunt
to ridicule the security arrangements, although they had been warned not to do
it.409 Posing as Canadian participants in the summit, they made it through several
security checkpoints with their motorcade of three black limousines and a
motorcycle. Their ID cards were stamped with the word joke clearly visible. When
they arrived ten metres outside Intercontinental Hotel where the US participants
were staying, a Chaser team member dressed as Osama Bin Laden stepped out of
one of the cars and said to the police “I’m a world leader. Why haven’t I been
invited to APEC too?”
Julian Morrow who directed the stunt later said: “It was an attempt to satirise in a
silly way the very heavy security and the spin surrounding that security. It was a
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test of the old adage that if you want to get in somewhere the best way is right
through the front door.”410
Australian authorities refused to be amused and charged the team with offences
under the new security laws. In Australia the action caused much debate, and later
all charges were dropped. The rationale was that when the police did not stop the
comedy team at the checkpoint, it had given “tacit” permission for them to be in the
restricted zone. The Chasers have themselves said that they were surprised by
their own success. When they planned the stunt, they had prepared for every
possible scenario along the way, except this. They have also claimed to have
regretted the prank, saying that it was stupid and went too far.411
The Chaser’s stunt was a ridicule of the whole APEC summit, especially the
security arrangements. Talking about security is absurd if it is possible for
someone who looks like the world’s most wanted man to pass security check
points with an ID card stamped joke. In this case, the target of the ridicule was not
a particular person, but absurd security arrangements around a summit of world
leaders. Since the Australian authorities were responsible for security, they were
the ones who ended up humiliated.
Members of the The Chaser team do not consider themselves political activists, but
are professional comedians ready to ridicule everyone and everything. 412 However,
no matter what their intentions were, the message of the action is a critique of the
security hysteria, and forces its audience to ask questions like: When people speak
about security, what is it they expect will create a safe environment – and for
whom? Just for world leaders, or for everyone? Why are some people’s lives
considered worth more than others? How to create a world where everyone is
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safe? How can fences and weapons which separate people instead of uniting them
bring more safety?
The comedy team used their professional characters to make a stunt. The incident
became widely known because they brought their TV crew with them and it later
became part of their TV show. Almost three million viewers watched this episode of
the show.413
The stunt is difficult to place in the typology of humorous political stunts. The way
they hijacked the identity of bin Laden resembles the hijacking of identities for
corrective purposes, but although they suggest that bin Laden ought to have been
invited as well since he was a world leader, this was not their message. The other
corrective stunts have a serious intent in their correction, but no one really thought
that the Chaser’s cared if bin Laden was present or not. Neither did they sneak in
on the scene as is one of the characteristics of the corrective stunt; they invaded
the major scene in Sydney, right in the face of the authorities. This is more closely
related to the provocative stunt. The way they made their way through the security
arrangements with an identity card stamped joke brings the absurd to mind, and
the provocative aspect of the stunt might warrant a place in the provocative
category. However, it did not have the element of “what are you afraid of?” that the
other provocative stunts have. That the Chaser’s stunt is ambiguous and does not
fit in the typology might be a reflection that the Chaser’s do not really have a
political message apart from ridiculing the security arrangements.
There is nothing in this typology preventing activists from combining aspects from
the different types of stunts and having overlaps. However, in most cases there is
an internal logic within each type, and the stunts dilute their meanings if this
coherence is abandoned. The rebel clowns don’t suddenly explain rationally what
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the clowning is about, and John Howard’s Fan club do not step out of character to
announce “we don’t really mean this”.
The APEC stunt showed that it was quite easy to challenge security arrangements,
and afterwards this became the main issue. A real Osama Bin Laden with bad
intention could have caused a lot of damage, so the stunt easily plays into the
hands of the advocates of even more security.

The diversity of humorous political stunts
As one would expect, context matters a lot for understanding humour. Language
and political situation are probably two of the most important circumstances.
Hearing about people who take their TV for a walk during the news broadcasting
make little sense if one is not aware of the political situation in Poland at the time
and know about the appeal for a boycott of the TV news. Serbian word plays need
explanation in order to become comprehensible for non-Serbian speakers. That
context matters might sound obvious, but comedians, activists or anyone else
aiming to produce humour need to take into consideration what the intended
audience knows in advance – especially if an international audience is involved.
Likewise, awareness about cultural differences regarding what are acceptable
objects of humour matter for everyone aiming to produce humorous political stunts.
There seems to be no limit to the mediums available for political humour.
Everything from a lecture, a bridge, a double door, or a shopping centre opens up
possibilities for the creative prankster. It is also likely that the more creative the use
of the medium is, the more attention one will get. Most of the examples presented
here were communicated via mass media – if not to the whole world, then at least
to a national audience. But even in times with less media attention, local messages
can have an effect if many people participate. The numerous Polish TV-walkers got
their message across. The Danish anti-Nazi writing on double doors were
apparently a one-time only experiment from a creative butcher. But had it been

221

used systematically in half the shops in occupied Denmark, who knows what would
have happened?
When a medium is unusual or is used creatively there is a risk that the medium
receives more attention than the issue the actionists want to raise awareness
about. The Chaser´s APEC stunt put more focus on them being in the restricted
area than on the reason for establishing such a zone. A similar observation can be
made regarding the Yes Men on the BBC as a Dow representative – the discussion
ended up being about how Yes Men created false hope for the victims of the
disaster, not about the company’s responsibilities for cleaning up and
compensating victims.
Some individuals have easier access to mass media than others. Professional
comedians already have an established platform that they can use for political
humour. Some of them use this platform to make fun of all dogmatism no matter
who is behind it, whereas others have an agenda. Joanne Gilbert in her writing on
women stand-up comedians suggests that “true believers” in any cause will never
be able to joke about what they believe to be right because they take it too
seriously.414 Although the Chaser’s might agree with Gilbert, and some people
might choose not to joke about what is most sacred to them, there is little doubt
that the majority of the activists presented here are dedicated to seriously
challenging their targets and that their style appeals to many people’s sense of
humour.415
The examples I have given above all carry a message that I personally support. As
Peter Berger writes, “Those who laugh together, belong together”416, and that
people laugh more at humour expressing political messages they support than
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ones they disagree with should be no surprise. Nevertheless, what people
appreciate also depends on what techniques are used, and what kind of
techniques they prefer. Most people can find things funny if they recognise the
stereotype they are based on or because they like certain techniques without
agreeing with the message of a piece of political humour.417

Humorous political stunts and the play of politics
Humorous stunts are games of pretence, interpretation and appearance. They
operate within a play frame, and depend on establishing a resonance with one or
more audiences that this is humorous, and that ambiguity and multiple meanings
and interpretations are acceptable. Nevertheless, the play frame and humour do
not mean that stunts are not serious, in some cases even deadly serious for the
people involved. Some of the games are played with regimes such as the Nazi
occupiers which did not hesitate to kill those who dared challenge their version of
truth. The examples provided here point to the need to question the idea within
humour studies that the contrast to the humorous is the serious. Humorous stunts
are just one method in a larger struggle which is not playful at all. What is at stake
is a question of life/death; of democracy/dictatorship; of censorship/freedom of
speech.
The humorous political stunts illustrate a shortcoming with a purely technical
approach to understanding why something is funny. Although one or more of the
techniques described by Berger could be found in most of the aforementioned
cases, the techniques were not sufficient to explain the political context the stunts
are an integrated part of. In particular the provocative and naïve types do not make
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sense from a purely technical point of view. Humorous stunts are so much part of a
power struggle that one cannot fully understand them without analysing them
within their context.
My model with a classification of five different types of stunts provides a starting
point for analysing how pranksters relate to those they confront. The essential
aspect of this typology is the way the activists present themselves and position the
different stunts in relation to the rationality, logic and claims to truth that the
different representatives of power aim to uphold in this play of politics. The purpose
of including so many examples has been to illustrate that there can be much
diversity also within each type of stunt, although each one still depends on the
same logic.
In reviewing the different theories of humour, I mentioned how the incongruity
tradition is today considered the most important theoretical perspective when
explaining what causes amusement. The humorous political stunts fit well within
this theory. In these examples, the incongruities that cause the audiences to smile
and laugh are closely connected to the relations of power. Those who consider
these episodes funny are likely to enjoy watching the pranksters from the minority
position outsmarting the apparently powerful and almighty companies,
governments, institutions and agencies. A reason for the enjoyment is for a short
while seeing the roles turned upside down and the established relations of power
challenged. At least temporarily, these representatives of vested interests with so
much money and/or force at their disposal are brought down to earth by a few
clever activists.
More specific incongruities can also be identified. In the example of the John
Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club there is an incongruity connected to the use of
irony. The fan club members present two incompatible statements of critique and
celebration at the same time. Returning to Mark Thomas and his exposure of the
Indonesian military officer, there is an enormous incongruity between the
seriousness of the human rights abuses he uncovered and the relaxation exercises
224

he convinced Major General Widjojo to perform. The Yes Men at the textile
conference made an incongruous presentation where the apparently serious
message of the presentation did not correspond with the absurd outfit.
As mentioned earlier, the cases included here are not representative. However, a
hypothesis that can be tested by future research is whether the same five
strategies for dealing with power holders through humorous stunts are relevant in a
variety of cultural contexts.
In all examples, pretence is a central element, since no one wants to play the
ordinary protester on the stage of the political theatre. These five types of stunts
represent different ways of undermining dominant discourses and thereby
transforming the play of politics, at least temporarily. They attempt to disrupt,
subvert or transform relations of power because they highlight the contradictions
and weaknesses of the dominant discourse, using a format that is recognisable
and accepted as humorous.
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Table 2 is an expanded version of table 1. In addition to the columns of description,
position in relation to dominant discourse and dominant humorous techniques
which were included in table 2, the table now includes a summary of the theatre
metaphor, the “statement” that the stunt can be understood to make to power
holders as well as other audiences. Finally, in the last column I have suggested
some examples of each stunt that can be said to be typical and show all the
characteristics of this particular type of stunt.
Both the supportive and corrective stunts position themselves as rational and
logical, but exaggerate, play along with and overemphasise the discourse of those
in power. In the corrective stunt, this is done by hijacking the message or the
identity of the target, whereas in the supportive stunt identification with the target to
help and support is the key. The supportive stunt happens right in the face of the
powerful, while a characteristic of the corrective stunt it that it usually happens
behind the power holders’ back. In these two types of stunts the messages to the
audiences are also similar – to expose the powerful and show who they really are.
On the surface both the supportive and corrective stunts appear as if their
statements should be taken at face value. But that is only at first glance. After that
initial apparent acceptance of the discourse of the powerful, they base their
challenge to power on the moment where the audiences must ask themselves if
this is meant to be taken literally, or if someone is joking. Although this is an area
that has not been studied yet, the people who carry out these stunts assume that
something important happens in that moment of uncertainty. When a reader or
viewer asks herself “is this serious? Do they really mean this?”, the perception is
that she is more open to new information and new perspectives. When political
arguments are presented rationally using traditional ways of disseminating
information such as leaflets, posters and speeches, most people meet the
arguments with an already formed opinion. However, humour can provide a
cognitive “detour” or a “psychological circuit breaker” creating this moment of
openness. If that moment will really change a person’s view and deepen the insight
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depends on a number of factors, but at least there appear to be a possibility for
getting the audience to re-examine its assumptions.
The naïve, absurd and provocative stunts each has a different way of relating to
the discourse of those they aim to challenge. Those performing naïve stunts
appear not to understand that what they do can be interpreted as a challenge of
anyone’s rationality, whereas the absurd pranksters defy rationality altogether.
Initiators of provocative stunts seem not care about the rationality and logic of the
powerful at all.
In both the absurd and naïve stunts the pranksters appear as innocent clowns. In
the absurd stunts, those who carry them out can partly protect themselves from
prosecution because there is usually little logic to what they do. This possibility is
not available to those performing a naïve stunt, since there is usually a logic behind
their naiveté which can be disclosed. It is not the mistakes of the authorities which
cause laughter, because they are not fooled, but the daring to challenge and hide
behind the innocence which appeals to friendly audiences. This boldness is
something the naïve stunt has in common with the provocative, but they differ in
how they display their courage. Whereas the provocateurs of the provocative stunt
seem not to care, the innocent appear not to understand.
Through the theatre metaphor, other differences between the stunts become
visible. In the supportive stunt, the pranksters invade any scene right in the face of
the power holders in order to show their apparent support. For this type of stunt,
there would be no point in hiding away, and they are depending on the sharing of
the scene with the representatives of the dominant discourse. If the power holders
are not there, they cannot offer their help, support and protection. If the political
situation makes it too dangerous or too difficult to invade a scene right in the face
of the power holders, potential pranksters can consider trying other types of stunts.
In the corrective stunt, the pranksters also aim for a scene usually controlled by the
power holders. However, in order to display the correction that they want to
communicate, they depend on capturing and holding this scene for a while. In
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order to do this, they calculate on not being discovered or removed from the scene
for as long as it takes to generate the confusion about whether this is a joke or not.
A characteristic of several naïve stunts are that the pranksters sneak in on the
stage and display their message more or less in secret; if they did it openly it would
rather be a provocative stunt. However, the Santas are an exception since the logic
of their stunt depended on the gifts being given away openly. In their case, the
naiveté was generated by the use of the mythological Father Christmas figure. For
the absurd stunts, there is no specific scene to aim for, and the absurd performers
can stage their play anywhere. Everyone who happens to be present or show up
will become part of the absurdities. Depending on the situation and what point they
want to make, they can be bold and invade a scene, or they can sneak in on the
stage and remain discreet until it suits them to reveal themselves. A characteristic
of the provocative stunt is that the provocateurs attempt to capture or invade a
scene as loudly as possible; it would be a contradiction if they tried to be discreet.
The audiences to the humorous political stunts are numerous. They can include
the target/butt of the prank, media, people on the scene, random passers-by and
other activists. Sometimes those who initiate a stunt have a specific audience in
mind, but most of the stunts presented here appear to have the general public as
their main target and the aim is to encourage a critical perspective on the dominant
discourse. In many of the stunts the initiators deliberately aim to blur the line
between audiences and performers. Everyone who happened to be present on the
street when Orange Alternative staged their happenings became part of the event.
The employees at the AXA bank and the visitors to the arms fair in Greece became
unwilling main characters in the shows when Netwerk Vlaanderen and Mark
Thomas showed up with their land mine clearance team and PR training.
Within social movement research there has been much focus on how activists
frame their activities and messages, but relatively little is known about how
audiences actually perceive it. From media studies it is well known that audiences
are not “empty vessels” waiting to be filled with propaganda, but actively interpret
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what they see and hear depending on their own previous knowledge, experience
and expectations.
Whether audiences accept something as humorous is not straightforward and selfevident. There is a struggle over what meaning to attribute to what is said or done,
and the outcome depends on the context, as Palmer has pointed out.418 The
example from the Yes Men at the textile conference in Finland showed that humour
is a fragile thing. With the original conference audience, the stunt was a complete
failure. Not until the film reached a different audience was it recognised as humour.
Palmer does not say that the butt of the joke or prank has to agree that something
is funny, but either the situation demands or the audience agrees that this was
humorous. When audiences are moved from the rational mode to the humorous
mode, they laugh. Laughter has the potential to undermine the dominant discourse,
when it changes the scene of the political play so much that the ordinary play is
temporarily disrupted. So far, no one has interrupted the play permanently, but that
does not mean it cannot be done.
That protesters manage to interrupt the ordinary play of politics so much that they
take over the scene is not unusual. This happened in Seattle in 1999, when the
neo-liberal discourse was under attack and the WTO meeting was disrupted by
60,000 protesters. Many aspects of these protests had a carnivalesque
atmosphere, for instance the 250 turtle people who contributed to reducing
potential violence.419 However, from the point of view of the WTO, these 60,000
still performed the usual protester roles; they just got out of control. And as long as
most of the activists frame their actions as protest, this image will not be changed
by a minority of clowns, Santas and turtles.
In most of the examples provided here, the situation is different from conventional
protest because of the pretence that this is not a protest. The disruption through
pretence opens up possibilities for transformation rather than opposition. Maybe
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except for the provocative stunt, the use of humour means that it is much more
difficult for representatives of the dominant discourse to frame these actions as
ordinary protest, although they certainly try and frequently succeed. Since nonprotesting protesters cannot easily be categorised with the other protesters, the
show on the scene is interrupted in a different way. The fan club was not protesting
Howard’s politics, they were celebrating him. The Yes Men did not disrupt WTO
meetings, they just clarified WTO’s neoliberal position. The Polish TV walkers did
not strike or march in a demonstration, they just took their TVs for a walk at a
certain time. CIRCA did not say that war was wrong, they just wanted to contribute
with their skills in the army as well. Therefore they did not fit into the ordinary play
called “dominant discourse tolerates protest.”
But what is different? The humorous techniques bring in new ideas on the stage,
and if they cannot be considered part of the usual show, something else has to
happen. Actors cannot continue playing Shakespeare when someone appears on
the stage performing a children’s play. Then they either have to stop playing and
wait for security to remove the new actors, or improvise a completely new play.

The borders of the humorous political stunt
There is a close relationship between the concepts of culture jamming, pranking,
creative activism and tactical carnival presented in chapter 1 and the humorous
political stunt. Some of the examples provided by authors who write about these
concepts obviously fit within the definition of humorous political stunts. There is
especially a big overlap between culture jamming and the type of humorous
political stunts I have called corrective. Åsa Wettergren considers fun and humour
key ingredients in the culture jammer’s resistance towards late capitalism’s
commodification of feelings. In culture jamming there is an emphasis on creating
pleasure which is opposed to the pleasures that consumerism can buy.420 The
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Adbusters version of the obsession ad mentioned in chapter 1 becomes a
humorous political stunt when it is placed in public places. However, in
Wettergren’s definition it is not a requirement that culture jamming is humorous,
and she restricts it to anti-corporate forms of protest.421 That excludes the antimilitarist and regime-critical stunts included above.
Much of what takes place as part of the tactical carnival is humorous, but funny
slogans, songs and posters generally lack the confrontational aspect that cannot
be ignored which is required for something to be a humorous political stunt. Neither
do they include a deception that blurs the line between the artists and the
audiences.
The notions of culture jamming and tactical carnival were invented to investigate
something other than relations of power and are not first and foremost concerned
with how activists challenge power by positioning themselves humorously in
relation to the rationality of dominant discourses. Figure 1 schematically sums up
the relationship between the humorous political stunt and other concepts. It shows
the overlap between culture jamming and the corrective stunts. All the types of
humorous political stunts are placed within the circle creative activism which is a
much broader concept. The two boxes to the left illustrate that the mediums for
communicating political humour and the techniques used to generate amusement
are independent of the humorous political stunts.
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Figure 1. The relationship between the humorous political stunt and
other concepts.
Political humour comes in many different forms, and much of it is not humorous
political stunts in spite of it being both amusing and political. As mentioned in the
beginning of the chapter, I have intentionally been clear about what I consider the
core of the definition and the ideal type of a humorous political stunt and included
examples that are indisputably included in the definition. On the other hand I have
deliberately chosen to be vaguer about the borders in order for future research of
the margins to be able to bring new insights to the phenomenon. This section
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discusses some of the borders and grey zones using a few examples: political
jokes told in public; theatre; and graffiti.
In some places and contexts, comedians perform at great risk to their own
freedom, and just the telling of a joke in public becomes a political act. On several
occasions, Burmese comedians who have criticised the military regime have been
imprisoned. One of the most well-known is Zarganar (which is a stage name that
translates as “tweezers”). Even from prison, Zarganar´s jokes spread to the
community. The prison guards enjoyed them, and passed them on to other
people.422 An example of a joke Zarganar´s friend Htein Lin told to a visitor
concerns electricity. Burma regularly has power cuts, but according to the official
newspapers there is no shortage of power, and the opening of new power plants is
regularly celebrated. So the story goes:
Htein Lin once shared a house with Zarganar. One day they visited
a teashop, run by another former political prisoner. As they drank
tea, Zarganar told Htein Lin about a friend who had died. “That’s
terrible,” said Htein Lin. The teashop owner overheard. “Poor
guy,” he said, “what happened?” Zarganar replied: “He touched a
newspaper and was electrocuted”.423
The punch line here makes a Burmese audience laugh, but can be puzzling to
outsiders. The point is that the only way Burmese people get in touch with
electricity is through the newspapers.
Other comedians have also had trouble with the military junta in Burma. The
Moustache Brothers is a trio where two members have served several years in
prison for their political humour. Now they only perform in their own home, where
foreign tourists can watch the show and bring their criticism to the outside world.
An example of their humour is this:
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Lu Maw is in pain. A toothache has robbed him of food, sleep and
sanity; only a health professional can bring relief. Summoning the
last of his strength he escapes across the Burmese border to
Thailand, hoping that there he’ll find the treatment he desperately
needs. Finally Lu Maw finds a clinic. The dentist is perplexed. “Why
have you come this far?” he asks. “Surely they have dentists in
Burma.” “Sure they do,” replies Lu Maw, his face stretching to a
grin. “But in Burma we’re not allowed to open our mouths”.424
Although clearly political and humorous, these jokes from Burma are not humorous
political stunts even when they are performed in public. The element of deception
which blurs the line between performers and audience or is too confrontational to
be ignored is missing. That comedians perform is courageous and obviously
confrontational, but the humour is not generated by the confrontation of doing a
show, but the content in the show. It is what they say from the stage which is
funny, not being on the stage.
Another arena for professional satire has been the theatre. Italian playwright and
performer Dario Fo does not perform stunts the way I have defined them here, but
his theatre production during half a century is obviously political. It is firmly
grounded in a tradition of carnivalesque subversion,425 but concerned with serious
subjects such as rape, war and police repression. His use of the comic to explore
these issues caused many to be surprised when he in 1997 was awarded the
Nobel Prize for literature.426 During years of writing and performing he has been
condemned by both the communist party in Italy and the Catholic Church. Fo’s
work has been dominated by a concern for the poor and downtrodden and aimed
at exposing the establishment.427 He is especially concerned with restoring
people’s pride in their folk culture and is inspired by Bakhtin’s work on carnival and
Gramsci’s work on hegemony. The process of hegemony devalues folk culture and
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make what is considered “culture” reflect the oppressor’s view of the world.428 Fo’s
performances and plays include both one man farces where Fo plays all the roles
himself, and more traditional plays staging several actors.
An example of the later is “The Accidental Death of an Anarchist” which is a farce
based on real events in Milan in 1969. The police claimed that the railway worker
Giuseppe Pinelli, suspected of bombing a bank, felt so guilty that he committed
suicide by throwing himself out of the window. Fo’s play exposes all the
contradictions in the official explanations and inquiries into the death. 429 Much of
Fo’s work are border cases of humorous political stunts. Just like with the jokes
told by comedians in Burma, Fo’s plays are humorous, political, told in public and
confront authorities. However, because they are performed on stage they can be
ignored, and again there is no deception blurring the line between performers and
audiences. The incongruity is not created by being on the stage, but by what is
being said from the stage.
A final example to explore the borders of the humorous political stunt is taken from
the world of graffiti. Like adbusting, graffiti is based on the idea that the streets
belong to everyone. People who create graffiti speak back to all the advertising in
public spaces dominated by commercial interests.430 Some graffiti carries an
obvious political message that goes beyond saying “no”, and some graffiti artists
reach world fame. The prime example is Banksy who started his career in Bristol in
the mid 1980’s, and is now well known around the world. Today he is considered
an artist rather than a rebel, and his pieces are no longer removed from public
spaces.
In his work, Banksy criticises everything from established art museums to war,
consumerism and surveillance. Most of his pieces do not have an obvious political
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message, and they are not funny either. But some of his work is both political and
amusing. Take for example the piece on the cover of the book Wall and Piece431, a
guy in a black jacket, with his face covered and his arm raised to throw something.
What most people expect him to throw is a stone, but what appears in his hand on
the back cover is a bunch of flowers with yellow, red, blue and green. The
contradiction between expectation and what is actually in his hand is amusing.
In 2005 Banky painted on the separation wall which Israel has built on occupied
Palestinian territory,432 and in 2007, he was back to make more images in
Bethlehem. One of them is an image of a little girl in a pink dress who is body
searching an Israeli soldier in uniform. The incongruity in this situation, the
unexpected reversal of roles makes this an amusing image to some people. It is
also an image that can be used to discuss the borders between humorous political
stunts and other political humour because it changes depending on the situation
the image is placed in. When the painting appears in a place where it is seen by
IDF soldiers passing it, it is a challenge to the power they practice every day
towards civilians and can be understood as a humorous political stunt. However,
now that it is a famous painting, it is used in many different places. I have it as a
poster on my wall, and I find it both amusing and political. However, having it on
my wall at home is not a stunt. Just like the jokes and the theatre play the image is
not an amusing confrontation, but a picture of an amusing confrontation that does
not blur the line between artist and audiences.

431 Banksy, Wall and Piece (London: Century, 2006).
432
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village Bil’in.
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Illustration 10. Banky graffiti from Bethlehem. Photo by Pawel Ryszawa.
Reprinted under GNU Free Documentation License.

Do humorous political stunts really make a difference?
In her book about irony, Hutcheon raises a puzzle about this particular mode of
communication. Why bother with irony when it is so complex and the intentions can
so easily be misunderstood?
Why should anyone want to use this strange mode of discourse
where you say something you don’t actually mean and expect
people to understand not only what you do mean but also your
attitude toward it?433
Not all irony is humorous, and not all humorous political stunts are ironic.
Nevertheless, Hutcheon’s question is also relevant when it comes to humorous
political stunts and in particular when the aim of a nonviolent action is to engage
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people in dialogue. Why use this method instead of saying what you mean without
making communication more complicated? There are probably just as many
answers to this as there are humorous activists, but a general answer is that the
potential benefits are greater than the risks.
In chapter 1 I introduced the discussion within humour theory concerning whether
humour really poses a challenge to those in positions of power, or if it is merely a
vent for frustration. I indicated that it is necessary to leave the either-or dichotomy
behind and instead discuss what role humour can play under what circumstances.
Looking at one particular form of political humour, the humorous political stunt, and
dividing it into different types is one way of probing the complexities of humour.
Also the play metaphor and all the cases in this chapter can contribute to
illustrating how complex it can be to analyse the effect of humorous political stunts
on relations of power.
Some of the factors that are likely to have an influence can be approached through
the theatre metaphor: Was the scene empty or were there already lead actors on
the stage when the humourists attacked? How long did the disruption last? How
frequent were the disruption(s)? How many people wanted to play a role not
included in the script? How did those in power respond to the challenge? Were the
lead actors put in a situation where they felt they themselves had to stop the play,
or did the humourists stop it?
It seems that the more the challengers managed to enter the stage when there
were already lead actors present, the easier it was to get attention from mass
media and a large audience, something which the John Howard’s Ladies Auxiliary
Fan Club and Yes Men on BBC experienced. But if it is too difficult or too
dangerous to interrupt lead actors, this can potentially be compensated by
frequency or number of people, as shown in the example with the TV walkers.
Maybe CIRCA could have increased its influence by performing more plays at the
same time. Another factor affecting success is the new actors’ ability to keep the
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focus on the dominant discourse, and not divert all attention to themselves or their
way of performing.
The use of pretence combined with the ambiguity, incongruity and contradictions
necessary for generating humour means that the attack on the dominant discourse
can be both direct and indirect at the same time. The pretence that this is not a
protest means that it is indirect. But sometimes there is a direct link between the
technique used to generate the humour and the discourse to be undermined. The
humorous techniques directly contribute to the deconstruction, at least for a little
while, and serve to illustrate that the dominant discourse is not as almighty and
unchallengeable as it appeared. The Fan Club used impersonations of a
stereotypical idea of what women were and should be to satirise and exaggerate
what they considered Howard’s old fashioned vision for Australia. When the Polish
people took their TVs for a walk, the absurd image of the TV in the stroller also
directly dealt with the issue of false news on TV. The Yes Men’s golden leisure suit
with its Employee Visualisation Appendage was also in its own absurd way directly
linked to the issue of workers’ rights that the group wanted to highlight. CIRCA’s
slapstick was a direct attack on the military recruiters’ claim to adulthood, and their
clowning embodied values that directly contradicted the discourse of militarism.
However, the link is not that strong in all cases. Voina’s ridicule of the FSB via a
bridge painting did not communicate what in particular they thought was wrong with
the FSB, and Otpor’s Dinar za Smenu did not show what the activists thought was
problematic with Slobodan Milošević’s regime.
Not surprisingly, the representatives of these dominant discourses did not agree to
improvise a new play, but sometimes they were forced to do it. They did not accept
the children’s play but insisted on continuing with Shakespeare. In some cases it
was possible to ignore the new actors, because they were too few, or because they
presented themselves when no important actors were already on the stage. With
ACE bank, Netwerk Vlaanderen could gain the attention of the general public, but
they did not disrupt the functions of the major banks whose practice they wanted to
criticise, and the banks could ignore them. In the Yes Men’s stunt at the textile
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conference, WTO could also safely ignore these new actors. However, that those
in power are not directly affected does not necessarily mean that a stunt has no
effect. Other audiences might be directly or indirectly affected when they encounter
the stunt on the street or through a YouTube video.
In some of the other cases, the activists interrupted the ongoing play so much that
the representatives of the dominant discourses felt some kind of reaction was
needed. The Fan Club, CIRCA and the Santas were physically prevented from
being present on the stage where they wanted to be. In Poland, people from the
Orange Alternative were arrested and put in detention, and in the case with the TV
walkers, the government changed the rules for when the stage was open by
changing the curfew time.
The question of effectiveness is important, but extremely difficult to estimate. In
some cases, the pranks can be disruptive enough to catch world attention and
force a reaction from those being undermined, something which happened to the
Yes Men when they went on the BBC as representatives of Dow, and when The
Chaser team were charged with offences under new security laws after the stunt
ridiculing security during the APEC summit in Sydney. However, even when
humorous political stunts are “just” short and symbolic interruptions, they are still
contributions to the discursive guerrilla war that the activists are engaged in.
Summing up, it should by now be clear that a large number of factors are involved
in determining the impact of a humorous political stunt. It is not just a question of
directly challenging established relations of power, but also concerns the activists
themselves and their commitment to a cause, as well as media, other activists and
the general public.

Conclusion
Humorous political stunts are attempts to disrupt the smooth dominance of
prevailing power formations. They are a unique type of resistance due to the way
they utilise humorous incongruity. Except in the cases of provocative stunts, the
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pretence that this is not protest means that it is a challenge for those in power to
frame these actions as ordinary protest. Because it is difficult to treat nonprotesting protesters in the same way as other protesters, the play of politics either
has to continue in a different way or be temporarily broken down and exposed as a
play that is not totally dominant after all.
Humorous political stunts can be powerful stories because they frequently speak to
the imagination. In Sweden, homosexuality was officially classified as a disease
until 1979. The story goes that the movement for homosexual rights therefore
organised a campaign where they asked people to call their employers and say
that unfortunately they would not be able to work today, since they were feeling a
little gay.434 As a naïve stunt, this exposed the hypocrisy of considering
homosexuality a disease by pretending that it was not meant to be considered a
disease which should prevent people from working. In connection with an
occupation of The National Board of Health and Welfare in 1979, a few people did
indeed use this argument, but there is no basis for the stories of thousands of
people calling in sick. However, the story strikes so many keys that several people
independently of each other have told it to me as a true story. Likewise, the story of
the Yippies throwing dollar bills in the New York Stock exchange has created
images of greedy stock brokers crawling on the floor in many people’s imagination.
Humorous political stunts are related to phenomena such as culture jamming and
tactical carnival that other scholars have studied, but these concepts were
developed with a different aim in mind. Although there are many overlaps these
notions speak about something else. Likewise, Berger’s 45 techniques of humour
can provide insights about how the amusing incongruity is generated in a
humorous political stunt, but his framework does not have much to say about
humour and relations of power.
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This chapter has identified the ideal type of a humorous political stunt where a
dominant discourse is openly challenged by a confrontational performance/action.
It is either so confrontational that it cannot be ignored or involves a deception that
blurs the line between performers and audiences. I have intentionally been clear
about the core of the phenomenon, but vague about the borders in the hope that
future research on borderline cases can bring more insight about the core as well.
The many different examples showed that even within this ideal type, there is room
for much diversity.
I formulated, examined and illustrated five main categories of humorous political
stunts. Supportive, corrective, naïve, absurd and provocative types of stunts
position themselves in relation to those in power in distinct ways. Almost all
examples of humorous political stunts can be placed in one of these types because
there is an internal logic to them, but the example of the Chaser’s APEC stunt in
Sydney demonstrates that this is not always the case.
The type of stunt says something about the broader picture, but by introducing so
many different examples it also became apparent how much variety there can be
within one type of stunt. Take for instance the three supportive stunts by the John
Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club, Mark Thomas and the landmine clearing team
in the AXA bank. They have the supportiveness in common, but even within this
category there is much variety. Similarly for all the other four types.
The theatre model is a way of analysing the dynamics of each individual stunt.
Investigating the four factors of stage, actors, audiences and timing separately
brings insights about each stunt, but understanding the way each of the factors
influences the others and how they play together shows how the humorous political
stunt can be varied and how many possibilities there exist for creative activists. It
also shows the complexities of power and resistance and how it is unfruitful to
consider resistance a question of either futility or impact. Even when those in
positions of power do not change their behaviours because of a single humorous
political stunt, the pranks can be part of broader social movements. They can be
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inspiring, uplifting events in the discursive guerrilla war that bring attention, new
energy and perhaps most importantly demonstrate the existence of alternative
discourses.
The following chapter analyses rebel clowning, a particular type of an absurd
humorous political stunt, in more detail. The two subsequent chapters are the case
studies of Ofog and KMV. In all these chapters the five types of humorous political
stunts and the theatre metaphor are tools that serve to analyse the humorous
political stunts performed by these organisations.
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Chapter 4: Radical clowning as humorous political
activism
Introduction
In Chapter 3 I presented the British Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army
(CIRCA) as an example of an absurd stunt. This chapter explores the phenomenon
of radical clowning in more detail, drawing primarily on Ofog’s experiences with
clowning435 and relating this to findings from the academic literature on CIRCA.
The analysis takes its point of departure in Peacock’s clown theory with its focus
on three central clown elements – play, otherness and incompetence and adds a
fourth element which is prominent in Ofog’s and CIRCA’s clowning - ridicule. It
shows under what circumstances rebel clowning can contribute to facilitating
outreach and mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging relations of
power. The chapter concludes with a discussion of clowning in relation to
Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolence and the contradictions and limitations of radical
clowning.

Radical clowning with Ofog
The “clown army” is a concept that the Swedish anti-militarist network Ofog has
used frequently during its nonviolent actions, both before and during our joint
research project. It was often one of the first things people from Ofog mentioned
when I talked with them about humour. Ofog’s radical clowning is directly inspired
by the British CIRCA.
The literature on clowning as a form of protest is growing. Poul Routledge and L.
M. Bogad have both analysed their own and other “clownbattant” experiences in
CIRCA in academic writing in their respective fields of critical geography and
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performance studies. The rebel clowns have also been used as a case in order to
discuss citizenship436 as well as humour and nonviolent resistance to
oppression.437 Routledge has described how the clowning is developed within a
tradition of direct nonviolent action emphasising independent organising through
affinity groups, a tradition that Ofog is also part of. These affinity groups take care
of training, preparations and the participants’ emotional well-being through what he
calls sensuous solidarities.438 CIRCA’s activism has been placed within a larger
trend of joyful, carnival-like protest that has been termed carnivalesque439, the
ethical spectacle440, and tactical carnival441 as described previously.
Bogad traces the history of CIRCA back to London 2003 and the recruitment tour
through Britain that resulted in about 150 clowns participating in the protests
against the G8 summit in Edinburgh in 2005.442 In addition to contributing to the
goals of tactical carnival, clowning is considered a way of countering our society’s
focus on individualism and celebrities. Since it is difficult to recognise people
behind the makeup, clowning is seen as an equaliser.443 The clowns in these very
special armies dress in a mixture of military and clown clothing and use attributes
from the clowning sphere. While they are clowns in their hearts, their curiosity
draws them to the exciting world of everything associated with police and military
authority. Their absurd performances become a different way of challenging the
discourse of militarism as well as police and military personnel that uphold this
discourse. Clowning frequently opens up possibilities for interaction which are not
available in the same form to “ordinary” protesters.
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The people who initiated CIRCA had a well thought through idea about what they
wanted to do and the purpose of the clowning. CIRCA’s own statement About the
army is a long explanation of the name Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army.
Clandestine signifies a refusal of celebrity and resistance of surveillance, and
Insurgent that “we have risen up from nowhere and are everywhere”.444 Rebel
sends signals of changing the world in a rebellion that will continue forever and
promise always to disobey those in power. Clown “because what else can one be
in such a stupid world. Because inside everyone is a lawless clown trying to
escape. Because nothing undermines authority like holding it up to ridicule.”445
Finally, in the section about why they are an Army, CIRCA says that a single clown
is pathetic, but together an army of clowns is dangerous and can declare war on
the absurdity of the world where money counts more than people and there is an
absurd war going on in Iraq.446
Since CIRCA first introduced the idea of rebel clowning to the global social justice
activist community in Europe, the idea has spread to many different struggles and
under different circumstances in the so-called western world. Ofog’s use of
clowning is part of this spread and adapts the idea of rebel clowning to local
circumstances.
In the written comments I collected during the first workshop with Ofog about
humour, someone wrote:
As clowns we are more unpredictable, one moment we imitate
police, the next moment we play with each other and the third
moment we play with the police(…) it is also possible to push the
limits more as for example clowns, like passing barriers.
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Unpredictability is a central aspect of the clown army, just as it is in conventional
circus clowning. When clowning within Ofog was new to me, I wrote in my research
notes:
Ofog has used the concept of the clown army several times, and
found it a useful way to question power and authority. (…)It is a
good way to get a lighter tone, ease tension and get out the
human side of the policeman or woman, who will maybe start to
juggle with the clowns. Most people become happy when they see
a clown, but sometimes the police get annoyed as well.447
Subsequently, I have explored the concept and the various ideas in the quotes
above by interviewing people about their clowning experiences and through
participatory observation as a clown.
None of the people with clowning experience that I have interviewed have had
much training or referred to any theory about clowning. Within Ofog, there is
knowledge about CIRCA, but little connection to the whole tradition of clowning.
The three clown army actions in Luleå, Gothenburg and Belgium where I was a
participant observer were organised in a typical Ofog manner. Preparations were
done with short notice, ad hoc and with a mix of more and less experienced
clowns. This way of preparing has its advantages and disadvantages. More people
can participate if they are not required to spend long hours rehearsing and
preparing. On the other hand, the performances might not be as good as they
could otherwise have been. For example, Emma and Maria who participated in
Luleå found it difficult to go in and out of their clown roles in different situations.448
More training could probably have prepared them how to handle this.
For some Ofog activists it has been important to let the clowning be a way of taking
action that everyone can participate in. Peter, who was an experienced clown
when he joined Ofog, thinks that it is important that the clowning is unpretentious. If
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some people in an affinity group have clowned before and others not, people learn
from each other:
You can walk in there and just stand there, and then you still fulfil
a function. Everyone does not have to do the same, go in to
influence or establish a relation or do something more
advanced.449
People engage in the clown army with multiple aims in mind, and there may be as
many opinions about the purpose of clowning as there are clowns.

Peacock’s clown theory
Several books provide instructions and practical exercises for people who want to
practice clowning or other physical comedy450, but academics have made
surprisingly few attempts at theorising clowning. An exception is Louise Peacock’s
book Serious Play: Modern Clown Performance, which has a few pages on CIRCA.
However, more interesting is her attempt to define the unique features of all
clowning, including ceremonial clowning, the traditional circus clown, clowns in
theatre and the recent use of clowns in hospitals. According to Peacock, clowning
“allow[s] us to connect with deeper truths about human existence”451, and she
explains that:
The clown clowns not simply to amuse his audience but because
he [sic] has observations about the world, about life, to
communicate to them, and play becomes a conduit to aid that
communication.452
This wish to communicate observations about the world can also be found in
CIRCA’s aims. Kolonel Klepto, echoing CIRCA’s webpage, explains:
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CIRCA aims to make clowning dangerous again, to bring it back to
the street, reclaim its disobedience and give it back the social
function it once had: its ability to disrupt, critique and heal society
(…) creating coherence through confusion - adding disorder to the
world in order to expose its lies and speak the truth.453
Peacock has identified three central aspects of clowning which will be the point of
departure for my presentation of Ofog’s clowning:
The clown is distinguished from the actor by his or her ability to
play with the audience and to create a sense of complicité with
them by using play to connect with them. There is always
something of the ‘other’ about clowns. This may be expressed in
the way that they look different from ordinary everyday people
(through make-up, costume, the use of a red nose), but the most
striking feature of the clowns’ ‘otherness’ is their attitude to life
as expressed through their performance. Whilst the clown often
fails to achieve what they set out to achieve, their failure is
framed by their optimism and by the simplicity of their approach
to life.454
I have emphasised the three concepts I consider central in Peacock’s definition
with bold - play, otherness and failure. Below I treat them as techniques that can
be more or less operationalised in a performance and apply them to the data from
Ofog. Later in her book Peacock uses the expression incompetence
interchangeably with failure, incompetence is a word I find more appropriate and
will use subsequently. In addition, I present the fourth concept of ridicule which
Peacock mentions, but did not find so prominent in traditional clowning that it is
included in her definition.
It is the combination of play and otherness that sets this type of activism apart from
what I have called conventional/ordinary protest and also from most other
humorous political stunts. Playful elements are part of many stunts, but they are
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seldom as central as in radical clowning. Likewise it is not unusual to emphasise
otherness in some types of activism, for instance queer performance, but then it
frequently has an angry tone that is not part of the clown performances the original
CIRCA and Ofog have tried to foster.
Working on humour together with Ofog I have come across three different contexts
where radical clowning has been used. In legal demonstrations clowning has been
a way to deescalate tensions and reach out to police officers. In civil disobedience
actions clowning has served the additional purpose of physically challenging
access to restricted space. In so-called counter-recruitment when Ofog has
attempted to disrupt military recruitment of young people clowning has been a way
to demonstrate the absurdity of militarism. In all these situations two of the basic
clowning concepts – play and otherness – are important features.

Play
Play is probably the most crucial element in clowning generally, and for rebel
clowning too. By playing with each other and inviting others to play clowns can be
understood to reach out. I observed how play can work for the first time during an
international summer camp called “War Starts Here” organised by Ofog near Vidsel
Test Range in July 2011. Vidsel Test Range, at the time known as NEAT (North
European Aerospace Test range), is Europe’s largest overland military test site,
with an air space almost the size of Belgium.455 This huge area in the north of
Sweden is administered by the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV)
and is routinely rented out to other countries’ military forces to train and test new
weapon systems.
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During the day of direct action, 200 people held a pink carnival just outside the
restricted test area.456 I was part of an affinity group with 8 clowns which had two
goals: 1. Challenge police perceptions of their own role, by trying to reach to the
human beings behind the police uniform, and 2. distract the police to make other
affinity groups achieve what they wanted, e.g. climb the fence in order to get to the
military runway. I will return to the problematic aspects of trying to do these two
things simultaneously.
The clowns were dressed in a mixture of clowning and military clothes, and brought
jump ropes, soap bubbles, feather dusters, balloons etc. with them to play with.
When all the 200 activists arrived outside of the restricted area, the clowns
immediately spotted the police blocking the road, and decided to “help”. As
members of the clown army the idea was to show how they felt a community with
others in uniform, although much of what the police do perplexes the clowns.
Forming their own line across the road just in front of the police, the clowns
assisted in stopping the rest of the activists from proceeding and helped direct the
traffic that was allowed to pass where the protesters could not go. At this point all
activists had agreed to respect the police line so the clowns’ “help” did not really
make a practical difference.
Most of the police seemed quite relaxed around the clowns, although they declined
to try the soap bubbles and most of them politely said “no thanks” when offered
sultanas and chocolate. Emma, who was part of our group, tells that when she
started to clean the shoe of one policeman with her feather duster, to her surprise
he just put forward his other foot as well.457 However, one particular policewoman
had been very hesitant in her interaction with the clowns. When they moved
towards her, she moved away, and she definitely did not want chocolate or
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Illustration 11. Ofog. Luleå July 26, 2011 clowns and police.

sultanas. However, a breakthrough came when the clown Sara claimed that her
shoes were bigger than the policewoman’s shoes and without words indicated that
she wanted to measure. When Sara sat down on the ground, the policewoman
followed her lead and put her boot against the clown’s boot, revealing that Sara did
in fact have the biggest shoes. A little while later, this same clown pretended to get
stuck half way through the fence into the runway, were a number of activists where
sitting under arrest and waiting to be escorted out. This performance was so good
that I thought Sara actually was stuck. It is the only example of a radical clown
deliberately using the idea of incompetence that I have come across.
Later in the day, a group of around 50 people, including some of the clowns,
decided to participate in a civil disobedience action when they entered the
restricted military area by walking on the main road which leads through the zone.
Cars can go through but are not allowed to stop. The place had been declared off253

limits to Ofog, but the handful of police had no chance of stopping the group. On
the walk to the fence which separate the road from the military run way, these 50
people were escorted by only two police officers – a man walking and a woman
driving the police car. During this five kilometre walk, some of the clowns walked in
the heels of this lonely policeman, sometimes one, sometimes three in a line,
imitating his every move. If he walked fast, the clowns walked fast, if he talked in
his radio, the clowns talked in their make believe radios. If he turned around to see
what was going on, the clowns turned around as well. From the clown perspective,
this was a game of “follow John”, but in all likelihood it looked rather different from
the policeman’s point of view. His strategy for dealing with the clowns seemed to
be to ignore them to the extent possible, and engage in conversations with the
“civilian” protesters.
Another example of clown play during a civil disobedience action was described to
me in several interviews. Bofors is one of Sweden’s biggest arms manufacturers,
and Ofog had held a demonstration against the company in June 2008. The police
had closed off a zone in front of the building with red and white tape. A small
delegation from the activists had just tried to deliver a letter to the CEO, but was
driven out of the enclosed area. Everybody was a bit tired, it rained a little, and the
activists were discussing if they should go home. Suddenly, three rebel clowns
from the clown army arrived. All three did their best to hide together behind a small
tree branch on this huge open parking lot. Pretending that they were invisible to the
police, the three clowns snuck into the enclosed area, hid behind a flower pot and
started playing clown games. Then the clowns became bolder, and tried to engage
the police in their games and imitate the way the police officers stood and moved.
Some of the police officers started to move differently in order to get the clowns to
imitate them, and one policeman even blew soap bubbles that a clown offered.
Vera reflected about the episode:
And then we appear, a group of clowns and kind of hide behind
little twigs and roll around and fool around and we can stay there,
and we reflected on that. But they just removed someone, and I
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don’t think it was because the police got tired, they understood
that it would probably be easier to let us stay in there. 458
As Vera interpreted the situation, the police thought it would be easier to let the
clowns stay inside the enclosed area and let them play since they did not do any
harm. That the police apparently accepted the clowns as harmless meant that they
had been successful in communicating their nonviolent intentions. Lena, another
Ofog activist who participated in the same clown group, adds how the situation was
perceived by the “ordinary” Ofog activists who were holding the demonstration
outside of the enclosed area:

Illustration 12. Ofog. The clown army succeed through camouflage and
silliness to get inside the enclosure. Outside arms producer Bofors’
headquarters in Karlskoga June 17 2008459
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We kind of snuck in, you know we were very visible because it was
a totally open parking lot, but we pretended to sneak in and came
all the way to the house and really played theatre. It was like a
show for the others in the manifestation because it rained a little
and was kind of “should we go home or what” atmosphere. 460
Peter described a similar challenging of space in Luleå in 2009, where he and
other clowns hid behind twigs and pretended to be completely hidden, in order to
cross the police line.461
Peacock’s emphasis on play and the rebel clowns’ attempts to get the police to
engage in play with them is also supported by John Wright’s understanding of
clowning. His book Why Is That So Funny? A Practical Exploration of Physical
Comedy462 provides many practical exercises for performers to help them find their
inner clown. To Wright it is important that clowns are not acting, they just “are”.
Clowns exist in the here and now without pretence.463 All clowning takes as its
point of departure the simple clown whom he characterises as “fun-loving, childlike,
amoral, irresponsible, mercurial, bizarre, destructive, chaotic and anarchic”. 464
Central to the simple clown is stupidity, naivety and constant bafflement about what
life has to offer.

Otherness
The second keyword from Peacock’s definition of clowning, otherness also
resonates well with radical clowning. By wearing parts of military uniforms, the
clown army is partly like soldiers, but the clowning attributes and especially the red
noses obviously make them part of the community of clowns. Ofog and CIRCA
clowns belong everywhere – and nowhere. The otherness is also expressed in part
of CIRCA’s description of itself quoted in Chapter 3: “We are circa because we are
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approximate and ambivalent, neither here nor there, but in the most powerful of all
places, the place in-between order and chaos.”465
A telling example of otherness comes from Vera when her clown character
pretended to fall in love with one of the police officers. She looked at him and flirted
by hugging herself, and felt it was a breakthrough that made him relax: “For me the
symbolism became: You are here, but you are not my enemy. I rather think you
should be with us instead.”466
A comparable expression of radical clowning can be found in one of Bogad’s
articles. The clown Trixi confronted a line of very serious police in riot gear during
the G8 summit in Edinburgh in 2005. During a rather tense situation, Trixie went
along the line of police and kissed the plastic shields of all the policemen in the
line, just after the shields had been used to shove people away in order to recreate
police control of a street. A photo of this episode went around the world the next
day as part of many reports of the protests. Bogad comments that the police who
were exposed to Trixie and her fellow clowns expressed reactions ranging from
amusement and surprise to asking her to “step away, from the shield please”.467
The clown performance continued with a number of different games, and after a
while the police withdraw from this part of Edinburgh’s streets. Bogad adds that
there might have been other factors than clown magic involved, but for the people
present it was a powerful moment.
Both Vera and Trixie used typical expressions of flirting to disarm and
communicate friendliness. It is part of both traditional and rebel clowning to divert
from established social norms in various ways. Peacock writes that “clown actions
can also involve sexual antics which involve a level of obscenity that would not be
acceptable in everyday society.”468 However, even if kissing and flirting are
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associated with sexuality, when done by a rebel clown confronting police it
becomes disconnected from its ordinary use. Instead of the kisses’ conventional
associations with sexuality, they become a sign of otherness when social
conventions about relations between protesters and police are broken.
Clowns behave in different ways, depending on the person underneath. They
communicate multiple and sometimes contradictory messages which get
interpreted in various ways by different audiences. As a minimum almost all rebel
clowns aim to communicate a non-threatening attitude, something that can be
achieved through the play and otherness apparent in their actions and attitudes. It
is impossible during the heat of the moment to communicate sophisticated
understandings of nonviolent action such as the whole of Vinthagen’s theory, but
most people that Ofog’s rebel clowns have encountered seem to understand that
no harm is intended.
Some clowns go further and want to express friendliness and demonstrate that
police and protesters should not consider each other enemies. Vera was one of the
people from Ofog I interviewed who expressed this aspect of clowning most
clearly. When talking about clowning during larger demonstrations, she said she
prefers to take the role of the curious clown who wants to include everyone in what
is going on. She likes the clown figure because it does not make her “a hard and
angry activist”469, a notion she used to describe the stereotype of political activists.
She wishes to communicate that the police are not the object of the activists’
anger; they are just something that people in Ofog have to deal with as part of their
anti-militarist activism. Vera is also the kind of clown who leaves police officers
alone if they don’t want to play, as she expresses it: “you know, it is not as fun to
play with someone who thinks you are very annoying.”470 When Vera clowns, she
gives everyone a chance to see what her intentions are:
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For me the point is that it should not just be fun for me, it has to
be something that the police can appreciate as well. It should not
exceed the limits, so if they don’t seem to understand that after
they have had the opportunity, then I leave them alone.471
Vera also explained how she used her high-pitched clown voice to communicate
the potential bond between activists and police with words: “But if you take a
helicopter, and you fly in over here, then you can let us down in the area of the
arms factory where we would like to be, that is a good idea, isn’t it?”472 She thinks it
is easier to get acceptance for the idea that activists and police have something in
common when she is clowning compared to when she is in “civilian”. Even if Vera
never displays anger herself, her experience is that she is perceived as angry by
the police when she is not clowning. However, she only pretended to fall in love
with one particular policeman. With others she thought looked stricter, she
practiced standing in line just as them. If she did not get any response she moved
on to the next one. But everyone got a chance to see what her intentions were,
including the head of the police.

Incompetence
According to Peacock, “failure or ‘incompetence’ is a staple ingredient of clown
performance”, and the third central aspect of clowning she identifies. 473 Weitz also
describes how the western clown is inspired by the country bumpkin and draws on
“physical, intellectual and social incompetence”.474 However, failure and
incompetence are almost absent from the data about rebel clowns. Although
CIRCA’s recruitment video includes a sentence about “learning how to be
stupid”475 and CIRCA’s statement has a reference to failure when discussing why
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they are clowns476, the incompetence is not mentioned in the academic literature
on CIRCA. As mentioned earlier, Sara getting stuck in the fence surrounding Vidsel
Test Range/NEAT is the only example of incompetence I have observed or heard
about. Since this is rather striking, I systematically looked for episodes of
incompetence in ten randomly selected YouTube videos documenting rebel clown
actions.477 In none of them did I find anything resembling incompetence.
Peacock herself does not engage in a systematic discussion about the similarities
and differences between what she describes as central clowning concepts and her
analysis of CIRCA. Thus, she mentions how CIRCA clowns are playing and how
they parody the military, but does not comment of the lack of incompetence in
CIRCA clown behaviour.
There are most likely several reasons why there is so little incompetence in rebel
clowning. Activists who have little knowledge of the clown tradition are unlikely to
have thought much about what ought to be “staple ingredients” in their clowning. It
also takes more practice and skills to be funny by appearing incompetent than
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most amateur rebel clowns have. In addition it requires a type of action/situation
where there is enough time to establish a contact with the audiences. It is also
possible that amateur clowns who are used to being “ordinary” protesters might
find it relatively easy to play and ridicule others, but a challenge to humiliate
themselves by appearing incompetent. However, it would require more research to
know why incompetence is almost absent from rebel clowning.
An interesting question is if more use of incompetence would improve the rebel
clowns’ likelihood of achieving their goals. It would probably contribute to
communicate the clowns’ otherness at the same time as it reaches out and
emphasises that we are all humans who can fail, activists and representatives of
authorities alike. Where the non-humorous activists usually find it hard to deal with
failure, this would be easier for clowns. Since clowns are constantly bewildered by
the state of the world and their lack of success, they could serve as an
embodiment of all activists’ common failure to change the world. Likewise, daring
to show incompetence, even though it in fact requires great skill to do it well, would
make it more difficult to interpret the clown activists as self-righteous.

Ridicule
If incompetence is missing, rebel clowning instead includes a fourth feature which
does not take such a prominent place in Peacock’s theory, namely ridicule. Clowns
standing next to police and military personnel and imitating their every move are a
“staple ingredient” in actions I have observed and heard about. Peacock’s clown
theory does mention ridicule, but in radical clowning the use of ridicule is more
striking than in conventional clowning. Rebel clowns address the issue of high and
low status with their parodies of police and military signs of importance and
prominence, for instance when body posture and ways of walking are imitated. The
parodies ridicule law enforcement officers’ attempts at displaying authority and for
most people they come across as funny without much explanation. As Emma
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expressed it: ”If you see a person with a red nose standing in exactly the same
position, then it looks comical.”478
Lena was one of the people I interviewed who emphasised how ridicule can be
used to expose the ridiculousness in the police and military roles. She talked about
a clowning experience from Luleå in 2009 this way:
A lot of military personnel stood there guarding the military airport
and we were mainly there to make fun of them. We had our own
little exercise a kind of “practice peace” where we encouraged the
soldiers to come with us and practice peace instead of practicing
war. But we were also just hanging around them. You know, when
you are dressed like a clown it is quite rewarding just to stand
next to a police or a military, and then you kind of make them
look stupid just by standing next to them.479
This use of ridicule is also outspoken when clowning has been used as so-called
“counter-recruitment”. This is a term used within the peace movement for activities
aimed at providing alternatives to or facts about military recruitment of young
people. The purpose of clowning in this context is to engage directly with the army
as an institution and not “just” interact with the police present at larger
demonstrations and civil disobedience actions confronting military exercises or
arms production.
During the interviews I asked some people what they expected would come out of
clowning counter-recruitment, something which Ofog had not practiced before and
we were planning to do. Gustav who had not been clowning himself, but was
interested in doing it as part of the counter-recruitment, explained his expectations
of the clown figure like this:
It is a way of ridiculing, or show (…) that militarism and military
recruitment is quite silly. Especially if it is a clown which is
recruiting I think it can be interesting. And first and foremost I
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also think that you can make people reflect a little more, hopefully
ask “what is this really, why do they do this?” It is actually quite
sick that you have people who recruit people to war.480
Here Gustav described how ridicule is part of rebel clowning, and the purpose of it.
Contrary to Lena he did not find it so interesting in itself to ridicule people in
uniform, but saw it as an opportunity to make the audiences wonder what the
clowns are doing, what they mean. Instead of providing a definite statement that
military recruitment is bad, the absurdity of the clowns might make the audiences
think for themselves.
The use of ridicule is not unproblematic. It is one of humour’s darker sides, and its
existence is often downplayed in writings focusing on the positive aspects of
humour.481 Below it will become apparent how ridicule is ambivalent in relation to
the playful and friendly aspects of clowning, and in Chapter 5 I return to the risks of
ridicule being experienced as abuse.

Analysis: Clowning the way to hearts and minds?
The first part of this chapter took its point of departure in Peacock’s clown theory. It
showed how radical clowning uses two of the three core features of clowning she
identified: play and otherness. These two aspects of clowning are central in
communicating friendliness and nonviolent intentions. However, Peacock’s third
feature, incompetence, is almost absent in radical clowning. Instead I identified
ridicule as a fourth central feature, which sends very different signals than
playfulness. In the analysis I will investigate how play, otherness and ridicule
contribute to or hinder the clowns’ ambitions when it comes to:
a) facilitating outreach and mobilisation
b) facilitating a culture of resistance
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c) challenging power relations482
Towards the end of the chapter I discuss play, otherness and ridicule in relation to
theory of nonviolent action.

Facilitating outreach and mobilisation
Frequently activists are very interested in getting media attention, since this is
considered the gateway to getting information about an action to the general
public. Although some activists are cautious about focusing too much on
mainstream media because the journalists have the possibility to distort the image
that the activists would like to present, few activists claim that unbiased or
supportive coverage does not matter.
Bogad’s experience from CIRCA in Edinburgh was that the clowning received a
less hostile media coverage than most of the other protesters, and CIRCA’s
promise to “amuse, bemuse, but never bruise”483 was quoted in several media
reports.
On April 1st 2012 Ofog participated in an action called NATO Game Over in
Brussels in Belgium. It was organised by a Belgian group and had participants from
many European countries. We were a group of six clowns from Ofog, but there
were several other clowning groups. The action was announced beforehand as a
humanitarian intervention, and was a civil disobedience action where 500 people
attempted to enter the headquarters of the military alliance NATO by climbing the
fence. There were numerous journalists, film crews and photographers present
while the action was taking place. They were filming and photographing the
attempts to climb the fence and the arrests of the 500 activists. The number of
photos showing clowns is out of proportion with the actual number of clowns,
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leaving the impression that clowns in handcuffs make good photos.484 However,
even if the media like the clown photos, clowns’ relationship with media is
ambivalent. It can be difficult to understand what the clown army is there for,
something Johanna has noted:

Illustration 13. Action pour la Paix. The author in clown handcuffed
together with her buddy and taken away by a policeman.
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It is probably very difficult for media to comprehend why we are
clowns, that is kind of a standard question from journalists, “why
are you clowns?” I think the question is understandable because
we work on something as serious as war preparation.485
Johanna continued reflecting that the clowning tries to communicate many different
things about the military structures and encourages people to reflect on this by
twisting things around and taking a step back, and concluded that “It is difficult to
explain all aspects quickly in a few sentences to a journalist in an interview.”486
However, explaining clowning is not just a challenge when it comes to journalists,
but to all outsiders. It is like explaining a joke. As soon as you try to explain the
punch line rationally, the joke falls to pieces. However, some clown performances
are clearer than others.
In November 2011 I contributed to organising a group of rebel clowns that wanted
to stand next to the military and recruit to the clown army at a big career and
education fair in Gothenburg. We produced a recruitment flyer which was a parody
of some of the elements in the military’s recruitment. The Swedish armed forces,
Försvarsmakten, advertises itself with a focus on the high tech equipment it uses,
team work, and peace. It presents itself as a good employer with many career
opportunities, with almost no mention of war or armed combat. The clown army
took up the competition with motivations such as
a job in the clown army is not like any other job. With us you don’t
get pay and pension. Instead you get material benefits such as
your own water pistol, a becoming red nose, a whole bottle of
bubble soap and a totally round hula hoop. In addition, you
become part of the amazing clown community.487
At the education fair, a group of six clowns and two civilian Ofog activists were
ready to enter the fair in order to recruit for the clown army next to the regular
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army. However, someone had been keeping an eye on Ofog and knew we were
coming, so the clowns were turned away in the door. Nevertheless, one of the
advantages of humorous political stunts is that an apparent defeat can easily be
turned into a success. Ofog could claim that Försvarsmakten was scared of
clowns.488
When the clowns were not allowed inside, they and the two civilian Ofog activists
spent an hour outside handing out leaflets. However, the parody in the clown flyer
got lost when the military’s flyer was not being handed out right next to it. In spite of
this, the civilian Ofog activists commented in the evaluation that the clowns had
drawn a lot of attention from passers-by, making it easier for them to engage
people in a conversation.489 So even if the action did not achieve its goal of
challenging a dominant discourse, the clowns still contributed to outreach.
Peter is one of the most experienced rebel clowns in Ofog. Talking about outreach
he said that clowning has a huge potential, and it is a shame that it is not used
more:
The potential is to be able to reach to those you encounter in a
different way. To loosen up the boundaries for what is allowed,
and also to be able to create an atmosphere in an action that is
positively appealing. Not only with police or military or other
protesters, but also if there is someone watching. In the kind of
environments where there are other people, then it becomes a
little more appealing with clowning. After all, clowns are
something people recognise, and it is more difficult to make a
hostile caricature of clowns. Dangerous clowns do not really exist,
so it becomes more difficult to talk about dangerous protesters.
Clowns are something different.490
Here Peter mentioned several different aspects of clowning that he thought
increased the potential. Clowns can reach to others in a way that is different from
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other forms of protest because the clown figure creates certain associations for the
passers-by. It is difficult to frame clowns as dangerous and demonise them
because they are something people recognise and generally have a positive
attitude towards. However, among activist clowns it is seldom mentioned that some
people are scared of clowns or that the clown figure has been heavily
commercialised (think of the McDonald’s clown Ronald McDonald). Neither is it
addressed that the ambivalence of the clown figure has been used as an extremely
scary figure, for instance in Stephen King’s novel It or as the bad guy “the joker” in
one of the Batman movies.
One of the potential problems with the spread of rebel clowning that has been
raised is that little or no preparation means that people dress up as clowns rather
than find their inner clown and stay in clown.491 A bad performance influences
many aspects of clowning, among them how it is perceived by others. Ofog has
been less systematic than the British CIRCA when it comes to clown preparations
and I suspect that some observers might be critical of the way the preparations are
done in Ofog. Routledge for instance is critical of how the idea of CIRCA has been
copied in other parts of the world and the lack of training. Not only does it take
practice to stay in clown, but to Routledge CIRCA was a method that was
developed for the specific context of the “war on terror” and the G8 protests in
2005.492 He thinks the concept becomes less coherent when people attempt to
transfer the idea to a different time and place. The example of clowning that he
appears to be most critical of was during the demonstrations against the UN
climate talks in Copenhagen in 2009. I agree with Routledge that it is difficult to
explain the clown army in the context of climate change, but the concept goes well
with everything to do with war and war preparations, not just the war on terror. For
Ofog radical clowning has also worked well in spite of short training sessions. Of
course training makes it easier to stay in clown, but one should not underestimate
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the trouble at least some outsiders will have with understanding the clown army
concept no matter how good and well thought through the performance is.

Facilitating a culture of resistance
Facilitating a culture of resistance is about the way groups build internal community
and strengthen the individual’s capacity for participating in resistance. In the
example from Bofors mentioned above, Lena felt the performance of the three
clowns gave new energy to the rest of the Ofog activists. In literature on CIRCA it
is frequently noted how clowning affects the clowns themselves. Routledge
reflects:
CIRCA was not an excuse for activists to dress up as clowns and
bring color and laughter to protests. Rather, the purpose was to
develop a form of political activism that brought together the
practices of clowning and non-violent direct action. The purpose
was to develop a methodology that helped to transform and
sustain the inner emotional life of the activists involved as well as
being an effective technique for taking direct action.493
Whereas Routledge emphasises activists’ emotional life, Bogad speaks about how
CIRCA training sessions are a way for the participants to find their clown personas,
something which goes beyond taking on a role in the moment of the action. In
addition to figuring out how one should look and act as a clown, Bogad mentions
the mutual relation between the individual and the group:
It is also a much longer and deeper process that involves a great
deal of thoughtful/playful exploration. Putting on the makeup
before an action is a crucial part of the transformation, the reentry into one’s alternate clown persona. This celebration of
individual creativity and identity through the development of one’s
own clown can hopefully enable CIRCA members to express
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themselves in the moment and mode of carnival while still feeling
part of a larger group identity.494
These types of comments about the purpose of the training sessions have not
been made by the Ofog activists I interviewed. The explanation for this is probably
the much more ad-hoc approach to clowning that Ofog has had than CIRCA.
However, all the clowns I interviewed said that clowning is fun and that they have
enjoyed it themselves. Clowning and other types of humour have been important
for many activists in finding the energy to keep working on such a depressing issue
as war.
To see how clowning can be a personal liberation, some of my field notes say a lot.
In my “normal” life, I am usually quite intimidated by representatives of authorities.
During demonstrations I prefer to keep in the background and let others handle the
interaction with the police. However, as a clown my fear was reduced considerably.
At my first clowning experience in Luleå described above, I ended up interacting
with the police in ways I had not even thought I would dare the day before. Straight
after the action, I wrote in my hasty field notes:
I found myself in new situations that I had not imagined [the day
before]. I was imitating a policeman for several kilometres by
following in his heels, and interacting with many of them.
Also during the NATO Game Over action in Belgium mentioned previously,
clowning made me less scared of the encounter with the police. I thought that the
chance of the police beating up clowns was smaller than violence against
“ordinary” activists, something which Bogad also has noted. What is even more
interesting is that I have been able to take this experience of fearlessness from my
clowning persona and subsequently use it also in my “normal” life.
However, clowning is not necessarily personally liberating for everyone if people
find it hard to find a way to use the clown role under the circumstances they
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encounter. Emma and Maria felt a little superfluous as clowns in Luleå in 2011
when there were so many protesters and so few police. When Emma had been at
the action in Luleå two years previously, the atmosphere had been very different
and there had been police and conscript soldiers everywhere. Maria had decided
to be part of the clown army in Luleå in 2011 as a personal challenge, since she
has never liked the clown figure much, not even as a child. Although it felt a bit
strange for her to be a clown with this attitude behind her, she is glad that she tried.
Sometimes during the action she had a good flow and it was cool, but at other
times she did not really know what to do and would have liked to have more
training and scenario planning beforehand.495
To sum up rebel clowning’s impact on facilitating a culture of resistance, it can be a
way to contribute to more energy and sustainability to the group, and a personal
liberation for some clowns. However, it depends very much on the circumstances
what the clowns can do.

Challenging power relations on the ground
Through play and otherness clowns present their friendliness and nonviolent
intentions, but as soon as ridicule is added the whole affair becomes more
ambivalent. When it comes to relations of power, the accounts of rebel clowning
first and foremost attest to the way activists perceive and interact with police and
military on the ground, since they are the representatives of dominant discourses
that rebel clowns actually get to meet.
Although the police and soldiers on the ground are rarely what concerns activists
the most – in the case of Ofog the main target is the dominant discourse of
militarism – relations with the police frequently become the major topic for rebel
clowns. Law enforcement officers respond to clowns in many different ways, but
according to the clowns there is something disarming about the clown figure. Vera
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experienced this already when she was performing as a clown for the first time.
She described how by being in her role as a clown, the police that she interacted
with became more relaxed. Her experience was that at first they were quite stiff,
but once they understood that the clowns did not intend to do anyone any harm,
they responded by moving in ways which they expected the clowns to imitate.496
Earlier I described the action at Bofors’ headquarters in 2008 where three clowns
“snuck” inside the enclosure. Vera experienced a change in the dynamic of the
interaction with the police:
And we had very much fun, and in the end the police started to
interact with us and blow soap bubbles. When we imitated them
they started to do funny things because they knew we would
imitate them, and it became an interaction instead of an angry
demonstration.497
To Vera, situations like this show something about what it is that clowns can do
that other protesters cannot do, and how disarming the clown figure can be:
I experienced how big the difference can be between being a
clown and an ordinary activist, and I thought it was really intense
and cool. Not because it is very cool in itself to cross the enclosed
area, but there is something very disarming with this figure, the
symbol that the clown is.498
Lisa, an activist who observed this episode, viewed it as a little victory regarding
space because the clowns managed to get a little further than what was allowed.
That victory felt important, since the year before someone had been arrested and
convicted just for being a few meters inside the enclosed area.499 However, there is
a limit to the clowns’ ability to influence relations of power. Vera used the term
disarm metaphorically to describe how the clowns charmed the police into a mutual
recognition of each other as human beings. However, in spite of this
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“disarmament”, the police literally remained armed and it is hard to imagine
anything the clowns could have done that would change that.

Illustration 14. Ofog : A police blows soap bubbles outside Bofors
headquarters.500
The challenge of space was mainly symbolic, since the clowns themselves did not
have any clear plans about what they wanted to do once they were inside. It was
the crossing itself that was seen as a victory, because it challenged the authority
that the police was trying to uphold. Some people might consider this childish
mischief, but in this context where the police were there to protect a big arms
producer against nonviolent protest, and there was no obvious reason for having
the restricted area exactly where it was placed, the challenging of space became
an undermining of the rationality that the police were trying to uphold. By physically
crossing the line of authority, the clowns showed that the location of the line was
artificial and negotiable, since some people could be there and others not. By using
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an absurd humorous political stunt, they pointed towards the absurdity of the
situation.
However, clowning will not have this effect of negotiating space in all types of
situations. At the NATO Game Over action in 2012 the clowns found little space to
manoeuvre because everything happened so fast and there was little we could do
as clowns. I doubted how useful the clowning was because the timing of the action
meant there were only a few minutes when we could interact with the police. My
field notes describe how my clown character offered sultanas to a policewoman on
a horse in this very short moment of opportunity:
Then I tried to approach the police to offer my sultanas, but did
not get very far before three police horses were cutting me off and
I became a very small and scared clown. However, as a
determined friendly and peaceful clown I still offered sultanas, and
even in a situation like this the policewoman actually felt obliged
to say “no thank you”. That is an interesting observation, and
although the police of course react individually, friendly clowning
definitely helps break through. But no chance of imitation or
playing games.501
My interpretation of the policewoman’s polite reaction was that I had succeeded in
communicating the nonviolent values that I intended to, and to me it felt like
“breaking through” to the person behind the police role. It is possible that this is an
over interpretation and she might have been friendly anyway, but during the heat of
the moment I was satisfied with being able to bring about this reaction.
After the NATO Game Over action outside of NATO’s headquarters we had to walk
half a kilometre to an enclosure. On the way I tried to talk to several of the police.
Some responded and some did not speak English or pretended not to. I asked
them if they were scared of clowns, and when they said no as expected that
became an opportunity to ask why they then arrested the clowns. No one
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Illustration 15. The author in clown offering sultanas. Photo by Olivier
Vin, heymana.com.
answered that, but some of them smiled. I interpreted the smiles as if they did see
the absurdity in the situation. However, another episode was a bit more peculiar
and difficult to interpret. Before being put on the bus to the police detention,
everyone was searched and everything that said “NATO Game Over” or otherwise
expressed a critical opinion of the military was taken away and thrown in a pile. By
then I had decided to stop clowning, and had put the red nose in a bum-bag. When
I was searched, the policewoman threw away my soap bubbles and my red nose,
and no insisting that they were mine would bring them back. In my notes I wrote:

275

This was just really ridiculous but that must be scary material,
how else to interpret such an overreaction? It shows that clowning
has some impact on them although I’m not sure what impact.502
I enquired of other clowns if this had been a systematic approach towards all
clowns, but it appeared to be a random decision by one particular police person.
In several of the interviews, people from Ofog also commented on police reactions
to clowns. Again it becomes obvious that clowns generate many different
reactions. Emma and Maria observed the policeman in Luleå who walked several
kilometres with one or more clowns in his heels. Emma’s impression was ”I think
he thought it was quite comical,”503 and she thought that he had a good attitude
because he talked to some of the “civilian” demonstrators. To her it looked like he
tried to interact a bit with the clowns, and smiled a little. Maria added that he was
quite tolerant and did not overreact, but treated us like a good father when his kids
were a bit naughty or out of line.504
Johanna had not been close to the police herself as a clown, but has observed the
various responses to clowns: “The police laugh, and I think it is very difficult not to
do that. However, I have also seen police who did not dare to laugh.”505
As Johanna interpreted the police, most of them could not help but laugh, and in
her opinion those who did not laugh did not dare. An alternative interpretation is of
course that they were just not amused.
Peter’s experience has been that police and military do not really know how to
react to clowns. According to him clowning creates uncertainty because they
cannot react as they do with conventional protesters.
I think there is such a liberty in the role of a clown. First of all, the
limitlessness, what you can do as a person, it becomes more like
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play. I have noticed that police and soldiers do not really know
how to meet clowns, they can’t really behave as they usually do
when they meet demonstrators. Instead they become a bit more
cautious. They don’t know exactly how to react, and therefore you
can get away with more things than you usually would. It
becomes a little less hostile.506
Peter has also had the experience that the police attempted to make the clowns
become serious, asking them to stop clowning and being foolish. When I asked
what he and the other activists did as a response, Peter painted a picture of the
dilemma that absurd clowns pose to police who know how to deal with rational
protest, but have little experience with absurdity:
Peter (laughs): Then you just continue, that is the point. To be a
clown is about giving those you meet a perspective on their own
role, on how they react. So when I walk and pretend to be a
soldier, and place myself next to a soldier then maybe they get a
perspective. That is a part of the action as well, that you can reach
to the human being in a different way. You go in as a clown and
play either police or military or demonstrator, so everyone can see
themselves in what they do.
Majken: Have you seen any episodes where you have felt that
break through the police role and reach the person who is behind
it?
Peter: That is difficult, because you never really know, actually.
You feel that the police are uncomfortable, you can feel that. And
then you have reached through in some way, because then they
are not so certain in their role. Then you have kind of broken
through, but it is difficult to see if there is any personal
connection. But you feel that they must in some way reflect on
how to react to this. And then you have reached across in some
way.507
Peter thought it was difficult to know to what degree he and other clowns had
connected with the persons behind the police role, but had the feeling they became
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uncomfortable and Peter interpreted the uncertainty as a kind of breakthrough.
This is Peter’s understanding of the situation, but to make someone who is usually
sure of themselves and how to handle various situations uncertain is a big
achievement from the clowning perspective. It is worth noting that Peter’s
experience is that when it comes to meeting clowns, confusion lead to less
hostility. It is easy to imagine other situations where uncertainty would lead to more
aggression.

Illustration 16. Ofog. Luleå July 26, 2011. The clown army “helps” the
police stop the protesters approaching Vidsel Test Range.
Emma also spoke about the confusion clowning can create. She mentioned the
example from the 2011 action in Luleå, where the clowns “stole” the police task of
directing the traffic, and played police who told the other activists where they could
be and not be (while the clowns were on the side where the activists could not
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be).508 It became difficult for the police to uphold authority when clowns are
standing next to them and performing the task that the police consider their job.
Maria brought up another theme connected to the relationship with the police which
she had encountered when she tried to explain the clowning to some of her family
members who are not familiar with Ofog. They asked if clowning were not
counterproductive if it risked making the police annoyed and angry? Even if
clowning feels good for the clowns and the other activists, Maria suggested that
clowning risks turning the focus too much on the police. She added something that
many people in Ofog agree to: “I’m not involved in Ofog to be against the police.”509
Maria both saw the risk of clowning turning our attention away from the goal, and
that the police get provoked and become rougher with protesters.510
Peter acknowledged the risks that Maria identified, but was not so worried about
provoking the police and military.
That can maybe happen, but it is not a general response I have
felt. As a clown one’s task is to touch somebody on a tender spot,
ridiculing people, so of course that can happen. You are more
challenging as a clown than as an ordinary political activist or
protester, clowning is the weapon. It becomes more personal for
the person you meet, that is obvious. If you meet a person who is
a little more defensive, and feel that this is touchy, then of course
that person can become more outward-reacting in an aggressive
way. But it varies very much from person to person among the
police, and generally I have not been met with more hostility from
their side when I have been clowning.511
Among the clowns there is a worry of not being understood and concern that the
clowning might backfire into hostile reactions to the clowns. However, those who
have had most encounters with the law enforcement as clowns have felt that
although they might cause confusion , they have not been met with hostility.
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When it comes to the relations with the police, both Bogad and Routledge mention
many of the same things that Ofog activists have told me and that I observed.
Clowning changes the dynamic of the interaction when the police are not sure how
to react, and it is an attempt to reach to the human being behind the uniform.
Bogad explains how the clowns refuse to behave as “ordinary” protesters when
they do not show fear or turn to anger:
As the clowns greet the police as ‘friends’ and fail to either melt
away in fear or raise the tension in anger, a shift in the paradigm
and pattern of confrontation ensues. The true challenge is to stay
‘in clown’ even when conventional power relationships assert
themselves.512
Other protesters told Routledge how clowning can diffuse tensions and reach out
to the human being behind the uniform:
Various protestors at the G8 protests told us that such tactics had
helped diffuse tense situations between them and the security
forces during the protests. Moreover, CIRCA clowning attempted
to access the person behind the police uniform. During CIRCA
operations, I witnessed police officers smiling and laughing in
interaction with rebel clowns, and even mimicking the clown
salute.513
It is a challenge to sum up the reactions to clowns from authorities because so
many factors are involved. There is the “big picture” about what type of action the
clowns are involved in, since it makes a major difference if the clowns participate in
a big legal demonstration, an attempted counter-recruitment or a civil disobedience
action. It also matters a great deal how much time is available during the
encounter, what the activists are planning to do, and what instructions the police
have received from their superiors. Adding to the complexity is also the interactions
at the individual level. Behind every clown and police officer is an individual who
responds to micro signals from another individual – signals that might be intended
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or unintended and whose interpretation depends on how they are perceived. A
clown like Vera thought it was ok to pretend to flirt and fall in love with one police
officer, but she did not do it with others. A policewoman in Luleå had been hesitant
towards all clowns, but finally gave in to a clown who was particularly skilful and
convinced her to sit down and measure shoes.
Above Emma and Maria expressed concern that clowns might provoke anger.
However, a problem that was not really addressed by anyone in the interviews is
the risk that clowning focuses on the interaction with the police and diverts
attention away from the issue the activists are concerned about. After all, the
discourse of militarism is the main interest of Ofog, not the individual low-ranking
soldier or police officer.
Lena emphasised that it is not the people on the ground she wants to confront, but
systems and people on top of the hierarchies. As an example she mentioned that
she has never understood why people who are against the politics of former US
president George W. Bush get hung up on his alcoholism or dyslexia, when what
should be the focus is his politics. About the clowning and the soldiers she said:
These food soldiers are furthest down the hierarchy, and it is not
them as persons we want to get at. We want to reach those who
decide about the structure.514
Nevertheless it is mainly those at the bottom of the hierarchy who are exposed to
the clowns’ mocking and ridicule of authoritative body language and commands,
since the clowns usually do not have access to those on top of the hierarchies.
This creates a contradiction between what the clowns intend to achieve and what
they are actually able to do. Although the clowning is directed at the role that police
and military perform, it is the individual police officer or soldier who knows how the
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experience feels for them.515 Some police officers might laugh or smile at the
ridicule if they have enough critical self-distance, but they can also be genuinely
offended.

Clowning – an absurd humorous political stunt
The accounts above illustrate that the clown army has multiple meanings for the
people who engage in it. Some emphasise the playful and friendly aspects of
clowning, others the ridicule. People get involved in rebel clowning with a huge
variety of aims in mind to do with both the atmosphere within Ofog and with
relations to other people, especially the police and military who are the state
representatives that Ofog activists meet when they take action. The reactions to
clowns also vary a lot – from indifference to laughs, smiles and play, as well as
being told to stop being silly.
Maybe clowns are trying to do so many different things at the same time that it
becomes almost incomprehensible to others. Certainly journalists have expressed
confusion. However, to confuse someone who is usually sure of themselves and
what they do is in the clowning perspective an achievement in itself. This is
something that Peter touched on when he experienced the police’s uncertainty
about how to handle the situation as something positive.
Radical clowning is a version of the absurd stunt as described in Chapter 3, and
challenges all claims to rationality and logic put forward by the police and military
with a refusal to accept this perception of the world. Clowning aims to transcend
established power relations using slapstick and absurdity. Through ridicule, parody
and imitation, the police and military are denied the dignity of being adults in
uniform performing their job. Clowns are “others”, who do not dress and behave
like the people uniformed officers usually have to deal with, but have adopted a
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role quite contrary to associations with both crime and conventional protest. This
means that the police do not just go ahead and react as they usually do. Although
representatives of law enforcement are unlikely to be fundamentally scattered in
their view of the world, they have been placed in a position where there is no
response that seems quite right.
When Vera pretended to fall in love, or suggested that the police help the activists
get into the arms factory by providing a helicopter, she transcended the usual
relations between these groups of people. Of course everyone involved is aware
that the clown army is a performance and that the red nose is not real, but since all
protest is a performance, at least for some clowns it becomes a way of including a
sincere wish to communicate in the performance. Whether this intention comes
across is of course another matter.
However, the absurd stunt and the clown role have some limitations. Clowns
cannot attempt to present alternatives to militarism in rational terms at the same
time as they are clowning. Here one is forced to choose. Rationally explaining the
purpose of clowning requires that one bring along civilian friends or stop clowning.
In traditional clown performances, aggression and violence can be part of the
show,516 but the initiators of the original British CIRCA did not include this in their
concept of rebel clowning. That nonviolence was central is indicated by the slogan
“amuse, bemuse, but never bruise”517, and any sign of violence would have been
an obvious contradiction to the nonviolent values that the activists wanted to
communicate. Had the clowns been aggressive in their play, this would have been
a potential source of huge misunderstandings.
In his writing about the background to CIRCA, Bogad places it within the carnival
against capital.518 In this carnivalesque protest there is a focus on do-it-yourself
direct action, taking personal control and protesting in ways that is not permitted by
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the state. Although most of what happens is nonviolent, this type of activism
sometimes ends in vandalism and rioting.519 In an account of a network of cycling
clowns in New York, Shepard, Bogad and Duncombe mention an episode of a
biking clown who intentionally hit a man who had parked on the bike lane.520 They
do not reflect on this, but such episodes are potentially much more damaging for
the clown army concept than the lack of training which has been brought up as the
biggest problem. It is one thing if the performance is confusing or meaningless, but
if clowning becomes associated with what most audiences consider vandalism or
assault, then there is a considerable risk of losing sympathy from otherwise friendly
audiences who respond positively to the clown figure. Good-will might be lost if
they perceive clowning as a disguise for vandalism, rather than a sincere wish to
communicate the absurdity of the world order. Clowns who engage in or gets
associated with violence have left the innocence of the clown figure behind.
To my knowledge, this type of incident is not something Ofog activists have
experienced, and there is nothing that indicates that this happens frequently in
rebel clowning. However, when searching for traces of incompetence I came
across the video You Can Not Give an Anarchist Clown Directions (Especially
While Wearing Riot Gear).521 It shows a man with clowning face paint arguing with
a policeman. According to most observers the policeman is not wearing riot gear
as the title suggests, but a bicycle helmet and an ordinary police uniform. The
person who is identified as an “anarchist clown” called Gen'ral Malaise of the
Salish CIRCA in the explanation that goes with the video seems to have left all
playfulness behind. Instead of playing tricks with the policeman or teasing him, he
is engaging in a relatively aggressive conversation that has nothing to do with the
humorous mode. There is no absurdity, play, otherness or even ridicule. The film
clip shows the limits of clowning. The person is obviously upset about an episode
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where a protester was hit by a policeman522, but his clown persona found no way
of dealing with this frustration within the limits of the role. Other clowns might have
been able to use their clown roles to express their grief and horror about what had
happened.
Just like with other aspects of humour and the carnivalesque, clowning’s
subversiveness has been debated and there is no consensus.523 Not surprisingly
there is a tendency to frame this as either-or, rather than ask under what
circumstances clowning can be subversive. Weitz discusses different
interpretations of traditional clowning, and finds that the clown can be seen as a
way of enforcing social control that teaches children the “correct” response to
failure – to be ashamed and disappointed. However, he adds that “it is also
possible to read the clown’s buoyant attitude toward setback as somehow
liberating, shrugging off social expectation to shoulder the world playfully.”524 Weitz
claims that even if the clown can get away with much “the status quo reasserts its
primacy in the end, with the reins still firmly in the hands of the dominant discourse
– yes, we have had a good laugh, but what has changed?”525
What has changed is that some of the children grow up and take the liberating
potential they saw with them into adult life. The very existence of the idea of rebel
clowning shows how the clown figure has been an inspiration for resistance. It is a
traditional figure that has been modified and interpreted in the context of protest,
and if this is the result it is irrelevant that academics have found it to mean
something different. Although clowning might be a way to enforce social control
and teach children “correct” behaviour, at least some of the children later
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remember the subversive potential it showed them when they took clowning into
their political activism.

Play, otherness, ridicule and theory of nonviolent action
Above I discussed the possibilities and limitations of clowning when it came to
facilitating outreach and mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging power
relationships based on their expressions of play, otherness and ridicule. In chapter
1 I presented Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action with its four different
dimensions. A nonviolent action (1) is dialogue oriented at the same time as (2) it
aims to break power. An ideal nonviolent action is (3) an utopian enactment that
demonstrates that (4) violence is not necessary and not normal.526
Above it became clear how many clowns use their clown personas to be dialogue
oriented when they use play and otherness to express their nonviolent intentions.
Even when clowns stay within the absurd in their relation with the police, some
aspects of the ridicule might be considered a strong contradiction to nonviolent
values and the dialogue oriented element of the action. Radical clowns might reach
out to individual police officers, and be received in an atmosphere of mutual
recognition of friendliness. Nevertheless, when the clowns at the same time aim to
distract police officers in a dishonest attempt to divert attention away from what the
police are there to do and thus prevent them from doing their job, they jeopardise
the trust they have just built. The police are most likely perfectly aware of this
double role of the clowns and never fully let their guard down as long as they are
on the job. The clowns will never know if they have just failed a potential ally. The
individual police officer might consider policing protest an undesirable aspect of her
job that just has to be dealt with and support the activists’ demands for global
justice or nuclear disarmament – viewpoints that might be weakened if police feel
badly treated. That clowning also can break power, at least temporarily, became
apparent when it turned out to be difficult for the police to find an adequate reaction
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to the three clowns who “snuck” inside the enclosure outside Bofors. These clowns
could be in places where other protesters were not allowed.
It is in the third dimension of Vinthagen’s theory, the utopian enactment, that
clowning is outstanding and quite distinct from other types of both humorous and
non-humorous protest. According to Vinthagen, the power of utopian enactment is
frequently underestimated and neglected when activists prepare for actions. An
utopian enactment as part of a nonviolent action directly displays what an
alternative reality would look like if the activists’ vision of the world came into being.
The activist should both believe and behave as if even the most brutal opponent at
some point will be willing to change. This corresponds well with the naiveté and
stupidity inherent in the clown role. Both traditional and rebel clowns should always
behave as if the world is actually going to treat them well, an optimism which is
emphasised by both Peacock and Wright. The nonviolent action should make
visible that the utopian situation is possible in principle, at least for a short moment
while the action is being carried out. Instead of making abstract demands, one
shows that world, even if just as a vague hint or fleeting glimpse. Good nonviolent
actions help all parts in a conflict deal with hatred and enemy perceptions and
undermine the idea that violence is normal. At the same time as the activists fight
injustice, they should – to the degree it is possible – build the society they long for.
The rebel clowns embody a vision of the world with space and tolerance for
innocence, otherness and play.
Another aspect of the utopian enactment that Vinthagen emphasises is his
modified version of the self-suffering that was important to Gandhi. In Vinthagen’s
theory the self-suffering is associated with the willingness to risk suffering and even
death for one’s cause. Looking at the clowns from this perspective, one can also
speak about activists-as-clowns running a risk. Although the clowns ridicule others,
the clowns also expose themselves considerably. Through their otherness, clowns
accept the role as the outcast of society in order to comment from a marginal
perspective. This aspect of the clown has not been explored in the literature on
CIRCA or discussed in Ofog, but it is a way for the clowns to make a unique
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contribution to the nonviolent action. This self-accepted outcast role is of course
limited because it is only temporary – radical clowns can slip back into their usual
life as soon as the face paint and costume are removed – and is not comparable
with risking death. Although the rebel clowns take their outcast position seriously, it
is a privilege to be able to decide yourself when you are willing to be seen as an
outcast.
Keeping the utopian enactment dimension of nonviolent action in mind, one should
not underestimate the power of a hint of a better world. It is part of the “nature” of
clowning that it cannot do more than hint. As an absurd humorous political stunt it
is bound to remain absurd. As was pointed out above, convincing clowns have to
stay in clown and perform from this position. It is impossible at the same time to
give rational talks about how society ought to be organised.
Although hints of a possible better world are important, clowning certainly has its
limitations. Peacock claims that the effect of CIRCA was limited527, and Bogad
reflects that in themselves, performances like these can only hint at a better world:
These carnival-inspired power-plays can be problematic. While the
experience of training and playing with CIRCA, or with
carnivalesque protest in general, can be liberating for individual
participants, these actions in and of themselves only hint at a
better, possible world. Tactical carnival in and of itself does not
change the fundamental relations of production or distribution in
the greater society. The liberatory spaces it creates are quickly
dispersed, either by the force of the state or by the inevitable
need of its participants to eventually get back to work.528
It is important to be cautious when judging the effects the clowns have had.
Creating friendly relations with the police might be considered an important aspect
of a good nonviolent action, but it can hardly be the goal in itself. Of course a few
clowns here and there cannot be expected to dismantle the discourse of militarism,
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but Ofog’s clowns did not even get to meet representatives of NATO or Bofors and
communicate the absurdity of the situation directly to them. Such a “meeting” only
took place indirectly through the media. Thus, the most generous interpretation
possible is to say that the clowns in these cases might have contributed to
reaching out and created a little more attention to the issues of NATO and Swedish
arms production and export. Clowning was also a positive experience for most of
the activist clowns and can potentially contribute to creating a culture of resistance.
Finally, radical clowning can under some circumstances break established
relations of power when it becomes a way of negotiating physical space.

Conclusion
Ofog’s clowns are an application of the rebel clown army concept developed by
CIRCA. Rebel clowning is part of a tradition of tactical carnival and playful protest
which appears to be increasingly popular in the global justice movement in the socalled western world. Rebel clowns can play a natural part in bigger actions like the
pink carnival in Luleå or the humanitarian intervention in Belgium where they
provide some of the colour and playfulness which are elements in the world that
the activists strive towards. In the counter-recruitment actions the ridicule of military
personnel provides a more obvious and direct challenge where clown values clash
with the ideals that militaries uphold. Unpredictability is part of the clown figure and
clowning can be varied considerably, but like with all other types of actions it is a
challenge for clowns to remain unpredictable and not become yet another routine
within the repertoire of contention.529
Peacock’s definition of clowning with its key concepts of play, otherness and
incompetence was a useful starting point for investigating Ofog’s rebel clowning.
Both play and otherness were found in abundance, but incompetence was almost
absent. A possible explanation for the absence of incompetence is that
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convincingly pretending to be incompetent requires performance skills that most
activists have not acquired. However, rebel clowning has another core feature,
ridicule, which Peacock did not find prominent enough in traditional clowning to
include in her definition.
The way individual rebel clowns and clown groups perform their versions of play,
otherness and ridicule influence how the interactions with various audiences
unfold. Although clowns cannot control the reactions of others, the ways they draw
on these core features determine to what degree radical clowning can contribute to
outreach, a culture of resistance and challenging relations of power.
When it comes to outreach, clowns appear to be confusing to media, at the same
time as they are recognised as good images for photos. Since most audiences
associate clowns with something positive, they are a way to communicate
nonviolent values and present a non-threatening face to outsiders. Regarding the
culture of resistance, clowning can be a personal liberation for individual activists
and bring new energy that can be spent on other types of activism.
For those who engage in rebel clowning, the most interesting aspect is its ability to
challenge power. Since the police are the state representatives Ofog activists meet
most often when they take action, interactions with them become the centre of the
clowns’ attention. Rebel clowns have been met with many different types of
reactions from authorities. At the education fair in Gothenburg, the clowns were
turned away at the door. Offerings of food have been politely declined. The
policeman in Luleå who walked for almost five kilometres with clowns imitating his
every move ignored them most of the time. Some police officers respond to the
clowns by moving in ways they expect to be imitated.
Many factors influence to what degree the clowns can reach out to the police and
other audiences and if they succeed in challenging established relations of power.
The time available to build a relationship with the audience, the skills of the clowns
and the interactions that arise between individual clowns and audiences all matter.
The varied reactions to clowns reflect the ambiguity of the clown performances and
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how they constantly shift position. It is part of the role to be unpredictable and be
difficult to place in a box. However, this also makes it difficult to predict exactly
what the reactions might be, and the clowns’ own focus on interaction with police
officers can potentially risk diverting attention away from the issue the activists
were originally concerned about.
I also investigated how the use of play, otherness and ridicule can be understood
in light of Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action. Some parts of clowning,
especially play, make it dialogue oriented, while ridicule sends a contradictory
message. However, it is especially when it comes to the aspect of the utopian
enactment that clowning is highly unusual. The clowns show what another world
can look like at the same time as they often aim to speak to a shared humanity that
transcends roles of activists and police officers. Although clowning may only hint at
another world, one should not underestimate the power of showing potential. It is
part of the logic of absurd stunts that you cannot simultaneously be rational.
Even when they are considered annoying, nonviolent rebel clowns at some level
appeal to the shared experience of what it means to be human. The clown figure
can potentially speak to both the comic and tragic aspects of human life in addition
to standing out from other types of humorous as well as non-humorous protest.
However, it is not enough to put on a red nose and start imitating the police – the
relations are still fragile, and if the performance is not experienced as sincere the
possibility will collapse. That is why just a single violent clown should be a concern
for the whole community of rebel clowns.
Militarism is a dominant discourse that manifests itself through a number of military
institutions, most notably the armed forces. No single action or method is likely to
significantly change that in the short term. It would be naïve to expect a group of
clowns to do more than contribute to change, no matter how skilful and dedicated
they are. However, it is worth taking into consideration that the experiments
CIRCA, Ofog and similar groups have done so far have been small scale. Of
course it is impossible to dismantle the military institutions and the discourses of
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militarism and neo-liberalism with 8 clowns here and 150 clowns there. However, it
would be an interesting experiment to evaluate what effect a “standing army” of
1000 trained, creative, unpredictable yet persistent clowns could have in 10 years.
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Chapter 5: Ofog - playful anti-militarist mischief
Introduction
The case study of the anti-militarist network Ofog begins with an introduction to
what type of activities members of the network carry out, Ofog’s nonviolent
platform and views on civil disobedience, organisation and who Ofog activists are.
The purpose of this is to place the use of humour within a broader context. In
Chapter 4 I presented Ofog’s clowning, a particular type of absurd stunt. In this
chapter many of Ofog’s other humorous political stunts are introduced together
with a discussion of their place within Ofog’s overall way of working and what
meaning they have to Ofog activists.
Seven different public humorous actions or campaigns are presented. The type
and amount of information are uneven: some are introduced briefly while others
are discussed in great detail. The data about the actions originate from the
interviews, workshops and participant observation I carried out as part of the
participatory action research project supplemented with information from press
releases, newspaper coverage and Ofog’s webpage.530 Although this is not an
attempt to write the history of Ofog, I have chosen to include many details and
anecdotes that are not documented elsewhere to give a fuller context for
understanding Ofog’s use of humour.
After summing up the findings from these humorous political stunts through the
theatre metaphor I proceed to analyse Ofog’s use of humour according to its ability
to facilitate outreach, mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging power
relations. Finally I discuss some interesting findings, namely how the distinction
between humour and other types of creative activities is experienced as artificial,
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and the risks with using humour in political activism. The conclusion sums up the
chapter and points towards some possible future research areas.

The anti-militarist network Ofog
Ofog is a Swedish network of anti-militarist individuals and affinity groups doing
direct action for peace in Sweden and abroad. The targets of its anti-militarism
include NATO, Swedish arms production and export, military exercises and
militarisation of Swedish society. The network uses methods such as participation
in public debates, education and training in nonviolence as well as civil
disobedience in its attempts to simultaneously challenge and raise awareness
about the discourse of militarism and the institutions that uphold this worldview.
The network was formed in 2002 when a group of people began to participate in
international peace actions in various places in Europe, such as “Trident
Ploughshares” blockades of UK nuclear weapon facilities in Scotland and England
and the Belgian “Bombspotting” campaign. Ofog started doing actions in Sweden
in 2007 with a disarmament camp in Karlskoga, near the headquarters of one of
Sweden’s biggest arms producers, Bofors.531 At this point, Ofog already had a
tradition of combining the serious issues of anti-militarism and opposition to nuclear
weapons with prankish ways of carrying out protest.
The name “Ofog” in itself is playful and has a humorous touch to it. On its
webpage, Ofog explains its name this way in English:
”Ofog” literally translates into ”mischief”. But Ofog is also a play
with words. “Foga” is a Swedish verb meaning to conform, to
obey. But in Swedish, if you put an O before a word, you turn it
into its opposite. “Foga” also means, roughly, fixating things
together in a decided and unchangeable form, so in this meaning
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of the word, when we put the O before, this is an allusion to our
function as a flexible, dynamic network.532
Ofog is a network and not a formal organisation. Anyone who agrees with the
platform can take action in the name of Ofog. The first part of Ofog’s platform
states:
Ofog struggles for disarmament, international solidarity and a just,
peaceful world. We work against the world’s largest military war
organisation NATO and the growing militarisation of the EU,
against nuclear arms and the arms industry, the Swedish as well
as the global.
We are a network independent of religious societies and political
parties, where everyone who endorses our platform is welcome to
participate. Within the guidelines of the platform everyone is
welcome to build their own group and carry out actions in the
name of Ofog.
Ofog’s activities happen locally through independent local groups,
nationally through coordinated actions and camps and
internationally by travelling to actions in other countries and
cooperation with antimilitaristic networks and organisations in
other countries.
We work for peace through peaceful means, through opinion
building, public awareness raising, active nonviolence, civil
disobedience and other forms of peaceful direct action. Our
working methods are characterised by openness, responsibility
and respect towards everyone involved and care for our own and
other’s safety.
We think it is important to challenge the obedience that makes
repression, abuse and injustice possible. Because some laws allow
abuse to be perpetrated some of us sometimes choose to take
action which breaks the law. Breaking laws is one of the many
tools of resistance and that Ofog as a network sometimes break
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laws does not mean that everyone who participates in our
activities choose to do so.533
My impression from the participant observation is that there is congruity between
the way Ofog present itself in the platform, and the way the network operates in
reality. The platform emphasises Ofog’s network structure where affinity groups
take action independently. The embracement of civil disobedience in the platform
shows how some members are ready to take radical steps in order to achieve
change.

Civil disobedience
From the platform it is apparent that civil disobedience is central to Ofog. Although
many of the network’s activities are also focused on awareness raising,
participation in public debates, education about nonviolence and organising cafes
and seminars, the active support of civil disobedience is one of the keys to the
“feeling” of Ofog. Another central aspect is the light-heartedness where the use of
humour plays an important part.
A few Ofog activists have done disarmament civil disobedience actions – which the
arms producers call sabotage. The most extensive actions of this type so far in
Ofog’s history occurred in the Disarm campaign from 2008-2010, where five people
in three different actions disarmed parts of grenade launchers and canons, and
attempted to disarm a fighter plane, all produced in Sweden. For this the activists
were convicted to a combined total of 2 years and 3 months in prison and 944,774
Swedish crowns in criminal damage (approximately 140,000 Australian dollars).534
However, the majority of those who decide to break the law limit their disobedience
to activities that result in relatively small fines, such as entering a restricted military
area to do a citizen inspection or mark out that war starts here. In spite of relatively
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minor direct consequences of this type of civil disobedience, for most of us these
decisions to break laws do not come easily, and only after careful deliberations. 535
On its webpage, under the heading “Civil disobedience”, Ofog says:
Ofog works against nuclear weapons and arms export in various
ways, but our main form of action is civil disobedience. By civil
disobedience we mean in openness and without violence breaking
a law, an order or a tradition, with a political purpose. Why have
we chosen this approach?
There are many arguments in favour of civil disobedience against
nuclear arms and arms export. Ofog has not made a joint
statement; everyone has their own reason for working with the
network.536
This is followed by a list of different arguments in favour of civil disobedience.
In this description of what is meant by civil disobedience, Ofog refers to four key
concepts which are standard in most literature on civil disobedience: 1. openness,
2. without violence 3. break a law 4. with a political purpose.
These four components do not differ considerably from John Rawls’ classic
definition:
I shall begin by defining civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent,
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the
aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the
government.537
Ofog’s understanding of civil disobedience is also quite consistent with a standard
Scandinavian definition suggested by Persen and Johansen:
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Civil disobedience (…) [involves] conscious, nonviolent, illegal
actions done openly with the purpose of influencing social or
ethical conditions considered serious by the participants. It is
actions that fulfil at least five criteria: 1. Openness, 2. Nonviolence
3. Breaking the law 4. Serious conviction 5. Social and/or ethical
purpose.538
The literature then continues with long discussions about these criteria, and when
civil disobedience is justified and not. Although there might be disagreements
about the finer points of the terminology, these definitions mean that civil
disobedience differs considerably from other types of law breaking since it is not
done for the benefit of the individual, but for what the participants consider
important social or ethical reasons.
In Ofog’s civil disobedience actions, activists act out of strong convictions and
feelings of personal responsibility to prevent arms produced in Sweden reaching
war zones and wars from being prepared in Sweden. The subsequent court cases
are also grave affairs where people frequently argue that they take action in selfdefence539 in order to prevent war crimes. I have not observed humour playing any
role in this important aspect of Ofog’s actions.

Ofog activists and activities
People in Ofog are diverse when it comes to age, gender, backgrounds and the
lives that have led them to Ofog. The people I interviewed have been or are
involved in a number of other issues including union work, prisoners’ rights, animal
rights, refugees, anti-racism, the environment, feminism and LBGTQ (Lesbian,
Bisexual, Gay, Transgender, Queer) rights and activism. No one I interviewed had
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been involved in any other organisations that had the same style as Ofog or used
humour to the same degree.
I have not tried to do a survey of people’s backgrounds, but within the organisation
there is a self-consciousness that Ofog is white, young and with a middleclass
background. The network has an outspoken aim to be inclusive, and looking at the
network as a whole reveals an age range from 16-75, and a more or less equal
representation of men and women. However, even within networks like this,
informal hierarchies emerge based on personality and experience. Ofog has tried
to counter this by rotating roles and responsibilities and actively encouraging
newcomers to contribute with ideas and share their points of view. This said, during
the time of my fieldwork there did seem to be a core of people who others turned to
when they had questions and there were uncertainties. These people might well
disagree much among themselves, but my impression is that some people’s words
carried more weight than others on some occasions. This is probably unavoidable
and it does make sense that others listens more to the experienced activist who
has spent much time with Ofog than to the newcomer. What gives “status” in Ofog
is how much time you spend working on Ofog’s issues and if you have done civil
disobedience and been to prison for it. Nevertheless, I have never spent time with
any other group that makes such a conscious effort to be inclusive and take
consensus decision making so seriously.
This atmosphere of tolerance and sharing creates an environment that stimulates
creativity, including the use of humour. Although it is difficult to prove this causal
relationship, it is probably not a coincidence that Ofog is a network that uses more
humour than other organisations, according to the people I interviewed. Ofog’s way
of organising means that there is much less chance of someone saying no and
disapproving of different ideas. Although other participants might not find an idea to
be optimal, they are unlikely to express this loudly as long as there is an affinity
group that wants to go ahead with the suggestion. In a hierarchical organisation
where someone at the top makes the decision, there is a much higher risk that
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someone will say no. It only takes one leader that disapproves of humour whatever
the reason for the whole organisation to turn away from humour.
Although civil disobedience actions are important and contribute to making Ofog
different from other peace organisations in Sweden, locally much work is focused
on opinion building and awareness raising, both with and without humour. To give
some examples: In Stockholm the local group in December 2011 arranged a Nobel
walk to all the places in Stockholm that contribute to war.540 In Malmö, they
arranged a five week summer course in nonviolence together with a local folk high
school. One Christmas, they hung toy automatic weapons wrapped as gifts on the
public Christmas tree. Under the banner “Sweden sends hard gifts to the world’s
children again this year,” they collected signatures against arms export from the
general public. They have also been present at the local arms producer which
manufactures red dot sights exported to armies around the world. Here they have
lit candles, read out the names of victims of the war in Iraq and tried to talk with the
workers and leadership of the factory. During a trial against Ofog activists that had
climbed the fence to the same factory they rented a jumping castle and arranged
“jump for peace”.541 In Umeå they sang Christmas carols with a different text
before Christmas 2011, and in Gothenburg the group has regularly arranged “antimili” cafes with various themes and speakers.

Ofog’s public humour
In this section some of Ofog’s campaigns and actions are presented with an
emphasis on the use of humour. In some cases it becomes clear that humour is
not easily defined, and that a campaign or action can have humorous elements
although these are only a minor part. For each example I identify which type of
stunt it is according to the model presented in Chapter 3 and apply the theatre
metaphor to analyse them.
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Ofog, "Stadsvandring I Krigsföretagens Och Fredsinitiativens Stockholm,"
http://ofog.org/nyheter/stadsvandring-i-krigsforetagens-och-fredsinitiativens-stockholm.
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Interviews in Malmö September 2011.
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Reality AB
In the North of Sweden near the town Luleå, the Swedish Defence Materiel
Administration (FMV), operates Europe’s largest overland military test site now.542
In 2009, NATO had permission to use this huge area, something which Ofog
considered a sneaking erosion of Sweden’s tradition of neutrality.
Ofog pretended to start a new company called “Reality AB”, which saw this NATO
exercise as an opportunity to do business. Although NATO had of course done
everything possible to make its exercise realistic for its soldiers, Reality AB would
help them make it even more realistic. With the company slogan “We die for you”,
what they could offer were the missing civilian victims – dead, wounded and
traumatised. On the main street in Luleå, Ofog activists showed up dressed as
serious business people to provide information about this new opportunity for a
summer job in Luleå as a civilian victim of “collateral damage”. Reality AB was
especially eager to get women and children, and had a questionnaire for people to
fill in where they could write about the kind of job they would prefer – did they want
to die, be injured or get post traumatic stress disorder? On a couple of occasions
they created a scenario in the main street in Luleå of civilians getting killed. Once
they enacted the bombing of a wedding in Afghanistan, another time the NATO
bombing in 1999 of a train with civilians in Grdulice in the South of Serbia. At the
bottom of the invitation to participate in this scenario, it also said “With us,
everyone is welcome. Even you can become a civilian casualty.” The idea was also
to take the civilians to the military base, but this part of the plan was never carried
out.
This is an example of a supportive stunt according to the model introduced in
chapter 3. Ofog framed its protest as an attempt to help NATO make its exercise
more realistic and improve it. There are similarities with the way the John Howard
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Please see Chapter 4 for more details about this area now called Vidsel Test Range but formerly
known as NEAT (North European Aerospace Test range).

301

Ladies’ Auxhiliary Fan Club supported John Howard and how Netwerk Vlaanderen
pretended to search for landmines in AXA in concern of everyone’s safety. Irony
was used to draw attention to the fact that most people killed in war are civilians. A
large majority of the people Ofog met on the street also understood this irony, but
two people took everything literally, and thought they had applied for a real
summer job.
The incongruity Ofog aimed to expose was the military’s attempt to present war as
“clean” and a fight for human rights and development, while the reality on the
ground is that civilians are wounded and killed. Since Ofog’s show was on the
street, and not directly confronting NATO, it could be ignored by the
representatives of the dominant discourse. Had Ofog instead chosen to take the
play to a place where NATO or Swedish authorities could not ignore it, the
spectacle would have been different. Since they were not playing the ordinary
protester role, it would with all likelihood have been difficult to respond adequately.
However, the audience Ofog was targeting was the general public in the hope of
increasing awareness about NATO’s role in causing civilian suffering.
It is difficult to know if Ofog got their message across better through the use of
irony, and one can only speculate if Reality AB managed to reach a different
segment of the general public or if they reached them at a deeper level. Johanna,
who was one of the recruiters on the street, reflects about how the general public
usually know in advance what types of arguments they will meet from both the
military and from protesters:
I think it is difficult for most of us to reflect critically on the
militarism we live in and get fed with every day. Therefore it is
important to think about strategies that make people reflect. It
can be easy for people to “switch off” and I think [the style of
Reality AB] is a strategy one can use not to end up in this for and
against. When we hand out leaflets about the tragic consequences
of war and so forth, I think it is easy for people to switch off and
kind of let go. However, you reflect on something that seems to
be somehow twisted. (…) Although I am angry at an unjust world
order, I think it can be very difficult to get sympathies when you
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are angry. I think it can be easier to get people to join you if you
make them laugh, and [make them see] that you have some kind
of self-distance.
Here Johanna describes how she experienced Reality AB to be a strategy to reach
out to people in a way that differed from conventional leafleting. Although she is
angry about the state of the world, her experience is that it is more constructive to
channel this anger into a type of action that is “twisted” and therefore makes
people reflect about what Ofog “really” means.
During interviews, Reality AB is the action several people within Ofog have
mentioned as Ofog’s best humorous action. Both Johanna, Vera and Lena
mentioned it as their favourite example of Ofog’s use of humour. Vera exclaimed
spontaneously when she remembered the action: “God, that was really smart. That
was a typical genius thing”. She was not in Luleå the year it took place, but thought
it was a very successful action, a smart choice:
That was probably the best ever. Unfortunately I didn’t have
anything to do with it. But that was a really smart thing, and I was
very impressed by those who got the idea.
The stories about Reality AB have become part of Ofog’s “heritage” and are shared
when humour is discussed within the network. However, it is not so pervasive that
everyone I have interviewed had heard about it.

Refining recruitment ads from the armed forces
Ofog has also been working with “ad-refinement” or “ad-sabotage” of the Swedish
military’s public recruitment campaigns. Sweden ended conscription in 2010, and
ads for the Swedish military, Försvarsmakten, were new in public space. To recruit
enough soldiers, Försvarsmakten spends roughly 1 billion Swedish crowns
(approximately 166 million Australian dollars) every year on recruitment
campaigns. The institution is acutely aware of the need to build a brand that
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appeals to young people, and that there is a huge difference between this brand
and selling commercial products.543 The first recruitment campaign had the slogan
“Do you have what it takes?”, and in addition to having the right physical and
mental capacities, it also included references to having the right opinions. These
ads stated things like “Your grandmother does not think it’s a big deal if Sweden’s
airspace is violated. What do you think?” and “Your friend does not want any help
during natural catastrophes. What do you think?” Ofog activists did a refinement of
the ads by manually adding more text. The text “Your grandmother does not think
it’s a big deal if Sweden’s airspace is violated” was supplemented with “But she is
fucking outraged that USA is practicing bombing in Norrland” [area in the north of
Sweden]. “Your friend does not want any help during natural catastrophes” was
corrected with “By the military. Other help is welcome”. “Do you have what it takes
to have an opinion” and its reference to Försvarsmakten’s webpage was modified
with “We have what it takes” and a reference to Ofog’s webpage. The ironic press
release about the action began this way:
Ofog shows that we have what it takes to have an opinion and
refine Försvarsmakten’s many million crown ad campaign. The
military’s colourful posters with biased messages were tonight
expanded with a little more facts the military itself forgot to
mention.544
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Christopher Holmbäck and Urban Hamid, "Framtidens Svenska Militärer Rekryteras Tidigt,"
Re:public 2012.
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Ofog, "Vi Har Vad Som Krävs För Att Ha En Åsikt!," http://ofog.org/nyheter/vi-har-vad-somkr%C3%A4vs-f%C3%B6r-att-ha-en-%C3%A5sikt
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Illustration 17 Ofog. The original text from Försvarsmakten, white on
green background says “Your friend does not want any help during
natural catastrophes.” It has been refined with the text: “By the
military. Other help is welcome”. In the corner, the supplement text
says: “We have what it takes” and a reference to Ofog’s webpage.
This type of ad-refinement is an example of corrective humour as described in
Chapter 3 and has many similarities with culture jamming. Instead of just openly
criticising the Swedish military forces, Ofog corrects the image that
Försvarsmakten tries to portray of itself with a different version of what military
reality is about. When the military attempted to sell itself as a helper during natural
disasters, Ofog suggested that this should be a civilian task. When
Försvarsmakten referred to violation of Swedish airspace, Ofog tried to draw
attention to the fact that NATO is allowed to practice war in Swedish airspace. The
provocative assumption in the posters, that if you do not agree with
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Försvarsmakten’s interpretation of reality, it means that you don’t dare to have an
opinion, is openly rejected. By the very act of ad-refinement, Ofog activists showed
that they disagreed, and that they certainly had what it takes to have a different
opinion.
Returning to the theatre metaphor, Ofog snuck in on the scene behind the back of
Försvarsmakten, something which is a typical characteristic of the corrective stunt.
There are no major actors present to be challenged, and there is no special
requirements regarding timing, apart from doing the modification while
Försvarsmakten’s campaigns were running. Just like with Reality AB, Ofog’s
intended audience is the general public, maybe even specifically the young people
that Försvarsmakten are targeting in their recruitment campaigns. To my
knowledge, no one in Ofog has been caught doing ad-refinement and there has
never been any other reaction from authorities and companies that provide spaces
for ads than to remove the changes as quickly as possible. Lena, an experienced
ad-refiner, has noticed that when she does the corrections openly on smaller
posters on public transport, it becomes a way to discuss militarism with the other
passengers.545 Sneaking in on the stage without a direct confrontation and having
the general public as the main audience means that it was unproblematic for
authorities to ignore Ofog.
In these ad-refinements there are some similarities to the billboard liberators and
adbusters mentioned in Chapter 3, but also some important differences. Ofog’s
modifications were a critique of this use of public space, and an attempt to interfere
with a newly established brand – the Swedish armed forces, which now had to sell
itself in a way that was not required before. But although Försvarsmakten has
worked hard to create its own brand, Ofog’s refinements were not a critique of
consumerism like most adbusting. It also differed from the type of adbusting that
Harold criticised for not presenting alternatives. It suggested joining Ofog instead of
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Comment made by Lena during the War Starts Here seminar about counter recruitment July 24
2011, Luleå.
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the armed forces, and this way showing that you have what it takes to have an
opinion, just not the one Försvarsmakten would like to see. Compared to the
Obsession example from chapter 3 Ofog’s modifications were not very graphically
and technically sophisticated in this case, but it provided a much more
controversial message than reminding the audience that cigarettes cause cancer
or that skinny models might contribute to young people’s eating disorders. It also
expressed Ofog’s attitude of “do it yourself” with the means available.

Ironic posters and flyers
When the technical university in Lund arranged an open day and invited
companies to have a stall and meet the students who were training as engineers,
physicists etc., two people from Ofog also showed up. One of the companies that
were invited was SAAB, one of Sweden’s big arms producers. SAAB and the other
companies used this as an opportunity to show themselves as good employers, in
order to recruit the best students. Ofog took advantage of this, and decided to
produce a satiric version of a SAAB recruitment flyer. The first three lines read:
Do you have what it takes to create a world filled with suffering,
death and misery? Then SAAB AB is the company for you. SAAB is
world leading in the attack and war industry and our weapons are
frequently used around the world.
The two activists discretely placed the flyers among SAAB’s own recruitment
material, and as far as they know, SAAB did not notice them. They have not heard
about any reactions to the satiric flyers either.546
This was an example of a corrective stunt that has the core characteristics of the
challengers sneaking in on the scene behind the back of the actor they wanted to
expose, in this case SAAB. They hijacked the recruitment flyer and in ironic terms
phrased it as if this was produced by SAAB. As in the other corrective stunts, the
activists aimed to bring attention to facts that the company would prefer to keep
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Interview with Gustav September 2011.
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silent about. They targeted the same people as SAAB, those who were showing an
interest in working for the company, presumably in the hope that this unmasking of
the company might make people think twice about this employment choice.
A second satiric flyer was produced and handed out by the Malmö-Lund group
during the election campaign for the parliamentary election in 2010. It was a
parody of a sales ad and advertised Swedish arms. On the top it said “Sweden’s
war industry is booming, we celebrate that with an arms sale”. On the bottom it
said “you find us all over Sweden”. In the middle were photos of three weapons
produced in Sweden, the red dot sight from Aimpoint in Malmö, an Excalibur
grenade and a Carl Gustaf grenade launcher. It did not have a direct connection
with the election, and the person who made the flyer thought that the timing with
the election was not ideal since it drowned among all the election flyers from the
political parties.
The arms sales flyer was a supportive stunt, again using irony to bring attention to
Swedish arms production and export. What at first glance can be interpreted as
celebration for the arms industry used the easily recognisable language of a shoe
or cloth sale to ironise about these products made in Sweden. The activists did not
get any immediate reactions from their audiences, maybe because the timing of
their show was not ideal, but as with many other stunts it is difficult to measure the
effect.
In 2013 Ofog in Stockholm produced a series of satiric posters, and 7 of them were
posted on Facebook in January and February. The posters were a parody of the
newest recruitment campaign from Försvarsmakten called “what are you doing?” In
this campaign Försvarsmakten produced a number of films and posters with
people doing various arty/cultural/meaningless things, depending on who you
asked. One showed a young woman apparently sorting her books according to the
colours on the back, another a young man making a piece of art/meaningless
pattern with post-it notes in different colours. Below Försvarsmakten wrote
something about what they do, for instance “What we are doing is making tracks
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Illustration 18. Two flyers from Ofog Malmö-Lund used on two different
occasions:
Left: Satiric ad for Swedish arms. On the top it says “Sweden’s war
industry is booming, we celebrate that with an arms sale”. On the
bottom it says “you find us all over Sweden”. In the middle are photos
of three weapons produced in Sweden, the red dot sight, Excalibur
grenade and Carl Gustaf grenade launcher.
Right: Satiric recruitment flyer from the company SAAB, hidden among
SAAB’s own recruitment material during a job fair. The text begins: “Do
you have what it takes to create a world filled with suffering, death and
misery? Then SAAB AB is the company for you. SAAB is world leading in
the attack and war industry and our weapons are frequently used
around the world.”
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Illustration 19. Parody poster from Ofog. The text says “As children we
were obsessed with Följa John [game where you imitate someone else]
and Simon Says. As adults we play the military versions Follow Orders
and Uncle Sam Says. On this meadow we are trying to follow the order
‘preserve a ridiculous tradition’. That is one of the things we know best.“

during snowstorms, and rescuing people in the mountains. Service within
Försvarsmakten is an opportunity to make a real difference”. To some observers,
the campaign was specifically ridiculing people doing something related to art, and
the campaign generated much controversy.547 Ofog’s posters, on the other hand,
were ridiculing Försvarsmakten. A number of Försvarsmakten’s own photos were
adapted to imitate the “what are you doing?” campaign, with the main text changed
into “what are we doing?” The texts in this corrective stunt was again referring to
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See for instance Alex Schulman, "Och Vad Håller Sveriges Försvarsmakt På Med," [And what is
Försvarsmakten doing?] Aftonbladet, January 27 2013.
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things that people in Ofog thought were missing from Försvarsmakten’s own selfportrait. The first poster published showed what appears to be a military ceremony.
The text from Ofog said:
As children we were obsessed with Följa John [game where you
imitate someone else] and Simon Says. As adults we play the
military versions Follow Orders and Uncle Sam Says. On this
meadow we are trying to follow the order ‘preserve a ridiculous
tradition’. That is one of the things we know best.
On Facebook, 242 people pressed “like” for this poster, and it generated 50
comments. However, most of the comments were critical comments from people
who disapproved of Ofog. The other posters received between 31 and 120 “likes”
and between 6 and 28 comments.

War Starts Here
Although the War Starts Here campaign was not developed with humour in mind, it
had some humorous aspects. During this campaign Ofog marked all the places
where war starts pink. The choice of the colour pink, the most un-militaristic colour
available, does create some humorous associations for many people. One of the
more spectacular actions happened in the town Umeå, where a new Ofog group
had recently been started. On April 20th 2011 a tank placed in the public space
outside the regiment was painted completely pink. In the press release, Ofog
explained the action this way:
The marking with pink of the tank is a part of a bigger campaign
to mark out all military activity like weapon factories, military
areas and other places representing militarism. “We don’t think
that military symbols should be found undisturbed in public
space”, says Angelika, one of the people who participated in the
action.548
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Ofog, "Rosa Stridsvagn - Pepp Inför Sommarens Massaktion!,"
http://ofog.org/pressmeddelanden/rosa-stridsvagn-pepp-infor-sommarens-massaktion.
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Illustration 20. Ofog. Umeå April 20th 2011, a tank outside the local
regiment was painted completely pink. The text says: War Starts Here.
On May 18th, Ofog in Umeå wrote on Ofog’s web page that now the tank had been
removed from public space.549
The painting of the tank is a typical example of a provocative stunt with its
message of “fuck you, this is our scene too, and now we control it temporarily”. It is
the devil-may-care attitude of the activists which makes it provocative, with the
colour pink adding humorous incongruity. A pink tank is absurd since it is rendered
useless when its camouflage colours are changed, not just to any colour, but pink –
the most un-militaristic colour on the paint pallet, one that contradicts the macho
associations of the military institution.

549
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This information was accessed July 5 2011 from http://ofog.org/ but was subsequently
removed.
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An international peace camp in Luleå in July 2011 has so far been the major event
of the campaign. Under the title “War Starts Here – Let’s Stop it Here” somewhere
between 200 and 300 people participated. The reason for choosing Luleå was that
it is close to Vidsel Test Range/NEAT, where both Swedish and foreign military
practice and prepare for war. Ofog had held a peace camp in Luleå also in 2009
and 2010, but this was the biggest so far. In addition to international seminars
covering everything from militarism & climate change to counter recruitment
against military recruitment, Ofog had arranged one day of mass action on July
26th to mark NEAT pink. The action consisted of different steps with the possibility
to participate in the marking without risking arrest, but many chose to enter the
restricted area. The activities of the clowns that participated were described in
Chapter 4. Ten international activists were arrested and detained at the local police
station,550 and more than 20 Swedish activists were arrested and later convicted
and fined.
War Starts Here combined aspects of the absurd and provocative types of stunts.
The colour pink is absurd because it is completely out of place: it does not fit in
with the military. However, it is mainly a provocative type of action, the civil
disobedience a refusal to be intimidated by the threat of fines and a criminal
record. Although not all civil disobedience is amusing, it is a refusal to accept the
rationality of the prevailing ideas about right and wrong. In the case of War Starts
Here, where the civil disobedience is combined with the absurd colour pink, some
audience members smile when the military equipment is symbolically
disempowered simply by changing its colour. Pink also has the advantage that it
signalises openness and inclusiveness, carnival and creativity. It is difficult to
present and frame 200 people dressed in pink as “dangerous”, and for the activists
who went further into NEAT in the days following the mass action, it also worked as
a protection against accusations of espionage.
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Ofog, "”Släpp Ut Våra Vänner” – Fredsdemonstration Utanför Luleå Polisstation,"
http://ofog.org/pressmeddelanden/slapp-ut-vara-vanner-fredsdemonstration-utanfor-luleapolisstation.

313

Britta’s ladies gym against NEAT 2012
The year after the big international War Starts Here camp, Ofog was back in Luleå,
but on a much smaller scale. About 20 people participated during a weekend in
August and a smaller group continued the stay a bit longer to do civil disobedience
actions while a military exercise was going on. Britta’s gym against NEAT in
downtown Luleå does not fit the definition of a humorous political stunt because
there is no direct confrontation or blurring between the performers and audiences.
However, it does have some absurd elements and is included here because I
gathered a number of reactions from passers-by that document how difficult it is for
activists to get their message across and are relevant for both humorous and nonhumorous actions.
Brittas damgympa mot NEAT (Britta’s ladies gym against NEAT) was a gym
program announced to be suitable for everyone and took place in the main
pedestrian area in Luleå during one of the busiest times of the week, Saturday
afternoon. In the press release, Britta Fredh551 as the initiator of the gym said:
I’m already active in Ofog, and felt that I wanted to do something
creative against NEAT. What could be better than to gather and do
a gym session together? In addition, we need to be fit in order to
have the energy to fight for peace.552
The press release promised an interesting gym programme that would be suitable
for everyone no matter seize, gender, and age. “The only demand is the will to do
gym training for peace against NEAT.”553
When I asked Jona, one of the initiators what the purpose of this gym was, the
response was:
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The last name is spelled almost like the Swedish word for peace (fred) and pronounced the
same way.
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Ofog, "Brittas Damgympa Mot Neat Har Premiär I Luleå," (press release 2012).
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Ofog, "Brittas Damgympa Mot Neat Har Premiär I Luleå."
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The purpose was to attack NEAT from a new direction. A gym
session can be for or against anything, it is attention grabbing and
people think it is funny. I feel more and more that it is important
to generate positive emotions for people in order to gain
acceptance and raise interest. The gym I had previously seen
generated positive reactions. I think that people will remember a
gym session against NEAT so much more than for example
someone giving a speech and distributing flyers. That is not so
attention grabbing, quite simply.554
Jona had done a similar event in Gothenburg when Sweden’s right wing party
Sverigedemokraterne held a meeting and in Stockholm in 2011. On these
occasions she thought these gym sessions against racism and xenophobia had
worked well and also gotten attention from the media beforehand.555
During the 45 minute gym session in Luleå, 10-15 women from Ofog participated.
Others handed out flyers in the beginning, but soon ran out of flyers. While the gym
session was going on, I made a little interview with some of the passers-by, asking
what they had seen, what they thought about it, if they had noticed the banner that
said Britta’s Ladies gym against NEAT, if they knew what NEAT was, and if they
had heard about the military exercise that would start the following Monday called
Nordic Air Meet. The way the questions were phrased depended on how the
conversation started, how people responded and if they knew about the military
test area.
I had dressed in a way that did not make it apparent that I was part of Ofog or had
anything to do with the gym and approached people that had looked at the gym for
a few minutes. Some people did not want to talk, but most were willing to answer
when I asked “I noticed that you are looking at the gym here. Do you mind if I ask
you a few questions about it?” Altogether I talked to 15 people, six pairs and three
individuals. Only four out of these 15 had heard about NEAT, and two of them only
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Personal communication with Jona December 3 2012.
Emma Löfgren, "Brittans Damgympa Dansar Mot Främlingsfientligheten," [Brittan's Ladies gym
dance against xenophobia] Dagens Nyheter, December 8 2011.
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as a “yes, now that you say that it is Europe’s largest military exercise place here in
Norrbotton”. The lively and colourful gym session with music generally caught
people’s attention. The weather was fine, and many people stopped to watch for a
little while, but not the whole session. Even those who did not stop generally
looked in the direction of the gym when walking past, so it was without doubt a
useful way to catch attention, and the more movement the gym included the more
people seemed to stop.556 However, many did not notice the banner that made the
connection to NEAT, and 11 out of 15 people that I talked to did not know what
NEAT was. Consequently, people had no way of understanding that this was a
protest against a military area. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to identify
several ways that the message could have been emphasised: The participants
could have been wearing something that said gym against NEAT, since people
looked at the participants in the gym, not the banner next to them. It appeared to
be a good atmosphere to hand out flyers in, so making sure to have enough flyers
and people to hand them out would increase the possibility that passers-by
understood what this was about even if they were not familiar with the abbreviation.
However, the best thing is to make sure that you use terms that the people you
reach out to associate with something. In Luleå, people are very well aware about
the military activity in their area, although not how far it reaches and who gets the
opportunity to practice there. But they refer to the name of the military airport, F21.
Another opportunity for Britta and her friends would have been to refer to a more
general concept, such as militarism like they had done in the other events that
Jona mentioned in Gothenburg and Stockholm.
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The description of the reactions is based on my field notes August 25, 2012.
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Illustration 21. Ofog Britta’s Ladies gym against NEAT, main street in
Luleå August 25, 2012. In the background some curious passers-by can
be seen.

Svensk Vapenfadder – Swedish weapon sponsors
Svensk Vapenfadder means “Swedish weapon sponsors”557, and is the name of a
satiric not for profit association and a web page launched by Ofog activists on May
27, 2012. Under the heading “What is Svensk Vapenfadder”, the campaign is
explained this way:
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A more literal translation would be “weapon Godfather”, since a ‘fadder’ is a Godfather or
Godmother, the person who during a baptism promises to take responsibility for the child in case a
child’s parents die or are unable to take care of it. The same term is used by development agencies
that facilitate individual sponsorships to children in poor countries. The Swedish term indicates an
even closer relationship with the weapon than what is apparent in the English translation.
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Svensk Vapenfadder is a not-for-profit association, started with
the purpose of increasing the knowledge about Swedish arms
export. We are religiously and politically independent, and united
by our decision to change the negative attitude towards arms
export found in the Swedish society.
We believe that as a nation, we can and should be proud of the
achievements of the Swedish conflict resolution industry. Swedish
products for combat and surveillance are market leading both
when it comes to efficiency and profit. Sweden exports most
weapons in the world per capita. We think that is something to
celebrate and as Swedes feel personally involved in.
As a weapon sponsor you become a sponsor of your very own
weapon. You also become a member of the association Svensk
Vapenfadder. For a modest sum you really make a difference,
create public opinion and in addition you get a warm and personal
relationship with your weapon that usually only the soldier in the
field has.
As a weapon sponsor you will – no matter what weapon you
personally have chosen – regularly receive reports about your
weapon. Is it fully assembled? What conflict will it be shipped to?
Has it contributed to any deadly shootings yet? In the case of
deadly shootings we of course give an immediate update,
something like that you should not go and wonder about!
We continuously work on expanding our offers, so that you easily
can find a weapon that fits your personal style. There is a weapon
for every taste!
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Illustration 22. The logo of Svensk Vapenfadder.
The campaign slogan was “Swedish weapons – in war for you”, and the webpage
offered information about seven of the different types of weapons, weapon parts
and dual purpose surveillance equipment that are produced in Sweden. One
example is the Carl Gustaf granade launcher:
Carl Gustaf, or granade launcher m/48 as it is also called, is a
fairy-tale about success in Swedish arms export. The first model
was launched already in 1948, but it is still going strong and has
now been sold to more than 40 countries. Cambodia, Burma,
Vietnam, India and Iraq, to mention some. But Carl Gustaf likes
travelling and changing hands on the black weapon markets, and
therefore it is an exceptionally exciting weapon to sponsor. If you
chose a Carl Gustaf as your weapon, it might happen that you will
be informed that it has contributed to deadly shootings not only in
the country it was sold to, but in quite different places. It is
especially popular for conflict resolution on the African continent.
Carl Gustaf has been found during the civil wars in both Liberia
and Somalia.
Carl Gustaf is made by Saab in Sweden. The barrel is made in
Eskilstuna, the system part and assembling in Karlskoga.
The webpage also had a list of many of the Swedish companies contributing to the
arms industry, and a list of answers to frequently asked questions. People could
choose between becoming a sponsor themselves and giving away a sponsorship
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to someone else by filling in a form asking for their name and their email address,
and choose what weapon they wanted to sponsor. They would also be asked if
they wanted to sponsor a child soldier in addition, and could pick the name of their
weapon from a list of 13 more or less ridiculous names. Once the form had been
submitted, it automatically generated an email to the email address that had been
provided, congratulating this person with the sponsorship. When choosing a
weapon, a price of the different sponsorships was given, but there was never any
prompt to donate any money, and the page did not include an account number.
Under the heading “proud weapon sponsors”, the page included a list of 11
politicians and civil servants closely linked with the arms industry, who was given a
sponsorship as a present during the launch of the campaign. One example was
this:
Minister of trade Ewa Björling has a refreshingly minimalistic view
of government intervention in Swedish arms deals with countries
at war. She thinks that “ultimately it is the responsibility of the
arms companies themselves in what market they choose to
operate”. Of course that does not exclude that the state can help
when needed. Ewa Björling contributed to starting the front
company supposed to make it possible for the Swedish state to
build an arms factory in Saudi Arabia. She also tried, but sadly
failed, to help the government owned company Svenska
Rymdbolaget sell a surveillance system to Ghadaffi six months
before he was brought down in Libya. For her zeal she is rewarded
with a weapon sponsorship to nothing less than a JAS 39 Gripen.
All the information about both weapons and the VIP sponsors’ statements was
accurate and thoroughly researched.
The campaign was launched on May 27 2012 in two different ways: The VIP
sponsors received a letter explaining that they had been chosen as VIP sponsors,
including the text about their achievements published on the web page. We also
had two stalls in Gothenburg and Stockholm, where Ofog activists in disguise
recruited potential weapon sponsors in two central public spaces with many
pedestrians. For the occasion we had produced a flyer telling about the campaign,
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brought along a little table where we offered coffee and displayed some of the
descriptions about the VIP sponsors.
The activists in the two cities had chosen two different strategies in their approach
towards the general public. In Stockholm they wanted to remain ambiguous, and
not reveal that this was satire. In Gothenburg, the two of us had decided that we
wanted to exaggerate our enthusiasm for the weapons so much that people by
themselves would realise that this was satire.
One activist who participated in Stockholm wrote about his experiences:
[I] encountered three people who expressed a positive attitude
towards the weapon sponsor [campaign]. One of them was an
officer. The other, a big middle aged man, did not say much about
himself, but he had a lot of knowledge about the topic. He knew
about different defence associations, and seemed to think that we
did a good job. He asked a lot of curious questions. I tried to get
his name and contact info, but did not succeed. He wanted to
check out our organisation himself. He thought it was sad that the
Swedish armed forces had received less and less money year after
year if one accounts for inflation. He asked if we thought we would
succeed in collecting enough money to really make a difference, it
is a question of big sums. I said that we did not know yet. That we
were still in an early phase and don’t yet know what the result will
look like, but that we of course hope to be able to collect a lot of
money. He seemed a little suspicious about who we really were.558
The same person continues, now referring to himself in the third person:
It was sad to notice that none of the people Paul talked to
expressed criticism of what we tried to do. Can it be because
many Swedes are scared of conflicts? Paul did not in any way
encounter anyone who questioned if this was real or if we were
joking. It really did not look as if anybody saw through our satire.
Thomas, another person who participated during the launch in Stockholm, wrote
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Most of the time it was unpleasant when people were extremely
positive, but on one occasion it became really cool. A man with
many years of experience from the armed forces and some arms
companies swallowed the bait totally. He started talking about a
new arms fair in Stockholm that he is the project manager of. Of
course he agreed that the majority [of the population] has a way
too negative image of weapons, and did not understand what
stability it created. He went on for a few minutes before he went
away with some concluding words about the possibilities for a
future cooperation.
The two of us who were responsible for the launch in Gothenburg had chosen a
different strategy, where we saw it as a goal to exaggerate so much that people by
themselves would understand that this was ironic. But that was much more difficult
than expected. I wrote about my own first encounter:
The very first person I talked to got very upset, and I did not
manage to exaggerate the concept enough to make him
understand that we were trying to satirise. He ended up leaving in
anger, saying loud that this was “really sick” – something we
could only agree with.
The rationale for making people grasp the irony was two-fold – our own well-being
and what we felt comfortable with, and the idea to communicate anti-militaristic
values and world views to people. When preparing, we identified three potential
main scenarios, which I summed up before the actual launch:
The best for me will be to get people interested who are a bit
sceptical at first, and then make them realise that this is satire, to
make them feel smart and clever that they figured it out. The
worst cases will be people who are genuinely interested and
maybe become upset or angry if they realise that we are satirising
about things they really believe is good. Then there might be
really ignorant people who don’t really understand, hopefully we
can send them away with a leaflet and they will talk to someone
who can figure it out.

322

Illustration 23. Ofog. The launch of Svensk Vapenfadder in Gothenburg.
The coffee table with presentations of some of the VIP sponsors. Malin
(right) in conversation with a curious passer-by and the author (in white
jacket) trying to engage people in conversation.
During the two hours we spent in one of the most crowded pedestrian areas in
Gothenburg, we became much better at this than I had been during my first
encounter. My fellow recruiter, who called herself Malin for the occasion, perfected
her performance. At the end of the day we had developed a routine which we had
not talked about in the planning. This idea was introduced by Jeanette, another
Ofog activist, who was visiting us in order to take some photos and decided to
contribute to our efforts. Jeanette started shouting like a street seller, quite loud,
and with a monotone voice “Welcome to Svensk Vapenfadder, we have great offer
today, become the sponsor of your very own weapon” and similar things. We
noticed how it worked to grab attention, and became an opportunity for Malin and
myself to approach those who suddenly started to look towards our table. Already
the same day I noted how the irony became more obvious because of the
incongruity between this type of communication, and the statements in what was
said. When Jeanette had to leave, I followed up her style. My favorite line when a
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group of people approached was to say “Support the Swedish war industry”. Then I
would continue with various combinations of the following:
Welcome to Svensk Vapenfadder. Become a sponsor today of your
very own weapon produced in Sweden. This is your opportunity to
support with your heart, not just with your wallet.
We established the routine that I would shout, and Malin would follow up. At first
the shouting felt uncomfortable, but at the end of the day I wrote that “This shouting
in the street I actually found rather liberating. Because it was so absurd that I found
it impossible that anyone would think I was serious.”
At the end of the day, I summed up the different scenarios Malin and I had
encountered like this:
Out like this, we encounter so many different people. Most don’t
want to talk at all. A few are curious by themselves when they see
a stand and approach us. Some just want a cup of coffee, and the
kids want the cookies. Some look at the stand or hear the
shouting, and get curious and we can approach them. Some of
them agree that the war industry is disgusting, and are relieved
when they find out that it is satire. Then they say that what we do
is great and wish us good luck. Others like weapons and the war
industry, and don’t want to see the irony, or maybe don’t want to
admit it. One guy told me that he already had a weapon, and
when I asked what kind it turned out to be a pistol from the Czech
republic, and he started to show me his licence for it. I don’t really
think he understood the joke, although I told him we could offer
something much bigger, like the JAS Gripen fighterplane. Some
people never seem to get the irony. Hopefully they will take the
leaflet, look at the webpage, or some friend will tell them they
have been fooled. A lot of people just seem to live with
information overload and don’t want to hear or think or know.
In December 2012 in the week before Christmas, Jeanette contacted seven of the
VIP sponsors. The opening was that now they had been sponsors for a while,
Svensk Vapenfadder would like to ask if they could get a quote for the webpage.
Jeanette only managed to get in contact with one person, the six others all had
secretaries and did not return phone calls or emails. The politician Jeanette
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managed to reach directly did not want to have anything to do with Svensk
Vapenfadder. After Jeanette had introduced herself and reminded the politician
about the VIP sponsorship she received in May, the response was:
Politician: Alright, I don’t take this very seriously probably…
Jeanette: What do you mean by that?
Politician: It was a rather unpleasant interference
Jeanette: How do you mean?
Politician: Well, I don’t think I need to explain so much more I
think. You know yourself what your purpose is, and I don’t share
the opinions you have… (hesitates) You’re talking about that
webpage, right…?
Jeanette: Yes, we have a webpage and an organisation.
Politician: If we say it like this, I’m not interested in having
contact with you this way, I think it is important with a good and
straightforward discussion on good conditions when it comes to
our export of defence materiel, and I didn’t like this initiative, that
is about what I have to say.559
It is possible to interpret the reactions of the politician in many different ways. First
of all it is rather remarkable that she knew straight away what Jeanette was talking
about in spite of the almost seven months that had passed since she received the
VIP sponsorship from Svensk Vapenfadder. Although she expressed some
hesitation and asked if it was about the webpage, her first response was not “what
are you talking about?”, but “Alright, I don’t take this very seriously probably…”,
straight away signaling that she knew what it was all about and implying that she
understood the irony. Then she proceeded to say that she disapproved of the stunt
and preferred a straightforward communication.

559

The phone conversation was audio-recorded on December 14 2012.

325

The six other politicians and civil servants who were contacted only know
themselves why they did not respond to Svensk Vapenfadder. It is reasonable to
assume that they realised they were part of an ironic stunt and were wise enough
to ignore it since they were not put in a position where they were forced to respond.
The idea of the weapon sponsor campaign was to my knowledge first brought up at
the workshop in Gothenburg in May 2011. However, nobody wanted to carry it
forward at that time, so it remained unused during the summer. I mentioned the
idea at the next workshop in Malmö in September to see what that local group
thought about it. Also here there was agreement that it was a good idea, but again
nobody wanted to take responsibility for it. During the national meeting, we set up a
small working group composed of people who wanted to explore the idea. Although
many creative ideas came up, such as actually sending phone messages to
people, we decided to start slowly with a webpage.
After our first planning meeting, I wrote this about our expectations:


Mentioning in different media, also mainstream



Something that will be useful for the local groups



Need to make sure we can keep track of number of sponsorships.560

After a skype conversation a few months later, I wrote this under the heading of
what we wanted to communicate:
It has to be interesting to read, and informative. Remove what is
not funny and does not contribute information. We aim to touch
people in the “crack” where they are wondering if this is serious or
if someone is pulling their leg.561
Somewhere between 10 and 15 people were involved in the preparations and the
launch. A small group of us had worked on it for quite a while. In addition, someone
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Notes from planning meeting October 19 2011.
Notes from Skype call January 3 2012.
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did the logo, another contributed with technical assistance for the web page and a
third with proof reading. Others offered comments or participated as recruiters on
the launch. A media spokesperson was ready on the phone, although she never
got any calls. It was a typical example of Ofog’s way of developing projects in
collaboration.
At this point I had already written much about humour and the ambition of reaching
the “crack” where the audience is uncertain if this is irony or “real” directly
developed from ideas that had come up when I interviewed people. Thus, this is a
good example of how data collection and interpretation cannot be considered
totally separate in a participatory action research inspired project.
Svensk Vapenfadder never became the big campaign some of us had hoped it
would. Some of the people who had been most engaged had other priorities after
the launch and those who were interested in continuing only did a few attempts.
More than a year later the concept was used again during Almedalsveckan, a one
week yearly political event on a Swedish island where politicians, civil society and
media meet and discuss all sorts of political issues at small and big seminars. In
2013, Försvarsmakten and the weapon producer SAAB arranged a seminar about
the JAS Gripen fighterplane at a place called “Defence Political Arena”. Three
people from Svensk Vapenfadder were ready to welcome the 60-70 participants
with the phrase “Would you also like to have a more personal relationship with JAS
Gripen?” about 15 minutes before the seminar started. In a setting like this, people
already had the arms industry in their mind.562 Thomas, who was a Vapenfadder
recruiter here as well had the experience that it was much easier to use the
concept here than it had been a year before in Stockholm. For Louise, this was her
first experience with being a Vapenfadder recruiter, and she remembers in
particular a woman who was working for the defence political arena and was
standing right next to them handing out her own leaflets. She came over to Louise
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to enquire what they were handing out, and Louise told her about how you could
sponsor your own weapon. Louise tells that “She was very interested and said
Vapenfadder sounded very good. While we were talking, she definitely thought it
was for real and we swopped leaflets”563 Louise did not know if she later read the
leaflet and there were no one who came to talk to her after the seminar.
Because it took a while for the seminar to start, the Vapenfadder recruiters had
time to observe the reactions of people who sat down to read the leaflet. Several
people who appeared to come from Försvarsmakten and the armaments industry
had responded positively when they were first approached by Vapenfadder, “yes
they would like to have a more personal relation with the fighterplane”, something
which both Thomas and Louise observed. Louise only remembers one person who
did not respond with a “yes” or “oh, that was nice”. When the seminar started, the
recruiters stayed and listened and observed people. Thomas’ impression was that
people’s faces changed as they read the leaflet and it started to sink in that this
could not be real. On the other hand, people from the peace movement and others
who were critical of the JAS Gripen plans were first annoyed by Svensk
Vapenfadder, but started to relax the more they read. Only a few people came to
talk with Thomas after they had read the leaflet, and the Vapenfadder recruiters
made sure to keep the mask and continue the play.564
Thomas had one conversation without being in the role as a recruiter that he
remembered in particular. The man who approached Vapenfadder held a leading
position at an arms factory. He told Thomas that they knew about Svensk
Vapenfadder, and started to joke that they were hurt that none of their weapons
were included in the leaflet and the webpage. However, as time passed he became
annoyed and asked Vapenfadder to leave since they were interfering with
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someone else’s event when they were distributing the leaflet, something he said
was undemocratic.565
Thomas’ impression was that the seminar at Almedalsveckan was a much better
arena to use for the Vapenfadder concept than the launch on the street. Here they
really managed to reach most of the participants at the seminar and could observe
them reading.566 Nevertheless, it was not possible to evaluate what people thought
about it.
The weapon sponsor campaign is a parody of the child sponsoring campaigns
where people can sponsor a child and follow that particular child through its school
years. However, the target here is not these child sponsorships, but the Swedish
arms industry. It is an example of a supportive stunt, where the critique was
disguised as an opportunity to show support for the arms industry. For those of us
who participated, it created a steep learning curve about how to use irony in a way
that the general public will understand it. We were very surprised by how hard this
part was.
The launch of this supportive stunt differs from some of the other supportive stunts
by not directly confronting the armaments industry. During the launch, Ofog did not
try to invade a scene where major actors were present, but instead established a
private scene among the general public. Because Ofog considered the general
public the main audience in this action, it was no problem for the industry and the
politicians exposed through the VIP sponsorships to ignore Svensk Vapenfadder.
During Almedalsveckan the recruiters were a bit more confrontational, since they
stood right outside the place where Försvarsmakten and SAAB were arranging a
seminar. It is interesting to notice that the man from the arms company who
approached one of the recruiters had heard about vapenfadder and knew straight
away what it was, since the concept had been used only a few times more than a
year before. Obviously it must have been a topic for conversation at some point. It
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also seems as if this man felt Vapenfadder was at least a little annoying, since he
bothered to argue and called Ofog’s presence undemocratic.
The number of people from the general public Vapenfadder got in contact with was
quite modest. Since the concept was only used a couple of times and it never went
“viral” Vapenfadder shows a potential and a learning process, but it probably did
not have much effect. The peak number of daily visitors to the webpage, 598 on
the Monday after the launch was pretty good but not spectacular.
In preparing the launch, the aim had been to get some media coverage, and a
press spokesperson was ready for calls on the phone. A few days before the
launch a press release was sent out, and the morning after the action a new one.
They did not result in any coverage. It is hard to judge if this is because the
webpage was not convincing enough to look as the real thing, or if media decided
not to cover it for other reasons. Nevertheless, this part of the stunt was a complete
failure, documenting that not all humorous political stunts are covered by the mass
media.

Speech bubbles at the Pride Parade
In August 2011, Ofog participated in the week long pride festival in Stockholm,
organised by the gay community as a way to celebrate and show pride in their
sexuality. Also present was the Swedish military, Försvarsmakten, represented by
men and women who are openly homosexual in the military. Under a banner
saying “Openness – part of our reality,”567 Försvarsmakten had a stand used to
promote the institution. This was a combination of the armed forces campaign
slogan “Welcome to our reality” and the pride festival slogan of “openness”.
Many Ofog activists are concerned with LBGTQ (Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay,
Transgender, Queer) rights and themselves identify as homosexual or queer
persons. They wanted to protest against the presence of Försvarsmakten in the
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parade, referring to the parade’s code of conduct that the parade is nonviolent. In
their feminist analysis, these activists in Ofog also think that being a feminist, one
cannot at the same time endorse violent solutions to conflict.
Ofog activists therefore did an action to correct the image Försvarsmakten
promotes of itself. 15 Ofog activists did a die-in with a banner saying “Your reality
kills”in front of Försvarsmakten’s stand. During the parade through Stockholm
which is part of the festival, Ofog activists carried posters formed as speech
bubbles in cartoons with different expressions referring to the “real reality” of
working in the military. One bubble said “Here I walk to protect my human rights
while my job is about abusing other’s human rights”, while others were “I’m just as
good as killing as straight soldiers”, “My job kills” “I think that some people’s lives
are worth more than others’” ,“Abusing other people’s rights is part of my reality”,
“Försvarsmakten’s reality = violence and repression” and “I think that Swedish
children are worth more than Afghan children”. These speech bubbles were carried
next to the uniformed soldiers to make it look like their statements.

Illustration 24. Ofog. The text in both photos says: Here I walk to
protect my human rights while my job is about abusing other’s human
rights.
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Less than a month after the action, I made a phone interview with one of the
participants, Sofia. She told me that they were about 10 people who all consider
themselves part of the radical queer movement, and that it was all planned while
they were at the festival when they saw Försvarsmakten’s stall and realised they
were there. The activists were not aiming at a lot of publicity, and did not send a
press release before the action.
When they wrote the text for the different speech bubbles they wanted to focus on
two things: That the military uses its participation in Pride for pinkwashing its
image, and that its reality is not openness, but to kill and uphold injustice. Sofia
used the term pinkwashing as a way of describing the armed forces’ double
standards. Apparent tolerance for LBGTQ persons creates positive associations at
the same time as the discourse of militarism stands in stark contrast to radical
LBGTQ values.568 The participants in the action thought that being queer has to do
with a lot more than policies about sexual identity. The group wanted to show that
there is no consensus within the LBGTQ movement about the presence of
Försvarsmakten in the parade. Therefore Sofia was also pleased to see that the
action has led to internal debate within the LBGTQ movement.
While they prepared the speech bubbles, the activists did reflect that some of the
statements were kind of harsh, but concluded that they were all true. Looking back,
Sofia comments that there was probably a difference between those that said “I”
and those that said “my job”. Although she does not say it explicitly, this is a
reference to the nonviolence principle of distinguishing between a person and the
role she performs.
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Sofia explained that the action was not intended to be funny in the sense of making
anyone laugh, and she is not certain what words are the best to describe what they
aimed at doing, but thought humour was part of it, not laughter. She also saw it as
a ridicule of the military’s intention to use this as an opportunity to give a positive
image of themselves, and that it can be funny when that is not possible for them. In
this case, there is a difference between being there, where it was not humorous,
and being part of an audience that hears about it later. While I have met people
who do not consider this humorous at all, others, myself included, have smiled
when they saw the photos from the parade. Thus, this is a clear illustration of how
much perspective matters for causing amusement.
Returning to the model of humorous political stunts, this action is an example of a
corrective stunt. Ofog presented an alternative version of how the soldiers speak
about their job than what Försvarsmakten and the soldiers themselves would do.
Ofog confronted their dominant discourse with a different perspective that aimed to
dispute perceptions of what the reality of the armed forces is and should be. In
contrast to many other corrective stunts, Ofog did not sneak onto a stage to display
the correction, but did it openly in a way which could hardly be mistaken for being
the soldiers’ own statements. Through this direct confrontation it also has some
similarities with a provocative stunt.
Ofog’s speech bubble action generated many different types of reactions. During
the parade itself, the individual soldiers did what they could to ignore it. Afterwards,
a spokesperson for the soldiers, Michael ”Totte” Ekdahl, chair of the association for
homo-, bi and transpersons in Försvarsmakten (HoF) said they were going to
report the activists to the police.569 In an interview with a newspaper, and a
subsequent opinion piece he wrote, he presented a very different perception of
what was at stake than Sofia did. Without mentioning the critique of militarism, he
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said the individual soldiers felt hurt when opinions they did not have were attributed
to them. This way, he moved the debate away from Ofog’s intention of criticising an
institution. Instead he contextualised the action as an attack on individual
homosexual soldiers who had already encountered much prejudice. He wrote:
It is very cynical to pick on the most vulnerable in all groups. The
activists have made a conscious decision to achieve maximal pain
for HoF’s participants. This way, they have ”kicked” our work for
openness for LBGT-persons in FM [Försvarsmakten, the Swedish
military] back as well as turned the Pride concept ”openness” to
suspiciousness.570
Similar comments were made in blogs and comments to the articles, for example
this:
And it is no problem to critisise the military in Sweden, but why
have the bad taste to do it by picking on homosexuals and
[transpersons] in this profession?571
Ekdahl was also suspicious of the motives of the Ofog activists. Instead of
acknowledging this as a contribution to a debate about queer identity and
militarism, he referred to their “conscious decision to achieve maximal pain.” This
kind of devaluation was also part of the comments: “Can one expect anything else.
Left wing activists have never put democracy especially high on the agenda”.572
Different bloggers and comments to blogs as well as the news report expressed
much criticism of the action. The main line of argument was that it is offensive
towards the individual soldiers. Only the soldiers themselves can tell if they felt
personally hurt or not, but there was nothing in the speech bubbles that criticised
the sexual identity of the soldiers. Instead, the bubbles offered a critique of the
military and war and referred to the potential consequences of Swedish soldiers’
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participation in the war in Afghanistan. The soldiers were targets because they
were soldiers, not because of their sexual identity. They were wearing their
uniforms and carried a banner that promoted the training to become an officer in
the armed forces. In a response to the debate article, Cattis Laska from Ofog wrote
how she considered anti-militarist work an integrated part of the queer struggle.
She finished with saying:
Finally: War kills, LBGTQ-military personnel as well as civilians,
and then it does not matter what sexual identity or gender identity
the soldier who carries the deadly weapon or the officer that gives
the order has.573
A year later, just before the next Stockholm Pride, Ofog’s action from 2011 drew
attention again. The action became part of a debate about who has the right to
define “queer” and if the LBGTQ struggle should be limited to the rights of sexual
minorities or implies a much broader political focus that also can question
capitalism and militarism.574
Under the heading “The whole parade became one long torment”, one of the
officers tells about how he experienced the episode. He filed a report to the police,
but the prosecutor dismissed the case because he did not think the soldier had
been the victim of any crime. However, in contrast to Ekdahl who wrote about the
events the year before, this officer acknowledged Ofog’s intentions to criticise
militarism. When asked if he intended to participate in the parade again this year,
he said:
It will not destroy my intention and my commitment to show who
I am. It is a little like an “antiprotest”, throw dirt on me, but I
walk anyway. Maybe because I know they have an agenda that is
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not about the LBGTQ-question but about the existence of the
armed forces.575
In an interview with the same newspaper, Kristina Johansson from Ofog again
emphasised why Ofog did this:
For us it is obvious that Pride is political. If the armed forces are
there it is political in a certain way. That is what we think you
have to start talking about. That it is not just a family party, that
the questions are political in many different regards.576
Internally in Ofog, the action has also generated debate, both about tactics and
about respect for individuals. To some people, this was simply too much of an
exposure of individuals. Others that participated in the debate used a different type
of argumentation: They did not object to exposing soldiers in uniforms this way,
militarism is militarism no matter what sexual orientation the soldiers have. But
from a strategic point of view they thought the action unwise, since it was too easy
for opponents to reframe Ofog’s intentions. They worried about the debate focusing
on discrimination of LBGTQ persons instead of on militarism.
Sofia was not surprised to see that Ekdahl tried to frame this as an attack on
individuals and their sexuality. When asked if she thought anything should have
been done differently, her spontaneous reaction was “no”. It was good that it
generated debate within Ofog and the LBGTQ movement, and she is satisfied with
the action.
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Summing up on Ofog’s public humour
The previous pages presented most of the outward directed humour that Ofog has
engaged in while it has been active in Sweden, and revealed the diversity when it
comes to the types of humorous political stunts that Ofog has initiated. Some of the
stunts that have required most preparation have been supportive, such as Reality
AB and Svensk Vapenfadder. The stunts that have challenged Försvarsmakten
recruiting and brand building efforts have primarily been corrective, as the
examples of adbusting and Ofog’s speech bubbles in the pride parade illustrated.
Many of the humorous political stunts that Ofog has performed have been
provocative, and for example the speech bubbles in the pride parade were
perceived as extremely provocative by the soldiers. Nevertheless, it is only the
painting of the tank in Umeå which is a provocative stunt the way it is defined in the
model. That Ofog has also used absurd stunts became clear from the clowning
presented in the previous chapter. Thus the only type of stunt that Ofog has not
experimented with is the naïve.
Returning to Berger’s list of 45 humorous techniques, which is a useful way to
understand what creates humorous incongruity, irony was the dominant technique
in the two supportive stunts, Reality AB and Vapenfadder. They got their inspiration
from making parodies of up-and-coming businesses and the child sponsoring
organisations, but the real target was the discourse of militarism and arms
production. However, in order for the irony to work the audiences were required to
recognise the ways of communicating that were being parodied and simultaneously
recognise the incongruity between the message and the way of communicating.
One way for Ofog to make sure the audiences switched from the rational mode to
the humorous mode was to use the technique of exaggeration. Another way of
communicating the irony was by using modes of expression that did not fit with the
message. For instance the street seller parody used in Vapenfadder was
incompatible with the pretended aim to convince people to become weapon
sponsors.
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The technique of absurdity was the humorous ingredient in the War Starts Here
actions at NEAT and the painting of the tank in Umeå. The corrective stunts with
the speech bubbles and the adbusting of Försvarsmakten used parody,
unmasking, ridicule and insults as their techniques.
Looking at the four elements of stage, actors, audiences and timing from the
theatre metaphor reveals that Ofog has used many different stages – from the
streets in Luleå, Stockholm and Göteborg with Reality AB, Svensk Vapenfadder
and Britta’s gym, to the tank in Umeå, the adverting boards and the Pride Parade.
Nevertheless, in spite of this diversity of stages, it is apparent that Ofog generally
shies away from major stages and actors in its humorous political stunts. There
were no parliaments or royal castles involved in Ofog’s actions.
The main audience was the general public, preferably to be reached directly. This
was the case with Reality AB, the ad-refinement, the ironic posters and flyers,
Britta’s ladies gym and Svensk Vappenfadder. The only actions which were
exceptions were the speech bubble action at the pride parade and War Starts
Here. Although the soldiers who were targeted at the pride parade cannot be
considered main actors, they were representatives of the Swedish armed forces.
Likewise, during War Starts Here the painting of the tank and the civil disobedience
actions at NEAT also directly confronted these institutions and forced them to
react. However, these two actions were also some of the cases included here that
were the least obviously humorous.
Ofog has also had an ambition about obtaining coverage by the mass media in
order to reach the general public, but has been far less successful with this than
many of the other groups that use humorous political stunts.
Timing is a crucial factor for anyone aiming to enter major stages and confront
important actors directly. Timing considerations become less troublesome when it
comes to reaching out to the general public which meant that for instance Svensk
Vapenfadder could work independently of what the arms industry did. The
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adbusting, on the other hand, only makes sense when it is seen in connecting with
Försvarsmakten’s ads.
After looking at Ofog’s humorous political stunts in relation to the theoretical model
presented earlier, the next section goes a step further and analyses what the
consequences of this use of humour are, and what it means to the activists who
engage in it.

Analysis: Humour in political activism
The previous section documented most of the outward directed humour that Ofog
carried out in Sweden so far. This section continues the analysis about what this
humour achieves in relations to people outside of Ofog and what it means to
people within the network. It is based on written comments I collected in workshops
about humour and on interviews with Ofog activists. The data reveal a very
reflective attitude towards humour and contain many thoughtful responses that
reflect the diverse attitudes and experiences of humour within the network.
Together the responses illustrate the diversity of all the stakeholders Ofog activists
wish to reach out to. The four questions to the participants in the workshops were
phrased like this: 1. What is the best example of a humorous nonviolent action that
you know of? 2. What do you think can be achieved by using humour as a method
in nonviolent actions? 3. How can humour influence the relations with the military,
media, arms producers and police in nonviolent actions? 4. Can there be any
problems with using humour as a method in nonviolent actions? The respondents
focused on very different things, presumably what they were concerned about.
Some focused on media, many on the police, a few on the workers at the arms
factories and the military. In most of the written statements from the workshops
there is no way of knowing if the comments reflect a personal observation of a
concrete action, a speculation or a hope. What they document is the diversity of
thinking about humour and its relations with challenging power, depending on the
type of humour, its context and target.
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In order to provide a structure, I present the material with the same headings as in
chapter 4. However, I have divided “facilitating outreach and mobilisation” into two
categories in order to acknowledge the difference between reaching out to mass
media and the general population and consciously aiming to get more activists:
a) facilitating outreach
b) facilitating mobilisation
c) facilitating a culture of resistance
d) challenging power relations
After these four sections I round off with discussing two aspects of Ofog’s use of
humour that do not belong in any of these categories.

Facilitating outreach
Both activists and academics assume that creativity and humour contribute to
reaching out to other people. Accounts of creative activist groups such as the
Raging Grannies, Billionaires for Bush and CIRCA frequently report this.577 Many
of the examples from chapter 3 were also covered rather extensively by national
mainstream mass media, for instance the Chaser’s APEC stunt. However, the
assumption about mass media appeal is so much taken for granted that no one
has done a comparison between the attention given to humorous and nonhumorous actions, so we do not know how big the effect is. Although this anecdotal
evidence makes it reasonable to assume some effect, it would be interesting to
look into the failed cases as well. With Svensk Vapenfadder Ofog tried to reach
mass media with humour but was unsuccessful, and when other actions have
received mass media coverage it has not been unproblematic.
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It is not just in academic literature that the connection between humour/creativity
and media coverage is assumed. The answers from the workshops with Ofog also
reflect an expectation that humour can facilitate outreach to potentially new
activists and sympathetic passers-by as well as convince journalists that this is a
story worth covering. This section is concerned with outreach to journalists and the
general public, the next with reaching new activists.
In both workshops and interviews, many people mentioned that it is easier to reach
the media if you do something humorous, and reaching out can be to both mass
media and the general public. One person expressed this distinction in a written
comment from a workshop:
Mass media. Succeed in being portrayed as a creative movement.
Avoid being portrayed as a destructive, lawless left leaning pack
like the media otherwise maybe want to portray activists. General
public: I think it is easier for an “ordinary person” to sympathise
with civil disobedience actions if they are carried out in a
humorous and clear and evidently non-aggressive way.578
Other respondents focused on how humour can catch attention and wake up
people:
Partly to make one’s message more accessible to those who are
“watching”.579
You reach new groups, that you in other cases can’t reach. People
who think politics etc. is dry and boring can be carried along with
the help of humour.580
Along similar lines, someone suggested that humour can be a way to reach people
in a different way:
I think that you get out to more/reach to more. Humour tears
down people’s “protection walls” and it can be easier to
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accept/realise something you actually don’t want. In addition I
think humour can demonstrate absurdity that can be difficult to
realise because conventions and patterns in society are habits.581
The written comments were too short to discuss outreach in detail, but in the
interviews a more nuanced picture appeared. Both Lena and Vera expressed the
view that humour had not made it easier for Ofog to get media attention. As
discussed in the previous chapter clowns can make good photos, for instance the
image of the CIRCA clown Trixie that went around the world after the protests in
Edinburgh. Nevertheless, Lena and Vera also said that in their experience, the
media were more interested in the possibility that the clowns would break the law
than in what the activists wanted to express with the clowning.
In Lisa’s opinion it is very difficult to predict what will get attention. She sees the
potential of humour, but was clear that humour is not the only possible option:
Ofog is a quite small movement that attempts to highlight
questions that no one really cares about. We need to pursue a
way that is a little sensational. To get oneself arrested is one such
way, and to be funny and dramatic is another very effective way.
However, we could also be very serious; it is difficult to predict in
advance what will gain a lot of attention.582
When I asked Vera what kind of response they obtained from media on the use of
humour, she replied:
We get the best response from media when we use humour, no
doubt. The only thing that gets as much response is when we get
arrested all of us, and that is a very laborious way to get media
attention. I think it is easier to get media to write about the
reason, the background to the action when you have used
humour. They write just as much, they are just as susceptible to
make an article as when you get arrested, but [when you get
arrested] then they don’t explain. In my experience it is more
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likely that you get some background when you have used
humour.583
Here Vera brings in a crucial dimension in getting media attention: Although some
might consider all coverage good coverage, she makes a distinction about the
quality of the reports. In the quote above she said that she thought the quality was
best when they used humour, and then commented on the quantity of the reports
about civil disobedience. Straight after this quote, Vera continued to explain how
media reports on civil disobedience actions have a tendency to focus on how many
get arrested and where rather than why: for some reason these actions do not
encourage journalists to reflect. Her conclusion is that a combination of civil
disobedience and humour might be the best:
It works a little better if you have used humour, maybe in
combination [with civil disobedience]. The best actions are often
when we have something which is directed outwards, and
someone who is arrested, then we get most attention from a
purely media perspective. A little sad sometimes, and you don’t
want to play by their rules too much, but at the same time it is
good to know what works and what does not work.584
Emma and Maria said more or less the same about the local press in their city.
When they have arranged things like a candle lighting and one minute of silence
for the victims of the weapons produced at the local arms factory, no media
bothered to show up. But if someone announces that he or she will climb the fence
in order to do a citizen inspection, they will be there. Maria expressed some of the
same doubts as Vera about relying too much on the media:
It feels like a difficult balance, media would like you to do
something spectacular (…) and they can always turn it around the
way they want, so sometimes it feels best not to involve them.
You never really know what happens.585
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When asked if humour attracts people, Johanna answered:
Yes, I really think that it does. For instance when they painted
pink hearts on tanks in Stockholm a couple of weeks ago [as part
of the War Starts Here campaign]. As a response to a critical
comment on Facebook someone had answered “but don’t you see,
it is hearts!” It is much easier for people to understand, as
opposed to smashing [the tank] to pieces (…)It is more difficult to
dismiss as a kind of ordinary vandalism or sabotage.586
Here Johanna considered painting hearts on a tank humorous, and explained why
she thought it is much more difficult to dismiss this type of activity as vandalism.
Lena also gave a very sophisticated and rational explanation for why she thinks
humour is an effective way of communication. When asked if something can be
achieved by using humour which cannot be achieved otherwise, she
spontaneously said yes. She elaborated that in a time where irony is used so
much, it is almost necessary to use this way of communication. When people are
presented with a sort of puzzle which they cannot solve straight away, it makes
them feel smart, special and capable when they are able to figure it out within a
reasonable time frame and are not tricked. Lena also thinks that the general public
finds it difficult to take in all the pain and suffering in the world. If you just tell them
about everything that is wrong, how Sweden contributes to war and how war starts
here, most people just close their ears. So she explained that you have to take a
detour in order for them to take it in, and humour and irony which they have to
crack and which make them feel smart can be one way of constructing this detour.
A similar comment was made by Raging Granny Barbara Calvert Seifred in Roy’s
study. She said that
Humour breaks down barriers… [and] eases the interactions.
We’re basically preaching in a way, but not in a preachy way… I
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think they’re disarmed a little bit at first, then they understand the
message and it’s too late.587
She thought that the humour disarmed the audience, created a crack where the
message could get in, and when the message was understood it was too late for
that person to withdraw from the message. Roy also quoted Regina Barreca about
humour’s potential as an eye-opener:
Humour can be a shortcut, an eye-opener… to get to the truth of
the matter (…) When we can frame a difficult matter with humour,
we can often reach someone who would otherwise withdraw.588
The comments resemble the logic behind the International Situationists and their
notion of detournement. It also has similarities to the concept of appropriate
incongruity. The humour that is likely to have this effect is the “intellectual” type
based on techniques such as irony and wordplays. Examples of humour used by
Ofog where Lena’s “detour” would fit are Reality AB, Svensk Vapenfadder and the
adbusting of Försvarsmakten’s recruitment material.

Facilitating mobilisation
In much of the literature on humorous political activism presented in Chapter 1 it is
assumed that humour makes it more attractive for new activists to be involved.
One example is Shepard who has focused on all forms of play and not just
humour. The potential for mobilisation is one of the conclusions of his work on
playfulness in queer activism. Shepard writes: “When social actors organize in
engaging, thoughtful ways, their work usually attracts followers. Through play,
others are seduced to join.”589
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However, a closer look at the relationship between mobilisation and humour in
Ofog reveals complexity: People get involved in Ofog from various starting points.
Emma and Johanna for example knew someone who was already involved, others
picked up a flyer or saw a poster about an action and decided to participate in it, or
they had followed news on Ofog’s email list. Maria mentioned that she was
interested in the issues Ofog works with, and at first she was a bit put off by the
humorous style which she had to get used to but now enjoys a lot. On the other
hand someone else told me in an informal conversation that originally she was not
especially concerned about militarism, but liked Ofog’s style and inclusiveness.
Lisa said that it was almost a coincidence that she became involved in Ofog and
not another issue.
Many different factors are involved in determining if people get involved in political
struggles, what level of engagement they have, if they maintain their commitment
over long periods of time, leave activism altogether or return to it again later in
life.590 My own previous research had shown that humour might play a role in
mobilisation of activists and supporters591, so in all interviews I asked if people
thought humour was important and if the use of humour would make more people
interested in becoming involved in Ofog. I also wondered if humour helped present
a clearer picture of what type of world it was that Ofog was working towards, a
world with more warmth, carnival, humour and joy.
Lisa answered “absolutely” when asked if humour can be a way of getting more
people involved in Ofog. It is one reason why she remained active in Ofog during a
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number of years. She agreed that humour can make it more clear what kind of
world Ofog strives towards – to be easy-going, humorous and carnivalesque
conveys a positive image of what it is that we want.592 Johanna expressed a similar
thought when she said “the world we want to see, we also have to try living.”593
However, Lisa also thought humour has some disadvantages if activists focus too
much on what they themselves think is funny and not on what is most effective. To
her humour becomes meaningless if it is just funny for Ofog activists. In addition,
Ofog risks being perceived as silly and losing trust. People will ask themselves how
a “frivolous” group like this would be able to govern a society or be responsible for
an economic policy. This said, Lisa did not think Ofog should take on this role:
there are other groups for that. But according to her Ofog needs to think
strategically about who is won over with humour, and who is scared away.594
Peter thought that humour and a light-hearted tone are important, and that Ofog
has an image of being both serious and making spectacular actions. He
considered humour important to the atmosphere in the group, otherwise people
cannot keep going for a long time. Many organisations are very “weighted down
with earnestness” as he said, and it can also be very aggressive.595 Ofog is
remarkably different and that is very important for Peter, otherwise he would not
have remained in Ofog.
Gustav emphasised some of the same things as Peter, that humour is important for
the people taking part, to find the energy to keep going. He definitely thought that
Ofog’s easy-going tone makes it easier for people to be involved in Ofog.
Otherwise you are only able to take part for six months “and then you are totally
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hitting the wall,” as he expressed it.596 This “tone” also frames Ofog as innocent
and harmless, showing that the activists are just human beings like anyone else.
Vera did not want to use the word “important” about humour, but she thought it is
smart. She also agreed that humour makes Ofog attractive to some people, but it
discourages others. In her city, there are people who do not want to be part of Ofog
because they prefer to be dressed in black, be angry and look dangerous. But
other people are drawn by the openness and the positive style, and for Vera that
optimistic and inclusive tone is an absolute necessity.597
In the next section about how humour influences activists themselves it becomes
even more apparent how complex the relationship between humour and activism
is.

Facilitating a culture of resistance
Facilitating a “culture of resistance” refers to humour’s potential for sustaining and
strengthening cultures that facilitate resistance. Chapter 1 introduced Scott’s and
Bayat’s work about hidden transcripts and quiet encroachment. In Chapter 4 I
noted how clowning for many activists is experienced as a personal liberation and
how this type of activism provides new energy. It is perfectly possible to facilitate a
culture of resistance without any use of humour, but previous research has
suggested that it might help. Again this has also been confirmed by Shepard’s
work on play, although he does not use the term “culture of resistance”:
For many, play offers a life-affirming response to death and war.
Here, play represents a counterbalance to disengagement; it is a
way to stay engaged rather than fall into depression and personal
alienation.598
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That humour can help prevent burn-out and act as a counterbalance to the
depressing issues of war and arms production was also confirmed by workshops
and interviews with Ofog activists. Two workshop comments illustrate this.
Laughter or happiness bubble in your stomach – and that is worth
so much when you work with heavy issues. Happiness quite
simple.599
Feel better ourselves.600
Maria also stressed that for a network like Ofog concerned with such serious
issues it is almost unavoidable to use humour because people need something
that creates some distance from the topics. Otherwise she fears that activists may
become very aggressive themselves in the end when they cannot find any
energy.601
At the outset of the research project I expected to find a relatively clear distinction
between humour which was directed outwards, and humour that was more internal.
However, this distinction is not drawn automatically by activists themselves.
Sometimes humour is purely internal, as illustrated by an anecdote told during the
workshop in May 2011. In connection with Ofog’s participation in an action in
Scotland, some people gave the police false names, which have an antimilitarist
meaning in Swedish but made no sense to the English speaking police. One
person was called Nei til Kärnvapen (No to Nuclear weapons), another Nedrusta
Nå (Disarmament Now). These names then followed them in the prison, during
police interrogations and DNA tests – much to the amusement of the activists.602
However, such a clearly internal type of humour is not very frequent. Many
examples of humour which took place before 2011 intentionally had a “public” and
visible side to them. But at the same time, they might have been difficult to grasp,
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and therefore ended up being more for the benefit of the activists themselves. An
example of this is from Luleå 2010, where the participants in that year’s summer
camp and civil disobedience action were parodying the military recruitment ads “do
you have what it takes to have an opinion?” It was the same ads that were the
target of the ad-refinements in Gothenburg mentioned previously. During the
various actions, the activists carried speech bubbles saying things like “My brother
thinks it sick to practice killing” and “my cousin does not think the military is good
for democracy”603, parodying the military ads.
Those who entered into the military test area were dressed as people from various
professions which Ofog considered more useful for society than the military. They
had statements attached to their clothing that said things like “My nurse does not
think the USA should be able to practice bombing here,” “My Librarian does not
think that war will ever create peace” and “my carpenter does not think the USA
should practice war in Norrbotten.”604
However, although the satire was public, it mainly played an internal role. In Ofog’s
press releases about seven people entering the military area in a civil disobedience
action, the way the activists are dressed is mentioned:
Dressed as “people beneficial to society” – teacher, carpenter,
cook, artist, nurse, librarian and farmer – they wanted to point
towards alternatives to militarisation and specifically disturb the
war preparations.605
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However, there is no reference to the parodies of the military ads, and the local
news reports about the events did not mention it either.606 This reflects that Ofog
did not consider this humorous aspect of the action important in its relations to the
media, and the observation above that the media primarily focus on the civil
disobedience. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it did not play a role internally.
A similar example is from the camp in Karlskoga in 2007, close to the weapon
producer Bofors the year before the clowns were successful in negotiating public
space. At that time, the US TV Series CSI (Crime Scene Investigation) was very
popular, so Ofog played on this theme and announced a crime scene investigation
at Bofors where they suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity were
taking place. The police tape to mark where the activists could not go contributed
to the crime scene feeling.607
In 2009, NATO was carrying out an exercise in Norrbotten which it called “Loyal
arrow”. As a parody, Ofog named its protest camp and actions “Royal Error”. Lisa
explained how Ofog had done that on several occasions. When asked if other
people though it was funny, she said:
No, I’m not sure. It is something which can be quite difficult if you
want to use humour. It easily becomes quite internal. We
understand the joke and think it is funny ourselves, but no, of
course it can be difficult for others to understand (…) maybe it is
just as much for our own sake, maybe it does not have to
influence someone else.608
Royal Error was the same year that Reality AB was recruiting people to act as
civilian casualties in the streets of Luleå. Another affinity group provided another
example of this internal-external dynamic of humour. Emma was part of the group

606

I have not made a systematic search for local news reports, but Ofog has collected them on the
webpage. Those from radio and TV are not accessible anymore, but some of the local newspapers
are. I have read four of the longer news reports from various local newspapers, and none of them
mentioned the professions beneficial to society or the parodies.
607
Episode told during workshop May 2011.
608
Interview September 2011.

351

which acted as a support group for deserters. In a little leaflet, distributed to the
soldiers the day before, the group invited all soldiers to participate:
Welcome to support group conversation for deserters.
Do you feel held back by the macho culture in the military and
want to learn to show emotions? Is your integrity abused by
orders from authoritarian officers? Do you want to lay down your
arms? We invite you to participate in our five step programme
where psychologists, social workers and life-coaches work closely
for your re-integration into society. Friday June 12 we will be
present outside F21 [the military airport] and receive both
conscripts and professional soldiers. With coffee and cakes we
create a nice atmosphere and through individual conversations
and group exercises we work with issues of self-confidence,
friendship and values. Spread the word at your regiment and
together we can work for a world without war.609
Of course this should not be interpreted as a serious attempt of converting the
soldiers, but through the exaggerations the action aimed at communicating
different values. Instead of condemning the conscripts, it was an invitation to reflect
on what it was that they were involved in. Emma explained how they had prepared
a role play where some of the activists were soldiers and others were the
counsellors. In front of the conscript soldiers on guard that day, they performed the
role play. For instance they illustrated how to challenge your ideas about
masculinity by practicing embracing your friend without slapping his back. They
also provided alternatives to what the soldiers could do instead of guarding a
military airport. An example was directed to the military police, who carry an
armband with the letters MP. Instead of guarding the airport they could join the
green party, which in Swedish is called Miljöpartiet and also uses the initials MP.
After the performance the activists offered coffee to everyone, but as far as Emma
remembers it was only the dialogue police who accepted the offer.
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During the workshop in Gothenburg, the participants who first told me about this
action generally thought that it went well, and that the soldiers had given the
impression that they thought it was cool that something happened. However, one
person mentioned that she did not want to participate herself because she thought
it was targeting the conscript soldiers too much and not the military system. In our
interview, Emma said she thought the action went well, but that she was not sure
this had been the best way to convince the soldiers to desert. Nevertheless, when
they left, the soldiers had given them the peace sign with their fingers.
I did not participate or observe this myself, but I suspect the achievements of this
action were mainly internal. The participants presumably had a good time
preparing and carrying it out, and managed to present their protest of the military
exercises as a positive, dialogue oriented stunt rather than an angry and negative
way of saying no. This way, it did have some of the characteristics of a supportive
stunt. Nevertheless, as Lisa said as a general comment above, sometimes the
impact on others is probably rather limited. The support group for deserters was
not intended to reach the media, and although some of the soldiers might have had
some reflections about their job, they did not appear to be the direct target either.
Had that been the case, the activists had presumably chosen a method that
involved less performance and more real dialogue. And in order to be successful
that would probably have required a setting that was not so directly connected to a
protest and civil disobedience action.
So far I have shown how humour can be a way to facilitate both outreach,
mobilisation and a culture of resistance. Among Ofog activists is it common to
consider humour important for their own well-being. Much of Ofog’s humour is
directed outwards, but several examples of humour that was public with all
likelihood served a more internal function. In the next section humour’s influence
on the relations of power is the focus.
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Challenging power relations through discursive guerrilla war
In Chapter 1 I discussed the complexities and limitations of understanding and
analysing relations of power and what impact humour can or cannot have on these
relations. Ofog’s humorous political stunts illustrate the challenge of estimating
what effect they have. The network’s focus on the very broad and extremely
powerful discourse of militarism makes it difficult to point towards any immediate
results. Unlike some of the other groups who perform humorous political stunts,
Ofog has a very broad agenda. Over the years, different parts of the network have
worked on quite different issues – from the military test site Vidsel Test
Range/NEAT to countering the armed forces’ recruitment efforts and Swedish arms
production. This diversity in focus and campaigns that seldom last more than a
couple of years make it less likely for the network to be able to point towards a
clear “success” regarding a clearly defined goal. That does not mean that Ofog’s
actions do not temporarily undermine relations of power, but it makes it much more
difficult to identify a more permanent impact.
In the previous chapter it became clear how the clowns to a large degree focused
on the immediate relations with police and military present during the actions. Most
of Ofog’s actions described in this chapter challenge relations of power not at the
level of interpersonal relations, but through attempts to destabilise dominant
discourses. Reality AB challenged NATO’s discourse of war as something
connected to sophisticated technology and protection of human rights by reminding
random passers-by in Luleå that war causes death and suffering and that civilians
are most exposed. The corrected recruitment ads reminded viewers that one can
“have what it takes” to have a political opinion without subscribing to the worldview
Försvarsmakten communicates through its ads. Although the discussion afterwards
got side-tracked, the speech bobble posters during the pride parade were also an
attempt to weaken Försvarsmakten’s discourse. Likewise, the ironic posters and
flyers also interfere with various dominant militaristic discourses. All these
humorous political stunts can thus be understood as “hit and run” attacks in this
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discursive guerrilla war. They might be short lived and temporary, but nevertheless
they raise dissenting voices in the public sphere about what is true, right and just.
More knowledge about how these contributions to the discursive guerrilla war are
received by various audiences would be an obvious topic for future research, since
the data about how the general public perceives Ofog’s humorous political stunts is
limited. Above I included my observations about reactions to Svensk Vapenfadder
and Britta’s ladies’ gym. The lack of media coverage also reveals that apart from
the clowns’ ability to make good photos, Ofog’s use of humour has been of very
limited interest to mass media. The information about how Ofog’s actions are
understood by people in positions of power is even more rudimentary. Apart from
the one politician who did not like to be included in Svensk Vapenfadder, I cannot
tell how these actions were perceived – if they were noticed at all – by politicians,
arms producers and the authorities’ representatives in the police and armed forces.
However, Ofog activists have provided many comments on their perceptions of this
interaction.
In the written comments from the workshops, there were many different answers to
the two questions “What do you think can be achieved by using humour as a
method in nonviolent actions?” And “How can humour influence the relations with
the military, media, arms producers and police in nonviolent actions?” which dealt
with humour’s ability to challenge relations of power. What is most striking about
the answers is the diversity. Those who commented on how humour affects
relations of power wrote things like:
To show the absurd in the system one protests against and
resists. To reduce hostility between different sides in a conflict by
doing something creative. (Just like it is good to have music in a
demonstration and not just shout slogans.). To get each other to
think creatively and therefore better find solutions.610
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This person suggested that humour communicates less hostility, similar to the way
the clowns in the previous chapter were communicating nonviolent values. This is
supported by another person who suggested that:
It is possible to make fun of and ridicule and resist what is terrible
and horrible without being it yourself. By highlighting something
from a “new” angle it can become so obvious how crazy power
relations are that resistance can become beautiful and funny at
the same time as it becomes more powerful.611
Someone else commented on the dilemma that humour might create for the police
and military sent out to prevent or stop an action:
In relation to military/police etc., make it more difficult for them
to physically prevent the action. It is more difficult to “brutally”
stop someone you think is funny and sympathise with.612
The quote above can be an observation about a clowning action where the clowns
succeeded in physically opening up space, but it might also be a comment on a
different type of situation.
Another person, writing about actions against arms production, expressed hope
that the employees at the factory would understand that the action was not directed
against them, but the system they are part of:
Think it can help clarify. For example, it makes workers at an
arms factory [understand] that the action is not directed towards
them but against the system.613
In the next quote, the person referred to humour’s potential for creating uncertainty
for people who are usually sure of themselves, in this way emphasising the
common bond between all human beings no matter their role in society:
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I think a major point may be the uncertainty that humour can
create in these meetings. All these actors hopefully need to think
about and talk about such actions and then also talk about/think
about the issue itself. Laughter is a good way to meet =
disarming. We see we are humans.614
Finally, someone who wrote specifically about clowning expressed hope that the
police would see the creativity and that it would make them reflect about their own
organisation.
On the occasions that I have participated in actions where there
have been clowns present, the police have often interacted. I hope
that they see that activists use creative methods for changing
society, instead of violence. Make them reflect on their own
organisation.615
The quotes reflect the wishes and hopes from people in a marginal anti-militarist
network about what the use of humour achieves. Future research might reveal how
it is perceived by people in positions of power and what meaning it has for them.
I separated the functions of humour into four different aspects of how it facilitates
outreach, mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging relations of power.
However, this categorisation is only for analytical purposes, because on the ground
of political activism the four different aspects are closely linked together, and one
humorous event might contribute to more than one aspect. Nevertheless, the four
categories might be useful when navigating the complexities of humour. Although a
particular event might not have sparked any reactions from people in positions of
power, it was still a contribution in the discursive guerrilla war about what to
consider true, right and just. Thus it can have reached out to many in the general
public, or it can have contributed to a culture of resistance. The four different
aspects make it easier to discuss exactly what a group can expect a particular
humorous political stunt being planned to achieve, or evaluate its impact. It might
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also be a way to expand the repertoire if it turns out that a group has a tendency to
focus on mobilisation, in spite of an outspoken goal of challenging an established
power relation.
The two final sections treat two aspects of the use of humour that came up in the
interviews and workshops but do not belong in any of the four categories above.
The first issue is whether the distinction between the humorous and non-humorous
actions is artificial and the second what the risks with humorous activism are.

Artificial distinction between humorous and other creative actions
One thing that has become obvious during this research is that the distinction
between humorous and other creative actions is rather artificial in the perspective
of activists’ lived experience. This is not something the informants tell explicitly, but
it becomes clear from the stories people spontaneously start to tell. When I asked
for examples about the use of humour, the first examples I was told were usually
clearly humorous. However, several people continued with examples of actions
which were creative and involved some kind of performance such as street theatre,
but were not necessarily humorous.616 For example, Ofog activists in Malmö made
a street theatre of an auction of Swedish produced arms in the autumn of 2010.
One person played the auctioneer, while others were playing the buyers from India,
Pakistan and USA. The performance included a part where the Indian and
Pakistani buyers kept overbidding each other. All the weapons came together with
a civilian casualty who told how he or she had been bombed, shot or killed. This is
not a humorous political stunt since there is no confrontation or blurred lines
between audiences and performers, but it is obviously humorous. However,
straight afterwards, the Malmö-Lund activists told about two other episodes, which
were creative, thought provoking and drew attention, but were not humorous. One
Christmas they hung toy automatic weapons in the public Christmas tree wrapped
as gifts. Under the banner “Sweden sends hard gifts to the world’s children again

616

Field note observation during interviews in Malmö, September 2011.

358

this year,” they collected signatures against arms export from the general public.
Another example was the “jump for peace” that they arranged in connection with a
trial against activists who had done a citizen inspection at Aimpoint.
Humorous actions are different from other types of action. For analytical purposes,
it makes sense to distinguish humorous from non-humorous actions. However,
researchers should bear in mind that for many activists, this distinction between
humour and other kinds of creative performance is more academic than
experienced.

Risky humour
The final theme about humour and political activism from the interviews and
workshops with Ofog activists is the potential risks with using humour. Here the
findings from the field work are compared with the few existing reflections about
risks in the literature on creative activism.
1. The risk of being perceived as not serious about the issue
Almost everyone I have asked about potential problems with using humour in
activism responded that they see a risk of not being taken seriously. When asked
about potential risks in the workshops, one person in a written comment expressed
concern about being seen as unserious and self-centred:
We can be seen as unserious. Childish, silly, without anything
important, sensible, or important to say. Exhibitionistic: People
have thought that we want to “be seen”, without any more aims
or thoughts than that.617
The risk of not being taken seriously expressed in this quote appears real enough:
one must expect part of the audience to respond as if they believe that the
pranksters are just out to have fun themselves.
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In Day’s analysis of Billionaires for Bush, she includes a quote from a woman who
prefers “honest” and straightforward protest. Billionaires for Bush dressed as
stereotypical rich characters and made an ironic performance in support of US
president George Bush’s economic policies benefitting the rich. After Bush left the
White House, they have pursued the same issue. They are still Billionaires, but
what they are for depends on the circumstances. The quote that Day refers to was
broadcast in an interview on national radio when the Billionaires were present at a
Bush fundraiser:
I think they’re making a mockery out of it and it’s a joke, and it’s
pretty embarrassing. It’s confusing to children and it’s confusing
to a couple of adults here as well. And I have more respect for the
people over there who are saying what they happen to feel. They
dress normally. They don’t have to come in costume and have a
gimmick.618
There is no way of knowing how representative this woman’s views were, but they
reflect the need for care. However, much more research is needed about how
audiences perceive humorous political stunts before one can conclude that
audiences prefer rational ways of communicating. Some audience members may
prefer rationality because it is more familiar or easier to ignore.
Gustav is a Ofog activist who cautioned against too much humour. He emphasised
that it is important to show that one understands the issue one works with:
And then I don’t always think it is good to use humour.
Sometimes it is good to show that you are a serious person who
has read a lot and do this because you really believe in it, and can
argue your case as well.619
The issues of arms export and war that Ofog works with are probably some of the
most controversial issues one can imagine. Humour about any sensitive issue like
torture, hunger and people’s loss of life and livelihood should of course be
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approached with care. There will probably always be people who consider black
humour tasteless, but research about the use of humour in professions exposed to
life and death indicates that black humour might be a way of coping with difficult
issues.620 Nevertheless, the most obscure and macabre might be best kept as
internal jokes in order not to offend those who activists want to protect. However, it
also depends on how the black humour is performed. Before I started this research
project, I would have been doubtful about the possibility for creating humour
around civilian casualties in war. Nevertheless I think Reality AB is a good example
of black humour, and I have only met one person who openly disapproved of it.
All social movements considering using humorous political stunts need to take the
risk of not being taken seriously into consideration. Fear of this consequence is
probably the reason why humour is not used more, in spite of its potential benefits.
Organisations and movements who have already established ways of
communicating with their potential audiences based on rational arguments might
simply find it too risky to experiment with humour. The persistence of logical
argument is quite strong, even within a network like Ofog which is more willing to
experiment with humour than most other organisations.
The interviews and workshops also revealed other potentially problematic issues:
2. a risk of ridicule being experienced as abuse
Another risk with humour is the potential ethical problem that ridicule might be
experienced as abuse. If humorous intent can be reframed as abuse, a totally
different discourse is in use than when something is considered to belong to the
just-joking sphere.
Ofog’s platform emphasises nonviolence and respect towards everyone, so Ofog
activists can obviously get into trouble when an action involves ridicule or other
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expressions that might be interpreted as abuse. The speech bubble action at the
Pride Parade is the most obvious example where the target explicitly said that they
experienced this as abuse, and where also people within Ofog reacted. Although
the activists who participated in the action wanted to expose the consequences of
militarism and the presence of the soldiers in the pride parade, the soldiers who
were targeted experienced it as an attack on them as individuals, raising the
question of ethics.
In chapter 1 I presented Gantar’s and Billig’s thoughts about ethics and humour. If
one insists on judging humour along ethical lines in spite of Gantar’s conclusion
that it is not possible, one point of departure that Gantar and Billig do not discuss is
the position of those who initiate the humour. There is a huge difference between
ridicule initiated by people in power aimed at a minority, and ridicule that comes
from people in a subordinate position directed towards those more powerful. An
example of the first was the so-called Muhammad cartoons published by JyllandsPosten in 2005, where an established mainstream newspaper directed its satire
towards a religious minority in Denmark. That is very different from humorous
political stunts initiated by small activist groups and directed at powerful discourses
and their representatives. When people in power try to use what Billig calls the
“tease-spray” or the “just-joking spray”, one can point out that they speak from a
position of power and disapprove of their mockery, at the same time as one can
approve of ridicule which kicks upwards.
However, although it is possible to make this distinction in principle, Ofog’s speech
bubbles at the pride parade illustrate some of the dilemmas. It was people in
subordinate positions who ridiculed someone they saw as representatives of a
powerful institution, but under the circumstances, the individual soldiers did not feel
very powerful.
3. a risk of irony not being understood
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In connection with the Vapenfadder campaign the participant observation made it
very clear how problematic it can be to communicate with irony. No matter how
exaggerated a group itself thinks it is, there is always a risk that people
misunderstand the irony because the clues are not clear enough.
In Haugerud’s article about the Billionaires for Bush, she writes that most passersby who lingered for a little while realised that the performance was ironic. However,
she also quotes two people who embody this risk that the irony might not be
understood:
‘Is it a joke? I can’t figure out if it’s a joke’ said a woman
encountering the Billionaires for the first time at their 2004 tax
day event outside New York City’s central post office. A male
passer-by at the same event at first wondered: ‘But are they for
or against Bush?’621
That humour is not understood the way the initiators intended it to be seems
especially to be a potential problem with the technique of irony where the literal
meaning is different from the intended meaning. To understand irony requires what
Hutcheon calls “discursive communities”, where we share an understanding with
others about what things mean. All humorous techniques can potentially be
misunderstood just as rational communication can be, but the ambiguity of humour
and especially irony means that the potential for misunderstandings is built into the
fabric of this way of communicating. According to Hutcheon irony is not “just” the
opposite of what is said or done, but something that “happens” in the tension
between the people who initiate the irony, those who interpret it, the meaning
which is stated as well as what is not stated.622 Irony is based on the audience’s
moment of doubt about whether this is the actual meaning or not. For the prankster
the more cues one gives, the “rougher” the irony is and more likely that many
people will get it. On the other hand, if there are just a few cues, the irony gets
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better because of the ambiguity, but at the cost of the irony going over the head of
more people.623
There are two potential sources for the misunderstandings. Sometimes the
activists constructing humorous political stunts are just not skilled enough in
designing irony. This can be because they are not able to exaggerate thoroughly or
present the absurdity convincingly, which was probably the case for the
Vapenfadder campaign. Nevertheless, it would also become a problem if political
groups needed the skills of professional entertainers in order to be funny. 624
The problem might also be that the irony is so sophisticated that it goes over the
head of the intended audience. If it is based on references that the general public
are not aware of they have no way of discovering the hidden meaning. Then the
humorous political stunt risks becoming elitist, serving to show that “we are more
clever than you”, rather than engaging people in a debate about a political issue.625
And if an ironic message is taken literally, the result might be that stereotypes are
reinforced.626
4. a risk of humour becoming too internal or an end in itself
If the goal is outwardly directed action and campaigning, and humour is one of the
elements, it is important to consider beforehand how it will be understood and
perceived by the intended audience. Generally it is more difficult to create actions
that others will understand than what most activists assume, no matter if they are
humorous or not. Activists would probably benefit from researching these issues by
asking members of the potential audience what they think and evaluate their
campaigns instead of relying on their personal assumptions and speculations.
However, as described above there are also benefits to be gained from using
humour internally when it comes to creating a culture of resistance, and as long as
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the internal humour does not obstruct the communication outwards it is hard to see
any problems with internal humour.
5. the difficulty with combining the humorous and non-humorous
During its existence, Ofog has continuously combined humorous and nonhumorous types of actions. Reality AB took place side by side and partly mixed
with non-humorous street theatre, and the internal-external examples above
illustrate the same overlaps. However, during the interviews one person in
particular questioned if this was a good strategy. Lisa stressed that humour is
important for her own commitment to Ofog, but she would like Ofog to be more
cautious about mixing different approaches. We were talking about an idea for an
ironic campaign that had come up during the workshop in Gothenburg but was
never carried out. Lisa first emphasised that there has to be enough resources in
the form of time and energy to do it properly, but then continued to talk about how
mixing different strategies might be less efficient.
.. there should be energy to do it properly (…) I did not think that
we should do it this year [2011], because we already had a
campaign with one concept, and it could become very confusing to
have an ironic campaign and a serious campaign… and that was
how it was when we did Reality AB, that it became a little double
in a way, that at the same time we also had a non-ironic
campaign, and maybe that is not very strategic, we ought to
become better at choosing a focus. But in itself, [ironic
campaigns] are a very good idea.627
Here Lisa reflected on what she considered the problems with mixing rational and
humorous campaigns, comparing it to her memory of how reality AB worked. She
continued:
I think absolutely that [Reality AB] worked very well as it was, I
think it would have worked even better if we had just gone for
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that, (…) maybe it became a little half done, that someone got the
idea and that we did not do it 100%. But it is always like that.628
The problem that not everyone commits 100% to a certain idea is not something
that is peculiar to humorous political stunts. Since it is only a minority of groups that
primarily rely on humour in their communication, the majority of groups are likely to
change between the humorous and the non-humorous. And as long as
“seriousness” (= the rational) continues to be the norm, ideas for humorous
campaigns will end up being a supplement to the norm. Thus, the problem that
Lisa is pointing out is unlikely to disappear unless groups dare to say that this time,
we will try to let the humorous be the norm.
Lisa saw the potential that a humorous and non-humorous campaign about the
same subject might appeal to and reach out to different audiences, and suggested
that campaigns can run in parallel if it is not obvious that they originate from the
same place.
I think it can be difficult, but maybe it is possible to combine. It
does not have to be very obvious that it is Ofog who does it,
maybe Ofog runs a serious campaign, and then the ironic or
upside down can just be there. It does not need to have any
sender at all. Maybe we can reach different people that way. (…) It
is difficult, because I really believe in the idea [of an ironic
campaign], but I also believe in the idea of being serious (both
laugh), (…) and I think that you have to choose, I really think you
have to choose.629
In spite of Lisa’s belief that ironic campaigns can be a useful tool, she still ended
up stressing that she thinks it is important to choose and prefers that Ofog is
cautious about mixing humorous and non-humorous approaches about the same
issue.
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Related to the issues that Lisa brought up is the problem with doing a humorous
political stunt half-heartedly and mixing it with traditional protest. For activists who
are used to “ordinary protest” it can be a challenge to leave all the usual symbols of
protest behind, for instance when participating in a supportive stunt. However, the
result of a mix might be that neither the supportive stunt nor the ordinary protest
symbols come across. Instead the message one communicates is just confusing.
6. Satire risks making people disillusioned
The final potential problem with humour was not mentioned in workshops or
interviews, but has appeared in the literature. Perhaps the most fundamental
critique that has been directed against satire and irony is that they are cynical and
make people disillusioned. They are good at criticising everything and everyone
but do not present any alternatives.630 However, this is a misreading of much satire
and irony. Rebecca Higgie uses the Chaser team as an example of how one can
make a distinction between cynicism and kynicism when discussing satire.
Kynicism is a notion that comes from ancient Greek philosophy and Higgie says
that “Kynicism is cynicism without the latter’s nihilistic nature.”631 Whereas cynicism
criticises without seeing any hope for change, “Kynicism also questions and
doubts, but maintains that there is a better way of doing things”.632 Although the
satire does not provide any alternatives to the prevailing political order, under the
surface of the irony, a kynical approach finds that not all truth is said to be nonexistent, just the particular truth of the prevailing order.633 When it comes to the
satire and irony in humorous political stunts, it is usually quite clear that the
initiators are committed to improving and not just criticising. It is difficult to accuse
the grassroots groups behind most of the stunts presented here of being cynical.
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The risk is much greater for professional comedians, though many of them have a
direction in their social critique.
The potential risks with using humour that Ofog activists have identified vary a lot,
but also have something in common. Fear that humour might offend, be
misunderstood or lead to a group losing legitimacy are different reasons, but all
result in a persistence of logical argument . However, an investigation into the
potential problems also revealed that some of the potential problems might be due
to general organisational and planning aspects. When evaluating a humorous
political action and deciding if something similar should be repeated in the future,
this might be worth taking into consideration.
The persistence of logical argument might also stem from the fact that subversive
irony requires an intimate knowledge of dominant discourses – an intimacy that
can also be considered complicity.634 That is probably one reason why some
political activists become uncomfortable when it comes to humour, including irony.
To create irony is only possible if you know very well the language of what you
want to ironise about. Hutcheon explains that there is an emotional element when it
comes to producing and interpreting irony. Irony does not just say something about
a certain topic; it also adds an emotion or an attitude towards it.635 This emotional
dimension might be problematic for activists concerned about being perceived as
rational.

Conclusion
Activists in Ofog work with serious issues of war and war preparations, arms
production and arms export. This chapter is not an attempt to document Ofog’s
whole history, but the part concerning the role of humour. Although a light-hearted
tone, including humour, plays an important role in much of what Ofog does, it is far
from the only thing. The majority of the civil disobedience actions are carried out
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with only hints of humour and these hints are usually more for the benefit of the
participants than directed outwards. In legal activities aimed at awareness raising
and opinion building, the use of humour takes more space and has been used on
numerous occasions as the primary strategy, for example in Reality AB,
Vapenfadder and the satiric posters.
What is most striking with the humorous examples in this chapter is their diversity.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, humour is so diverse that it is almost impossible to
make general statements about the phenomenon. As Ofog activists have
expressed in interviews and written comments, they mean very different things
when they speak about humour. The people who have participated in this research
are just a small sample of a fairly homogeneous group. They all have more or less
the same background and political perspective. Nevertheless what they speak
about when they use the word humour is quite varied. Imagine what it would have
been like asking the same questions to a group of people with highly varied cultural
and political backgrounds.
This diversity makes it difficult to make generalisations about using humour in a
struggle, because the notion covers so many different types of activities. In order
for such a conversation to be meaningful, it is necessary to examine specific
humorous actions and be clear about intended audiences.
Another finding from this chapter is that although the distinction between humorous
and non-humorous actions is meaningful for analytical purposes, it is not a
difference which makes much sense in the everyday life of activists. When people
are asked about humorous actions they usually start out telling about humour, but
it is not uncommon subsequently to switch to actions that have other creative
aspects. “On the ground” it might make more sense to talk about to what degree
methods are creative, rather than humorous.
Complexity is also a key word when it comes to understanding the reactions to
Ofog’s humorous political stunts. The small inquiry I did during Britta’s ladies gym
against NEAT gave an idea about how difficult it can be to get the intended
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message across to the audiences. The reactions after the speech bubble action at
the Pride Parade suggest some of the tactics that opponents may apply in order to
devalue activists and reframe the discussion so it takes place on their home
territory.
The functions of humour for Ofog activists were divided into facilitating outreach,
mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging relations of power.
Facilitating outreach means reaching out to various audiences, but especially
media and the general public. The findings in this chapter supported previous
research in documenting how humour can be a good way to catch the attention of
members of the general public otherwise not concerned about the issue. However,
it is difficult to know if this attention leads to a change in opinion or behaviour. One
Ofog activist suggested that ironic messages the audience can “crack” within a
reasonable amount of time might make people feel smart and this way reach them
at a deeper level. This would be an interesting topic for further research.
Many of the examples of humour presented in Chapter 3 were successful in
reaching mass media with their humorous political stunts. This is not something
Ofog has experienced, probably because most of the humorous political stunts
have been directed more towards the general public than mass media. Since
humour’s appeal to mass media is so much taken for granted, little is known about
how many other political groups have tried to reach media with humour but failed. It
would also be interesting to compare what type of media coverage would result if
the same amount of time and energy was spent on non-humorous activism but
equally attention grabbing activities, such as civil disobedience.
Even though they mean such different things when they talk about humour, most of
the people from Ofog I interviewed considered it an important factor in facilitating
mobilisation. They said that it is an important reason why they joined, that they
think it makes potential new activists interested in Ofog, and a reason why they
stay committed. For a network working with such grave issues, humour is
experienced almost as a necessity in order to prevent burnout.
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Ofog is a network speaking from a marginalised position. Although many people in
Sweden are highly critical of Sweden’s arms export, Ofog is a very small network
that is also marginalised within in the broader and more moderate peace
movement that does not engage in civil disobedience. Some political groups
decide to focus on a very narrow issue whereas others spread out their activities
much broader. Ofog belongs to the last category, with attention going to arms
production and military recruitment as well as military test sites. There are many
reasons for this, but a consequence is that there are rarely any short term goals to
reach, making it much more difficult to judge if a campaign has been successful
and really challenged relations of power. It is difficult to see any changes in
Swedish arms production, recruitment practices and use of test sites that can be
attributed to Ofog activities. If one compares the resources that Ofog controls with
those of the armed forces, FMV and the armament industry, it would be quite
unrealistic to expect Ofog’s humorous political stunts to create much permanent
change, but Ofog provides a critical dissenting voice in a context where belief in
military solutions to conflict dominates. Through the humorous political stunts, Ofog
can be seen to wage a discursive guerrilla war where dominant discourses about
NEAT/Vidsel Test Range, the job as a soldier and the results of Swedish arms
production are challenged in many small ways. Although these challenges to
dominant discourses are temporary, they do break the hegemony and at the same
time give an impression of the potential that arises from this type of activism.
Ofog has used four of the five different types of humorous political stunts – the only
type missing is the naïve stunt. The supportive, corrective and absurd stunts have
been used in different forms, while the provocative has only been used when
people in Umeå painted a whole tank pink.
Another conclusion is that one should not underestimate the power of the
experience of challenging a major dominant discourse – and having fun at the
same time. Although there is no sign that the discourse of militarism or the
institutions that uphold it are about to be dismantled, all successful social
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movements had to start somewhere and appeared hopelessly naïve when they set
out.
Finally, the chapter included a discussion about some of the risks with using
humour. The most obvious risk, pointed out by almost everyone, is of audiences
perceiving the presence of humour as a sign that the activists do not take the
issues of war preparation and arms production seriously. This is a consequence of
the widespread and taken for granted dichotomy between the “humorous” and the
“serious”, where the humorous cannot be serious at the same time. Speaking
about “rational” or “non-humorous” types of actions as a contrast to the humorous
avoids this problem. The other potential risks identified are of ridicule being
experienced as abuse, irony being misunderstood, the humour becoming too
internal, and the potential problems with mixing humorous and non-humorous
methods in the same campaign. Although it was not brought up during the
interviews and workshops, I also discussed the risk of satire being perceived as
cynical.
Fear that humour might offend, be misunderstood or lead to a group losing
legitimacy all result in a persistence of logical argument. Gantar suggested not
caring about ethics when investigating laughter critically because it is an
epistemological dead end. Nevertheless, activists performing humorous political
stunts are operating in a world where ethics does matter, and are well advised to
consider how their stunt is likely to be received also from this perspective. With
ethics in mind they have a better chance of getting the political message across
instead of spending their time defending their choice of method.
Nevertheless, when planning and evaluating a potential humorous action or
campaign, it is worth keeping in mind that some of the problems that arise with an
idea involving humour might be due to general organisational and planning
challenges and not connected to the humour per se. For example it is a general
problem for many groups that they pursue several ideas half-heartedly instead of
committing 100% to one idea.
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The next chapter is a case study of the strategies of another Scandinavian group
working on anti-militarism. Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt (KMV), meaning The
Campaign Against Conscription, worked under circumstances comparable to Ofog,
but focused on one particular issue, total resistance to conscription.
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Chapter 6: Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt – combining
legal and spectacular actions
Introduction
How can you imprison a conscientious objector for 16 months without calling it a
punishment? This was the central question for Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt (KMV),
which means The Campaign Against Conscription. KMV was a Scandinavian
campaign started in 1981 to work against conscription and support conscientious
objectors who were imprisoned for their conviction. The case study focuses on the
Norwegian conditions and the strategies used by the campaign to pressure the
Norwegian government into changing the law. Although this is not the history of
KMV, it includes many details about KMV’s way of organising and working with
both humorous and non-humorous activities. The purpose of this is to provide a
coherent narrative about KMV and to show its similarities and differences with
Ofog.
In the previous chapter Ofog activists’ perceptions about the benefits and risks with
using humour were discussed in relation to different audiences and functions
related to outreach, mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging relations
of power. Since nothing indicates otherwise, it is reasonable to assume that the
KMV activists shared similar ideas about what humour could achieve. This chapter
then takes the question of what role humour can play in challenging relations of
power one step further and analyses how the humorous political stunts were
integrated with three other non-humorous strategies.
The chapter begins with some background information about the campaign and the
situation for the conscientious objectors. It continues by presenting four different
strategies that KMV used in its struggle, the first and major one being 1. to create a
spectacle around the court hearings and imprisonments. The group performed
several humorous political stunts as part of this strategy which are especially
relevant here. In addition, three other strategies were pursued: 2. Participants in
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KMV used the court system by filing charges against the state for violating their
human rights, something that turned out to be essential for their success. 3.
Solidarity work with other conscientious objectors around the world and 4.
Lobbying and participating in the public debate. These different strategies are
presented in some detail to make it possible to trace the use of humorous political
stunts within a larger campaign. Because the legal strategy was decisive for KMV’s
success, this chapter does not have humour as its only focus.

The launch of KMV
KMV was launched in Halden in Norway on 28-29th of November 1981.636 This was
also the first time the name KMV was used publicly. KMV was a joint campaign
involving Swedish and Norwegian activists, with some links to Denmark and
Finland as well. The campaign was primarily concerned with the fate of the socalled total resisters who refused both military and substitute service, but also
supported other conscientious objectors risking imprisonment. Some of the key
Swedish and Norwegian activists knew each other from War Resisters’
International and since they were so few in each country they decided to work
closely together in a joint campaign.
Although many activities took place in Sweden and one person was very active in
Finland, the major focus of KMV was the conditions in Norway. The language
barrier was one reason it was difficult to get a bigger Finnish involvement and in
Denmark the way the conscription system was organised meant there was very
little interest in total resistance.
In its main platform, a booklet published in 1981, KMV was introduced with an
English name, ICR – Scandinavia. The booklet explained that the campaign had
been underway in Scandinavia for more than two years, and that publishing the
booklet was a step towards an active network. ICR was an abbreviation of
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International Collective Resistance, an international campaign for total resistance
originating in 1974.
KMV’s platform was a four page long pacifist-anarchist declaration. It refused both
the military, direct and structural violence and enforcement of service to society,
but spoke in favour of decentralised nonviolent resistance to violence and
oppression.
Under the heading “Common anti-militarist understanding” the platform started:
We look at ourselves as radical anti-militarists. Our resistance is
not only directed against the military, but against any kind of
violence. We strive towards the abolishment of all armies – both
an army built on conscription and a recruited army. We dismiss
conscription and all its consequences, especially the substitute
service, the so-called civil service.637
The substitute service was described as an integrated part of the military system
that can “never be in any fundamental opposition to the military service”. 638
The platform continued with the question of the development of modern weapons
technology and linked the military system with patriarchy. It also noticed women’s
possibility for refusing to cooperate with the military system although they were not
drafted. War preparations and militarism influence people’s lives long before any
service is demanded, and resistance should begin “everywhere where there are
psychological, political and economic preparations for war. Real peace work must
imply a dismantling of society’s violent structures”.639
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Under the heading “our goal” the platform described a society based on human
rights and people’s right to decide on issues related to their own life. It called for
economic redistribution and decentralisation of big businesses, and stated that
KMV would work towards building alternatives to show that another world is
possible. “We see in nonviolent forms of action the only possible means of defence
because it also includes the values it wants to defend, like openness, democratic
decision making and so on.”640 Later in the text KMV emphasised the principal
difference between a substitute service organised by the state and a completely
volunteer and self-organised peace service.
The platform finished by noting KMV’s international affiliations and the possibility of
cooperating with other parts of the peace and environmental movements on issues
where one worked in the same direction. It stated that KMV respected the work
done by pacifist peace organisations that supported the substitute service, but that
KMV saw “total resistance as the ultimate consequence of refusing to cooperate
with the military system”.641
With a few exceptions, the most active participants in KMV were men who were in
the middle of their cases as total resisters or had recently finished them. As Ulf
Norenius, one of the Swedish founders of KMV, answered when asked about why
he became so involved in KMV: “You know, it creeps very close when you have to
go to prison yourself, most people don’t have to go to prison.”642
Several of the founders of KMV had much experience from other anarchist, peace,
radical law, solidarity and environmental groups which they were actively involved
in parallel with the work in KMV. In Norway there was especially an overlap with
Folkereisning Mot Krig (FMK) a pacifist organisation dating from 1937. Two of the
Norwegian co-founders of KMV, Jørgen Johansen and Øyvind Solberg, explained
how there was fierce discussion within FMK about whether one should accept the
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substitute service or not. The majority in FMK considered substitute service
acceptable, while Johansen, Solberg and a few others did not and decided to form
an independent group to work particularly on the issue of supporting total resisters
and abolishing all conscription. According to Johansen, FMK’s general assembly
changed the organisation’s position regarding total resistance several times. The
total resisters in KMV remained active in FMK and the two groups worked closely
together.643
KMV was a non-hierarchical group, deliberately organised as a campaign focusing
on one particular issue. It was more of a loose network than a formal organisation.
The highest authority in KMV was the grand meeting. Everyone could participate in
these meetings which were held approximately two times a year.644 Between the
grand meetings, the work was organised by individuals and local groups. During
the 1980’s the most consistent groups over time were in Oslo, Ise, and
Gothenburg. Other local groups popped up and died out depending on where
certain individuals lived and how involved they were in the campaign at that
particular time.

Who were the total resisters?
In 1981, Norwegian conscientious objectors had to go through a thorough police
interrogation and be accepted by the ministry of justice in order to be recognised.
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The substitute service was longer than for military service, presumably in order to
make up for the fact that the conscientious objectors were not called up for
repetition exercises like the military conscripts.645 Nevertheless, to the
conscientious objectors it felt as if the duration of their service was a punishment
for refusing to carry arms. Most conscientious objectors had no trouble explaining
their strong pacifist conviction, objecting to participating in all wars and serving the
substitute service. During the 1970’s and early 1980’s the number of applications
for conscientious objector status was increasing.646 The substitute service, which
most conscientious objectors willingly accepted, was required to be “civilian in
character and under civilian administration, without connection to military
installations or activities.”647 The substitute service was mainly carried out within
the areas of education, health care and cultural institutions. However, the small but
diverse group of total resisters prevented the system from functioning smoothly
since they refused both the military and substitute service.
In an article in one of KMV’s newsletters, Øyvind Solberg gave a thorough
description of nine groups that potentially could be called total resisters.648 In
relation to the way KMV focused its work and prioritised its activities in Norway,
three groups are of particular interest.
1. Principled total resisters who on principle refused all service to the state.
Typically they were acknowledged as conscientious objectors because of
their commitment to pacifism. When they were called up to serve their
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substitute service, they refused that as well. Next a court determined that
the conditions were fulfilled for them to serve their service by force in an
institution under the prison administration. This was regulated in §20 of the
Norwegian law on conscientious objection from 1965. Since the time of the
alternative service was 16 months, they should serve 16 months as well.
They could either serve in a special place for total resisters, called camp
Dillingøy, or spend 16 months in prison. Camp Dillingøy was an open
institution and primarily established for the members of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, who agreed to serve there. The principled total resisters who
were motivated by political arguments such as anarchism and refused to
cooperate with the system in any way were transported to the prison by the
police.
The principled total resisters were not convicted of anything criminal, and
the 16 months were not called a punishment. The time served was not
entered into their criminal records, but apart from that there were no
practical differences between their prison conditions and those of other
prisoners. Solberg mentioned that some people refer to this group as the
“true” total resisters, and it is principled total resistance which is the
philosophy behind KMV’s platform.649
2. Selective objectors650 were not pacifists, but applied to become
conscientious objectors because they did not want to fight in wars under the
present system. Generally they referred to Norway’s membership in NATO
or the existence of nuclear weapons. Since only pacifists who refused to
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participate in all wars could obtain the status of conscientious objector, the
applications of the selective objectors were denied and they received their
military call up orders. If they then refused, they were convicted to three
months in prison. In a typical situation they would get a new call up order
and refuse that as well. Sometimes they would be pardoned the second
time, but the practice changed over time. The selective objectors were
convicted of evading military orders and their time in prison was considered
a regular punishment. In his article, Solberg mentioned that at least some of
the selective objectors would also refuse the substitute service if they had
had the opportunity. Even if they were not pacifists, they objected to the idea
of people being obliged to have a duty to serve. 651

3. Content dependent objectors who were pacifists but refused the substitute
service because it was not relevant and did not train them in a national
defence based on nonviolence. By and large these objectors did part of their
substitute service and then became total resisters during this process. They
were sent to prison for the remaining time of the substitute service under the
same conditions as the principled total resisters.652
These were the three main groups and their typical situation. However, the
situation was frequently unpredictable and also changed during the time KMV was
active. Also many other types of total resisters were active for shorter or longer
periods of time or their cases were of interest to KMV. Usually the processes went
on for many years, and it was not uncommon that people changed their positions
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during the time. For example, someone who was actually a principled total resister
might declare himself a selective objector in order to get less time in prison.
In Sweden the situation was different. Principled total resisters were given a
regular court case, charged with refusing to obey orders. During the campaign’s
existence, the length of the punishment was changed. Within KMV, many of the
Swedish participants were so-called late refusers653 who had done their military
service but developed their conscientious objection later in life and refused to do
the repetition exercises.654
KMV as an organisation was committed to principled total resistance, and not
everyone who was spending time in jail for refusing military service felt comfortable
in the group. This was one reason why an even more informal group was
established in Norway, called Samvittighetsfanger I Norge (S.I.N) which means
Prisoners of Conscience in Norway.655 Another reason was that the concept of
prisoners of conscience had other connotations which were more appropriate
under some circumstances, e.g. when it came to cooperating with Amnesty
International. Many of the most active activists in KMV were also heavily involved
in S.I.N and changed their “hats” depending on the circumstances. S.I.N produced
two issues of a newspaper and a report about conscientious objectors in prison as
a reply to a government proposition on conscription.
Norway’s way of treating the principled total resisters with 16 months in prison
without calling it a punishment was unique in Europe. Officially the total resisters
simply carried out their substitute service by force in an “institution under the
administration of the prison administration”. This contradiction – that what
appeared as a punishment was called something else – became the core of the
total resisters’ spectacular protests and legal strategy, revolving around their court
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hearings and prison time and generating newspaper headlines like “Prison is not
punishment.”656 The court hearings were not a real court case, since their only
purpose was to establish the identity of the total resisters. They were not charged
with anything criminal, but nevertheless, media frequently reported as if this was a
serious criminal offence. This indicates that the Norwegian state had a hard time
explaining its practice.
During the early 1980’s the idea of total resistance became known in much wider
circles, thanks to the young men’s own efforts. Their visibility also made the
number of total resisters grow. Between 1965 and 1984, eight people spent time in
prison after being sentenced according to §20. At the end of 1984, 25 people had
been convicted according to §20 and were waiting to go to prison.657 In December
1985 this number had increased to more than 40, and KMV was in contact with 96
total resisters, estimating the real number to more than 100.658
The department of justice was responsible for all cases regarding conscientious
objectors, and I had the opportunity to interview Jens Jensen659 who represented
the Norwegian state and the department of justice in questions regarding
conscientious objection. The interview revealed that the representatives of the
Norwegian state were unaware how closely the selective objectors and total
resisters cooperated and how much the two groups felt they had in common. To
the lawyers they appeared to be two very different types of cases because of the
difference in legislation, but the people it concerned found a communality of
interests because both groups spent time in prison for their convictions.
Jensen explained that he had forgotten about the issue of the total resisters
serving their substitute service in prison until I reminded him about it when I
contacted him for an interview. On the other hand, he had clear memories about

656

Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad, "16 Måneders Fengsel Er Ikke "Straff", Sier Myndighetene," [16 months
in prison is not "punishment", says authorities] Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad, April 20 1982.
657
Notis Øyvind Solberg, KMV, "Rundbrev 9," (Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt, November 1984), p. 4.
658
KMV, "Rundbrev 16," p. 14.
659
The informant wishes to remain anonymous, so this is a pseudonym.

383

the heated debates regarding the selective objectors. In the eyes of Jensen and his
colleagues, the issue of total resisters was a minor one:
Those who did not want to perform substitute service for
principled reasons, they were shrugged off, like okay, if they really
want to make it so complicated for themselves, let them do that.
(…) It was a small group that we [in the department of justice]
didn’t care much about.660
That the total resisters themselves and the Norwegian authorities had different
views on the importance of the issue is no surprise. For most total resisters,
refusing to perform substitute service was a decision that changed their lives. For
the Norwegian authorities, they were a handful of people making life difficult for
themselves and working on an obscure idea about abolishing military defence.
Before, during and after KMV’s campaign, the institution of conscription remained a
cornerstone in Norwegian defence policy. However, although KMV was
insignificant in the eyes of Jensen and he did not remember the change in their
treatment, for KMV activists it was a major success they still talk about 25 years
later.
After this introduction to KMV and the issues of total resistance and selective
objection, the next section investigates the different ways KMV aimed to challenge
the imprisonment of both groups.

KMV’s strategy
As noted in the introduction, KMV’s way of working can be divided into four major
strategies which were pursued simultaneously: 1. To create a spectacle which was
sometimes humorous 2. Using the court system when it seemed beneficial to KMV
by filing charges against the state for violating the human rights of the total
resisters. 3. Solidarity work with other conscientious objectors around the world
and 4. Lobbying and participating in the public debate. I identified these four
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strategies by first making a chronological list of all KMV activities mentioned in the
newsletters. Looking at the outward directed activities and excluding internal
meetings and meetings with other peace organisations, these four types of
activities appeared to be distinct ways of working which have their own logic and
goals. Taken together they contribute to facilitating outreach, mobilisation, a culture
of resistance and challenging established relations of power. The first category of
creating a spectacle also reflects the finding from chapter 5 that the distinction
between humorous and other creative action is artificial and does not reflect activist
experiences. Combined the two first strategies of creating a spectacle and using
the court system were decisive in changing the legislation within a decade. These
two strategies were the main outward directed activities of KMV, with the solidarity
and lobbying playing only minor roles.

Creating a spectacle
Already at the founding meeting in Halden in 1981, KMV set the stage for the
spectacles to come. Halden is a border town between Sweden and Norway and
the town was symbolically chosen. The press was invited to Fredriksten Fortress, a
17th century fortress with a great stake in the past wars between Sweden and
Norway.661 A handful of participants in KMV burned their conscription books or call
up orders and two speeches were held. The local newspaper carried a photo of six
men setting fire to the military papers on the front page together with an article that
quoted from KMV’s platform.662
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Illustration 25. Jørgen Johansen’s conscription book, burned at
Fredriksten Festning, Halden, during the launch of KMV, November
1981.

Norenius explained how this and other burnings were part of a strategy of noncooperation with the conscription system. When charged with refusing
conscription663 or a repetition exercise in Sweden, a number of people refused all
cooperation with the court that was going to punish them. They did not show up in
court voluntarily and made it as difficult as possible for the police to serve them the
date of the trial. Some people refused to show up in court while most preferred to
make the trial a political spectacle. When in prison, the non-cooperation could be to
refuse to work or eat. Norenius himself refused to work, something which meant
that he was sent to a high security prison.664 The burnings of military documents as
in Halden were part of this non-cooperation:
[We really saw] the burning of the conscription books as a
challenge towards the system, because it says in them that it is a
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document of value that you must take care of, that it is your duty
to take care of it. And when we burned that and call up orders,
then there is much more pressure in the protest [compared to
other protests] (…). Then you challenge the state, take the
initiative yourself [kind of say] “come on, press charges against
me for this as well [if you dare]”.665
None of the people I have interviewed had heard about anybody who was charged
after burning the military documents, and they think the authorities were uncertain
about how to handle the situation.666 It became what is called a dilemma action
where the state loses face no matter how it reacts.667 They could let the young men
get away with the burnings, thus giving them the opportunity to show their
contempt publicly. Alternatively the authorities could press charges for the
burnings, something which would give a group like KMV the chance for further
publicity about the issue of conscription that they wanted to highlight. It added to
the dilemma that most of these young men were well educated and otherwise
relatively well adjusted in society. I will return to the subject of dilemma actions in
Chapter 7.
Over the years, Norwegian participants in KMV tried in various ways to draw
attention to their §20 court hearings, for example by bringing many supporters or
by making the court hearing itself into a spectacle. One of the first that is
documented is that of Jørgen Johansen, another founder of KMV. Already in 1977
Johansen had been accepted as a conscientious objector and exempted from
military service, but he also refused to carry out the substitute service. His §20
hearing was coming up in April 1982. Before this, he produced a poster which was
displayed in public places. He invited everyone to come and watch this “drama in
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several acts arranged by the court and KMV”.668 According to Johansen the judge
was very upset by the poster, claiming that it was provocative to call the court the
organiser of a piece of theatre.669 Already before the hearing, Johansen was
interviewed by the local newspaper, and given the opportunity to explain several of
the complicated details in this type of case – for instance how the state tried to
define 16 months in prison as service to society and not a punishment.670
Usually these types of §20 cases did not take very long, but Johansen had called
many witnesses, and two days were set aside by the court for the case. Johansen
also spent a long time explaining his pacifist and anarchist convictions. Many
people came to hear the case.671 Johansen and his lawyer Øyvind Solberg argued
that 16 months in prison cannot be considered anything else than a punishment,
no matter what the official label is. They declared that by automatically sending
someone to prison for 16 months, the state violated §96 of the Norwegian
constitution which prohibits automatic punishment without a fair trial. Johansen and
Solberg also remember one of the witnesses in particular. She held the most
senior administrative position in the department of justice responsible for the
conscientious objectors, and was asked to explain what type of court hearing this
actually was. To Johansen and Solberg she appeared uncomfortable when she
explained that it was not an ordinary criminal case or a civil case. Neither was it a
special court. It was simply a meeting in the court room.672
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Poster from Jørgen Johansen’s personal archive. Apparently Johansen was inspired by a similar
poster created by Ulf Norenius some years before.
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Overbevisning," [Local conscientious objector "announce" his own case: -Unique to serve time for
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The court did not agree with Solberg and Johansen’s arguments, and Johansen’s
case ended with the court announcing that the conditions were fulfilled for him to
serve his substitute service in an institution under the administration of the prison
authorities. Nevertheless, the case was a huge success in terms of generating
attention, both in the local area673 and in one of the major national newspapers.674
Several headlines included the obvious contradiction “prison is not punishment”,675
a theme around which the subsequent legal processes revolved.
Johansen’s court proceedings themselves had been very sober, and he and his
lawyer and witnesses had tried to argue rationally why what was going on with the

Illustration 26. The local newspaper Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad’s coverage
of Johansen’s case. The heading says “16 months in prison is not
‘punishment’, says authorities” Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad, April 20 1982.
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The case was covered by the local newspapers in Sarpsborg, Halden and Fredrikstad, see for
instance Ketil Strebel Pedersen, "Ise-Mann Må Avtjene Verneplikt I Fengsel?," [Man from Ise must
serve conscription in prison?] Fredrikstad Blad, April 20 1982.
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Aftenposten, "Fengsel for Militærnektere Er Ikke Straff," [Prison for conscientious objectors is not
punishment] Aftenposten, April 28 1982.
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See for example Aftenposten, "Fengsel for Militærnektere Er Ikke Straff."; Sarpsborg
Arbeiderblad, "16 Måneders Fengsel Er Ikke "Straff", Sier Myndighetene."
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total resisters was wrong. In the spectacular actions to come this rational approach
was replaced with attempts to expose the court as a farce, thus escalating with
nonviolent means the tensions around the issue of total resistance.
The first type of humorous political stunt that KMV engaged in was a so-called jailin. On midsummer night in June 1983, 12 people managed to climb up on the
prison wall of Oslo Kretsfengsel with ladders, and ten of them then jumped into the
prison yard. Their demand was that either Johan Råum should be let out of prison,
or they should all be locked up together with him. Since he was in prison because
of his opinions and they all shared these views, the “visitors” argued that they
ought to be imprisoned as well. Råum was a selective objector who had already
served his first three months prison sentence, and was now serving the second.
The prison authorities were not used to getting extra inmates and one can assume
that the action must have been totally unexpected. The activists refused to leave
and managed to have a meeting with the person in charge of the prison and Råum
himself. They negotiated that a press conference should be held inside the prison
before the ten activists were carried out by the police.
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Illustration 27. Arbeiderbladet’s coverage of the first jail-in June 24
1983. The heading says “They escape the wrong way”.
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KMV called this a røm-inn, a literal translation of which would be an escape-in. The
English term jail-in676 does not really cover the meaning of trying to escape but
doing it the wrong way, which is quite funny to those who speak Norwegian. After
spending three to four hours at the police station they were all released. The story
got considerable attention, for instance it was covered by the tabloid VG.677 The
newspapers reported that the prison authorities were not going to press charges,
and that the action would have no legal consequences for the activists. One of the
articles also mentioned that there was a nice and friendly atmosphere between the
activists and the prison authorities, something which both sides pointed out.678
However, in his own writings Johansen says that they were reported to the police
for trespassing, but that the charges were later dropped because of “lack of
evidence” as the official terminology goes.679
The masterminds behind the action were Knut Solberg and Øyvind Solberg who
both had read and been inspired by Gene Sharp’s 198 methods of nonviolent
actions. After brainstorming about how to do the action, they asked if anybody else
wanted to participate. Johansen was one of those who were eager, and the group
organised the rope ladders and also practiced using them. Johansen and Solberg
remember with great amusement that some of the KMV participants who stayed
outside the wall hid the ladders, so when the police arrived they could not figure
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Gene Sharp uses the term jail-in about various ways of seeking imprisonment, either to fill the
jails, refuse to leave on bail or as in this case, seek imprisonment in solidarity with someone already
imprisoned. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action: pp. 418-19.
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Gunnar Fortun, "Rømning - Feil Vei," [Escaping - wrong way] Arbeiderbladet, June 24 1983.
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with the actions done by the total resisters were “henlagt på grunn av bevisets stilling” as it is called
in Norwegian. In Norwegian, a literal translation is not “lack of evidence”, just that something is not
right about the evidence. When the prosecutor dismisses a case for “lack of evidence”, the accused
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written confessions, would have been to decide on a “waiver of prosecution” (påtaleunnlatelse).
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win the case. In cases of “waiver of prosecution” the accused can demand to have a trial in order to
clear his or her name. KMV would have enjoyed the possibility to appeal such a waiver of
prosecution and the attention it would bring.
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out how the KMV activists had managed to get up there. The police’s own ladders
were too short for them to reach the top of the prison wall and bring down those
who were sitting there, something which added to the amusement. KMV had
several activists who were experienced in working with the media, and they had
informed journalists whom they trusted that if they turned up at the prison at a
certain time, something interesting was going to happen.680 Officially the action
was carried out by S.I.N, but judging from the KMV newsletter’s references to the
event, KMV felt very much responsible for it. The overlap between KMV and S.I.N
is also confirmed by Johansen and Solberg.
A year later, a new jail-in was staged by S.I.N. This time it was for Rune Berg,
another selective objector who was serving time.681 A third jail-in was carried out
on May 3 1987 in support of Bjørn Eggen who was on his second hunger strike.
Four people jumped into the prison yard of Oslo Kretsfengsel and 8 others
occupied the prison wall.682 Eggen had completed his compulsory military service
and four repeat exercises, but then became a principled total resister and was sent
to prison for 143 days after his §20 hearing. Already in March 1987 he was taken
to prison and went on a hunger strike. After 29 days his deteriorating health forced
the prison authorities to bring him to hospital. Either a misunderstanding or a
deliberate deception led Eggen to believe that he would be released and he started
to eat again. When it turned out that he would instead be taken back to prison, he
escaped from the hospital. During these months in 1987 Eggen’s hunger strike, the
jail-in and another support action where 7 people locked themselves to a pillar
outside of the government building in Oslo generated much media attention for the
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Interview with Jørgen Johansen and Øyvind Solberg January 31st 2013.
On this occasion 8 people participated, but only 2 jumped into the prison yard. The newspapers
found it especially interesting that one of the people who participated in the action was Johan Råum
who had been the inmate who received unexpected visitors the year before. Stig Grimelid, "ExFange Tilbake," [Ex-prisoner back] VG, August 28 1984; Esther Nordland, "Inntok
Fengselsmurene," [Occupied the prison walls] Arbeiderbladet, August 28 1984.
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total resisters and KMV.683 Solberg also remembers that KMV activists at some
point organised a 24 hour vigil outside of the prison with torches, and that for
several weeks there was a 24 hour presence outside of the government building in
order to show support for Eggen.684
Hunger strikes were a way for the total resisters to bring attention to their cases
once they were in prison, and several others before Eggen had been on hunger
strikes and managed to get out using this method.685
KMV’s second type of humorous political stunt took place on September 12
1983686, a few months after the first jail-in in order to gain attention for the case of
Øyvind Solberg. He was a lawyer by profession, an attorney for many of the total
resisters and also one of the driving forces in KMV. Solberg did three months of his
military service in the late 1960’s after finishing law school, and says that he
actually enjoyed the military training then. Because he had three children he
obtained a postponement for the rest of his service, and he claims to have been a
quite conservative law student. It was not until 1973-74 that he became radicalised
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and was drawn into anarchist and radical law circles. Only then did he start thinking
seriously about militarism and conscription and realised that it was “completely
hopeless” and that “I really can’t be part of this”.687 When he was called up for a
repetition exercise in the mid 1970’s his pacifism had matured and he applied to
become a conscientious objector. At that time he did not consider total resistance;
that idea only started to form after he met other total resisters in FMK in 1979.
The conscription system moved slowly, and anyone who did not cooperate with the
system could drag their cases out for years by ignoring letters and not showing up
for the substitute service. Solberg’s §20 hearing did not come up until 1983. Then
he called his friend Jørgen Johansen and said “I would like you to be in court with
me, I need your help”. Johansen replied “Sure, I will come with you, but you are a
lawyer, so you can defend yourself?” To Johansen’s surprise, Solberg replied “No,
no, I already have a defence lawyer, I would like to have you as the prosecutor!” At
first Johansen thought that would not be possible to organise, but the real
prosecutors seldom bothered to show up for the §20 hearings, because the result
was not negotiable, always 16 months in prison. This was a fact that annoyed the
activists in KMV a lot, and one of the reasons Solberg had the idea for this stunt.
Johansen says “we were annoyed that the prosecutor did not show up in these
cases, it all went so automatic that they did not bother to come”. Solberg explains
that “at the time, I had the idea that if you are going to do something, what if
everything was turned upside down?” He had not heard about anyone who ever
tried to do anything similar, but liked Monthy Python’s humour and tried to apply a
similar approach to political activism. Many people have a privately engaged
lawyer, but Solberg is the only Norwegian who has ever had a privately engaged
prosecutor.
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Illustration 28. Arbeiderbladet’s front page after the prosecutor case
became public. The heading says “Played prosecutor”. Arbeiderbladet,
September 19 1983.
Johansen borrowed a prosecutor robe and turned up in court, where he was sitting
at the prosecutor’s place when the judges turned up. There the judge asked “are
you new here?”, which Johansen could say yes to without lying. Johansen, who
had long hair and a big beard, had done his best to tame it with hair pins and look
respectable. Solberg had prepared a script for Johansen for the court proceedings,
and because Solberg had himself worked as both a judge and a prosecutor after
396

law school he knew which details to include in order to make the performance
convincing. In court, nobody noticed that anything was wrong, and the proceedings
went on for two hours. The whole event was filmed by KMV, and Johansen did
indeed look very serious and convincing during the proceedings. Nevertheless,
some of the things he said were rather outrageous. In his parody of the prosecutor,
Johansen demanded that since Solberg was a lawyer, he ought to serve almost
four times as long in prison as the police had initially demanded. Because Solberg
had served part of his military service, he was facing 96 days under the
administration of the prison authorities. Johansen demanded that he get 376
days.688 Nevertheless, the judge did not notice anything wrong and it was KMV
itself that told the press about the fake prosecutor.
At first, KMV was not sure what to do with the film, and it took almost a week
before the story hit the media. But it exploded when part of KMV’s film was shown
as the major story of the 7pm news, Dagsrevyen. In 1983 Norway only had one TV
channel called NRK, and “everyone” was watching that particular news broadcast.
The reporter introduced the two and a half minute story with “Last Monday Oslo
byrett [Oslo court] was tricked by a fake prosecutor in a case about a conscientious
objector.”689 In studio he continued with some of the facts in the case, and then
part of the film was shown while Johansen was introduced. The speaker said about
him that “he went to extremes and demanded a longer time in prison than what the
police had asked for. He played his role so convincingly that the judge did not
expose him.” The voiceover added that the judge had told Dagsrevyen that the
prosecutor did not say much, that there was little juridical argumentation and that
was why he did not react. The broadcast then continued with an interview with
Solberg in the studio. The interviewer asked the reason for showing up with a fake
prosecutor, and Solberg replied: “The whole point was to show that the court
system in these cases is a parody of a proper court system.” Solberg explained the
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Gunnar Fortun, "Spilte Aktor," [Played prosecutor] Arbeiderbladet, September 19 1983.
NRK, "Fake Prosecutor in Dagsrevyen," (NRK, 1983).
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arrangement with the 16 months in prison and how the court really had no choice
about how to rule. The journalist finished off with asking “you are yourself a lawyer.
Is it not a violation of the court’s dignity to do something like this?” Solberg got the
last word with his reply “In my opinion it is the court that has violated my dignity
when I’m dragged in front of a court which is such a parody.”690
When the deception was revealed, both Johansen and the judge were interviewed
by several of the national Norwegian newspapers. The judge is quoted for saying
I was shocked when I heard what had happened. All my
colleagues have reacted strongly and want Oslo byrett [Oslo
court] to take action. I will report the case to the police and the
department of justice.691
When asked by the journalist whether he had any suspicions, the judge said: “No,
usually this is routine cases. ‘The prosecutor’ gave a plausible explanation for
showing up, something the police usually don’t do in these cases.” The newspaper
finished the article paraphrasing the judge: “he [the judge] admits that ‘the
prosecutor’ seemed convincing when he in a trustworthy way argued that Solberg’s
time in prison should be expanded compared to the police demand.” 692
For KMV, it was all about the possibility to show what a farce the court cases were.
Solberg expressed it directly in the interview in NRK – they considered the court a
parody of a proper court system and wanted to expose that. In a newspaper article,
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In Norwegian the interviewer asked “Er det ikke at krænke rettens værdighet å gjøre noe slik? ”
and Solberg replied ”Jeg oplever det heller slik at retten krænker min værdighet når jeg blir drat inn
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He was quoted for saying that “I think it is arrogant of the prosecution to consider a case
straightforward, and therefore fail to appear. The prosecution has itself to blame in this case.”
Gunnar Fortun, "Rettsvesenet Kan Takke Seg Selv," [The judicial system has itself to blame]
Arbeiderbladet, September 20 1983.
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Solberg and Johansen were also quoted as saying that they hoped a case would
be raised against them. Johansen said:
We hope there will be a case against us, so that we can show what
happens to us conscientious objectors. I take responsibility for
what I have done and I’m prepared to be punished for it. Most
likely I will demand to get the law’s harshest punishment.693
The point about demanding the harshest punishment was a Gandhi-inspired
approach designed to show that he really was prepared to take responsibility for
his actions. At first, Johansen and Solberg had their hopes fulfilled. The court filed
a report to the police against both of them as well as Solberg’s lawyer Wulfberg.694
In his report of the event, judge Alfsen described the proceedings differently from
what Johansen and Solberg remember. Alfsen thought that Johansen did not say
much, and that there was nothing unusual in what he said:
At the start of the court procedure on September 12 a person
dressed in a black lawyer robe appeared and let the recording
clerk understand that after the police had been informed that a
defence lawyer would participate (what usually does not happen in
this kind of cases), they had decided to participate as well. The
person sat down at the prosecutor’s usual place. Because of the
information the person had given, the recording clerk wrote
“public prosecutor Jørgen Johansen” on the piece of paper with the
names of those who appear in court at the table of the court (…)
Jørgen Johansen de facto performed as the prosecutor in the case.
He did not engage in any legal argumentation against the relative
substantial pleas made by Solberg and lawyer Wulfsberg, since he
“was not prepared for this”.695
Alfsen wrote that Johansen, Solberg and Wulfberg had violated several paragraphs
in the criminal code and courts act696 for “unauthorised exercise of official authority”
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or assisting in this, and they had shown contempt for the court. Alfsen’s superior
used this report to report Johansen, Solberg and Wulfberg to the police the day
after the deception was first revealed in newspapers and on national TV.697
Solberg came close to losing his right to practice as a lawyer, but got away with a
“serious warning” from the department of justice because he assisted Johansen in
impersonating the prosecutor.698 However, even the highest placed civil servant in
the department of justice, Departementsråd Leif Eldring, could see the comic side
of the case according to the well-respected newspaper Aftenposten.699
The legal proceedings against all three were dismissed for lack of evidence,
although both Johansen and Solberg requested that they be tried in court. Both
argued that it was in their interest to be tried, Solberg because he had no
possibility of appealing the warning he had received700, and Johansen because of
the “harassment” he had been met with in the mass media.701 However, none of
them heard back from the police. The main reason they would have liked to have a
trial was of course the possibility of generating more publicity about the total
resisters.702
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In Johansen’s and Solberg’s opinion, most people that heard about this stunt really
liked it and thought it was good fun. They have only heard one person being
sceptical about it – a FMK member who thought the deception was not in the spirit
of Gandhian nonviolence because deceiving the court betrayed the principle of
honesty.
Meanwhile, different kinds of spectacular dramas in the courts continued. On
November 16 1983, Knut Solberg, another principled total resister (not related with
Øyvind Solberg) had his court case in Oslo. He started out with three demands to
the judges: 1. The judges had to be willing to make an independent decision in this
case. 2. The judges had to promise to follow their conscience, and not just rule
according to the laws. 3. The judges also had to promise to take Solberg’s
conscience into consideration so that they together could make an ethical ruling in
the case. The main judge dismissed these demands straight away, which made
Knut Solberg state that he considered this response very arrogant, and that he did
not have any confidence in the court. He and the audience then proceeded with the
court hearing, while the judges and the prosecutor left “for a break”. After a while
they came back with the police, and declared that everyone in the audience was
expelled. Both the audience and Knut Solberg left voluntarily in order to finish their
version of the protocol somewhere else, while the hearing inside finished without
Solberg being present.703
In May 1984, the principled total resister Harald Eraker set fire to his conscription
book during his court hearing with these words:
This is not a real court case. Neither they nor I have any kind of
influence on what happens. I will be given 16 months in prison
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anyway, and for me there is no purpose in testifying. Therefore I
will not cooperate any more in this case.704
Five other activists were in the court to support Eraker. They carried a banner
saying “stop the court parody. Remove §20”. The action was covered by a national
Norwegian newspaper and the report included a big photo of the burning of the
conscription book, the activists and the banner. Eraker was interviewed at length
about his conscientious objection and the newspaper article also included a quote
about how he considered the courts a parody:
This is not a court case. I will be told that I’m going to prison for
16 months, but I could have received that in a letter. Instead they
dress this in a legal frame. The only thing the judge has to do is to
establish that I’m Harald Eraker and that I refuse substitute
service.705
The article also showed that the total resisters now had established a reputation
and were known to the press. The journalist wrote that the events in court “are the
latest in a number of actions in connection with court cases against conscientious
objectors”.706
Numerous other actions were carried out in connection with the §20 court cases.
The activities are only mentioned briefly in KMV documents, but show a steady
flow of efforts to expose the parodies of the §20 hearings and in other ways bring
attention to the total resisters. On October 24, 1986 Dag Olav Sivertsen burned his
conscription book in Oslo byrett.707 Jan Otto Nilsen made a funeral for §20 out of
his hearing when he tore the page with the paragraph out of the law book, burned it
inside the court and later tried to bury it on the lawn outside of the Norwegian
government building. However, the guards came running and he did not manage to
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actually get §20 in the ground.708 On November 20 1986 total resister Morten
Rønning and the audience showed up for his §20 hearing dressed as clowns under
the motto “§20 is a parody”. The event is described in the newsletter:
And parody it became! The clowns came up with so much silliness
and antics that the police were called and the clowns expelled. The
conclusion was that you don’t get more fun than what you make
yourself. Wonder who will be the next judge who voluntarily takes
a total resister case?709
Solberg also remembers a clowning episode, but is not sure if it was the same or
another event where Morten Rønning was using a red clown nose. Every time
someone said “§20”, Rønning would stand up, grab the red nose on his face and
move the nose to and from his face while he in a mocking, high pitched voice
repeated “§20, §20, §20”. Solberg noticed how the two lay judges were struggling
to prevent themselves from smiling, while the main judge looked gravely at Solberg
and said “do you have anything to do with this, lawyer Solberg?”
Other occasions than the court hearings were also used to create a spectacle.
During a parliamentary hearing about conscription in Norway in 1985 some total
resisters came to listen to the debate dressed in prison uniforms. The two or three
times resisters were referred to in the debate they stood up.710
In 1988 KMV produced a poster with the heading “Wanted”. It showed 24 smiling
young men and the time they were going to spend in prison for their conscientious
objection. The text underneath the photos said:
Here are 24 of the almost 200 conscientious objectors who are
going to prison in Norway. Six of them have been summoned to
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Illustration 29. KMV poster from 1988. Under the heading “Wanted” it
shows 24 men and the time they were going to spend in prison for their
conscientious objection.
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prison, but have evaded. They are considered dangerous because
they are expected to resist with nonviolent means. They are all
supporters of nonviolence and freedom of conscience, and work
for a nonviolent alternative to the military defence. It is important
that they are arrested and sent to prison before such ideas are
spread. Possible information about the wanted should be given to
the department of justice or to the nearest police authority.711
December 1 is recognised as international day for prisoners for peace, and for
some years KMV in Norway marked this by inviting people to burn their
conscription books in front of the parliament. The event in 1989 was documented in
the newsletter. Next to two banners saying “The parliament is arming, we disarm”
and “conscription books to be burned here” they kept a fire going. Solberg
remembers that they had made sure in advance that someone who still had a
conscription book would turn up and burn it. But out of the blue, people they did not
know at all just came by, threw their conscription books in the fire and left without a
word.712 One report of the event said that the conscription books with their plastic
cover gave a thick, black smoke,713 while another newspaper reported that 20
people followed the encouragement to burn their conscription books and that the
people who did that were all reported to the police.714 Solberg never heard that
anyone was actually prosecuted for burning his conscription book715, so it might
well be another case which was dismissed for “lack of evidence”.
To sum up on KMV’s spectacular events, they included the humorous political
stunts with the fake prosecutor, the jail-ins and the clowning. In addition,
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conscription book burnings and the funeral procession in court were spectacular
and attention grabbing, but not humorous. Looking at the number of events, this
strategy appears to have been KMV’s preferred choice, something which was also
confirmed in the interviews. In the analysis below I investigate what role the
humorous political stunts played for KMV’s success in changing Norway’s law on
conscientious objection.
The Norwegian authorities responded to the strategy of creating a spectacle in
numerous ways, but the design of the actions meant that it seldom was possible to
ignore the total resisters completely. Frequently the police were brought in to arrest
the total resisters and/or their supporters and remove them from the court room or
the prison walls. At other times the police only became involved after the event
when charges were pressed against the total resisters, for instance with regard to
the fake prosecutor.
Jensen remembers that in the department of justice he and his colleagues were
aware that “[the total resisters] made quite some noise” as he spontaneously called
it, and he remembers the case with the fake prosecutor. When asked what he
thought about it he said: ”Nothing else than that we had a quite relaxed attitude to
it. What was problematic were [the selective objectors] who were not exempted
from military service.”716
There is no reason to doubt Jensen regarding the department of justice’s position
when it came to the spectacular events. Although they were responsible for the
conscientious objectors’ cases, it was the courts and prison authorities who were
first in line when KMV took action. It would have been very interesting to have data
about the reactions from both the juridical and lay judges who witnessed all these
actions, but unfortunately such an investigation would be very difficult to carry out
after so many years. However, even if the department of justice did not have to

716

Interview with Jens Jensen April 2013.

406

deal directly with the spectacular actions, the situation was different when it came
to KMV’s legal strategy of suing the Norwegian state.

Using the courts
In parallel with the spectacular actions which exposed the court hearings as a
farce, KMV attempted to use the court system to expose the state rationally as
well. However, contrary to many other organisations that pursue a legal strategy,
KMV did not see this as the only possible course of action, and the legal strategy
was combined with a successful media strategy.
Norenius from Sweden was the first of the total resisters from KMV to apply to the
European Commission of Human Rights at the Council of Europe. He was one of
the late refusers who had done his military service. When he was called up in
1963, he decided to do his 10 months with an open mind, but when I interviewed
him he said that “if I wasn’t an anti-militarist before, I became one”. The first time
he was called up for his repetition exercise he received a postponement because
he was studying, but when it was time for the second repetition he refused to
participate. According to the practice of the time he was convicted to one month in
prison for this “severe refusal to accept orders”.717 The next time he refused his
repetition exercise he was first convicted to two months in prison, but when he
appealed the higher court lowered it to one month again. Because he refused to
work while in prison he was sent to a high security prison, something he referred to
as “the university of life”.718
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Illustration 30. The text in this drawing says “pacifist” for the prisoner to
the right. Underneath it says “You are imprisoned for murder, and I for
refusing to kill”. Norenius referred to this cartoon and said “And this was
true in Sweden in 1984, I was doing time together with murderers”. The
origin of the drawing is unknown.719
After being denied the opportunity to have his case heard by the Supreme Court in
Sweden, Norenius complained to the European Commission of Human Rights. His
argument was that his total resistance was treated differently than that of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses because they were automatically exempted from both
compulsory military service and substitute service in Sweden.720 He considered it
discrimination when those who were basing their total resistance on religious
grounds received a different treatment compared to him and others with political
motivations whose total resistance led to fines and a prison sentence.721 Not
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surprisingly for Norenius, his case was dismissed by the commission. The
explanation for the dismissal was that membership in Jehovah’s Witnesses was
convincing evidence that someone held strong religious believes preventing him
from performing any compulsory service. According to the commission no similar
evidence could be found in other cases, and the Swedish state’s need for
conscripts was reason enough to convict non-religious total resisters to prison.722
When I asked how KMV decided which cases to take to court, the driving force
seems to have been individual persistence rather than a collective decision about
which case would have a chance. Norenius said that “here it is oneself who
chooses. It was not the campaign as such [that decided], it was more about
someone who wanted to try.” However, once someone decided to go ahead it
appears to have been self-evident that he would receive the support of the
campaign.
While Norenius’ case regarding the Swedish conditions was still under
consideration, Johansen took his case to the same European Commission of
Human Rights at the Council of Europe with a different argumentation and referring
to Norwegian conditions. Johansen’s original court hearing had happened in April
1982. After that, he appealed to the Supreme Court in Norway, but the case was
dismissed in November the same year. Johansen had still not been summoned to
camp Dillingøy, but on May 4 1983 applied to the European Commission of Human
Rights to consider his case a violation of several articles of the European
Convention on Human Rights.723 In May 1984 the commission decided to ask the
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Norwegian state for a written explanation, but only regarding article 5.724 This
article of the Convention about “Right to liberty and security” states in §1 that:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(…)
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for
noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to
secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 725
Johansen and his lawyer Øyvind Solberg argued that there must be a limitation to
this, and that “the effect of the present Norwegian law is that a certain group of
men must be imprisoned for sixteen months”.726
Johansen’s case at the European Commission of Human Rights was first
mentioned in a national Norwegian newspaper June 24 1984, when the
commission asked the Norwegian state to give a written explanation about its
practice.727 It became a rather big case on March 9, 1985, when it became known
that the commission had asked the Norwegian state to appear before the
commission in order to explain its practice728, and the Norwegian state immediately
stopped imprisonment of the principled total resisters while the case was
pending.729 Only one other case against the Norwegian state had ever been
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considered for admission by the commission, so this was an important case that
officials took very seriously.730
That the case was important for the Norwegian state was confirmed by Jensen.
When asked if the case was embarrassing for Norway, he said:
Not embarrassing, no, not to go there, but of course quite a lot of
prestige was at stake when you are dragged to the European
Commission of Human Rights. If the commission had found that
Norway’s praxis was contrary to international law, then of course
it would have been problematic. (…) There is no doubt that from
the state’s side, quite a lot of effort was invested in the case (…)
when the case was taken to Strasbourg and [the commission]
accepted to take it, it was time to start working.731
Although Jensen did not agree that it was embarrassing for the government, he left
no doubt that the case was important for the Norwegian state in terms of prestige
and the time spent on it.
The actual meeting took place on October 14 1985. Since the Norwegian state was
sending five representatives, Johansen and Solberg decided to bring two other
lawyers with them. For the local newspaper in the town where Johansen had had
his first court hearing in 1982, Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad, this was such a major
event that it decided to send a journalist to Strasbourg to cover the case. In an
interview a few days before the hearing, Solberg showed great optimism about the
prospects for the case to succeed. Johansen expressed his ambivalence towards
the court system and probably spoke for many in KMV when he said:
- I cannot escape the feeling that this is more a game about
paragraphs than a question of justice, says Jørgen Johansen in a
comment. – After all, it is 21 European governments that finance
the commission and [they] presumably wish to safeguard the
states’ interests. Personally I make a clear distinction between law
and justice, but hope that this case is such a clear breach of the
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Convention on Human Rights that it is unavoidable to get a fair
judgement. As an anarchist it is fun to get permission to negotiate
with the state. That has probably never happened before either for
anarchists or for peace movements. At least the state has been
forced to the table to talk, says Jørgen Johansen.732
However, the optimistic quotes in the newspapers are with all likelihood part of
involving media in the spectacle. In the minutes of the KMV grand meeting held on
January 1st 1985, it says “Jørgen Johansen has little hope of winning in the
European Council which he calls just as corrupt as the Norwegian court system”733.
It seems fair to assume that the minutes present a more honest attitude than what
Johansen told the journalist.
The newspaper that quoted Johansen’s ambivalence about the commission’s
ability to make a fair judgement also states that: “The Norwegian state also
obviously considers the case very serious. The delegation has now been expanded
from five to six participants.” It continues to list the names of the highly ranked civil
servants from the ministry of justice and the ministry of foreign affairs.734
The Commission of Human Rights spent 5 hours deliberating the case, but in the
end it was considered inadmissible. Solberg was terribly disappointed, although he
had not expected to win, he had been fairly certain that at least it would be
considered by the commission. The announcement that the case was inadmissible
was given straight after the deliberations, but it took some months before the
explanation for the decision was released. In this period all that was public was that
Johansen’s complaint had been dismissed, but no one knew why. 735
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When the decision from the commission was released in December 1985, it
became clear that the commission had accepted the arguments of the Norwegian
state. The time Johansen would spend in prison could not be considered a
punishment since he would be released if he changed his mind and decided to
perform the substitute service.
The commission considers that there is a difference in the
character of the detention in the applicant’s case as compared
with detention after conviction. The applicant may at any time be
released, provided that he changes his attitude. This fact may be
of little interest to the applicant, but it distinguishes his detention
from normal incarceration following a criminal conviction.736
Around 8-10 principled total resisters who had had their court hearings were now
facing 16 months in prison. In spite of the defeat in Strasbourg, KMV decided to
continue pursuing the path of the courts. Already in 1982, KMV had raised a case
against the state, claiming that the imprisonment of the principled total resisters
was a breach with the Norwegian Constitution’s article 96 which prohibits
punishments without a judgement.737 This case was dismissed by the court
because no individual total resister was named, and the court could not make a
judgement just because an organisation thought it was unconstitutional.738
In May 1986, two of the people who had been summoned to prison decided to
pursue this path again and filed charges against the Norwegian state at the court in
Oslo. Bjørn Bremnes and Tom Nilsen claimed that the state was violating article 96
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of the Constitution. While the case was under consideration, the department of
justice decided that no principled total resisters should be imprisoned.739
Because of the ruling in Strasbourg, Solberg knew what line of argument the
representatives of the Norwegian state were most likely to pursue. He decided to
sharpen his argumentation around the issue of the “choice” that the state claimed
the total resisters had to change their mind and perform the substitute service.
Solberg remembers that he made a comparison with the way the Nazis in
Germany had told members of Jehovah’s Witnesses that they could just change
their faith, and then they would not be required to go to the concentration camps. 740
KMV also called Nils Christie, a famous Norwegian professor of criminology, as
one of their witnesses. He testified that although the total resisters were not
technically punished according to the Norwegian state, in reality their time in prison
resembled that of other prisoners in all respects. And in the Norwegian criminal
law, you had to have committed quite serious crimes in order to be sentenced to 16
months imprisonment. Compared to many other places, Norway had (and still has)
a rather liberal prison policy.
Oslo court decided on the case January 12-13 1987, and did not find any violation
of the constitution. The conclusion was the same as in Strasbourg; the total
resisters would be released as soon as they changed their minds.741 KMV
appealed the decision, and it took another two years before the case was heard in
January 1989 in Eidsivating Lagmannsrett.742 The court had seven judges – three
of them had a law degree and four of them were lay judges with no judicial
background. Six of the seven judges agreed with the earlier ruling, but one of the
lay judges dissented, something which according to Solberg was very important.
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KMV activists lost in all the cases where they tried to challenge the Swedish and
Norwegian states with legal means. That the courts uphold the status quo in cases
like this is no surprise. Many social movements that have tried to battle states and
big business with legal means discover that the court system is geared towards
protecting those with money and power rather than being an institution where
“justice prevails”.743
However, in spite of losing the legal battle, KMV in Norway was still successful in
using the cases to generate attention. Below it will become apparent how big a role
these cases played in changing the law. Not only did they stall the imprisonment
while they were pending, they also drew the civil servants’ attention to the
problems with the law.

Solidarity
In addition to the two main strategies of creating a spectacle around their cases
and using the courts to challenge the state, KMV’s activities also reflected other
ways of working. One of them was solidarity with conscientious objectors and
especially total resisters in other parts of the world as well as within Scandinavia.
KMV activists advised other potential total resisters about the consequences of
different types of refusal. In some periods this was organised as a service with
special phone numbers and people on duty to receive calls744, at other times it was
more sporadic.
Several times it was also suggested to establish a symbolic “refugee camp” in
Sweden for Norwegian total resisters. It was discussed during the grand meeting in
June 1982, where two different strategies were suggested: a permanent “refugee
camp” as a community, or a tent camp during the summer of 1983. Norenius and
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his partner offered their house as a place for such a community,745 and their letter
also outlined the logic which must have been discussed during the June 1982
meeting. They wrote:
At the meeting at Seletun, Bergen, last summer we discussed the
possibilities for opening a “refugee camp” in Sweden for
Norwegian total resisters. Admittedly, total resistance is a crime
both in Norway and in Sweden, and there exists an extradition
treaty between the two countries. However, the point is that the
Norwegian total resisters have not been convicted, and hence
ought not to be extradited.746
KMV was assuming that the fact that the total resisters in Norway were not
convicted in a regular trial, but “just” serving their substitute service in an institution
under the administration of the prison authorities, would prevent the authorities
from using the regular extradition system between the two countries. Apparently no
one took up the offer from Norenius and his partner, as the plans for a permanent
refugee camp never went ahead.747 When interviewed, Norenius reflected on the
limitation of letting the Norwegian resisters stay with friends in Sweden on an
individual basis.
It’s an idea, but it costs quite a lot in terms of resources. Of
course you could let these young Norwegian men come to Sweden
and stay with friends and they would also be able to work and so,
but then you don’t get this refugee camp effect, it does not
become a political question. It becomes support of an individual
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and that is good, but the issue [of conscription] you don’t get
anywhere with.748
Here it becomes apparent that even when it came to solidarity work, KMV was still
thinking in terms of using the refugee camp to generate publicity and making a
spectacle around the total resisters.
In July 1983 it was announced to have a symbolic tent camp in Krokstrand on the
Swedish west coast, close to the border. A Norwegian journalist who visited
reported that 16 Norwegian total resisters participated, but in spite of the
newspaper’s reference to these “sensational plans”749, the camp did not have any
political significance for KMV.
Another type of solidarity work was with conscientious objectors and especially
total resisters in other parts of the world. The KMV newsletter frequently had
updates about new and ongoing cases and legal developments in countries such
as West Germany, Poland, South Africa, Greece, France and Spain. This type of
solidarity also went the other way. When Norenius refused to perform his repetition
exercise he received several letters of sympathy. During the court procedure the
judge read several letters out loud; one came from Argentina and demanded that
Norenius be acquitted. The support appeared to have meant much to Norenius: the
letter from Argentina was something he mentioned spontaneously when talking
about his own case.
On a few occasions, the KMV newsletter reported on actions in sympathy with the
Norwegian principled total resisters. In August 1985, in connection with a march for
nonviolence in Denmark, some actions were carried out to show sympathy with
total resisters. The group considered the conditions for conscientious objectors
worst in Spain, France and Norway, and wanted to occupy their embassies in
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Copenhagen.750 At the Norwegian embassy, some protesters climbed up with a
banner outside, while others found their way to an entryway which they blocked.
They were careful to let through people who wanted to apply for a visa or other
services, but not the staff.
Norenius who participated at the Norwegian embassy thinks that somewhere
between 10 and 15 people took part. He remembers it as a fun and successful
nonviolent direct action. “It all went really well, and there was never any expression
of hatred or heated atmosphere.” To him, it was an example of how nonviolence
changed how others perceived the situation. The first sign of the police they saw
were two or four policemen in their short sleeved summer uniforms and
characteristic police caps. They sat down and chatted with the occupiers while they
waited for backup. When the backup arrived they could all hear the sirens from a
distance, and out poured the police in full riot gear with helmets, shields and
machineguns, lining up in a row. When the person in charge had been briefed
about the situation, he gave an order, and all the police went to change into what
Norenius called “almost civilian cloth” – the short sleeved shirts and usual caps.
Norenius was the designated negotiator, since he knew the Norwegian case quite
well. The demand for all three occupations was “Freedom for all conscientious
objectors”, and at the Norwegian embassy they demanded to talk to the
ambassador. In an article about the event that Norenius wrote for a Swedish
newspaper, he said that they managed to have a “real political debate” with the
employees at the embassy. Altogether the Norwegian embassy was occupied for
two hours and twenty minutes before all the occupiers were carried out to a police
bus. When they were released from police custody one by one during the evening,
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the cheers and celebrations outside of the police house increased. As far as
Norenius remembers they got a lot of positive media coverage of the event.751
Another international solidarity action took place in October the same year. When
Johansen’s case was up for consideration in Strasbourg, Spanish total resisters
held a demonstration outside the Norwegian Embassy in Madrid. The newsletter
also reprinted articles in French and Flemish about the situation for the Norwegian
total resisters.752
Such solidarity actions were with all likelihood reported home to Oslo by the
embassies, but it is difficult to know if they had any impact, since they are not
referred to in the department of justice’s suggestion to change the law on
conscientious objection. However, it helped the Norwegian total resisters feel that
they were not alone and not forgotten.
KMV also sought solidarity from Amnesty International, but the relationship was
ambivalent. Amnesty International works for respect for human rights and amnesty
for political prisoners, and until 1979 it recognised the total resisters as prisoners of
conscience.753 Then the organisation made it clear that it accepted conscription
and it was only the selective objectors who declared that they were willing to
perform the substitute service but not granted the status of conscientious objector
that were considered prisoners of conscience by Amnesty International.
In 1986 selective objector Ulf Alstad was recognised as a prisoner of conscience
by Amnesty International when he was serving his second prison sentence. This
recognition was reported in Aftenposten, one of the major Norwegian
newspapers.754 A group of people from KMV and S.I.N did a solidarity action
outside of the department of justice while Alstad was in prison. They climbed into a
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couple of trees with a banner saying “Amnesty demands: Set Ulf Alstad free”. In
addition they requested to talk to the minister of justice. That demand was not
heard but they were promised that if they climbed down and cleaned up after
themselves they could meet with the minister’s Secretary of State the next day,
something they accepted. However, Amnesty International did not like the way
KMV and S.I.N had used its name. In a subsequent meeting with Amnesty’s
section in Norway, KMV agreed not to use slogans at future events which could be
misinterpreted as if Amnesty International was the organiser.755
Amnesty International had (and still has) a very high standing in Norwegian
society, and when Norway ended up on Amnesty’s list of countries that violate
human rights because of its treatment of the selective objectors, it became news.
For instance, in 1987 it was covered by a national Norwegian newspaper that Lars
Aasen, a selective objector, had been adopted as a prisoner of conscience by local
Amnesty groups in the Netherlands, Austria and Great Britain.756 Johansen and
Solberg explained that when the selective objectors had been accepted as
prisoners of conscience they were “playing in a completely different league”, that
generated media attention because of Amnesty’s status, and then the spectacular
actions became superfluous.
This view is also confirmed by Jensen who remembers that the total resisters were
not a concern at the department of justice, just something they had to “manage”.
The selective objectors who were adopted by Amnesty, on the other hand, were a
totally different matter:
What were a little touchy were those who were adopted by
Amnesty as prisoners of conscience. That Norway ended up on
Amnesty’s list of countries that had prisoners of conscience was
troublesome in itself. That was a little sensitive, but apart from
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that group [of selective objectors], everything about the
conscientious objectors was something that just had to be
managed.757
KMV frequently pointed out what they considered Norwegian politicians’ double
standards – that when Amnesty International criticised other countries that was
something good, but when the organisation pointed towards flaws in Norway’s way
of treating its conscientious objectors it was something different. A short but
amusing example of this is when Øyvind Solberg met and talked with the
Norwegian King about the subject “Amnesty International and prisoners of
conscience in Norway”. In an article titled “Meeting with the boss”, Solberg wrote:
The King has several times encouraged people to support Amnesty
International. This can seem uncontroversial, also various
[Norwegian] governments have given their support to Amnesty’s
struggle for human rights. The problem is that Amnesty thinks
that Norwegian authorities violate human rights by imprisoning
conscientious objectors. Does the King support Amnesty’s demand
to release Norwegian prisoners of conscience? The King did not
want to tell. He would rather not talk about the subject at all,
except that he thought it would be very few conscientious
objectors who were imprisoned. Therefore we talked about
something else, like abortion for instance.758
However, KMV’s relationship with Amnesty International remained ambivalent
since Amnesty International did not accept the Norwegian principled total resisters
as prisoners of conscience during the 1980’s. Over the years KMV lobbied for a
change in Amnesty’s position and participated in some of their meetings in the
hope of getting Amnesty to take a stand against the treatment of the total resisters.
They did get support from some people within Amnesty, but nevertheless the
lobbying remained unsuccessful.759
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KMV spent quite some time on solidarity work with conscientious objectors in
prison, and also received some support from abroad. There is a considerable
overlap between KMV’s and S.I.N’s solidarity work and the spectacular actions.
The jail-ins for instance can be understood as a show of solidarity, although they
were primarily constructed to create a spectacle. Had they only been intended as
an act of solidarity, KMV would not have called journalists in advance.

Lobbying and participating in the public debate
The documents that KMV produced give an impression of a group showing
surprisingly little interest in direct lobbying of decision makers compared to many
other campaigns and organisations. KMV did write open letters and met with
politicians and representatives from the authorities, but this activity has not left
many traces. Compared to the attention given to other types of activities, these
meetings mainly appear to be mentioned as side remarks hidden among the more
important business of creating a spectacle around the court hearings and
imprisonment. For instance, all I have been able to find regarding the meeting with
the Secretary of State in 1986 mentioned above in connection with Alstad’s case is
this:
During ‘the conversation’ the next day we did not get many
concessions or promises about change, but we presented our view
and also got some information about the government’s plans and
attitudes after the Strasbourg case.760
One can wonder why the “government’s plans and attitudes” did not deserve more
attention. I suspect that the reason the KMV newsletters reflect so little interest in
lobbying efforts is that the meetings were experienced as insignificant. The minutes
of a grand meeting in 1985 describe how KMV representatives met with three
different political blocs (the liberal-conservatives, the social democrats and the
socialists) before the parliamentary debate about the conscription system in
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Norway. In the minutes it says that “None of the political parties wanted any
change in the law, that was the conclusion of the meetings”. 761
However, attitudes towards lobbying differed from person to person, and especially
Solberg was an eager participant in the public debate. He wrote a considerable
number of open letters and letters to the editors of numerous newspapers where
he argued rationally for KMV’s ideas and a better treatment of the total resisters.
One of the open letters also reflect KMV’s playful attitude. In 1983, KMV together
with five other organisations wrote to the King, suggesting a change to the
traditional speech on New Year’s Eve. Usually the King used the opportunity to
send a greeting to the country’s armed forces at home and abroad. Reminding the
King that not everyone serves their service in the armed forces, they suggested
that he send the greeting to “everyone serving conscription, whether it is in the
armed forces, in civilian service or in our prisons”.762
There is not much to sum up regarding KMV’s lobbying activities. They were
almost non-existent compared to the attempt to create a spectacle and the use of
legal procedures against the Norwegian state. Below it will also be apparent that
the law was not changed because of initiatives from the politicians, but because
the legal strategy in the courts prompted the civil servants in the department of
justice to look for a less controversial treatment of the total resisters.

The legal procedures that changed the law
In June 1990, the parliament changed the legislation that had made it possible to
serve the substitute service in an institution under the administration of the prison
authorities, and the new law took effect on January 1 1991.763 At the same time,
the criteria for being accepted as a conscientious objector were also slightly
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revised, making it possible for those who objected because of the existence of
weapons of mass destruction to be recognised as conscientious objectors as well,
but through a different bill. The activities of KMV and S.I.N described above were
decisive in bringing about this change. However, the process of discussing and
deciding on official reports and white papers in order to change laws can be long
and winding. In this case some of the processes were exceptionally long and
exceeded the decade that KMV existed as an active campaign. Tracing the
changes is complicated by the fact that the issues of total resistance and selective
objection were two very different issues when it came to the laws that regulated
them.
In 1974 the Norwegian government decided to appoint a committee whose task
was to write a Norwegian Official Report on conscription.764 The reason the
committee was appointed was the rise in the number of both conscientious
objectors and selective objectors. One of the questions the report was to discuss
was the criteria for exemption from military service. The committee did not present
its findings until 1979, and in spite of the report’s more than 350 pages, the
question of total resistance is barely touched. Only the camps where Jehovah’s
Witnesses agreed to serve their substitute service after their §20 hearings were
mentioned. The people who refused this and were sent to serve “under the
administration of the prison authorities” were indeed very few before 1979, but it is
noticeable that they were not mentioned at all.
This official report meant that the parliamentarians in the justice committee
required a white paper765, which was presented by the department of justice in
1984, 10 years after the first committee was constituted.766 The white paper
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discussed the criteria for exemption from military service and how the selective
objectors were treated. But this report devoted no attention to the issue of total
resistance, in spite of the fact that KMV had made this a public issue by then.
The justice committee in the parliament was dominated by representatives from the
Liberal-Christian government coalition parties. Not surprisingly, the committee was
divided when it came to the question of expanding the criteria for being exempted
from military service. The majority was satisfied with the present order and did not
intend to make it possible for more young men to have their reasons for applying
for conscientious objector status accepted.767 After a decade of report writing and
debate the political constellations had changed so much that changes that
appeared obvious in 1974 were no longer acceptable.
However, when the justice committee’s suggestion was presented in parliament, it
was followed by a heated debate that brought up many issues, especially
concerning the selective objectors. Those who wanted a change were repeatedly
accused of eroding the idea of conscription and Norway’s defence will.768
Nevertheless, the debate in parliament revealed that there was still a strong
opposition to the present law and that the Christian party was about to change its
position. From the debate it is quite obvious that those politicians in favour of a
change were especially concerned about the criticism from Amnesty International.
One parliamentarian even considered it “shameful” for Norway. 769 Another
parliamentarian mentioned that he expected the protests from young men who
were denied the status of conscientious objector to increase in “numbers and
intensity”.770 Although the white paper did not discuss the total resisters, their
existence was also mentioned in the debate by parliamentarians who wanted to
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remove the possibility to serve the substitute service in prison.771 Since this praxis
was not mentioned in the document itself, the only explanation for the references to
total resistance are the total resisters’ own efforts to place their treatment on the
agenda.
When Jensen recalled the events from this time, it was obvious that the question of
selective objection were a much more challenging issue for the department of
justice than the total resisters. He repeatedly referred to the total resisters as a
minor issue that the department had to “manage”, and compared the sensitivity of
the issue to the selective objectors like this:
When it came to how infected the question was, the issue of
selective objection was an extremely sensitive political question, in
comparison to the management of the total resisters (…). [The
total resisters] were more or less a footnote in comparison.772
The law changes that were passed in 1990 concerned both §1 which regulated
who could be considered a conscientious objector and thus mainly affected the
selective objectors, and §§19 and 20, which concerned the treatment of the total
resisters. Below I will discuss these two processes separately.

Changing §1
Regarding §1, parliamentarians from the socialist party were for several years a
driving force for expanding the right to conscientious objection. They wanted many
of those who were considered selective objectors and convicted to prison
sentences to be recognised as conscientious objectors. According to the
representatives of the socialist party, there had for several years been a
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parliamentarian majority in favour of expanding this right, but the government was
on purpose delaying proposals for change.773
Already on August 5 1986, Kjellbjørg Lunde as a member of parliament proposed
that the parliament should order the government to suggest a law change that
would expand the right to conscientious objection. The committee of justice
decided against this774, and instead parliament on November 19 1986 sent the
case to the government for ”investigation and pronouncement”.775 The government
took a long time to investigate this, and on November 2 1988, an upset Kjellbjørg
Lunde took the opportunity during question time in parliament to ask about the
case. When the minister replied that the working group was about to finish its work,
Lunde reminded the parliament that it was two years ago since the case was sent
to the government for “investigation”, and a year since the minister was supposed
to present the findings. “When the minister of justice cannot give a reply a year
after the case was supposed to have been presented, I consider it pure delaying
tactics.”776
The debates about a changed legislation revealed that this was a highly sensitive
issue that many were concerned about. The discussion was not just about the
conscience of the limited number of young men who applied to become
conscientious objectors, but about the risk of weakening the military defence. The
changes that were finally passed in 1990 made it possible for some of the selective
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resisters to become conscientious objectors. Those who refused to serve because
of Norway’s membership in NATO would not experience any changes, but those
who referred to the existence of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass
destruction could now become conscientious objectors.

Changing §§19 and 20
Total resisters serving their substitute service in an institution under the prison
administration were regulated by §§19 and 20. Regarding these changes the
process was different, and the parliamentarians much less involved. The initiative
to change these paragraphs came from the department of justice, and was first
mentioned in a proposition to the parliament that suggested a new bill, ot. prp. nr
39, in February 1989. Because of various delays, the proposal was not discussed
by the parliament’s justice committee until June 1990777 and finally passed later the
same month.778
The suggested change regarding §§19 and 20 was one suggestion among several
others regarding changes to the law on conscientious objection.779 In the
proposition to the parliament called ot. prp. 35 it appeared as if the debate that
KMV had initiated about their treatment being unconstitutional and a violation of

777

Justiskomiteen, "Innst O. Nr. 75. Innstilling Fra Justiskomiteen Om Lov Om Endringer I Lov 19
Mars 1965 Nr 3 Om Fritaking for Militærtjeneste Av Overbevisningsgrunner Og Militær Straffelov 22
Mai 1902 Nr 13," (June 8 1990).
778
Forhandlinger, "Forhandlinger I Odelstinget Nr. 28. Sak Nr. 7.Innstilling Fra Justiskomiteen Om
Lov Om Endringer I Lov Av 19. Mars 1965 Nr 3 Om Fritaking for Militærtjeneste Av
Overbevisningsgrunner Og Militær Straffelov Av 22. Mai 1902 Nr 13. (Innst O. Nr. 75, Jf Ot.Prp. Nr
35)," (June 11 1990). There were several reasons for the delay. There was not enough time to
consider the proposed changes in the 1988-89 parliamentarian session. An identical proposal was
presented again in September 1989 as ot. prp. nr 10 for the 1989-90 session. Again the paper was
not discussed, this time because there was a change in the government (for reasons that had
nothing to do with the total resisters). In March 1990 the proposal was included in ot. prp. 35. Justisog politidepartementet [Department of Justice and Police], "Ot Prp Nr 35 (1989-1990) Om Lov Om
Endringer I Lov 19 Mars 1965 Nr 3 Om Fritaking for Militærtjeneste Av Overbevisningsgrunner Og
Militær Straffelov 22 Mai 1902 Nr 13," ed. Justis- og politidepartementet [Department of Justice and
Police] (March 2 1990). The department of justice described the situation of the total resisters the
same way in all these three proposals.
779
Justis- og politidepartementet [Department of Justice and Police], "Ot Prp Nr 35 (1989-1990) Om
Lov Om Endringer I Lov 19 Mars 1965 Nr 3 Om Fritaking for Militærtjeneste Av
Overbevisningsgrunner Og Militær Straffelov 22 Mai 1902 Nr 13."

428

their human rights was the main reason why the department suggested these
changes. The department referred to this criticism and Johansens’s case in
Strasbourg, but concluded that since KMV activists lost both in Strasbourg and the
case against the Norwegian state, the parliament was not obliged to change the
law.780 The suggested law change was introduced in a peculiar way:
Even if it must be assumed that the arrangement [with serving
substitute service in prison] is not contrary to International law or
the Constitution, it is a question whether the present arrangement
is appropriate.781
The word “appropriate”782 is a bit peculiar because it does not really say anything.
Did it mean that the lawyers at the department of justice was aware that they had
the law on their side, but themselves found it odd to keep people in prison for 16
months without calling it a punishment? Or did it mean that they were aware that
KMV were likely to keep making trouble? Or could it be a reference to the solidarity
actions that had been carried out at Norwegian embassies in Denmark and Spain?
Since Jensen did not remember the issue of total resistance and details about the
law change any more, he only commented generally about how the lawyers in the
department of justice thought at this time:
This is how it is when you start to approach a grey zone, even if
you are not crossing the borderline. If there are other solutions
which mean that you stay clear of being near the borderline, then
you rather withdraw and find other solutions.
With this general statement Jensen meant that even if the Norwegian authorities
had the possibility to continue the “prison without punishment” practice, it was
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considered near a grey zone since there was so much controversy about it.
Because another solution was available, the regular trial that KMV demanded,
proposing this change was a withdrawal from the grey zone. One reason Jensen
was certain that the case in Strasbourg played an important role for changing §§19
and 20 is the closeness in time. Although a couple of years passed, he saw this as
the only possible explanation for the change, and law changes always take time.
It is obvious that [the case in Strasbourg] brought the question on
the agenda. So if it was the same type of question, then I think
you can say quite clearly that there is a connection, I don’t think
there is any doubt about that.783
The argument used in the report for abolishing the possibility to serve the
substitute service in prison reflected what KMV had said for years. It did not seem
fair that the selective objectors were convicted to an unconditional prison sentence
of two times 3-4 months in a regular trial, while those who served the substitute
service spent at least twice as long in prison. The department of justice
acknowledged that:
While it can be adduced that compulsory service [in prison] is not
completely comparable with serving a prison sentence, the reality
for those concerned is comparatively modest when disregarding
the economic circumstances. 784
From a judicial perspective it is notable that this suggestion from the department of
justice was passed without much comment or discussion. The legislative work
preceding the conscientious objection law of 1965, Ot prp 42, explicitly said that
“punishment ought not to be used as a reaction towards conscripts who refuse
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substitute service on principled reasons.”785 That is, no person refusing substitute
service because of his conviction should be punished. In light of the fact that
previous lawmakers explicitly had declared that total resistance should not be
punished, it was quite drastic to turn it into a crime in 1990. The lack of debate is a
clear indication that most people probably had considered the 16 months in prison
a punishment in spite of the official terminology. There did not seem to be any
reason to discuss the principles when the result of the change was a considerably
shorter time in prison.
Jensen explained that the law did not operate in a vacuum, but followed trends and
developments in society. So although he agreed that it was a big principle change
to go from no punishment to convicting people to time in prison, “legislation adapts
to the situations and questions that appear”786. I asked Jensen if it was unusual
that a law change was suggested by the department of justice, but he said that:
It was not an exceptional way of doing it. In cases when problems
and questions press their way forward without any commissions
having written a word about it, it is done this way. So I wouldn’t
say it was extraordinary. It is when things start to get
troublesome for the government and they see that here there
might be reason to make a change that they present a report and
this is probably what happened here.787
A united justice committee supported the suggestion from the department of justice
regarding the changes to §§19 and 20 with the remark that the practice of serving
substitute service in prison was “unfortunate on principle” and continued “Even if
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forced service in prison is not imprisonment, the difference in reality is small for the
person concerned.”788
There was only a very short debate in parliament preceding the decision to change
the law. However, although no parliamentarians were involved in suggesting the
changes, two of them referred to the end of the practice with substitute service in
prison as the most important part of the revision.789

Analysis: The role of humour within a campaign
From silence to spectacle
Traditionally conscientious objection to military service is considered an individual
moral choice that each conscript has to make on his or her own. However, just as
laws do not operate in a vacuum but reflect changes in society, so do individuals’
conscience develop influenced by inspiration and debate from their surroundings.
The Norwegian state was uncomfortable with the whole issue of imprisonment of
conscientious objectors, something which is obvious from the interview with
Jensen, the official reports and white papers, and the debates in parliament. For a
country like Norway that claimed to be a defender of human rights, it was
problematic to be accused of violating the rights of the conscientious objectors.
That authorities preferred to keep the issue quiet can be illustrated by an anecdote
that Norenius told. Although this happened in Sweden it is still an illustration of the
preference for silence. Many years after his imprisonment for refusing a repetition
exercise Norenius received a new call up order. This time it was not for the regular
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armed forces, but for what is called civil defence, a part of the Swedish total
defence strategy. Norenius wrote to them that he was going to refuse the exercise
and reminded them of a case back in the 1950’s where a Swedish woman called
Barbro Alving had refused to participate in civil defence. The case was famous
since she was a well esteemed writer and journalist known by her pen name Bang
and served a one month prison sentence for her refusal.790 Norenius wrote that “if
you really want to, I’m prepared to take this fight, but otherwise you can have your
call up order back”.791 After that he has never heard from the military authorities
again, and his interpretation is that they prefer to keep it as quiet as possible
around the total resisters.
Until the beginning of the 1980’s total resistance was almost non-existent in
Norway, and to the Norwegian state this was desirable. The state’s representatives
preferred to deal with the young men on an individual basis and when necessary
send them to prison without any publicity. KMV was a very small political group, but
managed to move the issue of total resistance from the arena of personal,
individual choices to a collective challenge, making “noise” on the way as Jensen
called it. In less than a decade total resistance was on the agenda as never before.
Their situation was discussed in parliament, debated in major newspapers and
parliamentarians questioned by journalists about their opinion on the issue. Court
hearings were turned into a theatre stage and the Norwegian state had to defend
its practice in front of the European Commission of Human Rights, an issue it took
so seriously that no total resisters were imprisoned while the case was pending.
Total resistance went from being a possibility that most young men had probably
never even considered, to a viable option chosen by more than 100. Although this
is a very small number compared to all those who went into military service and the
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substitute service during the same period, it is still a dramatic increase when the
choice involved such far reaching consequences.
Each individual total resister was probably aware that the more their numbers
increased, the greater the chance that they together would provide enough
pressure to change the legislation. Most of the Norwegian total resisters involved in
KMV never went to prison for total resistance, including both Johansen and
Solberg. Nevertheless, there were no guarantees, especially not for the first ones.
All they knew was that 16 months in prison was a real possibility and that only
hunger strikes had made it possible for other conscientious objectors in prison to
get out.
Johansen felt that he had no choice: cooperating with the military system by
performing the substitute service was never an option for him.792 Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to assume that most people would consider this a difficult choice, and a
considerable number most likely had second thoughts. To most potential total
resisters, no matter how politically important they considered their refusal to
cooperate with the military system, it would have been fairly easy to justify both to
themselves and to others the less dramatic choice of complying with the substitute
service.793
One challenge with making conscientious objection into a collective issue was that
refusing conscription was (and still is) framed as an individual moral choice rather
than a social phenomenon. This was reflected by KMV’s ambivalent attitude
towards the legal system. On one hand, many KMV participants tried to cooperate
as little with the courts as possible, seeing them as the extended arm of the military
system. On the other hand, the §20 court hearings were one of the best
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opportunities to generate publicity about the fate of the total resisters. KMV
participants frequently used their court hearings for all they were worth, for
instance when Johansen impersonated the prosecutor during Solberg’s hearing,
when Eraker burned his conscription book in court or when Nilsen made a funeral
procession and tried to bury §20. In spite of the ambivalence, KMV participants
also tried to give the state some of its own medicine when they raised cases
against the Swedish and Norwegian states for violating their human rights.
The total resisters did have a very good case in Norway, which made it more likely
that they would succeed. No matter what one thinks about conscription, it violates
logic to send someone to prison and not call it a punishment. In all other European
countries with conscription and the right to conscientious objection, total resistance
was considered a crime and the total resisters convicted in an ordinary trial. It was
also obvious that the time - 16 months - was out of proportion both with sentences
for ordinary crimes and selective objection in Norway as well as the punishment for
total resistance in Sweden.
The result of the campaign is an indication that the principled total resisters had a
much better case than the selective objectors. The cases of the principled total
resisters and the selective objectors appeared to have equal weight in the actions
that KMV and S.I.N carried out. Nevertheless, the new law that went into force in
1991 changed the conditions for the principled total resisters dramatically, while the
circumstances for the selective objectors changed only slightly. It turned out to be
easier to gather a parliamentary majority for the total resisters than for the selective
objectors. This happened in spite of the fact that both Amnesty International and
the parliamentarians from the socialist party were much more concerned with the
selective objectors than the total resisters. Although it carried some weight in the
debate that Norway was on Amnesty’s list of countries violating human rights, this
argument was not heavy enough when the debate turned to the risk of Norway
losing its “defence will”.
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In the end, the department of justice had no problem convincing a united
parliament that the contradiction “prison is not punishment” was not “appropriate”.
A reason for the success on the issue of total resistance was probably also that the
resisters now actually would be punished, something that can be framed as a more
“conservative” line. On the contrary, the change regarding the selective objectors
suggested by the socialist party could only result in fewer punishments and more
conscientious objectors.
Johansen is convinced that when they started the campaign, most people did not
have a clue that total resistance was even a possibility, and most of the politicians,
bureaucrats and judges did not fully understand what legislation Norway had and
what they contributed to enforce. Johansen thinks that the facts only started to
dawn on the elite after several years of spectacular actions, lobbying and the
hearing in Strasbourg. He considered it “an erroneous law that very few people
understood and no one could [actually] defend.” Johansen is certain that the
Strasbourg case was an eye-opener, and that the civil servants who had
participated went home knowing that they had to change the legislation. This view
is supported by the fact that the initiative to change the law came from the
department of justice itself and by the quotes from Jensen above.
KMV’s success in Norway is quite impressive when taking into account the limited
resources that were available to the network. As late as March 1985, when the
NOU about conscription was discussed in parliament, only a few politicians
mentioned the total resisters during the parliamentary debate.794 When KMV met
with them in advance, no one was prepared to propose a law change.795 Just 4
years later the department of justice proposed a change which was accepted
unanimously by parliament.
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Most parliamentarians have probably forgotten about KMV long ago – even Jensen
who was working on issues of conscientious objection regularly only had vague
memories about this group of total resisters. Should they remember, the politicians
would probably hesitate to admit that KMV was decisive for their change of mind.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see any other factors than the total resisters’ own
effort, creativity and persistence. Johansen said “there is no other explanation than
our actions”796, and Jensen was certain that the case in Strasbourg played a
decisive role.
Looking at the timing of the change it is even possible to assume that two factors
were more important than others. Early in 1985 the Strasbourg case had not yet
received much attention in Norway; this only happened later that year. It therefore
seems reasonable to give that case much credit for the sudden change in attitude.
Secondly there are the numbers: At the end of 1984, 25 men had had their §20
hearing and were waiting to go to prison.797 In December 1985 this number had
increased to more than 40, and KMV wrote in its newsletter that the campaign was
in contact with 96 total resisters.798 The department of justice did not know about
all these because they had not yet had their §20 hearings, but the 40 existed in the
system. It is not clear if the department of justice was aware of the increase. Since
Jensen’s memories of the whole issue of total resistance were so vague, he did not
remember anything about the numbers. The department of justice did not keep a
record of the number of total resisters, since they were considered to be serving
their substitute service just like the other conscientious objectors. Neither was the
increase mentioned in ot. prp. 35. On the other hand it seems unlikely that such a
dramatic increase in numbers should go unnoticed and not be part of the reason
the department of justice suggested abolishing the arrangement with serving
substitute service in prison.
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If the court cases against the Norwegian state and the numbers of total resisters
played such an important role, did it mean that the spectacular actions had been
superfluous, and that Johansen’s case in Strasbourg alone could have changed
the law? That we will never know, but that seems unlikely too. The two strategies
of creating a spectacle and using the courts went hand in hand, and it is
reasonable to assume that the numbers grew because of all the attention that the
total resisters received for all of their actions, spectacular as well as “sober”.
Further research such as interviews with a number of the total resisters who joined
KMV during these years might clarify how they heard about KMV and what
convinced them to become total resisters themselves. However, it is just as reliable
to draw from findings from the case study with Ofog and my previous research on
Otpor. That a creative and spectacular style of protest, including humour, is likely
to attract more people became clear when the themes of outreach, mobilisation
and a culture of resistance were discussed in Chapter 4 and 5.799

The role of the humorous political stunts
The humorous political stunts that KMV activists performed were a vital part of their
strategy. The stunts were an unpredictable obstruction of the state’s intention of
carrying out the court procedures in an orderly fashion, and they were a way to get
attention. The stunts were part of the discursive guerrilla war about what is true
and just concerning total resistance.
KMV used two types of humorous political stunts which in two distinct ways
positioned KMV as a critic of Norwegian authorities’ discourse about total resisters.
In both of these stunts, it was the dominant discourse of military service as the
norm which was under attack as well as the option of accepting the substitute
service as a valid alternative. To KMV the substitute service was something the
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representatives of the dominant discourse had adopted as a way to appear more
tolerant and inclusive while still upholding the military service as the norm.
The prosecutor impersonation was a supportive humorous political stunt, and
included all the characteristics of this type of stunt described in chapter 3. Instead
of a conventional and rational protest, it was framed as a support and
encouragement to the Norwegian authorities’ position on total resistance.
Johansen made the court into a parody when he appeared overenthusiastic in his
role and suggested that Solberg should be sentenced three times as long as the
law demanded. It was an invasion of the authorities’ own stage, right in front of
their eyes. Although it is not an important stage for national politics like the
parliament, it was an absolutely crucial stage for legitimising the treatment of the
principled total resisters and dressing their imprisonment in a legal frame. It is
difficult to imagine a more appropriate scene to invade when the intention was to
disrupt the Norwegian state’s routines regarding the total resisters.
At this point in time, KMV was not a well-known group. They did not have any
celebrities to promote their cases, they were rather few and had very limited
resources. In this particular case, Johansen’s performance and improvisations
skills turned out to be so convincing that the usual actors on the stage did not even
realise that their usual performance had been turned into a play of politics. To the
larger audience, the Norwegian public, the stunt served to expose the reality of the
total resisters’ cases. Each person who heard or read about this stunt made his or
her individual interpretation of its meaning, but in the newspaper coverage the
stunt was presented according to the taste of KMV. They framed it as astonishing
that a fake prosecutor could demand an imprisonment so much longer than what
the law prescribed without anybody noticing. To the authorities it must have been
rather discomforting to have their practice on an issue they preferred to keep out of
the public eye exposed this way. According to Johansen and Solberg, the case is
unique in the history of Norwegian judicial practice. According to their friends and
colleagues, it is still something that lawyers and judges talk about, and a friend of
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Johansen who is an attorney has called this “the most hilarious thing I have heard
in many, many years”.800
The jail-ins were provocative humorous political stunts. In this type of stunt there is
no attempt to disguise behind irony and double meanings that this is a protest as in
the other types of humorous political stunts. The humour derived from playful twists
to the provocation, in this case by someone unexpectedly making their way into the
prison instead of the conventional goal of escaping. Just as in the prosecutor case,
KMV invaded a stage which was central for their struggle, the prison walls. Again
this was not a major national scene, but just as the court room it was loaded with
symbolism. If the usual actors in the court room – the judges, prosecutor and their
assistants – were unprepared for a fake prosecutor, the prison authorities were
probably even more unaccustomed to citizens clamouring to get in. Afterwards, a
dilemma arose for the prison authorities and prosecutor: Charge the intruders with
trespassing or pretend that nothing happened? According to Johansen the case
was “dismissed for lack of evidence” in spite of a written confession, the same
thing which happened in the prosecutor case. KMV interpreted this to mean that
the authorities did not want any further publicity about the incident. When it came
to the audience of the Norwegian population, again KMV managed to reach them
through mass media. Once they had access to the media, the stunt spoke for itself.
However, it was a type of stunt which depended on surprise, and could only work
this way a limited number of times – after a while, it would not be newsworthy any
more.
The central aspect in both the jail-ins and the prosecutor case was how KMV
positioned itself in relation to the dominant discourses of crime and punishment.
The fake prosecutor did not argue against sending Solberg to prison, but instead
was very supportive of the legal practice and demanded that the total resister
receive a longer sentence. In the jail-ins there was no disguise, but an open
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provocation when they demanded that either the prisoner of conscience be set
free, or they should all be imprisoned with him. In the case of the prosecutor, it was
an attempt to expose the absurdity in sending someone to prison without calling it
punishment. The jail-in served to expose and ridicule the practice of sending
conscientious objectors to prison.
Reflecting on what they did at the time, Johansen said that
It was not always a clear political message that we sent out, it
was about showing them the finger, doing things that were totally
unexpected. After a while we wanted to get attention from the
media, we were so annoyed with not being heard. [Usually] we
only got small letters to the editor in the newspapers, and then we
soon realised that spectacular actions made it easier to get
through to the media.”801
Johansen’s reference to “show them the finger” indicates that the provocation was
important to KMV. He elaborated on the statement that it was not a clear political
message by explaining that the actions themselves did not show why they did
them. Although they brought banners for the jail-ins, someone who just heard
about someone jumping into the prison would not understand the connection to
conscientious objection without an explanation.802 Likewise, a story about a fake
prosecutor tells that the court system can be fooled but the listener needs much
more information in order to understand the context of total resistance. Johansen
might have a point here, but the scenes that KMV’s chose to invade were central in
their struggle and what they wanted to change about their situation. In the
prosecutor case they snuck in behind the backs of the authorities, in the jail-in they
openly captured the prison walls. In both cases the boldness and devil-may-care
attitude of it causes admiring smiles and the absurdity invited people to ask
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themselves, “why would anyone voluntarily climb into the prison? How come that
no one notices a fake prosecutor?” In the jail-in case the amusement increased for
passers-by who could wonder “what should be the punishment for this provocation
– prison as the activists had demanded?”
These humorous political stunts were an integrated part of KMV’s strategy, but
they were only part of it and their contribution to the success cannot be understood
in isolation from the other strategies. The spectacles around the imprisoned
conscientious objectors were not just created with humour, but with actions
involving non-humorous conscription book burnings, hunger strikes and a funeral
for §20. In the previous chapter I indicated how the distinction between humorous
actions and other types of creative activism can be seen as artificial and does not
reflect the lived experience of many activists. When it comes to KMV this is evident
from the fact that the humorous political stunts they performed can best be
analysed as part of a strategy that aimed to create a spectacle, humorous as well
as non-humorous.

KMV and the courts
KMV had an ambivalent attitude towards the judicial system. On the one hand, the
legal system was used to convict the selective objectors to prison and send the
total resisters to serve their substitute service “in an institution under the
administration of the prison authorities”. As anarchists, most of the participants in
KMV had a very negative attitude towards the state and therefore also its legal
system. Johansen expressed this explicitly when he doubted that he had a chance
with the commission in Strasbourg. On the other hand, KMV activists did what they
could to use the legal system to their advantage, by suing the Norwegian state.
Little has been written about how social movements interact with the legal system.
Gustafsson and Vinthagen make an international review in their article “Rättens
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rörelser och rörelsernas rätt”803 and provide a framework for investigating KMV’s
interactions with the legal system. Gustafsson and Vinthagen’s aim is to move the
discussion about social movements’ experiences with the law away from
dichotomous understandings. In earlier writings about the subject there has been a
tendency to see the law either as the extended arm of the state that movements
cannot influence (legal pessimism) or an overly optimistic view about the legal
system’s contribution to social change (legal optimism).804
Thomas Mathiesen suggest a third approach in his book “Retten i samfunnet”805
He calls this a critical approach in between the two extremes that “leads to a very
careful and thoughtful use of legal strategies”.806 Mathiesen focuses on what
lawyers can do to promote the interests of “weak” groups; his critical approach
does not include what activists without formal law qualifications can do. He
proposes five different legal strategies, but emphasises that the list is not
exhaustive. The most obvious is to bring concrete cases to court, but Mathiesen
warns about the risk of the whole question the weak party wants to raise becoming
legalised. By this he means that the judicial process and its rules count more than
the issue itself. Probably the biggest problem with legalisation is the risk that if one
loses in court, the case is closed in public. There is no doubt that Mathiesen raises
an important point, but this was not so relevant for KMV. Even though Johansen,
Bremnes and Nilsen lost their cases, KMV was prepared to continue its campaign
with different actions. This might be because of most KMV participants’ anarchistic
worldview. Although Solberg had some expectation that they could win legally,
most activists presumably expected the Norwegian state to win. So although it
might have looked as if the case was now closed, KMV all the time had new plans,
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and the department of justice started to work for a law change in spite of the legal
victories.
Most people in KMV viewed Johansen, Bremnes and Nilsen’s cases in a way that
resembles Mathiesen’s next legal strategy, that lawyers use the court as an arena.
The court becomes a political platform without letting the judicial form and the
prospects of winning or losing dominate. Mathiesen refers to Jaques Vergés’
notion breaking process807 where the parties do not have the same values and do
not agree on the rules. When it comes to KMV, many of the §20 hearings were
such a use of arena/breaking process where the court was used as a platform to
express disapproval and lack of respect for the court, for instance by burning the
conscription book and symbolically bury §20.
Mathiesen’s last three legal strategies concern lawyers working systematically with
cases, work in movements or the practice of jurisprudential work. That Solberg was
a lawyer by profession gave the campaign an opportunity to navigate the judicial
system without making some of the obvious blunders that organisations without
such knowledge might have made. It is probably also a contributing aspect to the
fact that KMV never let the issue of total resistance become legalised in spite of the
amount of time spent on legal cases.
Similarity to Mathiesen, Gustafsson and Vinthagen also present a model between
the legal optimistic and legal pessimistic. But where Mathiesen is concerned with
the role of lawyers in the legal strategies, Gustafsson and Vinthagen are interested
in the relation between the law and social movements in a broader sense that also
includes how organisations and citizens can use the law to their advantage. They
suggest five strategies that social movements have at their disposal in their
attempts to influence the law. 1. Social movements can “compensate for
implementation of existing laws”. 2. They can try to reform the law on the system’s
terms. 3. They can “challenge existing law” by breaking the law. Even more far
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reaching is 4. To create new law and 5. To “undermine existing law by resisting
and subverting the power-relations that uphold the law”.808
The case study of KMV shows how the group used two or three out of these five
categories in its work in Norway. The number depends on how one understands
Gustafsson and Vinthagen’s fifth category of undermining the law.
First of all KMV tried to use the method of reforming the law through its lobbying
activities, vigils outside of the prison and the hunger strikes. These are methods
mentioned by Gusafsson and Vinthagen.809 The two authors do not consider the
possibility of using the court procedures themselves to reform the law, but both
Johansen’s complaint to Strasbourg as well as Bremnes’ and Nilsen’s case against
the Norwegian state are examples of trying to reform the law by using the existing
system to the extent possible. Even if KMV in these cases followed the rules of the
established system, one can also understand their activities around the reform
work as a method for gaining media attention, something they considered
necessary in order to create change. This way the experiences from KMV show
how reform work in court and the struggle for media attention can complement
each other. It is interesting that even if KMV lost according to the system in all
court levels, the law change that they finally won was also on the system’s terms.
Secondly, KMV challenged the law during the court cases and imprisonment of the
selective objectors and the total resisters. The humorous political stunts with the
jail-ins as well as other spectacular actions with burning conscription books,
burying §20 and playing a clown in court all violated existing laws and norms.
Gustafsson and Vinthagen point towards this strategy’s potential to bring attention
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from mass media810, something which also happened after many of these
challenges, in particular the first jail-in.
It is not so easy to place KMV’s action with the fake prosecutor in Gustafsson and
Vinthagen’s typology. It is possible to interpret the fake prosecutor as another
example of challenging the law, but the action can also be understood as an
example of undermining the law. Gustafsson and Vinthagen mention strikes,
boycotts and sabotage as examples of this legal strategy811, and at first glance a
single fake prosecutor does not have the potential to exert the force that they
describe in this category. On the other hand, they characterise the category as
“One attempt to practically prevent and at the same time convince others that the
legal activity must stop for political/ethical reasons”.812 Gustaffson and Vinthagen
do not provide examples of this unusual method where the undermining of the law
actually takes place within the court room itself. Nevertheless it is perfectly possible
to interpret the fake prosecutor as a direct undermining of the law within the court
room. Because of this parody of a prosecutor Solberg could not be considered to
fulfil the conditions in §20 after the deliberations this day: the case had to be heard
again later with a real prosecutor present. The presence of the fake prosecutor
thoroughly sabotaged the court hearing, although only temporarily. The stunt was a
concrete prevention of the smooth functioning of the law and intended to convince
others that the law should be changed, just like Gustaffson and Vinthagen
characterise undermining in their typology.
To sum up the relationship between KMV and the courts, the group was successful
in bringing about a law change, but it was not the court cases against the state that
directly led to this. Rather the legal strategy worked indirectly through the attention
the issue of total resistance generated.
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The role of other factors
KMVs ability to reach mainstream media both with its spectacular actions and the
legal strategy is with all likelihood part of the reason for its success in changing
§§19 and 20. Without this attention there would probably not have been such a
dramatic increase in the number of total resisters, and there would not have been
any “noise” to make the department of justice reflect on the existence of the total
resisters. Over the years, KMV activists and supporters created several front page
stories, numerous news reports in print media, a steady stream of letters to the
editors and the fake prosecutor even hit the 7pm TV news. However, it is important
to notice that the coverage of the jail-in and fake prosecutor stunts were not as
extensive as Johansen imagined. A systematic search of a large number of
Norwegian newspapers revealed that the cases were indeed reported in some
newspapers, but it was far from the “all” that Johansen implied in the interview.813
From the data here, it is not possible to say much about the effects of the two
strategies of solidarity and lobbying. They seem to have played a minor role for
KMV when it came to time and effort, and they do not seem to have had any
impact on changing the law. However, it would have been extremely unusual to
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have a political campaign that did not try to explain its goals through lobbying and
participating in the public debate.
Even if the solidarity did not have a direct effect on the outcome, it can have
contributed to sustaining a culture of resistance in KMV. The emphasis that
Norenius put on the support letter he received from Argentina is an indication of
this. The importance of solidarity work would be an interesting topic for further
research, but since many activists spent time on solidarity activities, it seems
appropriate to draw attention to the fact that solidarity work did not seem to have
much relevance in this case. Even the occupation of the embassy in Denmark that
Norenius described as a successful nonviolent action in terms of dialogue with the
employees at the embassy and maintaining nonviolent discipline did not leave any
traces in the legislative work for the law change. That does not mean that it was
not noticed, but at least it did not make its way into the official documents.
Had the idea with a permanent refugee camp at the Swedish side of the border
been carried out, it would probably have been its spectacularity that could have
contributed to success rather than the solidarity it was a sign of.
Another important factor for KMV’s success was the smooth functioning of the
network. The men who were most active got along well both as activists and as
friends, and managed to create a very supportive an open atmosphere that
encouraged creative actions. Johansen was proud that
Everyone who did something, they got a pat on the shoulder, yes!
[Someone would say] ’I saw you did this, I saw you wrote that
article or organised that meeting.’ We supported each other, it
was a very positive atmosphere, there wasn’t any trouble or
fighting within the group, it was [like a] party!, (…) a constant
party.”814
Solberg agreed with this positive description, and added that “and if anybody
disagreed about something, that was okay.” Johansen continued: “I can’t
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remember any political disagreements within KMV, like there were in other groups I
have been part of. (…) It was just supportive reactions.”815
Although KMV fizzled out in the early 1990’s without reaching the goal of
abolishing conscription, it was probably the success regarding §20 that was the
main reason. Had the Norwegian authorities continued to send total resisters to
prison to serve their substitute service, the resistance would have continued. KMV
was prepared to go further and try new ways. The group even warned the
department of justice that more was to come during a meeting on April 21, 1986. 816
The decision to change the law in Norway was made in June 1990. This timing with
the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the end of the cold war raises the question of
whether this structural factor might have played a role. Although it is a relevant
question, there is nothing in the data to support this connection and it appears to
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KMV, "Rundbrev 17," p.14. One of these new ways was outlined by Solberg in a letter to
Johansen. Although it was never turned into reality, this new strategy which Solberg labelled a
“dilemma action” shows that KMV was certainly not running out of ideas: “If we look at those who
have previously been in prison for forced service [of their substitute service], no one has ever asked
to be released [because he changed his opinion regarding serving the substitute service]. The
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Then the same can be repeated. For this, it is again possible to imagine two possibilities. The
authorities will let the person walk out of prison as often as he wants to. One day in prison, and then
a few days or months in liberty before a new transport to the prison. The disadvantage with this it
that it will take many years to serve all the 16 months. Another disadvantage is the situation of the
prison. People who come and go will lead to unrest and administrative problems. The most likely is
therefore that the authorities after a while will say stop and refuse to release the person even if he
declares that he is willing to perform “normal” substitute service. The disadvantage with this is that
the authorities lose their main argument of claiming that substitute service in prison is not
punishment. Assuming that this argument is decisive for the assessment of punishment versus not
punishment another disadvantage arises: The inmate can by his own way of acting decide if the
detention is punishment or not!” The quote is from a letter from Solberg to Johansen. The letter is
not dated, but it refers to the fact that Bjørn Bremnes has been summoned to prison on May 5, and
that Øyvind will sue the state on Bremnes’ behalf, so it must have been written around March or
April 1986. The letter is in Johansen’s personal archive. No KMV activist ever had to try this
strategy in practice, but it is obvious what a dilemma it would have created for the Norwegian
authorities. It is also documentation that KMV was not running out of creative ideas about how to
challenge the Norwegian authorities.
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be a coincidence. The changes to both §§1, 19 and 20 had been on the way for
years. The department of justice argued in favour of a changes to §§19 and 20
already in February 1989, at a time when Norwegian authorities had no reason to
believe the Berlin wall was about to fall. The wording of the revised bill did not
change during the almost 1½ years that passed before the decision to change the
law was made.817

Dissolving KMV
The victory of the revised law in Norway meant that the air went out of KMV and it
gradually dissolved. It appears that some of the most energetic individuals had
already started to spend their time on other political questions and movements
before the law was passed without new people taking over. Norenius thinks that an
important reason was that many of the most active people became fathers during
these years, and it was demanding to have young children and continue this type
of political activism. Thus, what in social movement literature is called their
biographical availability diminished.818 When the Norwegian state again started to
imprison total resisters as a punishment after a regular trial, the most active people
had moved on to other issues without being replaced. Another reason Norenius
identified was the general tendency of people leaving one movement or
organisation for other challenges. Solberg said that “it just fizzled out”, and
Johansen commented that “no one was sent to prison, there was nothing to make
a fuss about, few court hearings, pause in the imprisonments.”
KMV continued to have some activity during the early 1990’s and a magazine
called Basta was produced at irregular intervals between 1990 and 1994.
According to Solberg, one of the important campaigns during these years was to
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encourage people to opt out of the conscription system, but it never really took off.
When the first of the total resisters convicted according to the new legislation went
to prison in 1994 there was some more activity and new newsletters before it
fizzled out again.819 A web page called KMV still exists but was last updated in
1998.820

The impact of KMV
Ajangiz has argued that in order to understand the changes in the length of military
service and the abolition of conscription in many European countries during the
1990s the role of social forces, including the number of conscientious objectors
cannot be ignored.821 He considers Spain the most obvious example where a
strong movement of total resisters compelled the decision to abolish conscription in
1996 with effect from 2001. Compared to KMV, the Spanish movement was very
strong. Between 1988 and 1999 more than 20,000 people in the state of Spain
spent time in prison in the struggle against conscription.
Apart from the situation in Spain and a Swedish investigation822 there does not
exist any literature in English or the Scandinavian languages about total resistance
and its influence on politics and law.
Although KMV failed in its attempt to abolish conscription altogether, the changes
to §§19 and 20, which meant that the arrangement with substitute service in prison
was abolished, was a major victory for the group. Their decade long struggle had
also had practical consequences for the men who had declared total resistance.
While the legal cases in Strasbourg and against the Norwegian state were
pending, no total resisters were taken to prison. Solberg is proud that up to a
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hundred people who had had their §20 hearings in reality got an amnesty.
Although such an amnesty was never officially declared, they just fell through the
cracks in the system.
Johansen and Solberg also think that KMV had other effects that had not been
goals of theirs, but nevertheless the result. During the years that KMV was active, it
became easier to become a conscientious objector based on a pacifist conviction.
Although there was no change in the law, they noticed that in practice it became
easier to be accepted in the police interrogation. So although KMV did not work on
the rights of the conscientious objectors performing substitute service (they had
their own organisation), Johansen and Solberg believe that KMV influenced their
situation. In Norway there does not exist any study to document this claim, but the
tendency to adjust the treatment of all the conscientious objectors based on the
number of total resisters has been clearly documented in Sweden.823 It is a divide
and rule tactic the state can use to separate the moderate antimilitarists (who
accept the substitute service) from the more radical total resisters.
According to Johansen and Solberg, KMV was also part of a process of
radicalisation of the whole peace movement that happened in the 1980’s in both
Sweden and Norway. A relatively small number of people, including Johansen,
Norenius and Solberg, were driving forces in this process. Creative and confronting
ideas were being reinforced by an encouraging and supportive activist
environment. For instance, FMK’s magazine Ikkevold exposed secret NATO bases
in Norway in 1983. In addition to being secret, the bases were also prepared to
receive nuclear weapons in spite of Norway’s official position of refusing nuclear
arms on its territory in peace time. The editorial committee of Ikkevold was
accused of espionage and the case went all the way to the Supreme Court before
the members of the committee were found not guilty. In Sweden a train that carried
Haubits cannons to be exported to India was stopped in 1987 in a civil
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disobedience action and the whole Swedish arms export industry scrutinised. The
military air facility in Rygge in Norway was temporarily closed down in 1983-84 in
some of Norway’s biggest civil disobedience actions opposing military activity. It
would be an interesting area for further investigation to see if Johansen and
Solberg are right in believing that KMV was important for this radicalization
process.

Conclusion
The purpose of this case study has been to show how KMV’s use of humour
worked as part of a strategy within a larger campaign, and to the extent possible
establish which effect the humour had compared to other factors.
Through the actions that were carried out and those that only remained ideas KMV
demonstrated much creativity as well as a good understanding of what aspects of
the treatment of the total resisters made the Norwegian authorities most
vulnerable. At the time it called itself a campaign, with the terminology of today it
would probably have been called a network. Its way of organising has a striking
similarity with Ofog, except that the transnational character made KMV rather
exceptional for its time.
Both total resistance and selective objection were a response to the system of
conscription, which meant that the Norwegian state was the initiator of this
“engagement”. However, from 1981 it was not just the young men who were forced
to respond to call up orders from the state and make up their mind about their
position – the state also had to respond to numerous initiatives from KMV and
S.I.N. that went way beyond an individual refusal. By 1985 the number of total
resisters in Norway had grown considerably.
The case study identified four different strategies that KMV pursued:
1. Spectacular actions took place primarily in the courts and prisons. They aimed to
expose the court hearings as a farce and draw attention to both total resisters and
selective objectors serving time in prison, no matter if this was labelled punishment
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or substitute service. KMV used two types of humorous political stunts – the
provocative jail-ins and the supportive fake prosecutor. Looking back with the
benefit of hindsight, Johansen was not satisfied with the fact that these two types
of humorous political stunts did not speak for themselves about the issue of total
resistance and conscientious objection. Nevertheless the scenes of prison walls
and court rooms stand out as highly relevant for the changes KMV demanded.
There are many humorous political stunts where one could be much more critical
about why a particular scene was chosen for a certain message.
2. The challenges the state seemed to take most seriously were the use of the
courts against the Norwegian state. Johansen complained to the European
Commission of Human Rights at the Council of Europe that the Norwegian state
was violating the European Convention on Human Rights when he was forced to
serve the substitute service in prison while the state refused to call it a punishment.
The state naturally enough found it necessary to defend itself and spent many
resources on this. Although the informant from the Norwegian state insisted that
being dragged to the court was not an embarrassment as long as the state won, it
still turned out to be a decisive factor for the law change that eventually took place.
The case in Norway where Bremnes and Nilsen filled charges against the state for
violating the constitution was another important case. Although KMV activists lost
both these cases in court, they demonstrated that there was a grey zone which the
state decided to withdraw from, something which was confirmed without doubt from
the same informant. The legal strategy was combined with a media strategy, thus
showing even this type of legal battle’s potential for contributing to the spectacle.
3. Solidarity activities with other total resisters around the world probably meant
much to individuals. It was a welcome support when groups in other countries
carried out actions in solidarity with KMV, for instance at the Norwegian embassies
in Denmark and Spain. However, there is no data to tell if this was something the
Norwegian authorities registered or cared about.
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4. Some individuals within KMV, especially Solberg, wrote many letters to the
editors about total resistance, and this way participated in the public debate. KMV
also had meetings with political parties and tried to lobby for their case, but
compared to how many political groups operate, KMV as a campaign showed
surprisingly little interest in this part of its work.
The four strategies demonstrate how humour can successfully be used as part of a
larger campaign. In the analysis of the case I showed that humour was an effective
way to draw attention to an issue that concerned only very few people. The stunts’
media appeal indicates that KMV were able to reach out to many more people than
those who felt the imprisonment on their own body. The humour was with all
likelihood a contributing factor to the dramatic increase in the number of total
resisters. However, there is no doubt that humorous political stunts did not do this
alone – they were an integrated part of a strategy where the legal cases probably
influenced the Norwegian authorities more directly. In just four years the situation
changed from absolutely no parliamentarian interest in the fate of the total resisters
to a unanimous “yes” for the law change suggested by the civil servants.
KMV and Ofog resemble each other in many ways, especially when it comes to the
radical anti-militarist ideology and the way of organising. However, there are also
some notable differences. Whereas KMV was focusing on the issues of selective
objectors and total resisters in prison, and only that, Ofog is concerned about a
much broader range of issues. One reason KMV could claim such a major victory
after a decade of organising was that it was so committed to this particular issue. It
helped KMV that the Norwegian legislation violated simple logic when it claimed
that prison was not punishment. Nevertheless the issue of total resistance was so
radical and something that concerned so few people that it is difficult to see the law
change as anything else than a major achievement for such a small group.
The interview with Jensen who represented the Norwegian state and the
department of justice in questions regarding conscientious objection provided
much insight about the processes that were taking place on the other side of the
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table. Although the information concerned this particular case it also illustrates
some consequences that might be interesting to many social movements as more
general observations.
First of all the alliance that the total resisters and the selective objectors had
formed made no sense to those on the other side. Where Solberg and Johansen
saw a natural connection because both groups were serving time in prison for their
refusal to cooperate with the military system, Jensen saw two completely different
groups with little in common.
The case also revealed that contact with politicians is not necessarily the key to
changing laws. For the selective objectors, representatives from the socialist party
were important for pushing their case forward. However, the proposal for a revision
of the relevant paragraphs concerning total resistance came from the civil servants
in the department of justice.
KMV grew out of the so-called youth rebellion of the late 1960’s, which did not
really manifest itself in Scandinavia until the 1970’s. The spread of the idea of total
resistance based on combining anarchism and pacifism was part of the political
radicalisation of the late 1970’s. Two of the three key people I interviewed from
KMV had actually performed regular military service, and it was the repetition
exercises that got them involved in total resistance.
Although a major part of KMV’s work regarding the situation in Norway is described
and analysed here this is not the history of KMV. A thorough history would require
more focus on the work done in Sweden and the network-like informal way of
organising which characterised KMV and set it apart from many other
organisations. This said, I hope the case study has provided enough details to give
more than a taste of how KMV organised, strategised and developed ideas.
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Chapter 7: Humorous political stunts and relations of
power
Introduction
The first three chapters presented the relevant literature on political humour,
nonviolence and power, the methodological considerations behind the thesis and
the definition and model of humorous political stunts. Chapters 4-6 analysed the
data from the two case studies about Ofog and KMV. This chapter discusses the
potential and limitations of the humorous political stunt’s engagement with relations
of power. I will return to findings presented earlier and discuss them in relation to
each other.
In Chapter 1 I discussed different understandings and definitions of power and
resistance and the implications for research on humour. I quoted some humour
scholars that persistently claim that humour cannot change political circumstances
and is merely a vent for frustration. A similar discussion has been taking place
within performance studies about the efficacy of the carnivalesque in protest. Such
ideas reflect an old-fashioned realpolitik perspective on power and seem to miss
the point that most humorous political stunts are aiming to make.
Below I problematise the arguments from both humour studies and performance
studies in relation to my findings and a perspective on power and resistance which
takes Foucault, Scott and Bayat into consideration. After a brief discussion of the
problems with how to measure impact, I look at humorous political stunts’ potential
impact on facilitating outreach and mobilisation, a culture of resistance and
challenging relations of power from this perspective. Afterwards the chapter revisits
the model of five types of humorous political stunts and the theatre metaphor,
before proceeding to Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action and its four
dimensions – dialogue facilitation, power breaking, utopian enactment and
normative regulation. Here I investigate how different types of humorous political
stunts strengthen or weaken the various elements. It appears that humorous
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political stunts work especially on the power breaking dimension, under some
circumstances can contribute to dialogue facilitation, and that some types of stunts
are good examples of temporary utopian enactments.

How to evaluate the impact of humorous political stunts?
Social relations are complex, and all social science struggles with the question of
how to “prove” causal relationships. Knowing that there will seldom be a conclusive
answer, approaching the subject requires clarity about what one considers an
effect under particular circumstances, and how much effect is required in order to
have achieved change.
Humorous political stunts are one type of method that activists can use, alongside
many options for rational communication. In most cases, the same people who
carry out humorous political stunts also engage in non-humorous, rational activism
as the work of for instance Ofog, KMV, Otpor and Netwerk Vlaanderen show. A
few groups or individuals have specialised in humorous political stunts, like the Yes
Men and Mark Thomas, but nevertheless they are still part of larger movements
fighting for similar goals about social justice.
Day in her writing about ironic activism points out that the activists are aware that
the stunts in themselves will not be able to convert committed conservatives. 824
However, groups that perform humorous political stunts are parts of larger trends
that may or may not be considered successful social movements a hundred years
from now. Over time, some social movements without doubt shape society and
contribute to change regarding small and big issues.
To date most experiments with humorous political stunts have been rather small
scale. The week long Santa action is one of the most extensive examples when it
comes to the number of participants and time. But the culmination in the shopping
centres did not involve more than 50 people during one afternoon. What would
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have happened if the humorous political stunts had been carried out on a larger
scale? How would it affect those in powerful positions if they had involved ten times
as many people, and occurred ten times as frequently? The answers to these
questions of course involve speculation or counter-factual history writing, but
asking the questions assumes that the potential of humour might only just have
been touched.
Imagine an army of Santas handing out presents in every single shop in
Copenhagen before Christmas, not just two places. Imagine Reality AB actually
bringing hundreds or even thousands of victims of “collateral damage” to a NATO
exercise: how would Swedish authorities have reacted then? Imagine Ofog’s ad
corrections being present on every ad, not just a few. And not just on one
occasion, but every single time the military advertises in order to recruit new
soldiers.
Some pranksters aim to change particular circumstances, and if the goal is limited,
it is possible to see if they succeed or not. At one level KMV had a very bold goal,
to abolish conscription, but the group also had a much more limited objective, to
change the law that gave many of its members 16 months in prison. Although they
did not succeed in ending conscription, they were very successful in changing the
law and reducing their time in prison considerably.
Ofog is a group operating with a much more diffuse goal, a peaceful world. Those
who are active do not expect to win this battle in their lifetime, but at least they can
look themselves in the mirror and say that they tried. The institutions that a group
like Ofog is up against have almost unlimited resources. The Swedish armed
forces control an annual budget of 40 billion Swedish crowns, spend 1 billion of this
on advertising, and are one of the biggest employers in Sweden.825 Ofog is a
network of volunteers. Of course a few humorous political stunts will not dismantle
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Swedish militarism, but neither will a similar level of action using rational
arguments and non-humorous political activism.
Although the potential of humour should not be dismissed because no immediate
result can be documented in terms of law or policy changes, one should be careful
not to fall in the trap of viewing everything that activists do as a success. Even if
activists themselves consider a certain activity important and meaningful, it might
look different through the eyes of an observer. Of course activists need to justify to
themselves why they do what they do, and it is extremely painful to reach the
conclusion that “what we did was badly planned, carried out half-heartedly and did
not have any impact”. The case study of Ofog showed how the Ofog activists did
not evaluate their actions in relation to the goal of dismantling militarism. Probably
because “militarism” is so diffuse, it is difficult to know when one has had any
influence. Instead Ofog activists focused on the relations immediately observable,
such as reactions from police and civilian passers-by. Likewise it can be difficult for
a researcher supportive of a certain struggle to conclude that actions taken by
friends did not seem to reach their goals at all.
Schriver and Nudd have suggested looking at performative protests as a
continuum rather than as a dichotomous success/failure.826 They base this idea on
a Foucaudian power analysis which recognises that even when what one opposes
looks like a monolithic force it still has multiple sources.827 Their continuum is a
major step forward from perceiving success/failure as either/or, but it is still far from
catching the complexities of humorous political stunts and their effects on various
audiences. To mention just one example, it is perfectly possible to be successful
when it comes to mobilising new activists, but an utter failure in changing a policy.
However, a more nuanced view of success and failure should not neglect the fact
that many political activists have much to learn when it comes to evaluating their
own actions. Seldom is it made explicit what the criteria for success are, and there
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is a strong tendency to view one’s own actions in a positive light. This might be
natural in order to make one’s own actions meaningful, but such an approach is not
necessarily effective in bringing about change.
In Chapter 4, several activists emphasised the positive relations clowns could
develop with the police. However, although such good relationships can be one
aspect of a successful nonviolent action, it would be strange if good relations
became the main goal. The risk of being side tracked from the activists’ core issues
of militarism, neo-liberalism and social justice is a general problem and not
something peculiar to humorous activism. A non-humorous example from Chapter
6 about KMV can illustrate this. The occupation of the Norwegian embassy in
Denmark in support of the total resisters was described by one of the participants
as a very successful nonviolent action. However, what he implicitly treated as
criteria for success were the friendly atmosphere, the maintenance of nonviolent
discipline and the action going according to plan. These are all meaningful aspects
of nonviolent actions, but to me one very important success criterion ought to be
the impact on Norwegian authorities, something which was not mentioned. The
same problem was apparent in several of Ofog’s actions. When clowning, success
was measured in the relationship with the police – not the influence on the arms
producer Bofors or those responsible for running the Vidsel Test Range.

Impact on outreach and mobilisation
One way to evaluate the impact of humorous political stunts is to investigate
whether they influence outreach and mobilisation, a culture of resistance or
relations of power. When it comes to outreach, it is obvious that humorous political
stunts can sometimes open the door to mainstream mass media for small activist
groups. A quote from a US prankster sums up this aspect of the relationship
between the media and humorous political stunts:
The media can never deny coverage to a good spectacle. No
matter how ridiculous, absurd, insane or illogical something is, if it
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achieves a certain identity as a spectacle, the media has to deal
with it. They have no choice.828
Although this process might not always be as automatic as it is assumed by this
prankster and it is not unheard of that media remain silent about major spectacles,
some of the people who perform humorous political stunts are tremendously
successful in generating media attention for their stunts. I have not compared the
media coverage of conventional protest systematically with humorous protest, but
most activists who have tried to gain access to the media will agree that the
coverage Solvognen and KMV obtained for the army of Santas, the jail-ins and the
fake prosecutor were out of proportion to the coverage given to conventional
demonstrations or public awareness raising meetings. Netwerk Vlaanderen’s ACE
bank that invested in oil, weapons and child labour, the dropping of the teddy bears
over Belarus, and Voina’s giant penis on the bridge in St. Petersburg are other
examples of humorous political stunts covered internationally by mainstream
media. Likewise with the Chaser’s APEC stunt where they entered the security
area with an entry pass with the word “joke” across it.
Although Ofog activists had the impression that civil disobedience actions might
generate more coverage than humorous actions, at least one person experienced
that the quality of the reports was much better when they used humour. However,
a humorous political stunt is not in itself enough to gain media attention, and it
remains a challenge to obtain coverage that communicates the message and not
just the method. When the Yes Men’s corrective stunt about compensation to the
victims of the Bhopal catastrophe from Dow Chemicals appeared on the BBC, it
was due to a mistake by the BBC. Although the Yes Men are very skilful it seems
unlikely a group can rely on such luck when planning, and the BBC invitation was a
scenario the Yes Men had not counted on.
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In previous chapters I distinguished between humorous political stunts’ ability to
facilitate outreach and mobilisation. Facilitating mobilisation requires outreach to a
certain part of the population that one expects to be sympathetic to the cause and
willing to join the carnival themselves. Existing literature points towards humour’s
potential for facilitating mobilisation. The case study of Ofog confirmed this
potential and regarding KMV humour probably played a role in increasing the
number of total resisters.

Impact on cultures of resistance
When I started this research project my main interest was the pranksters’
interaction with the opponent, but along the way it became more and more difficult
to maintain this distinction between the impact on those outside the movement and
those inside since they influence each other. The case study on Ofog explored this
internal-external dynamic where humour might happen in public, but mainly be for
the benefit of the activists themselves.
It might appear to outsiders as if social movement organisers are “wasting their
time” when they frequently preach to the converted through humorous political
stunts. However, things that appear meaningless to the outsider might contribute
significantly to higher morale and energy within the movement, which in turn have
the potential to lead to more energy to spend on other types of activism. This
aspect of social movement organising I have referred to as building and sustaining
cultures of resistance.
In an article called "Anger, Irony, and Protest: Confronting the Issue of Efficacy,
Again" Chvasta positions activist academic Benjamin Shepard, who has used
much creative protest in gay and anti-war activism, against political scientist Robert
Weissberg. According to Chvasta, Shepard thinks that the carnivalesque does not
work anymore, and Weissberg thinks that it has never worked and is actually
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counterproductive. Chvasta herself thinks that the carnivalesque has to be
combined with lobbying.829
According to Chvasta, Weissberg thinks that only institutionalised efforts of
lobbying can bring about change. The carnivalesque is ineffective and potentially
harmful because it takes too much focus and energy. However, what Weissberg
considers effective lobbying, some activists would probably call a lame co-optation
where activism has its teeth extracted so they can no longer bite the system. In
Chapter 1 I presented a number of authors who have written about tactical carnival
and the carnivalesque and found that the reasons for using creativity are seldom
purely concerned with achieving immediate political goals, but about making
activism and political campaigning sustainable.830 But how is it exactly that
preaching to those who are already converted contributes to sustaining a culture of
resistance? Day discusses this in a chapter about irony in activism.831 She quotes
Jonathan Gray for saying that there is a reason why religious preachers do preach
to the converted every week. Reminders and reinforcement are important, and
religious leaders are aware of this. Day herself adds that “affirmation and
reinforcement fulfil an integral community-building function, which is a crucial
component of nurturing a political movement.”832 Humour can be one aspect in this
community building.
The energy which is available to activists is not a fixed amount, and participating in
activities one considers fun and meaningful is likely to create more energy and
motivation to continue. People who feel that others value their contributions, have
close friends within the movement, think activism is enjoyable and believe their
contribution will make a difference are much more likely to stay in activism and
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dedicate more time and effort to it. A good atmosphere contributes to creating a
community, and having a good laugh together can be one way to make it more
bearable to concern oneself with the apparently never ending uphill battles against
for instance war, dictatorships, poverty and climate change.

Impact on challenging relations of power
There are numerous ways to approach the issue of how humorous political stunts
challenge established relations of power. Later in the chapter I return to
Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action for the purpose. Here I suggest four other
elements that both researchers and activists can evaluate.
1. Discursive guerrilla war
Most organisers of humorous political stunts are well aware that their challenges
are not “real” resistance as the concept is understood in the old-fashioned
realpolitik approach to power. Instead humorous political stunts can be understood
as engagements in the discursive guerrilla war over what is true, right and just in
the domains that the activists are concerned about. The previous chapters
discussed how especially the corrective stunts presenting alternatives can be such
guerrilla attacks.
One of the ways that power is challenged in humorous political stunts is when
different dominant discourses are played out against each other. These different
discourses usually exist side by side governing different domains, but can be
brought together and contrasted with each other. For example, in western
societies, discourses of profit, human rights and gift giving are all dominant
discourses regarding a desirable life. When a humorous political stunt manages to
rub some of these discourses against each other, an interesting dynamic arises
when one dominant discourse is used to criticise another. This was the case when
the Santas in Copenhagen positioned the naïve and generous gift-giving Santa
against discourses about theft and private property. In Belarus the discourse of
human rights was used to challenge the discourse of respect for national
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sovereignty and air space. This way of playing dominant discourses against each
other is not unique to humour, but one reason that humour arises for some
audiences is that they spot the incompatibility and incongruity among discourses.
However, this is probably also a reason why other people are not amused at all –
they see one of the discourses as being much more important under the
circumstances (profit, sovereignty) and thus no appropriate incongruity arises for
them.
2. How do others respond to humorous political stunts?
Another way to investigate how humour has engaged with relations of power is to
look at responses to it. The different examples have documented some of the
many types of reactions, and how important it is for a social movement to be able
to read what is going on. Sometimes those who are being challenged can ignore
the attempt to undermine them. For instance, NATO did not get into trouble for
ignoring Reality AB. At other times no reaction might stem from the fact that no one
suspects that a prank is taking place, such as when the Yes Men spoke at the
textile conference in Finland. But frequently humorous political stunts are met with
sanctions from authorities: elves, Santas and clowns are handcuffed and taken to
prison.
Several authors writing generally about humour have made the observation that it
can be difficult to find an adequate response to a humorous attack.833 Both Palmer
and Speier have indicated that the best response is probably to come up with an
even better witticism.834 However, everyone who has found themselves the victim
of someone’s joke knows how difficult it can be to find a witty retort on the spot.
None of the defenders of the dominant discourses under attack in the examples
presented here have tried to respond this way in public.
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Reactions to social movements’ campaigns and actions are complex processes,
potentially involving a large number of people in different positions. It is pointless to
try to understand reactions isolated from the whole interaction, but focusing on
responses reveals diversity and a number of nuances that reach far beyond the
common sense categories of support or repression.
Most humorous political stunts differ from conventional protest because of the
pretence that the instigators are not protesting. The disruption through pretence
opens up possibilities for transformation rather than opposition. For many
humorous political stunts it is natural to use a vocabulary of confrontation,
opponent etc. The activists who initiate the stunts frequently see a clear division
line between themselves and those they consider powerful. On the other hand, the
use of humour means that it is much more difficult for representatives of the
dominant discourse to frame these actions as ordinary protest, although they
frequently try. Since non-protesting protesters cannot easily be categorised with
other protesters, the show is interrupted in a different way. On the surface, the fan
club was not protesting Howard’s politics, they were celebrating him. The Polish TV
walkers did not strike or march in a demonstration, they just took their TVs for a
walk at a certain time. Ofog’s company Reality AB did not demonstrate when the
NATO exercise took place, they just helped improve it. The Yes Men did not
disrupt WTO meetings, they just clarified the institution’s message. None of them fit
into the ordinary play called “dominant discourse tolerates protest”.
3. Does humour speak to a common humanity?
In Chapter 4 I demonstrated how clowns can show what another world can look
like at the same time as they often aim to speak to a shared humanity that
transcends roles of activists and police officers. Even when they are annoying,
nonviolent rebel clowns to some degree appeal to the shared experience of what it
means to be human. However, I also pointed out that the relations are fragile, and
if the clowning is not experienced as sincere the possibility will collapse.
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In Redeeming Laughter: The Comic Dimension of Human Experience, Peter
Berger writes that the ability to perceive something as comic is a unique human
feature. To him, humor is an intrusion into the non-humorous paramount reality that
dominates most people’s everyday existence. The idea of “intrusion” becomes a
striking expression for describing the humorous political stunts. It is both an
intrusion into authorities’ and conventional non-humorous protesters’ paramount
reality. Berger uses the term transcendence to describe this intrusion:
…the comic transcends the reality of ordinary everyday existence;
it posits, however temporarily, a different reality in which the
assumptions and rules of ordinary life are suspended.835
Berger does not discuss whether this transcendence can also take place when
someone does something they intend to be humorous, but that the butt of the joke
or part of the audience does not perceive it as funny at all. What happens then?
Does the transcendence still work with the police officers who do not want to play
along with the clowns? Can the transcendence only take place for those who agree
that this was humorous? As mentioned in Chapter 1, Palmer has emphasised how
humor is fragile and easily can fail. Accepting something as humorous is not
straightforward and self-evident; it is a struggle over what meaning to attribute to
what is said or done, and depends on the context. Humorous intent is not enough
for humor to succeed. The butt of the joke or prank does not have to agree that
something is funny, but either the audience agrees that an event was humorous, or
there is something special about the occasion which a given culture considers
humorous.836 The butts of the pranks may not consider them funny at all, but
nevertheless at some level it is possible to interpret the pranks as an appeal to our
common humanity, no matter if this is done consciously by the pranksters or not.
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When Berger discusses the comic and its intrusion into the paramount reality he
does not address these issues.
In my opinion, humorous political stunts have a potential for transforming relations
of power because they highlight the contradictions and weaknesses of the
dominant discourse, using a format that is recognisable as humorous also for those
who are the butt of the joke. The comic is an intrusion into our paramount reality
and temporarily suspends the world as we know it. Even when the “victims” are not
amused, the presence of the comic still communicates to everyone involved that
we are all humans in spite of our different roles in society. However, this is another
topic for further research.
Humorous political stunts call for a lexicon of disruption, challenge, transformation
and transcendence, rather than “opposition”, because the choice of humour as a
method is in itself much more inclusive and transformative than oppositional. This
vocabulary reflects a Foucauldian understanding of power formations and
dominant discourses, and can be found in academic fields such as queer theory
and performativity studies which directly draw on Foucault as well as queer
activism that has inspired other political movements to create a more playful
atmosphere.837 However, a similar vocabulary can also be found in fields like
peace studies and postcolonial resistance studies where Foucault has a less
prominent place, but where resistance and opposition nevertheless are understood
as multifaceted and relational.838
By applying the metaphor of theatre and pointing out the elements of pretence in
the stunts, these investigations into the humorous political stunt have shown how
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current (political) reality is temporarily forced aside to reveal a glimpse of other
potential (political) realities.
4. Dilemma actions
The fourth and final way I suggest to approach the subject of humour and relations
of power in this section is through the concept of dilemma actions. In nonviolent
action theory, a dilemma action is constructed so the target has to make a choice
between two or more responses, each of which has significant negative aspects for
them. The responses are not readily comparable and this is the nub of the
dilemma. In a typical dilemma action involving nonviolent action, the opponent can
either let the activists proceed to achieve their immediate goals or use force to stop
them with the risk of adverse publicity.839
Dilemma actions do not have to be humorous but many humorous political stunts
are dilemma actions. In both the Polish examples, the communist Polish regime
was caught in a dilemma. If they continued to let people take their TVs for a walk,
dissent could continue. But as soon as they made something innocent illegal, they
made fools of themselves. Likewise with the happenings of Orange Alternative –
police arresting elves who had not uttered a word of protest risked becoming a
target of further ridicule. The Chaser’s APEC stunt is also an example of a dilemma
action. The Australian authorities and the world leaders could either laugh or be
outraged. If they laughed, they implicitly admitted that their security arrangements
were ridiculous. When they prosecuted the comedy team, they made themselves
vulnerable to accusations of lacking a sense of humour.
Dilemma actions, humorous as well as non-humorous, undermine relations of
power when those apparently in a subordinate position can use creativity and
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surprise to catch the more powerful off balance and place them in situations where
no response appears quite right.
To sum up this section about how to evaluate the impact of humorous political
stunts, it is first and foremost important to be clear about exactly what impact one
is aiming to measure. Humorous political stunts can have an influence on many
different levels, to do with their potential for outreach and mobilisation, creating and
sustaining cultures of resistance as well as challenging relations of power. Next I
briefly revisit my model of humorous political stunts before I approach the subject
of impact by combining my model and Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action.

The model of humorous political stunts revisited
In previous chapters I introduced numerous humorous political stunts and analysed
them according to my model presented in chapter 3. The model divides the stunts
according to their way of relating to dominant discourses’ logic and claims to truth.
Supportive stunts pretend to help or celebrate people in positions of power or their
dominant discourse, with irony and exaggeration used to reveal that the support is
in fact not sincere at all. An example of a supportive stunt was Ofog’s company
Reality AB which was a tool for engaging the general public in a different
discussion about war when the “recruiters” were searching for people for a summer
job as civilian victims of “collateral damage” during a NATO exercise in Sweden.
Corrective stunts share some similarities with the supportive stunts in the way that
they at first glance look as if they are the real thing. However, a closer look reveals
that the identity of a powerful institution or person has been “borrowed” in order to
present a corrected version of its message. It is not a fake message, but an honest
representation of the aspect of the discourse that those in powerful positions prefer
to keep quiet about. The Yes Men’s stunts where they impersonated
representatives of the World Trade Organisation and the company Dow Chemicals
are some of the most famous examples of these types of corrections. However,
many others have used similar techniques for instance Ofog when the group added
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text to the Swedish armed forces recruitment ads in an attempt to make passers-by
reflect on the messages.
Those who perform naïve stunts take a very different approach and pretend that
they are not aware that what they do can be interpreted as dissent, for example by
hiding their message behind something innocent and normal. However, they can
also do like Solvognen did before Christmas in Copenhagen and take on a naïve
and innocent role like Santa, and perform the ordinary duties of this role figure, like
giving gifts away.
Absurd stunts do not directly relate to the dominant discourses at all. Instead they
use absurdity to maintain a distance from all claims to truth, like the clowns in
Chapter 4. The Polish Orange Alternative also staged absurd happenings in the
late 1980s when Poland was under communist rule. There was no obvious
expression of dissent in the silliness and the authorities had difficulties finding an
adequate response to the pranks when they presented no obvious threats or
political content.
Finally there are the provocative stunts. They challenge the dominant discourses
and their representatives head on without “hiding” behind irony, impersonations or
innocence. Instead they add an incongruous element which causes audiences to
smile. When KMV staged their jail-ins they were very confrontational about the
issue of imprisoned conscientious objectors, but by jumping into the prison yard
instead of a more conventional escape over the walls many people had to laugh. It
further added to the amusement that it became rather difficult to punish them for
trespassing since they had themselves demanded to be imprisoned together with
their friend.
In order to further analyse the dynamics of interaction in each stunt, the metaphor
of play was used to illustrate the complexities of each stunt and the differences
between them depending on the stage, actors, audience and timing. The metaphor
serve as a way to illustrate how easy the dynamic of the interaction can be
changed depending on each of these four different dimensions. The challengers
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can intensify or make their challenge less dangerous with just a little change in one
aspect. The metaphor is also an attempt to illuminate the dynamics of the
interaction involved in the stunts. The challengers can seldom determine the
outcome alone, exactly what happens also depends on the responses from the
established players and the audiences.
1. The examples have illustrated some of the diversity in humorous political stunts
when it comes to the type of stage the pranksters enter and the way they do it. In
Australia, John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club went for a major stage, targeting
Howard in the midst of an election campaign, while Ofog and the Polish TVwalkers preferred the more accessible stage of the streets. In some stunts the
stage was openly “invaded” right in the face of the audience and the other actors,
like in KMV’s jail-ins, while the Yes Men snuck in using disguise and were not even
recognised as challengers until after the stunt was over. The stage can be virtual,
or it can be a physical place.
2. Actors in this theatre also vary tremendously – from the Prime Minster in the
Australian case, to less known actors in the others. The challengers can be few in
numbers – the Yes Men were just two individuals with much help - or they can be
many, as the Polish TV-walkers. However, there seems to be a tendency that
humorous political stunts are initiated by small groups of tightly knit challengers –
something which is not strange when considering the need for planning and
scripting. In all the stunts I have looked at, the highest number of challengers found
is the 100 Santas that came to Copenhagen just before Christmas in 1974.840
One reason is probably that performing a humorous political stunt requires more
skills and dedication than signing a petition or participating in a demonstration.
However, this creates a potential risk of humorous political stunts being an elite
endeavour for those who can afford to spend much time on preparing for political
activism.
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Nonviolent activists have numerous audiences in mind when they design their
actions. Some are just desperate and want to do something. Others carefully
calculate how they think their opponent will react, and plan to achieve a certain
reaction from particular stakeholders. Sometimes activists are not so concerned
about the reaction from the opponent or there is no particular opponent such as in
the Santa actions, but want to reach out to the general public or attract more
activists. Many actions are successful and achieve their aims, but sometimes
things do not go as planned.
3. Who are the audiences for the stunt, and how do audience members react? Do
the challengers treat the audiences as part of the play, as in the Reality AB, or is
the play most successful with an audience that will later watch a movie of it, as in
the case of the Yes Men? Throughout the thesis I have talked about humour’s
ability to facilitate outreach to media and passers-by and mobilisation of new
participants. One of the features of a humorous political stunt is that audience
expectations are challenged. People watching the show on the political scene
usually have perceptions about what is going on and what they are going to hear
from different institutions and organisations. The challengers manage to turn these
expectations upside down when a lecturer or a prosecutor says something
outrageous and turns out to be someone else.
The way different audiences interpret humorous political stunts is probably the
most crucial factor highlighted by the theatre metaphor. It does not matter what
message the challengers had in mind if it is interpreted differently. How different
audiences interpret a show is also what is most difficult to discover. Even when
asked directly about their personal opinions, there is no guarantee that audience
members speak their minds and not what they think others wish to hear.
4. The timing of the stunt is sometimes crucial for the development of the stunt, at
other times less important. When activists are concerned with meeting the general
public it might not appear to matter so much exactly when the stunt is staged.
However, as the experience from Ofog’s Vapenfadder showed, timing the stunt in a
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way so the audience is already thinking about the topic might help get the intended
message across. In stunts such as those carried out by John Howard Ladies’
Auxiliary Fan Club and the Chaser’s ridicule of APEC security, a successful event
depends on timing it with the presence of the other actors required to be on the
scene to play their roles. Turning up a day too early or too late will ruin the stunt.
Considering each of the four aspects of the theatre metaphor – stage, actors,
audience and timing – can give an indication of the criteria for a successful stunt,
and how to increase the pressure if the stunt did not generate the expected
reaction. Above I indicated numbers and frequency as two ways to increase the
potential of a humorous political stunt; these four aspects are other ways of
thinking along the same lines. Imagine how much more attention KMV would have
received if those jumping into the prison and demanding to be locked up had been
more prominent actors – say the prime minister, the bishop or their children. If Ofog
had been a little bolder, they could have taken their victims of “collateral damage”
to a stage where it would have been difficult to ignore them, the NATO exercise
itself, something which would also have given the stunt a different audience. If
Netwerk Vlaanderen had timed their search for landmines with an important
meeting at the bank, it might also potentially have increased the visibility of the
stunt.
Writing about politics in terms of theatre does not mean that challengers that
interrupt the show are just “playing” and not serious about the issue concerned.
Using this metaphor is a way to take a step back and create an analytical distance.
It is also a reflection of the fact that all social interaction can be thought of as a
“performance”, and that both the representatives of the dominant discourses and
the challengers play their part in this interaction.
The phenomenon I have termed humorous political stunts differs from other types
of political humour by being done in public, and its confrontational attitude. The
chapter on clowning revealed that this particular sub-category of an absurd stunt
through the use of play and otherness can communicate nonviolent values and
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appeal to a mutual recognition of the human in the other. Well done clowning might
transcend differences between different groups (like police and protesters), even
when those who are the butt of the joke are ridiculed for their signs of importance
and authority, as long as they have just a little critical self-distance.
The two case studies documented how humour can be one way of reaching out to
more people, and how it can make activism more sustainable. The KMV chapter
also illustrated how humour can work together with other strategies and be
successful in achieving a limited goal. A single stunt cannot be expected to achieve
all this by itself, but together they point towards the potential inherent in humour.
It is the way the organisers of the humorous political stunts set out to challenge
dominant discourses and taken for granted assumptions that should be analytically
distinguished from non-humorous forms of protest. In addition to the appeal to our
common humanity, the dilemmas they create for their opponents differ because
they have not accepted the usual role of “protester” in the political game, but
pretend that something else is going on.

Humour and Vinthagen’s four dimensions of nonviolent action
In chapter 1 I introduced Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action and its four
dimensions of dialogue facilitation, power breaking, utopian enactment and
normative regulation. Taking the insights provided by the model of humorous
political stunts and the metaphor of play into consideration, how does the use of
humour in nonviolent action influence the rationality of each of these four
dimensions? In what way does it help or hinder the logic of the nonviolent action?
1. Dialogue facilitation
In his concept of dialogue facilitation, Vinthagen combines Gandhi’s satyagraha
with Jürgen Habermas’ thoughts on the ideal speech situation. In the ideal speech
situation, the participants mean what they say and they treat each other’s
statements with mutual trust. The communication is undisturbed by power
relations, and there is time enough to hear all people’s opinions and explore what
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they mean. Everyone with a stake in the issue under consideration participates on
equal terms and all have access to relevant information. Rational arguments are
allowed to rule and the best argument wins, not the person who is in a position to
force her opinion on someone else or best at manipulating. Finally, everyone is
ready to change their point of view based on convincing arguments by someone
else. The ideal speech situation is an utopia that can never occur in practice, but
that should not prevent people from striving for it. Another aspect to consider when
evaluating the effect of humour is who the activists are aiming to have a dialogue
with.
However, there are some problematic aspects with the ideal speech situation that
can be highlighted from the perspective of humour. Sammy Basu has shown how
the distrust in the ambiguity of humour is a shortcoming in Habermas’ ideal speech
situation, since humour is a way for both the strong and the weak to find more
“room to manoeuvre”.841 My findings about humorous political stunts support
Basu’s perspective, because even when they are ambivalent, humorous political
stunts usually remain dialogue oriented, both towards those who represent a
dominant discourse and other audiences. Although Basu does not elaborate on
how exactly humour can overcome the differences, he considers it social glue that
serves to incline one towards empathy with others.842 This inclusive humour
“cultivates the pleasurable recognition of our mutual absurdities with the Other”.843
Sombutpoonsiri found that the multiple voices that can exist side by side in carnival
foster an atmosphere of dialogue despite the existence of prejudices and
antagonism. A joyful atmosphere has the posibility of transforming hostility
between demonstrators and authorities and contributing to maintaining nonviolent
discipline.844 My analysis of the humorous political stunts showed that they almost
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always are communicating with multiple audiences. Compared to violent
resistance, humorous nonviolent actions appear to signal more openness because
of their playful attitude. This is especially obvious in carnivalesque protests of naïve
Santas, absurd clowns and pink carnivals, but also other types of stunts can
frequently be understood as dialogue oriented if the alternative had been more
disruptive forms of protest. Some activists also find it easier to communicate with
others when they are playing a role and can leave their usual shy self at home.
However, for those watching the clowns and the Santas the message might be
unclear, something which risks distorting the communication. The risk of being
misinterpreted when using humour is probably higher than with rational
communication. The people behind the actions are with all likelihood perfectly
aware of the possibilities for the discussion to side-track, but consider the attention
they get for an issue important enough to run the risk. Audiences might be
suspicious of the communicative intentions when it is not obvious to them what the
message is or it is loaded with possibilities for multiple interpretations as in the
absurd stunts.
In supportive and corrective stunts, the messages are more obvious, but audiences
used to rational communication might prefer honest, unambiguous communication
that does not require them to figure out what the intentions are. In addition, part of
the audience might become uncomfortable if it is not clear who is responsible for
what information, as when the Yes Men impersonated a Dow spokesperson on
BBC. It is necessary to bear in mind that no form of action is likely to satisfy all
audiences. Just as some people feel constrained or uneasy by Habermas’ demand
for rationality, others are lost without it. However, no matter how the audiences
interpret humorous political stunts the pranks almost always provide “material” for
conversation. It is both a way to strengthen the dialogue among the grassroots and
provoke those in power positions to at least pay some attention.
When evaluating the limitations and possibilities of the dialogue element in
nonviolent actions, one should not compare it only with rational communication in
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the ideal speech situation. On the other side of the spectrum stands the choice of
violent resistance or sabotage, such as taking up a gun, burning cars or smashing
windows. Compared to that even the most ambiguous and confrontational
humorous political stunts are considerably more dialogue oriented, also in the
sense of Habermas’ ideal speech situation.
In cases where the nonviolent activists are especially concerned with appearing
willing to engage in dialogue, for instance if they aim to convert the opponent to
their cause, it is probably wise to shy away from humour and especially ridicule.
Activists who have no problem “loving their enemy” and who can always present a
friendly and non-threatening face probably benefit from rational communication
since ambiguous humorous messages are likely to create more confusion than
clarity.
However, for activists who are angry and frustrated, the ambiguity of humour might
facilitate dialogue compared to violent actions and aggressive shouting. From the
perspective of the tradition of nonviolence, Voina’s painting of the big penis on the
bridge in St. Petersburg as a “fuck you” to the secret police was more dialogue
oriented than smashing their windows, especially towards audiences who see or
hear about it. On the other hand, painting the penis is less dialogue oriented than
sitting down and having a rational conversation about what one thinks is wrong
with the secret police. This is not to say that smashing windows and setting cars on
fire is not communicative in the sense of sending a clear message of frustration
and contempt, but it is even further from Habermas’ ideal speech situation of
respectful dialogue than the painting on the bridge. To the secret police, it might
not make much of a difference, and it is even possible that the painting would
anger them more than a broken window. However, to the general public the
painting sends signals of clever provocateurs rather than an angry mob out of
control. In the study and practice of nonviolence one emphasises that how
audiences perceive and interpret an action matters as much as the intentions and
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facts about what happens.845 Thus, both the traditions of nonviolence discourage
anything that can be considered vandalism, the principled tradition because
vandalism and sabotage are perceived as morally wrong, and the pragmatic
tradition because of the way such actions are perceived by others.
However, dialogue is just one element of the nonviolent action, Vinthagen has also
identified three other dimensions.
2. Power breaking
However much nonviolent activists strive towards dialogue with representatives of
what they oppose and object to, the possibility for dialogue is heavily influenced by
the existing power relations. The ideal speech situation requires that everyone
involved in the conversation are striving towards the utopia; it is not something that
can be done by just one party. The problem is that those who benefit from the
status quo seldom find much reason to engage in dialogue until they are forced to
do so. They resist this dialogue on equal terms with all possible means, including
devaluing the activists as persons and their motives, reframing what the action is
about and using all official and unofficial sanctions at their disposal. The most
obvious aspect of a nonviolent action is the attempt to break these existing
relations of power by pressuring those who refuse to engage into interaction.
With a Foucaudian understanding of power, people can never be outside the
relations of power that they want to challenge, but have to act from within.
Sombutpoonsiri’s thesis about the Serbian group Otpor emphasised humour’s
excorporation potential, where parody and satire can be used to resist power from
within the existing culture.
Many of the humorous political stunts aim to challenge and transform the power
relations. Usually this remains a temporary symbolic power breaking, when those
in power are ridiculed, humiliated and shown not to be so powerful and almighty as
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they first appeared. This is most obvious in the provocative stunts, as when Studio
Total violated Belarusian airspace to drop teddy bears supporting human rights or
Voina painted the penis on the bridge in St. Petersburg. Actions like these shout
“see, they are not that almighty anyway”. In some of the naïve stunts, such as the
innocent advertising for sausages on the butcher’s van door in Denmark, the
provocation is less direct and a bit more intellectually sophisticated.
However short and symbolic, the humorous political stunts can be powerful
contributions in what I call the discursive guerrilla war that the activists are waging.
If Foucault is right that the main source of disciplining a society is through
discourse, then a key role of resistance is to combat dominant discourses. Viewed
from this perspective, humorous political stunts have much to contribute in this
battle about what is true, just and right and what meaning to attribute to events and
actions.
Corrective stunts are the avant-garde of the discursive guerrilla war. It is not just a
stage which is occupied: they also include a clever message or a suggestion for an
alternative cause of action. When the Yes Men impersonated representatives of
Dow and the WTO, they showed that BBC and conference organisers could be
fooled, but that was a side effect. The main point was to establish a stage for
presenting an alternative way of acting for Dow and the WTO. Even if they
probably did not expect these institutions to listen, they succeeded in showing
audiences that alternative ways of behaving were actually a possibility.
At other times, humorous political stunts break the power of those representing
dominant discourses when they force a theme on the public agenda. Mark Thomas
broke Indonesian government representatives’ silence about human right violations
when his supportive stunt tricked them into admitting to human rights violations
while being filmed. Likewise, when Netwerk Vlaanderen created ACE bank that
relied on investments in controversial industries such as oil, weapons and child
labour it drew attention to a subject which all the major banks would have preferred
to keep silent about. Total objectors from KMV had little possibility to draw attention
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to their fate via traditional channels of communication, but when they staged stunts
like the jail-in and the false prosecutor, media coverage enabled others to know
about their situation which the Norwegian state was mainly silent about. When the
representatives of the Norwegian state then responded, a sort of dialogue had
been started. Although it was still far from the utopia in the ideal speech situation, it
was a move away from total silence.
Controlling language and symbols is an important aspect of upholding a dominant
discourse. The possibility to name and label the world can be just as important for
hegemony as physical control through the threat of violence. A consequence of this
understanding is that one should not underestimate the threat to the dominance
that arises from undermining symbols and language. Well done supportive and
corrective humorous political stunts skilfully twist and play with words and images
and bring in new associations. Ofog’s weapon sponsors, ad corrections and Reality
AB are examples of this parody and ridicule of the language of power. When the
Swedish armed forces through their recruitment ads tried to define military
solutions as the only solutions for anyone who “had what it takes to have an
opinion”, Ofog used their own symbols and language to suggest alternatives from
peace activists who were not afraid to have a different opinion.
Social movements have their own hierarchies and systems of power. Although
many political groups are aware of this and consciously work to counter
inequalities through their decision making practices and ways of organising their
work, they will probably always be there. Humorous political stunts, especially
absurd ones, can also be a way to point towards a movement’s own power
structures and aim to transform them. Clowns cannot only create uncertainty
among representatives of the authorities, but also among activists of the “old
school” who are most comfortable with rational arguments.
3. Utopian enactment
According to Vinthagen, it is not just the existing power relations that stand in the
way of an ideal speech situation. Communication about sensitive issues, such as
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political struggles, is also highly influenced by emotions. Emotions were long a
neglected research area when it came to social movements, but now many texts
have documented how feelings of anger and grief are central for the moral shocks
and outrage that are strong driving forces for many activists.846 Nepstad and Smith
argue that it is inaccurate to see emotions and rationality as opposites:
We need to cease viewing emotions and rationality as
dichotomous. Moral outrage is a logical reaction to the torture,
disappearances, and assassinations of innocent civilians and to the
lies disseminated by a government to cover its role as an
accomplice to these atrocities.847
Nepstad and Smith consider moral outrage a rational response to accounts of
torture and killing of civilians, thus it does not make sense to claim that emotions
and logic can and should be separated from each other.
However, in the context of nonviolent action, negative emotions like anger and
longing for revenge towards those responsible for wrongdoing and injustice may
block activists’ thinking about constructive solutions and a future peaceful coexistence. The aspect of the nonviolent action which carries an utopian enactment
can present a more constructive element. This does not contradict anger as an
emotional kick-starter for activism, but is a supplement when it comes to thinking
about the future. Utopian enactments demonstrate that alternatives to the
prevailing order are possible here and now, however fleeting and temporary. With
this enactment, nonviolent action suggests alternative ways of structuring society.
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As discussed in chapter 1, the definition of humour includes an emotional aspect.
This indicates that the humorous mode speaks to an emotional side of people that
might not be reached the same way when we operate in the non-humorous mode.
This makes humorous political stunts a good starting point for investigating
emotional aspects of nonviolent activism. Sombutpoonsiri’s thesis with its concept
of the carnivalesque as well as Bogad et al.’s idea about tactical carnival also point
towards this side of humour.
Humorous political stunts speak to the imagination, thinking out of the box,
encouraging audiences to look at reality from a new perspective. This is an aspect
where they differ from many conventional expressions of protest. Thinking about
the future is not limited to the usual way of “doing politics”, but instead an
encouragement to “play politics”. Orange Alternative showed with their happenings
that the grey everyday life of communist Poland could easily be turned into a
carnival, thus hinting at other possible ways of living in the future. Also the army of
Santas which used the naïve Santa figure to communicate values of generosity
and solidarity concretely enacted how the world could be different. Similarly, all the
other figures speaking to fantasy and imagination emphasise that the organisers
value diversity and creativity. In addition, absurd stunts are a way of illuminating
the absurdity of various situations.
When it comes to the corrective stunts, they can be much more concrete and
specific than the naïve and absurd about what alternatives they suggest. The logic
of the absurd requires the clowns and elves to remain ambiguous about what the
future could look like, but corrective stunts do not have this limitation. For instance,
the Yes Men showed how the WTO could close itself down, and that Dow indeed
had a possibility for apologising and compensating the victims of the Bhopal
catastrophe.
However, there is a limitation with using humour to present these alternatives.
Especially when it comes to the carnivalesque, some observers might associate
the playful frame with irresponsibility and not consider it “serious” enough. This is
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less of a risk in the corrective stunts, but here the “dishonesty” might in some
people’s eyes disqualify the expression of dissent from seriousness. It might also
become more difficult to reach out to potential allies and new activists who find it a
challenge to let go of their anger and don’t feel at home in an environment that they
see as too silly.
4. Normative regulation
The fourth and final aspect of nonviolent action that Vinthagen identified he called
normative regulation, which points towards the struggle for making nonviolence the
norm, the normal, and violence the abnormal. For Gandhi and his followers this
involved living by the principles of nonviolence in all aspects of life, something they
translated into service to society. The challenge was not just to fight injustice, but
also to build alternatives in parallel. In western societies, this aspect of nonviolence
is rather neglected, although some communities that practice both resistance and
construction can be found. The most widespread aspect of attempted normative
regulation can be found in trainings before nonviolent actions where the
participants practice how to remain nonviolent in spite of provocations.
Almost all the humorous political stunts contribute to the normative regulation
aspect of a nonviolent action because of the inherent playful attitude that speaks to
our common humanity. This is especially obvious with the same stunts that
contribute to utopian enactments. Many accounts describe how clowns and a
carnivalesque atmosphere deescalate tensions and make the atmosphere less
hostile, especially in cases where protesters are directly confronting a massive
police presence and there is a considerable risk of violent clashes. It does not even
have to be all protesters who are playing these roles: the mere presence of some
in the frontline appears to make the situation less tense. However, as pointed out
by some informants, individual police might be provoked and the ambiguity of the
clown role that teases and ridicules does allow for many possible interpretations of
intentions. Humour which is perceived as aggressive might make an opponent
insecure about how true the nonviolent intentions are. Judging whether humour is
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appropriate in the situation is similar to the dilemma when it comes to dialogue
facilitation: In cases where protesters have no problem maintaining their nonviolent
discipline and remaining calm and dignified without abusing their opponent, the
ambiguity of humour makes the nonviolent intention and norm less obvious.
However, when this is not the case and there is a risk of the nonviolent protest
turning aggressive, using humour and the carnivalesque to maintain nonviolent
discipline is much preferable, although it remains ambiguous.
Although humour at some level contributes to this normative regulation, the stunts
presented here are temporary interventions and usually their main purpose is a
short breaking of established relations of power. They are miles away from the
Gandhian constructive programs and the contribution to the normative regulation is
very superficial compared to the ideal. However, as Vinthagen points out when
presenting his theory, the normative regulation aspect is generally neglected in the
western world where most of my examples of humorous political stunts come from.
This discussion about humour’s relation to Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolence and
its four dimensions has revealed that humour can contribute to the goals of a
nonviolent action, but also that some aspects of some types of humorous political
stunts might be problematic because of the ambiguity of humour. While humour
can help emphasise one of the aspects of nonviolence, at the same time it might
become problematic when it comes to others. Table 3 schematically sums up some
of these relationships. However, to make it even more complex, it is also important
to take into consideration which audiences or actors the activists are aiming to
influence in what way. To take some examples: The main strength of KMV’s jail-ins
and fake prosecutor actions were that they broke the power of Norwegian
authorities, although only for a short while. They also had a dialogue oriented
element towards the general public who were not aware of the situation of the total
resisters. On the other hand the deception with the fake prosecutor and the
provocation in the jail-ins did not facilitate dialogue with Norwegian authorities.
There is an ever-present tension between the elements of dialogue facilitation and
power breaking in a world of unequal power relations. Neither were these two
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actions in themselves utopian enactments since they did not “speak” about the
alternatives KMV sought. Like all the other humorous political stunts the
contribution to the normative regulation is only superficial because of the temporary
nature of the stunts.

Table 3. The relationships between Vinthagen’s four dimensions of
nonviolence and humorous political stunts.
Dimension

Dialogue
facilitation

How do humorous political
stunts potentially weaken
nonviolent action?




How do humorous political stunts
potentially strengthen nonviolent
action?

Ambiguity about who is
behind a stunt and what
the organisers actually
mean might make the
dialogue more difficult.
The deceptions in some
stunts can be interpreted
as dishonesty that
weakens the dialogue.







Power
breaking



Silliness can be
interpreted as if the
activists are not serious
about the issue.
Especially the naïve and
absurd stunts run this
risk.
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All types of humorous political
stunts can be interpreted as
dialogue oriented.
Play is communicative,
especially compared to violence
and hostility.
Corrective stunts communicate
a suggestion for an alternative
cause of action.
Many activists experience a
personal liberation when taking
on a role.
Stunts frequently provide
material for conversation. Also
those who disagree talk about
them.
All humorous political stunts
temporarily break the
hegemony of powerful
dominant discourses.
Humorous political stunts
contribute to discursive
guerrilla war, challenging
dominant perceptions about
what is true and just.
Absurd stunts can break power
within the activists’ own group.

Utopian
enactment



Ridicule and humiliation
can be counterproductive
when it comes to the
utopian enactment.




Normative
regulation



Humour perceived as
aggressive might cast
doubt on how deep the
commitment to
nonviolence is.



Many stunts give positive and
constructive images of an
alternative and more just future
with room for tolerance and
diversity.
Corrective stunts clearly point
towards an alternative.
The playful attitude of
humorous political stunts
speaks to a shared humanity.

In other stunts, other aspects appear most clearly. Mark Thomas broke the power
of Indonesian government officials when he tricked them into talking about their
human rights abuses on camera under the disguise that he would teach them how
to improve their relations to the media. This was not oriented towards dialogue with
the Indonesian government. However, revealing what the government
representatives had said was an utopian enactment of a world where
representatives of a government do not lie to the public.
That a single action or stunt is not able to be the ideal when it comes to all the four
aspects is not a problem unique to humorous political stunts. Nonviolent activists
encounter the same contradictions between the different dimensions of an action
when they engage in non-humorous action planning. This issue is something for
both activists and academic researchers to consider further. There is no “solution”
to this problem, and no perfect humorous political stunt exists. Judging what is
most appropriate will always be a question about which aspect of a nonviolent
action one considers most important in the circumstances.

Conclusion
Humorous political stunts have an ability to appeal to the imagination, to people’s
desire for spectacle and drama. They create a tension between the said, the
unsaid, the skills and the attention of both the initiator of the irony and its
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interpreters. Political activists who undertake stunts like these see a possibility to
destabilise established relations of power when communication becomes even
more complex than usual. This is not to say that irony is automatically at the
service of those with less power, but those already in power have much less
interest in modes of communicating based on an unpredictable ambiguity with an
uncertain outcome. However, this ambiguity and built-in tension can be a way for
activists to reach out, mobilise, contribute to creating a culture of resistance, and
challenge established relations of power.
Looking at the data on humorous political stunts from the perspective of
Vinthagen’s four dimensions of nonviolent action revealed that most stunts’ biggest
contribution is to temporarily and symbolically break the power of dominant
discourses. By engaging in this discursive guerrilla warfare, humorous political
stunts show the potential of a different future. A single humorous political stunt is
unlikely to achieve much, but as part of bigger campaigns and movements stunts
provide attention-grabbing dissenting voices that speak from a different position
than conventional forms of protest.
In addition to their power breaking potential, some humorous political stunts are
also oriented towards dialogue facilitation, although they are far from Habermas’
ideal speech situation which is based on logic and reason. Activists who find it
unproblematic to remain dignified and calm are probably better off with nonhumorous forms of communication if the dialogue element of nonviolent action is
what counts most for them. However, if the alternative to a humorous political stunt
is displaying anger and smashing windows, even the most provocative humorous
political stunt is more dialogue oriented. Although the target might not experience it
as dialogue oriented, other audiences are more likely to see a smart provocateur
with a message rather than frustration out of control. In most nonviolent actions
there is a built-in tension between the dialogue-facilitating and the power-breaking
elements. Dialogue without power breaking is unlikely to move the powerful to
change that matters. On the other hand, power breaking without dialogue becomes
a way of polarising political differences and cementing established points of view
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rather than searching for ways to create change together in the Gandhian spirit of
holding on to one’s truth while approaching Truth.
Corrective and absurd humorous political stunts also contribute to the utopian
enactment element of the nonviolent action when they display a tolerance for
diversity or temporarily enact alternative courses of action for powerful institutions.
At one level all the humorous political stunts are contributing to the normative
regulation aspect of a nonviolent action since they question the discourse that
violence is normal. On another level, because they are only a temporary power
breaking, they are very far from Gandhi’s idea of the constructive programme on
which Vinthagen based this notion.
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Conclusion
Introduction
This conclusion sums up the thesis’ major findings as well as the theoretical
implications for research on humour and nonviolence. In addition, I will briefly
discuss the practical implications the findings might have for social movements
working for peace and social justice.

Humour, power and nonviolent resistance
Nonviolent resistance has been practised for centuries and studied within
academia for decades, but understandings of the dynamics of nonviolent action are
still rudimentary. Since nonviolence has been neglected and violent resistance
glorified to such a degree, there is much history to recover and contemporary
practice to document in order to provide reliable analysis of what impact nonviolent
action can have on relations of power. When it comes to studying the use of
humorous methods as part of a nonviolent campaign, hardly any research has
been done previously.
In humour research it has long been debated if humour can be a form of
resistance, or if it is merely a vent for frustration. However, framing humour’s
subversive potential as a question of either/or is a simplification of complex
processes. Some political humour is probably meaningless in the context of
struggles for social and political change. Nevertheless, jumping straight from this to
the conclusion that humour cannot make a difference or even that it is
counterproductive seems rather premature. Authors such as Foucault, Scott and
Bayat have investigated the subtle workings of power and resistance in ways that
take into consideration that neither power nor resistance can be considered one
dimensional. Humour researchers who are sceptical about humour’s ability to play
a role in resistance do not appear to take these authors’ work on power into
consideration. Instead they speak generally about resistance as if it is something
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that is either openly declared and will lead to violent revolution, or totally absent.
This study demonstrates why such an approach is inadequate. In order to
investigate how humour can sometimes be resistance it is necessary to use a more
sophisticated language on what humour is as well as a nuanced power theory
which can reflect the dynamic interaction between all the actors involved.
Although there has been little systematic inquiry into the relationship between
humour and nonviolence, what has been done shows that the interesting question
is not if a single instance of humour can change relations, which is of course
unreasonable to expect, but rather
What role can humour play in facilitating resistance to dominant discourses
and powerful institutions and people?
This has been the guiding question for my research.
Both in academic research and everyday language it is common to speak about
humour as if it is one “thing”, thereby allowing all humour to be judged and
evaluated from the same perspective. This is probably also a reason why a number
of humour scholars have insisted that humour cannot have an effect on resistance.
Based on one type of data (often jokes) they make overly broad generalisations
about all humour. The only thing all humour has in common is that it includes an
incongruity that causes at least part of the audience to be amused. Apart from this
very basic characteristic, humour is extremely diverse. Humour is a way of
communicating and is not inherently positive or negative. Just like any other form
of communication it can be used to make people happy or to cause them intended
or unintended harm. Some humour will reinforce the status quo, whereas other
humour encourages rebellion, and some may even have mixed effects.
Humour can be expressed through a wide range of techniques such as irony,
exaggeration, parody and impersonations through different media including jokes,
cartoons, theatre, music and graffiti. This complexity means that participants in
social movements discussing the pros and cons of humour in general terms might
actually be discussing very different things without realising it. If they want to
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discuss if humour can be used as an appropriate method it is probably wiser to talk
about the possible benefits and potential risks of a specific action. Likewise,
academics interested in understanding humour must also specify exactly what type
of humour in what context they are interested in.
Another problem with both academic and everyday language is labelling the
opposite of humour “serious”. This implicitly assumes that something cannot be
humorous and serious at the same time. Since a lot of political humour is both, it is
better to call the opposite of humour “rational” or “non-humorous”. This is not to say
that those who use humour are not rational, but that their method of
communication instead is based on contradictions and ambiguity which distort
usual forms of rational communication.

Humorous political stunts and the power of nonviolence
In order to investigate what role humour can play in facilitating resistance to
dominant discourses I have focused on one particular form of humorous action and
performance that I call humorous political stunts. I chose the term “stunt” because
it is not so clearly associated with one particular activist or academic tradition as
other possibilities such as “action”, “hoax”, “performance” or “prank”. I have defined
a humorous political stunt as
a performance/action carried out in public which attempts to undermine a
dominant discourse. It is either so confrontational that it cannot be ignored
or involves a deception that blurs the line between performers and
audiences. It includes or comments on a political incongruity in a way that is
perceived as amusing by at least some people who did not initiate it.
However, even within this particular form of humorous political activism there is a
huge diversity in the way it is practised. I have identified five distinct ways for those
who perform humorous political stunts to position themselves in relation to
dominant discourses and people in positions of power.
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Supportive stunts use irony, parody and exaggeration to disguise their critique.
Instead of being openly critical, they pretend that they support and celebrate their
target or want to protect it from harm. The targets will know that they are being
watched, and the audiences are presented with an image of the target’s vulnerable
sides.
Corrective stunts aim to transcend the inequality in power by presenting an
alternative version of “the truth”. They temporarily “steal” the identity of the
institutions and companies they are aiming to unmask. From this disguise, they
present a more honest representation of who the target really is. The correction
can for instance be an exaggeration that exposes greed and selfishness, or it might
just be the facts in language that everyone can understand. The Yes Men have
made this type of “identity correction” an art form under the slogan “sometimes it
takes a lie to expose the truth”848, but many others have used similar tactics.
Naïve stunts bring the unequal relations of power to everyone’s attention by
tackling the opponent from behind an apparent naiveté. What is actually critique is
camouflaged as coincidences or a normal activity. While the supportive and
corrective stunts often exaggerate and overemphasise what those in positions of
power say, people who carry out naive stunts pretend that they are not aware that
they have challenged any power.
Absurd stunts rely on total silliness and absurdity. From this position, the activists
are ridiculing everything and everyone claiming to know the one and only truth – be
it governments, institutions, or people within their own movement who take
themselves a bit too seriously. The absurd action shares some similarities with the
naive regarding the apparent naiveté of the activists, but whereas the participants
in the naive stunt appear not to understand, the absurd pranksters refuse to
acknowledge that any truth exists.

848

Front cover of Bichlbaum and Bonanno, "The Yes Men Fix the World."
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Provocative stunts do not pretend anything like the four other strategies. They are
an openly declared challenge to claims to status and power. They include an
element that part of the audience considers amusing, for instance when they
manage to expose shortcomings and present the “almighty” as humans with flaws.
The pranksters do not deny the unequal relations of power, as in absurd stunts, or
present any alternatives like the supportive or corrective actions do: they simply
appear not to care about the consequences of their actions.
This typology of humorous political stunts takes some of the complexity of the
phenomenon into consideration. What happens in an absurd stunt is so different
from what happens in the supportive and corrective that one cannot evaluate and
analyse them as if they are the same. They have the incongruity in common, but
when it comes to how they temporarily destabilise relations of power they are very
different – both in the way they position themselves in relation to dominant
discourses and the responses they generate. People exposed to political humour
react in many different ways, of course, depending on whether they are passive
bystanders, an audience getting involved, police ordered out to intervene or the
target of ridicule and humiliation. In addition, reactions depend on the context, the
message and the medium used.
Another method to approach the diversity of humorous political stunts I have
developed is to apply the theatre metaphor. Since all political activity can be
understood as a form of theatre where the actors enact a drama, the metaphor can
be a way to catch other elements of the diversity. Analysing the stunts from the
perspective of the stage, actors, audiences and timing can provide insight for both
activists and academics. For researchers it is a way of analysing the relational and
dynamic aspects of the stunts. One can ask who initiates the stunts and who
involuntarily becomes an actor in the play of politics? Where do the stunts take
place, and who are the audiences? How do the different audiences respond, and
how is the whole affair timed? For academics, these questions might provide new
insights, but the four elements can also be a way for activists to consider how to
make a humorous political stunt more effective. If an action has not had the desired
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effect, changing some elements might increase the pressure on governments,
appeal more to media or challenge dominant discourses more effectively. If it is
difficult to get close to certain main actors like prime ministers, maybe the effect
can increase if one attempts to capture another stage or considers changing the
timing.
Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action has identified four central dimensions which
he has termed dialogue facilitation, power breaking, utopian enactment and
normative regulation. Looking at humorous political stunts through this framework
reveals some of the ways that humour can contribute to the goal of the nonviolent
action, but also indicates situations where humour might be counterproductive.
When it comes to Vinthagen’s first dimension of dialogue facilitation, humorous
political stunts are more dialogue oriented than resistance that involves smashing
windows and setting cars on fire, at least when looking from the tradition of
nonviolence and considering other audiences than the target. On the other hand,
one can imagine forms of communication that are more dialogue oriented than a
humorous political stunt, since the ambiguity of humour can distort communication
when it is not clear what the message is or who is behind it. In addition, ridicule
might hurt in a way that hinders dialogue, and campaigns that rely on ambiguity,
double meanings, and incongruity might be perceived as unpredictable. Targeted
governments and companies might not experience it as worthwhile to have a
rational dialogue. Although humour can contribute to presenting a friendly face to
outsiders, target companies and institutions might become more cautious in their
attempt to engage in a dialogue with humorous activists.
If one is interested in humorous political stunts’ ability to challenge relations of
power, Vinthagen’s second dimension of a nonviolent action, power breaking, is
perhaps the most interesting. A single humorous political stunt can usually not be
expected to have more than a temporary and symbolic effect, but all resistance has
to start from somewhere. A humorous strategy can be built around a series of
stunts. If one agrees with Foucault and believes control of discourses to be one of
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the most important aspects of domination in a society, then it also follows that
attacks on the core of these discourses are an important method of resistance. I
have introduced the term discursive guerrilla warfare to indicate how humorous
political stunts can be “hit and run” attacks on such dominant discourses. Many of
the stunts are not just suggesting small adjustments or moderate reform of the
current world order, but have attacked essential aspects of dominant discourses
like neo-liberalism, consumerism and militarism.
The naïve and absurd stunts have demonstrated a particular ability to contribute to
the part of a nonviolent action expressing the third and fourth dimension of
Vinthagen’s theory, the utopian enactment and normative regulation. The naïve
and absurd Santas, clowns and elves speak to people’s imagination, popular
myths and folklore as well as childhood memories. Although this is also temporary,
these figures are one way of illustrating what a different world order valuing
spontaneity, creativity and imagination could look like.

The case studies about Ofog and KMV
The ways researchers gather information influence the type of answers they can
provide. No knowledge is neutral and research that does not explicitly attempt to
speak from the perspective of those in subordinate positions will almost inevitably
benefit most those with status and privilege and further cement established
relations of power. My research project was explicitly developed to investigate
humour from the perspective of nonviolent activists in order to see how humour
can be used as part of a struggle for a more just and peaceful world. Inspired by
the values behind participatory action research and feminist standpoint theory I
developed a case study strategy to investigate two detailed case studies using a
triangulation of methods.
Ofog is a Swedish anti-militarist network working against Swedish arms production
and the militarisation of society. Together with the network I investigated how
humour can be used as part of a strategy to challenge militarism. I used participant
observation, carried out interviews and initiated workshops to investigate humour
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together with Ofog. This case study primarily investigates what meaning humour
has for the activists who engage in it and how they perceive its effect. It also
documents some of the “messy” processes of day to day activism and how difficult
it can be to make priorities about what activity to pursue next. The research did not
generate as much change over time as I had anticipated. Although I never
imagined predicting the course of events, I had expected to witness an increase in
the use of humour, an even more reflexive attitude and strategic planning that
included more humour. Although this lack of development probably says more
about me than about other participants in Ofog, it is also a testimony to what I have
called the persistence of logical argument. Even within a network that is very
interested in using humour and where activists have an open mind when it comes
to experimenting with new types of actions, there is still a tendency to believe that
rational discourse will be more effective.
2½ years of participant observation and interviews with people in Ofog about
events that took place before I became involved made it possible to document
Ofog’s extensive use of humour. Four out of the five different types of humorous
political stunts have been carried out by Ofog activists. Radical clowning, a
particular version of the absurd stunt where people dress in a mixture of military
uniforms and clowning attributes, was one of the forms of humour that had been
used most frequently within the network. For activists in Ofog, it is considered a
way to challenge and ridicule police and military in uniforms. This form of activism
is found in many parts of the western world where it is part of the traditions of
tactical carnival and playful protest.
On several occasions Ofog has engaged in supportive and corrective stunts. A
supportive stunt that has become part of Ofog’s humorous baggage was when
people from the network invented the company Reality AB, that was going to “help”
NATO during an exercise in the north of Sweden by recruiting civilians to play dead
and traumatised victims of “collateral damage”. The one provocative stunt that
Ofog has carried out was when a whole tank was painted pink as part of a
campaign to mark out the places where war starts.
498

I analysed humour’s role in facilitating resistance from four different perspectives.
First of all, humour is perceived as a good way to facilitate outreach to media and
passers-by. One person I interviewed suggested that because understanding
humour requires an intellectual detour, it reaches them at a different level. Since
activists have the impression that many people meet conventional non-humorous
protest with a preformed opinion about what the activists are going to say and how
they themselves are going to respond, it is difficult to reach them. The detour that
is required to reconcile and grasp the incongruity creates a crack where you might
be able to catch people off guard. However, when it comes to media the situation is
not straightforward. Although many groups have successfully reached out to mass
media through a humorous political stunt, Ofog has not had the same experience.
Secondly, many activists consider humour a good way to mobilise new activists,
and several Ofog activists mentioned the network’s use of humour as something
they found attractive. However, to know more precisely how effective humour is for
mobilisation would require a different study where one observes if an increase in
the use of humour is followed by more people joining in. Alternatively it is possible
to interview newcomers about their perceptions about what motivated them to
become involved.
Thirdly, when it comes to facilitating a culture of resistance, it is possible to say
something more conclusive. For many Ofog activists, clowning and other types of
humour can be a personal liberation and a way to make activism more sustainable
and prevent burn-out. Contrary to some perceptions, energy for activism is not a
zero-sum game where time and energy spent on one thing automatically mean
less time and energy for other activities. Instead some of the humorous actions are
felt to create a good atmosphere and new energy within the network, which in turn
can be used on non-humorous activities. The feeling of contributing to resistance
might become self-reinforcing.
Fourth and finally, the data in the case study on Ofog reveal the activists’ wishes
and hopes about how humour will challenge relations of power. Since Ofog is
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working on such broad issues, it is not possible to point towards a “victory”. It
would be naïve to expect a network of volunteers like Ofog to dismantle Swedish
arms production or export with a few humorous political stunts. Nevertheless, even
if this is a small network, one should not underestimate the power of dissenting
voices. All resistance to dominant discourses has to start from somewhere, and
Ofog activists can be considered combatants in the discursive guerrilla war that
attempts to undermine the dominant discourse of militarism in Sweden. However,
one should be careful not to jump from this conclusion to seeing success when it is
not justified. Some humorous political stunts are probably not very effective if they
do not reach any audiences, or if the messages are not communicated clearly
because of lack of skills or unforeseen circumstances.
Investigating the meaning of humour also revealed that the distinction between
humour and other types of creative activism might make sense from an analytical
perspective, but it does not reflect the lived experience of all political activists.
Interviewing people about “humour” provided many examples of creative activism
that did not necessarily include the appropriate incongruity which is central to the
definition of humour. Likewise, the idea that there would be a clear distinction
between “internal” humour and humour which was directed outwards to
communicate with media, the general public, potential new activists as well as the
target of an action also turned out to be naïve. Although some humour was clearly
internal or directed outwards, the case study of Ofog also provided examples of
humour which was visible to outsiders, but nevertheless appeared mainly to be for
the benefit of the activists themselves.
Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt (KMV) was a Scandinavian campaign active in the
1980’s in support of total resisters who refused both military and substitute service.
This case study focused on the campaign’s work in Norway where the primary goal
was to change the law that sent the total resisters to prison for 16 months without
calling it a punishment. I found that KMV pursued four different strategies in this
work. Firstly, the campaign developed a strategy of creating a spectacle around the
court hearings and imprisonments of the total resisters and selective objectors.
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Part of the spectacle was two types of humorous political stunts – a provocative
stunt where the activists jumped the prison walls, not to escape, but as a jail-in
where they demanded that either their friend be released, or that they go to prison
with him since they shared his opinions. KMV activists were also behind a
supportive stunt where one activist showed up in court as the prosecutor when
another activist was having his court hearing that would send him to jail for total
resistance. In spite of the exaggerations, the parody of the prosecutor was so
convincing that the judge did not notice anything wrong, something which
subsequently generated much media attention.
KMV’s other strategy was to use the legal system against the Norwegian state.
One activist filed a complaint with the European Commission of Human Rights at
the Council of Europe, and two others made a court case against the Norwegian
state for violating the constitution when they were sent to prison without a proper
trial. KMV participants lost both these cases, but nevertheless they generated so
much attention that in 1989 the civil servants in the department of justice proposed
a law change in accordance with what KMV found acceptable. In 1985 there had
been no interest among the parliamentarians in the fate of total resisters, but a few
years later the department of justice’s proposed change of the relevant paragraphs
was accepted unanimously by the parliament.
Thirdly, KMV also engaged in solidarity activities with other total resisters and as a
fourth strategy some individuals were very active in writing letters to the editor and
other lobbying activities. However, in this particular case these last two strategies
do not seem to have had much effect on the law change although they meant a lot
to some individuals.
The case study of KMV showed in detail how various humorous and non-humorous
aspects of a campaign can complement each other. Humour has the potential to
play an important role within a campaign that combines humorous as well as nonhumorous elements. Here it was the ability to generate attention from media and
interest from potential new total resisters that seemed to be decisive. Although the
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department of justice did not keep track of the numbers of total resisters, KMV’s list
of contacts grew and an increasing number of young men decided to become total
resisters during the 1980’s.
When I was looking for cases that would be rich in information about humour it was
not a sampling criterion that the political activists in the case studies were
concerned about the same or similar themes. As it turned out, both Ofog and KMV
are/were radical anti-militarists organised like networks that work as marginalised
groups within a democratic setting. Although it is not possible to make strong
conclusions based on just two case studies, it is striking that both of these marginal
groups organised in network structures found it useful to use humour. It might be
worth exploring further if small and marginalised organisations see humour as an
opportunity to gain attention, while larger organisations do not see the need or fear
the risks associated with humour. Even if the persistence of logical argument could
be found in Ofog, it might be even more pronounced in formal organisations where
all activities need to be approved at the top of the organisation.
In spite of the similarities, there are also major differences between Ofog and KMV.
An obvious one is the separation in time, so while Ofog is still an active network,
KMV has dissolved. However, the most significant difference is that KMV worked
on a campaign with one particular aim in mind, while Ofog’s focus is much broader.
It might seem like an obvious finding, but the two case studies confirm that it
appears to be easier for a group that keeps a narrow focus to get direct results.
KMV did have a good case because of the obvious contradiction in sending
someone to prison for 16 months without calling it a punishment, but it probably
helped that they remained focused on this particular issue.

The risks and limitations with humorous political stunts
The case studies have shown that using humorous political stunts has many
potential benefits for social movements that aim at facilitating outreach and
mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging established relations of power.
However, this should not make activists and academics blind to the risks and
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limitations. Using humour includes a risk of not being taken seriously and a risk of
the humour becoming too internal. Trying to combine the humorous and the nonhumorous might also become a challenge.
Many of the humorous political stunts included here were extremely successful in
generating media attention. However, Ofog has not had the same experience so
one should not assume that humorous political stunts are a guaranteed path to the
front pages. Since the stunts that become most known are often spread via mass
media, there is an inevitable selection bias in the stunts included here. We know
little about all the attempts made that never reach the media because of issues like
unfortunate timing, bad planning or journalists’ hesitations to cover it. To uncover
all the attempts that never succeeded would require ethnographic research
comparable to what I did with Ofog.
All social movements with political messages face the problem that some people
do not understand their message, but the risk seems to increase when humour is
involved. The Yes Men tried on many occasions to make absurd statements
without getting any response. Irony in particular can be a tricky technique since it
based on saying one thing, but meaning something entirely different. Although
other humorous techniques as well as rational communication sometimes result in
confusion or bewilderment, ironic statements risk being mistaken for the real
opinion. On some occasions when people in Ofog were experimenting with irony to
confront militarism, their statements were understood literally as support for arms
manufacturers and NATO. In such situations it is not unusual to blame the
audiences for being stupid, but as Hutcheon has written, irony requires a discursive
community which had not been created on these occasions and might be more
difficult to establish than we think. Activists engaging in ironic communication must
be careful not to create ironic distance and hierarchies between those who “get it”
and those who do not.
Humorous political stunts provide an opportunity for social movements to be
creative in search of new ways to challenge dominant discourses. Many people
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might find an outlet for their creativity and talents that otherwise has little value
among fellow activists. However, this constant changing and shifting is demanding.
If the stunts are not re-invented, they lose their energy, so a certain stunt can only
be repeated a limited number of times in a certain context. In addition, humorous
political stunts predominantly seem to be carried out by small tightly knit groups
who spend a lot of time preparing their stunts. Some people might consider this a
potential problem that results in elitism, since not everyone can afford to spend so
much time on activism. Although it has not been a problem in my case studies,
there is also a potential trap in humour becoming an end in itself. Because humour
generates good feelings for the activists themselves they need to evaluate if
humour is a self-indulgence that is no longer considered one potential method in a
struggle, but creates an ironic distance to the subject.
Using humour, and especially ridicule, can also be discussed from an ethical
perspective. What is experienced as humour by the initiators and part of the
audience might look entirely different to the butt of the ridicule. Gantar found an
epistemological dead end regarding this question and concluded that it is
impossible to judge humour from an ethical perspective. Nevertheless, political
activists are likely to be judged from this perspective anyway and ought to take it
into consideration when planning.
I have suggested that if one insists on judging humorous political stunts along
ethical lines, an important place to start is the position of those who use humour
and ridicule. There ought to be a major difference between ridicule initiated by
those in positions of power that kick down, and ridicule initiated by marginalised
political activists kicking upwards.
However, although this can be a good starting point for an ethical judgement, two
examples from the case studies illustrate some of the dilemmas that will inevitably
arise. Although Ofog and KMV wanted to challenge the discourse of militarism and
those on top of the hierarchies, the individuals they encountered did not always
feel very powerful. On one occasion a group of openly homosexual soldiers from
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the Swedish armed forces participated in the Pride Parade in Stockholm. Next to
them a group of Ofog activists walked with speech bubbles made out of cardboard
with statements that was supposed to look as if they were the soldiers’ statements.
Although the text was related to war, the death of civilians, and Sweden’s military
presence in Afghanistan the individual soldiers experienced it as an attack on their
sexuality since it took place during the parade.
Likewise, the judge in the case where KMV turned up with a fake prosecutor was
quoted in a newspaper for saying “I was shocked when I heard what had
happened” and he made his superior file a report to the police.849 He did not
explicitly say that he felt abused, but it is not unreasonable to assume that at least
some people would have felt that way under similar circumstances. KMV was
targeting the court system, not an individual, in order to expose the system as a
farce. Nevertheless this judge, just as the soldiers in the Pride Parade, became the
direct victim, raising the question of whether Ofog and KMV behaved unethically. In
both cases it was people in subordinate positions who ridiculed those they saw as
representatives of powerful institutions – the court system and the military.
Nevertheless, those who initiate a stunt cannot dictate the emotional responses of
others.

Further research in the field
As mentioned in the introduction, this study has generated more questions than
answers, something which is often the case when researching an area where little
or nothing was known previously. Much research about humour’s role in nonviolent
resistance remains to be done. For starters, it would be interesting to see if the
typology of humorous political stunts applies worldwide, namely whether it is
possible to classify examples from other cultures according to the same five types
that I have used here. And is the use of this type of humorous political activism
really spreading globally and increasing in frequency as some authors have

849

Haugstad, "Her Blir Dommeren Lurt Av Falsk Aktor."
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indicated? A related task is to continue the theoretical exploration of the borders of
humorous political stunts.
Equally interesting would be more research on the reactions to humorous political
stunts. I have focused on the meaning humour has for the activists, but other
studies could do more to uncover what others think about it. A whole range of
thrilling questions remain unanswered: Is it really true that humorous political stunts
are better at getting media attention, or is this assumption a reflection of a selection
bias when one is forced to analyse stunts already described in the literature or
known from mass media? What can be observed about a target’s reaction when
they are confronted with a humorous political stunt, and what do they themselves
think about it? Do they experience it as dialogue oriented, or does the ambiguity of
humour distort the communication? How do other audiences, such as potential
new activists and the general public, respond? Can the detour demanded by
humour really find or create cracks and reach people at a deeper level? Does the
ambiguity of humour make it easier to communicate complex messages, or does
humour increase the risk of side-tracking so the focus ends up on the method and
the spectacle rather than the message that the activists want to communicate?
In order to investigate social movements’ humorous political stunts, it is a
requirement that the groups’ histories are documented. For both my case studies it
was necessary to document their activities in order to provide context for their use
of humour. The world over, there are numerous small networks whose histories
need to be written.
The main data for this research was from two Scandinavian case studies, but a few
of the other examples as well as earlier research has documented that humour can
play an important role also under authoritarian circumstances, for instance in
reducing fear. Researchers with access to this type of data can bring important
insights to the study of nonviolent resistance that can also have practical
implications.
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Theoretically my research has relied primarily on the theory of nonviolent action. It
has only touched the surface when it comes to perspectives from performance
studies and social movement theories. There are whole bodies of literature with
insights about street performance and emotions within social movements that
might be interesting for future studies.850
One finding from the study was that from the perspective of activists, the distinction
between humour and other types of creative and spectacular activism appears
rather artificial. Research on the effect of all kinds of creative activism could
investigate differences between humorous activism and other types of creative
activism.
Finally there is the question of the choice of methodology for researching
nonviolence and social movements. Researchers with access to money and
research time have a tremendous responsibility to use such resources wisely. It is
important to choose topics and questions that are not just interesting for the
researcher herself and will benefit her career, but also make a difference for people
struggling for peace and justice. Much inspiration can be drawn from participatory
action research and intervention research for activists and academics aiming at
bridging the gap between these two worlds. There is a huge potential for
systematic comparative “experiments” about nonviolence in general and humorous
political stunts in particular. One line of experiments would be to compare the
consequences of using humorous and non-humorous methods about the same
political issue. Another type of intervention/action research would be to work
together with activists in order to make “bigger” humorous political stunts in terms
of frequency and number of participants. My research has pointed out some of the
potential with humorous political stunts, but it has documented only the tip of the
iceberg of what is achievable through this type of action.

850

A starting point for such an inquiry could be to look at humorous political stunts from the
perspective of Richard Schechner’s holistic view on play, performance, ritual and politics presented
in: Richard Schechner, The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance (London:
Routledge, 1993).

507

References
Ackerman, Peter, and Jack DuVall. A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent
Conflict. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.
Ackerman, Peter, and Christopher Kruegler. Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The
Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.
Aftenposten. "Aksjon På Fengselsmurer." [Action at prison walls] Aftenposten, May 4
1987.
Aftenposten. "Falsk Aktor Og Impliserte Politianmeldt." [False prosecutor and
implicated reported to the police] Aftenposten, September 21 1983, 4.
Aftenposten. "Fengsel for Militærnektere Er Ikke Straff." [Prison for conscientious
objectors is not punishment] Aftenposten, April 28 1982.
Aftenposten. "Godtatt Som Samvittighetsfange." [Accepted as prisoner of conscience]
Aftenposten, February 12 1986.
Aftenposten. "Vernepliktsnektere Til Sak Mot Staten." [Draft refusers file charges
aginst the State] Aftenposten, January 9 1982.
Ajangiz, Rafael. "The European Farewell to Conscription?". In The Comparative Study
of Conscription in the Armed Forces, edited by Lars Mjøset and Stephen van Holde, 30733: Emerald Group Publishing, 2002.
Alfsen, Terje. "Report." Report to Alfsen's superior, September 20 1983.
Andersen, Bo Nyborg, and Terje Bjørnland. "Situationsbestemt Militærbekting."
[Selective conscientious objection] Samvittighetsfanger i Norge, not dated 1983.
Anonymous. "Burmese Humour." Accessed March 22 2011 from
http://www.freezarganar.org/Burmese-humour.asp.
Anonymous. C.I.R.C.A G8 Road Blockade youtube.com, 2005. Accessed October 27 2013
from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MX0aQU9x0Z4

508

Anonymous. Circa Recruitment Video youtube.com, not dated. Accessed October 27
2013 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_jS3Wh8g6s
Anonymous. Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army in Rostock 2007. youtube.com,
2007. Accessed October 27 2013 from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3h1CH0Vchv8
Anonymous. The Clown Army, Christiania 2005 youtube.com, 2005. Accessed October
27 2013 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l5NmhJLAO1w
Anonymous. Clownplay with Policeman @ G8 youtube.com, 2005. Accessed October 27
2013 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrwxqOTI0zI
Anonymous. G20 Toronto Protests Send in the Clowns youtube.com, not dated.
Accessed October 27 2013 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EMSJiUpeWso
Anonymous. Glasgow Section of Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army youtube.com,
not dated. Accessed October 27 2013 from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xqgcBblriBQ
Anonymous. Rebel Clown Army at Faslane 08/07/2012 youtube.com, 2012. Accessed
October 27 2013 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aB7AMrnKFbM
Anonymous. Rebel Clown Army Cologne youtube.com, not dated. Accessed October 27
2013 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iK9ZPVL4xU8
Anonymous. You Can Not Give an Anarchist Clown Directions (Especially While Wearing
Riot Gear) youtube.com, 2013. Accessed October 27 2013 from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5Geje_W6sQ
Arbeiderbladet. "Brant Opp Vernepliktboka." [Burned Conscription Book]
Arbeiderbladet, October 25 1986.
Bakhtin, M. M. Rabelais and His World. Translated by Helene Iswolsky. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1984 [1965].
Bakken, Erling. "Lokal Militærnekter "Annonserer" Egen Rettssak: - Enestående Å
Måtte Sone for Overbevisning." [Local conscientious objector "announce" his own
case: -Unique to serve time for conscience ] Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad, April 6 1982.
Banksy. Wall and Piece. London: Century, 2006.
509

Barash, David P. Approaches to Peace: A Reader in Peace Studies. 2nd ed. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010.
Barker, Colin. "The Making of Solidarity at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk." Chap. 10 In
Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, edited by Jeff Goodwin, James M.
Jasper and Francesca Polletta, 175-94. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Basu, Sammy. "Dialogic Ethics and the Virtue of Humor." Journal of Political Philosophy
7, no. 4 (1999): 378-403.
Bayat, Asef. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2010.
Becker, Howard S. "The Epistemology of Qualitative Research." Chap. 13 In
Contemporary Field Research: Perspectives and Formulations, edited by Robert M.
Emerson, 317-30. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2001.
Belarusian Human Rights House. "Two Belarusians Detained on Charges of "Teddy
Bear Drop"." humanrightshouse.org, July 23 2012. Accessed August 13, 2012 from
http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/18403.html
Benton, Gregor. "The Origins of the Political Joke." Chap. 2 In Humour in Society:
Resistance and Control, edited by Chris Powell and George E. C. Paton, 33-55. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
Berg, Bjørnar. "Samvittighetsfanger I Norge." [prisoners of conscience in Norway?]
Dagbladet, November 26 1996, 36.
Berger, Arthur Asa. An Anatomy of Humor. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1993.
Berger, Arthur Asa. Blind Men and Elephants: Perspectives on Humor. New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction, 1995.
Berger, Peter L. Redeeming Laughter: The Comic Dimension of Human Experience. New
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997.
Berlingske Tidende. "Bedrevidende Julenisser." [Know-all Santas] Berlingske Tidende,
December 24 1974, 6.
Bertelsen, Annebrit. "Fred Ove Reksten Fri Igjen." [Fred Ove Reksten free again]
Klassekampen, July 14 1983.
510

Bibby, Paul. "Chaser Comics Say APEC Stunt Went Too Far." The Age (Melbourne),
September 12 2007. Accessed March 30 2011 from
http://www.theage.com.au/news/tv--radio/chaser-comics-say-apec-stunt-went-toofar/2007/09/11/1189276725655.html
Bichlbaum, Andy, and Mike Bonanno. "The Yes Men Fix the World." Docudramafilms,
2009.
Bichlbaum, Andy, Mike Bonanno, and Bob Spunkmeyer. The Yes Men: The True Story of
the End of the World Trade Organization. New York: Disinformation, 2004.
Billig, Michael. Laughter and Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Laughter. London:
Sage, 2005.
Blee, Kathleen, and Amy McDowell. "Social Movement Audiences." Sociological Forum
27, no. 1 (2012): 1-20.
Bleiker, Roland. Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Bogad, L. M. "Carnivals against Capital: Radical Clowning and the Global Justice
Movement." Social Identities 16, no. 4 (2010): 537-57.
Bogad, L. M. Electoral Guerrilla Theatre: Radical Ridicule and Social Movements. New
York: Routledge, 2005.
Bogad, L. M. "A Place for Protest: The Billionaires for Bush Interrupt the
Hegemonologue." Chap. 14 In Performance and Place, edited by Leslie and Helen Paris
Hill, 170-79. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Bogad, L. M. "Tactical Carnival: Social Movements, Demonstrations, and Dialogical
Performance." In A Boal Companion: Dialogues on Theatre and Cultural Politics, edited
by Jan Cohen-Cruz and Mady Schutzman, 46-58. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Boulding, Elise. Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History. 1st ed. Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 2000.
Boyd, Andrew, and Dave Oswald Mitchell. Beautiful Trouble: A Toolbox for Revolution.
New York: OR Books, 2012.

511

Braithwaite, David. "Chaser Bust 'Proves Security Success'." The Age (Melbourne),
September 6 2007 Accessed September 3 2013 from
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/chaser-duo-held-over-apecstunt/2007/09/06/1188783379922.html
Branagan, Marty. "The Last Laugh: Humour in Community Activism." Community
Development Journal 42, no. 4 (2007): 470-81.
Breast Cancer Action. "Before You Buy Pink." Accessed September 12 2013 from
http://thinkbeforeyoupink.org/?page_id=13.
Brissenden, Michael. "7:30 Report - Australian Broadcasting Corportion - Campaign
Focuses on Rates Fallout." Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, November 8
2007.
Brown, Leslie, and Susan Strega, eds. Research as Resistance: Critical, Indigenous and
Anti-Oppressive Approaches. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2005.
Bruner, M. Lane. "Carnivalesque Protest and the Humorless State." Text and
Performance Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2005): 136-55.
Burcharth, Martin. "Krampetrekning Før Valget." [Dying twitch before election]
Klassekampen, October 30 2010, 26-27.
Carlbom, Mats. "Vitryssland Utvisar Sveriges Ambassadör." [Belarus expels Sweden's
ambassador] dn.se, August 3 2012. Accessed August 4 2012 from
http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/vitryssland-utvisar-sveriges-ambassador
Carlsen, Jon Bang. "Dejlig Er Den Himmel Blå [Beautiful Is the Blue Sky]." 45 min: C&C
productions Aps, 1975.
Carter, April. People Power and Political Change: Key Issues and Concepts. Abingdon,
UK: Routledge, 2012.
Case, Charles E., and Cameron D. Lippard. "Humorous Assaults on Patriarchal
Ideology." Sociological Inquiry 79, no. 2 (2009): 240-55.
Chambers, Robert. Participatory Workshops: A Sourcebook of 21 Sets of Ideas and
Activities. London: Earthscan, 2002.
Chambers, Robert. Revolutions in Development Inquiry. London: Earthscan, 2008.
512

Charmaz, Kathy. "Grounded Theory." Chap. 15 In Contemporary Field Research:
Perspectives and Formulations, edited by Robert M. Emerson, 335-52. Prospect
Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2001.
Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
Chvasta, Marcyrose. "Anger, Irony, and Protest: Confronting the Issue of Efficacy,
Again." Text and Performance Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2006): 5-16.
CIRCA. "Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army " Accessed August 2 2006 from
http://www.clownarmy.org/.
Clark, Howard, ed. People Power: Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity. London:
Pluto Press, 2009.
Clementsen, Conrad. "Anmeldelse." Letter from Conrad Clemetsen to Oslo
politikammer, September 30 1983.
Cohen-Cruz, Jan, and Mady Schutzman. A Boal Companion: Dialogues on Theatre and
Cultural Politics. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Condren, Conal. "Between Social Constraint and the Public Sphere: On Misreading
Early-Modern Political Satire." Contemporary Political Theory 1 (2002): 79-101.
Condren, Conal. "Satire and Definition." Humor: International Journal of Humor
Research 25, no. 4 (2012): 375-99.
Corrigall-Brown, Catherine. Patterns of Protest: Trajectories of Participation in Social
Movements. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.
Coser, Rose Laub. "Laughter among Colleagues." Psychiatry: Journal of the Biology and
the Pathology of Interpersonal Relations 23, no. 1 (1960): 81-95.
Council of Europe. "European Convention on Human Rights." 1950. Accessed October
2 2012 from http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B4575C9014916D7A/0/CONVENTION_ENG_WEB.pdf
Coy, Patrick G. "Shared Risks and Research Dilemmas on a Peace Brigades
International Team in Sri Lanka." Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 30, no. 5
(2001): 575-606.
513

Crawshaw, Steve, and John Jackson. Small Acts of Resistance: How Courage, Tenacity,
and Ingenuity Can Change the World. New York: Union Square Press, 2010.
Critchley, Simon. On Humour. London: Routledge, 2002.
Dagens Nyheter. "Ofog Svarar: ”Självklart Är Pride Politiskt”." [Ofog responds "Of
course Pride is political"] dn.se, July 25 2012. Accessed August 13 2012 from
http://www.dn.se/insidan/insidan-hem/ofog-svarar-sjalvklart-ar-pride-politiskt
Davies, Christie. "Humour and Protest: Jokes under Communism." International
Review of Social History 52, no. S15 (2007): 291-305.
Davies, Christie. Jokes and Their Relation to Society. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998.
Davis, Murray S. What's So Funny?: The Comic Conception of Culture and Society.
Chigaco: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Day, Amber. Satire and Dissent: Interventions in Contemporary Political Debate.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011.
Debord, Guy. Society of the Spectacle. Detroit: Black & Red, 1970.
Dentith, Simon. Bakhtinian Thought: An Introductory Reader. London: Routledge,
1995.
Diani, Mario. "Networks and Participation." Chap. 15 In The Blackwell Companion to
Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi,
339-59. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004.
Dickins, Jim. "APEC Security to Cost $24m a Day " http://www.news.com.au, June 3
2007. Accessed September 3 2013 from http://www.news.com.au/national/apecsecurity-to-cost-24m-a-day/story-e6frfkvr-1111113665331
Divinski, Randy, Amy Hubbard, J. Richard Kendrick, and Jane Noll. "Social Change as
Applied Social Science." Peace & Change 19, no. 1 (1994): 3-24.
Dowler, Lorraine. "The Four Square Laundry: Participant Observation in a War Zone."
Geographical Review 91, no. 1/2 (2001): 414-22.

514

Downe, Pamela J. "Laughing When It Hurts: Humor and Violence in the Lives of Costa
Rican Prostitutes." Women's Studies International Forum 22, no. 1 (1999): 63-78.
Downton, James V., and Paul Ernest Wehr. The Persistent Activist: How Peace
Commitment Develops and Survives. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.
Dudden, Arthur Power. "The Record of Political Humor." American Quarterly 37, no. 1
(1985): 50-70.
Dunbar, Norah E. Banas John A. Rodriguez DarielaLiu Shr-JieAbra Gordon. "Humor Use
in Power-Differentiated Interactions." Humor: International Journal of Humor Research
25, no. 4 (2012): 469-89.
Duncombe, Stephen. Dream: Re-Imagining Progressive Politics in an Age of Fantasy.
New York: New Press, 2007.
Duree, Ashley. "Greed at the New York Stock Exchange and the Levitation of the
Pentagon: Early Protest Theatre by Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin." Voces Novae:
Chapman University Historical Review 1, no. 1 (2009): 51-72.
Ekdahl, Micael ”Totte”. "Cyniskt Angrepp I Prideparaden." [cynical attack in the pride
parade] etc.se, August 11 2011. Accessed September 2 2011 from
http://www.etc.se/nyhet/cyniskt-angrepp-i-prideparaden
Ekstra Bladet. "De Røde Julemænd " [The red Santas] Ekstra Bladet, December 24
1974, 2.
Emerson, Robert M. Contemporary Field Research: Perspectives and Formulations. 2nd
ed. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2001.
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. "Irony." 2012.
Epstein, Steven. "A Queer Encounter: Sociology and the Study of Sexuality."
Sociological Theory 12, no. 2 (1994): 188-202.
Eriksson, Kjell. "Regner Med Seier I Strasbourg." [Expect victory in Strasbourg]
Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad, not dated 1985.
Euronews. "Swedish Activists Behind Belarus Teddy Bear Stunt." euronews.com,
August 2 2012. Accessed August 7 2012 from
515

http://www.euronews.com/2012/08/02/swedish-activists-behind-belarus-teddybear-stunt/
European Commission of Human Rights. "Decision of the Commission as to the
Admissibility Application No. 10600/83 by Jørgen Johansen against Norway." In
10600/83. Strasbourg, 1985.
Fletcher, John. "Of Minutemen and Rebel Clown Armies: Reconsidering
Transformative Citizenship." Text and Performance Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2009): 222-38.
Flyghed, Janne. "Konsten Att Disciplinera En Opposition." Retfærd, Nordisk Juridisk
Tidskrift 12, no. 2 (1989): 18-34.
FMV. "Europe’s Largest Overland Test Area." Accessed January 2 2013 from
http://www.vidseltestrange.com/europe%E2%80%99s-largest.
Fo, Dario. Plays. 2 vols London: Methuen Drama, 1997.
Forhandlinger. "Forhandlinger I Odelstinget Nr. 28. Sak Nr. 7.Innstilling Fra
Justiskomiteen Om Lov Om Endringer I Lov Av 19. Mars 1965 Nr 3 Om Fritaking for
Militærtjeneste Av Overbevisningsgrunner Og Militær Straffelov Av 22. Mai 1902 Nr
13. (Innst O. Nr. 75, Jf Ot.Prp. Nr 35)." June 11 1990.
Forhandlinger. "Forhandlinger I Stortinget Nr. 53. Sak Nr. 5. Innstilling Fra
Justiskomiteen Vedrørende Forslag Fra Stortingsrepresentant Kjellbjørg Lunde Datert
5. August 1986 Om Utvidelse Av Adgangen Til Å Nekte Militærtjeneste På Et Alvorlig
Overbevisningsgrunnlag (Innst. S. Nr. 17, Jf. Document Br. 8:1).", November 19 1986.
Forhandlinger. "Forhandlinger I Stortinget Nr. 192. Sak Nr. 3. Innstilling Fra
Justiskomiteen Om Verneplikt. (Innst. S. Nr. 111, Jf. St. Meld. Nr. 70 for 1983-84)."
March 12 1985.
Fortun, Gunnar. "'Overtok' Hele Rettssaken." ['Took over' the whole court]
Arbeiderbladet, November 17 1983.
Fortun, Gunnar. "Rettsvesenet Kan Takke Seg Selv." [The judicial system has itself to
blame] Arbeiderbladet, September 20 1983.
Fortun, Gunnar. "Rømning - Feil Vei." [Escaping - wrong way] Arbeiderbladet, June 24
1983.
516

Fortun, Gunnar. "Spilte Aktor." [Played prosecutor] Arbeiderbladet, September 19
1983, 1 and 11.
Foucault, Michel. "Disciplinary Power and Subjection." Chap. 11 In Power, edited by
Steven Lukes, 229-52. New York: New York University Press, 1976.
Foucault, Michel. "The Subject and Power." Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777-95.
Frampton, Caelie, Gary Kinsman, A.K. Thompson, and Kate Tilleczek, eds. Sociology for
Changing the World: Social Movements/Social Research. Black Point: Fernwood, 2006.
Francis, Linda E. "Laughter, the Best Mediation: Humor as Emotion Management in
Interaction." Symbolic Interaction 17, no. 2 (1994): 147-63.
Fraser, Mark W., and Maeda J. Galinsky. "Steps in Intervention Research: Designing
and Developing Social Programs." Research on Social Work Practice 20, no. 5 (2010):
459-66.
Fuller, Abigail A. "Toward an Emancipatory Methodology for Peace Research." Peace &
Change 17, no. 3 (1992): 286.
Försvarsmakten. "Om Försvarsmakten " Accessed July 13 2013 from
http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Om-Forsvarsmakten/.
Galperina, Marina. "Why Russian Art Group Voina ‘Dicked’ a St. Petersburg Bridge."
Accessed April 19 2011 from http://animalnewyork.com/2010/06/why-russian-artgroup-voina-dicked-a-st-petersburg-bridge/.
Galtung, Johan. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and
Civilization. London Sage Publications, 1996.
Galtung, Johan. Transcend and Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work. London:
Pluto Press in association with TRANSCEND, 2004.
Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Journal of Peace Research 6, no.
3 (1969): 167-91.
Galtung, Johan, and Arne Næss. Gandhis Politiske Etikk. 3. utg. ed. Oslo: Pax, 1994.

517

Gandhi. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. 6th rev. ed. 100 vols New Delhi:
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 2000.
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand. All Men Are Brothers. 1st Indian ed. Ahmedabad:
Navajivan Publishing House, 1960.
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand. The Story of My Experiments with Truth. Ahmedabad:
Navajivan Publishing House, 1927.
Gantar, Jure. The Pleasure of Fools: Essays in the Ethics of Laughter. London: McGillQueen's University Press, 2005.
Gianas, Tom, and Michael Moore. "The Awful Truth." UK Channel 4, April 25 1999.
Gilbert, Joanne R. Performing Marginality: Humor, Gender, and Cultural Critique.
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2004.
Gilbey, Ryan. "Jokers to the Left, Jokers to the Right." http://www.theguardian.com,
July 17 2009. Accessed September 6 2013 from
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2009/jul/17/prank-movies-bruno-sacha-baroncohen
Gilligan, Andrew. "Indonesians Admit Torture in TV 'Sting' " Sunday Telegraph January
17 1999. Accessed May 5 2012 from http://www.etan.org/et/1999/january/1521/19abri.htm
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1959.
Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds. Passionate Politics:
Emotions and Social Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Gravdal, Gunn. "Vernepliktsbøker Brent." [Conscription books burned] Aftenposten,
December 2 1989.
Gray, Stephen. "The Mustache Brothers." thanassiscambanis.com, not dated. Accessed
March 29 2011 from http://thanassiscambanis.com/sipa/?p=39
Grimelid, Stig. "Ex-Fange Tilbake." [Ex-prisoner back] VG, August 28 1984.

518

Gruner, Charles R. The Game of Humor: A Comprehensive Theory of Why We Laugh.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997.
Gustafsson, Håkan, and Stellan Vinthagen. "Rättens Rörelser Och Rörelsernas Rätt [the
Law's Movements and the Movements' Law]." Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap 123, no. 4-5
(2010): 637-93.
Halden Arbeiderblad. "De Brente Sine Vernepliktsbøker I Halden." [They burned their
conscription books in Halden] Halden Arbeiderblad, not dated 1981.
Hariman, Robert. "Political Parody and Public Culture." Quarterly Journal of Speech 94,
no. 3 (2008): 247-72.
Harold, Christine. Ourspace: Resisting the Corporate Control of Culture. Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2007.
Harrebye, Silas. "Cracks: Creative Activism – Priming Pump for the Political
Imagination or a New Compromising Form of Democratic Participation Balancing
between Critique, Cooperation, and Cooptation on the Margins of the Repertoire of
Contention?" PhD Thesis, Roskilde University, 2012.
Hart, Marjolein C. 't , and Dennis Bos, eds. Humour and Social Protest. Cambridge:
University of Cambridge Press, 2007.
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